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Summary
The basic objective of the research project was to model and 
subsequently identify the impact of plant dominance on labour market 
behaviour. To adùeve this aim the research was undertaken as two 
partly^related but largely complementary exercises. In one exercise 
the investigation concentrated on examining how dominance influences 
labour market behaviour and personnel policy at the plant level. By 
contrast the second exercise was concerned with the more general 
topic of how plant dominance affected the performance and efficiency 
of its LIM environment, in support of the investigation into plant 
dominance the research also involved a considerable amount of 
preliminary work which, although not directly concerned with 
dominance ^ had to be undertaken in some depth to ensure that the 
empirical work was set on a sound and comprehensive statistical base.
In terms of investigating the impact of plant dominance on 
personnel policy the project initially developed a fairly 
sophisticated model of dominant plant behaviour which was based on a 
significantly enhanced version of standard monopsony theory. This 
model was then used to compare the behaviour of dominant plants with 
similar plants operating in separate and more competitive local 
labour markets. Ebllowing this, and covering a quite different 
aspect of dominance, a model of how dominant plants relate to other 
plants within the same local labour market was also developed. 
This was based largely on the presumption that the large absolute 
size of the dominant plant would differentiate it from other plants 
located within the local labour market. The predictions generated 
by both these models suggested that dominant plant behaviour would 
be distinguishable across a range of local labour market variables. 
However, given the conplexity of the variables involved in the 
exercise and the nature of the interactions between them it was not 
feasible to derive a unique and all-embracing model of dominant 
plant behaviour.
VTesting the hypotheses relating to dominant plant personnel 
policy was a difficult exercise which, among other things, involved 
empirically identifying local labour markets, analysing local labour 
market industrial structure and subsequently pinpointing dominant 
plants, and gathering detailed establishment level information on 
dominant plants and the appropriate control groups. Although there 
were many practical problems associated with each of these steps, it 
remained possible to overcome the principal difficulties and thereby 
test the predetermined hypotheses with confidence that the results 
would reflect with reasonable accuracy the impact of dominance on 
labour market behaviour, in very general terms the results of the 
empirical analysis were, by and large, consistent with the
theoretical predictions that dominance would affect many features of 
an employer's labour market behaviour. Of the two separate aspects 
of dominance identified by the project the impact of size on plant 
behaviour was the most evident. The influence of monopsony on 
dominant plant behaviour was less profound in that although it 
appeared to affect most key labour market variables its importance 
seemed to be secondary.
AS explained previously, examining the wider impact of plant 
dominance on local labour market behaviour was largely a separate 
exercise which involved constructing a quite different theoretical 
model and its associated dataset. That is, rather than examining 
the behaviour of the dominant plant group and subsequently 
contrasting their behaviour with other establishments ^ this part of 
the study extended the scope of the analysis by focusing on the 
overall performance and efficiency of dominated local labour
markets, and in particular the behaviour of unemployment and vacancy 
rates in dominated local labour markets. Broadly speaking ^ the
principal prediction of the local labour market based model of 
dominance was that plant dominance will tend to minimise the
mismatch between unemployment and vacancies through its influence on 
the job generation process and local labour market information 
flows. Hence dominance should have a positive effect on local
VI
labour market performance. As well as considering how plant 
dominance may influence local labour market behaviour it was also 
possible within the same theoretical framework to suggest how other 
a^ects of the local labour market may influence efficiency. More 
specifically, hypotheses were generated to suggest that local labour 
market size, local labour market self containment, the extent of 
dominance, and the nature of the dominating sector may influence 
local labour market efficiency.
The empirical isolation of the impact of dominance on local 
labour market behaviour was also a complex exercise which involved 
controlling for a series of variables and overcoming a variety of 
potentially serious econometric problems. Nonetheless, by taking 
care when analysing the data it was still possible to draw several 
meaningful conclusions from the empirical results. Perhaps the most 
important finding was that there was very little evidence to support 
the suggestion that plant dominance affected local labour market 
performance. However, and by way of contrast, the available 
evidence did indicate that industrial dominance positively affected 
local labour market performance. Related to this another finding 
was that g on the basis of available evidence ^ it seemed that the type 
of dominating industry also influenced performance.
Drawing together the empirical findings seems to suggest that 
occupying a leading position in the local labour market does not 
appear to significantly disadvantage the dominant plant. This 
result holds even although there is ample evidence to suggest that 
dominant plant personnel policy differs in many respects from other 
plants and the cause of these differences may be traced back to the 
plant's position in the local labour market. Related to this and of 
equal importance it seems that in overall terms dominant plant 
employees are not adversely affected by the quasi-monopsonistic 
position of their employer. More specifically, although where some 
features of benefit package are concerned dominant plant workers
vil
appear to be worse off than comparable non-dominant plants, these 
negative aspects tend to be offset by several potentially important 
advantages associated with working in a dominant plant. Most of 
these plant level observations are also consistent with the more 
aggregated local labour market result that plant dominance does not 
seem to affect the underlying efficiency of the local labour market 
as measured by the mismatch between the local unemployed and the 
local vacancies.
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CHAPTER 1
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND A SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RESULTS 
1 GENERAL AIMS AND CONSTRAINTS
The topic, and to some degree the methodology adopted by the 
thesis originated in the SSRC sponsored project, "The Dominant 
Industrial Plant and Urban Development". The underlying purpose of 
the parent project was to examine the many different aspects 
associated with the working of British local labour markets (LIMs) 
which were identified as having employment structures dominated by a 
single non-tertiary employer, and to compare these labour markets 
with those which were not so dominated. In particular, the parent 
project set out to examine the fluctuations in economic welfare in 
dominated LLMs, and the operation of local income and enployment 
multipliers generated by the dominant plant.
Within this broad subject area this part of the research 
focuses specifically on the labour market behaviour of dominant or 
quasi^nonopsonistic plant^ both in the terms of the impact of 
dominance on their personnel policies and on the relationship of 
these plants to their LIM. Suprisingly, although dominance is a 
fairly common labour market phenomenon, it remains an underdeveloped 
topic in applied labour market research. To some extent this 
reflects the lack of an adequately developed theoretical 
underpinning upon which to base empirical analysis which in turn is 
partly attributable to the complexity of the topic. The absence of 
previous work in the area also reflects the lack of a suitable data 
set upon which to base empirical analysis and hypothesis testing. 
This study attempts to overcome both these shortcomings; firstly by- 
developing a theoretical model of dominant plant and dominated LIM 
behaviour, and secondly by building a sufficiently comprehensive 
data base to test whether the predictions of the model can be 
sustained empirically.
2In very general terms the first major hypothesis tested by the 
research is that dominant plant personnel policy differs in many 
important respects from the approaches adopted by other employers. 
In most cases these differences in personnel policy may be 
attributed to two largely separate structural features associated 
with dominance. The first feature is that dominant plants tend to 
be influenced by monopsonistic pressures since they employ a 
significant portion of the LIM's workforce. The second feature
relates to the large absolute size of dominant plants as measured by
the number of workers employed by the plant. The implications of
the monopsony and size effects for dominant plant personnel policy 
are quite different and in the research care is taken to distinguish 
between the two by analysing them separately where this is 
possible.
The second major hypothesis tested in the research is that 
dominance not only affects plant personnel policy but it also
influences the overall performance and efficiency of the LIM. This 
hypothesis relates mainly to monopsonistic influences and the extent 
to which dominance influences LIM institutions and information 
systems with the labour market. Other factors besides dominance 
also have an impact on LIM efficiency and therefore in order to 
isolate the impact these other considerations ^ %re examined in 
parallel in the research.
2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Although both the central research hypotheses appear to be 
relatively straghtforward, isolating the effect of monopsony and 
size on plant and LIM behaviour is a difficult empirical exercise. 
Labour market analysis, particularly at the plant level, is in the 
difficult position of spanning a range of social science disciplines 
and this can present considerable analytical and practical 
difficulties for researchers. That is, labour market behaviour is 
moulded by so many diverse influences, most of which are difficult 
to isolate and
3quantify, that constructing a realistic and yet sufficiently general 
model is an extremely difficult and often subjective exercise. 
Moreover, since many of these variables are closely interlinked it 
is extremely difficult to identify an unambigious causal sequence 
which will translate a description of plant and LIM behaviour into 
an explanation of the factors under observation. As a result of 
these considerations labour market analysis has been the scene of 
considerable debate over what constitutes the most appropriate 
philosophical and methodological approach to the subject. Basically 
the conflict may be split into two separate schools of thought; the 
traditional economic approach and the institutionalist approach.
The proponents of the traditional economic approach believe 
that LIM behaviour may be explained largely in terms of economic 
forces since these are seen to be of fundamental inportance and 
overshadow any other process in the market. Accordingly, when 
confronted with data on labour market behaviour, orthodox economists 
analyse the problem using the standard tools of demand and supply, 
equilibrium, or maximisation under defined constraints. The 
traditional economic approach, therefore, simplifies the problems of 
LIM analysis concentrating on the economic determinants of 
behaviour. Non-economic forces are generally dismissed as 
abberations, only slightly distorting the more powerful economic 
influences. Orthodox economists believe that to include other 
influences adds little to the explanatory power of the theory but, 
on the other hand, would greatly increase its conplexity. As a 
result there would be no manageable theoretical framework to help 
understand LIM behaviour and to predict LIM performance.
Ihe inst tional ^proach stands in marked contrast to the 
economic school by arguing that major shortcomings in the 
traditional economic paradigm have been highlighted by empirical 
investigations which, for the institutionalists, unequivocally
(1) For a review of the principal arguments involved here read 
Gordon (1972) , Gorina (1972) , and Thurow (1976)
(2) Note that some of the more modern economic analysis also take 
account of information weaknesses and other market irperfections. 
For example, see Lipman & McCall (1976)
4illustrates that many theoretical predictions of the orthodox model 
do not accord with reality. As a result the institutionalists 
conclude that, in its simplicity, the economic model neglects 
several important déterminants of, and constraints upon, labour 
market behaviour, Consequently, the institutionalists consider that 
the economically based assumptions underlying traditional theory are 
unrealistic and therefore it is unlikely that the predictions of 
the orthodox approach will be reliable. In place of the supposedly 
misspecified and inadequate model the institutionalists suggest ; 
that a wider interpretation of the problem is necessary; one 
which cannot be enconpassed by the narrow parameters defined by the 
demand and supply approach. As part of the wider approach the 
institutionalists believe that the labour market should be viewed as 
an interrelated interdisciplinery system composed of institutional, 
sociological, psychological and economic forces which combine to 
produce results far removed from the economically based 
predictions. The main advantage of this approach, according to its 
advocates, is that it 'explains' more about labour market behaviour 
than the economic approach. By taking important non-economic forces 
into account it becomes a closer approximation to reality.
For the purposes of the study, and bearing in mind the strengths 
and weaknesses associated with each viewpoint, the methodological 
approach adopted by the more orthodox economists is accepted as the 
most realistic and practical analytical tool. Indeed it can be 
argued that the shortcomings of the economic approach, and in 
particular its reported predictive failure, stem, from the exclusion 
of the inportant economic variables rather than the neglect of 
totally different institutional and sociological forces. The simple 
economic model critiaised by the institutionalists can be viewed as 
only the foundation of a more conplete and realistic economic 
interpretation of labour market behaviour. Once these additional 
economic forces are included the economic approach should conform
/3)
more closely with the empirical realities of LIM behaviour.
(3) See Lipman & McCall (1976) for exanples of this.
5Oonsequently in the following survey of LLM behaviour^ economic 
variables and economic pressures are taken to be the key 
determinants of dominant plant personnel policy and dominated labour 
market behaviour.
Turning to a different but nonetheless related consideration, 
it should be emphasised that although the model of dominant plant 
and dominated LIM behaviour developed in the research is credible 
and consistent it is not possible to develop a model incorporating 
highly specific predictions. This reflects the underlying 
complexity of the LIM environment and the close interrelationships 
between many of the key labour market variables under examination. 
As a result, and when dealing with the more problematic labour 
market variables, the theoretical framework developed in the study 
has to be couched in relatively general terms to allow for 
alternative but equally plausible interpretations. That is, given 
the nature of the labour market it is extremely unlikely that a 
unique model of dominant plant and dominated LIM behaviour exists.
A more realistic approach is therefore to build some flexibility 
into the theory which if necessary can be refined in the light of 
enpirical considerations.
Accepting the methodological approach favoured by economists, 
but at the same time recognising the dangers and limitations inposed 
on the study by the nature of the research, the theoretical and 
enpirical work on dominance is divided into four sections. Firstly^ 
the study identifies UK LIMs and their industrial structure, and 
thereby isolates those LIMs defined as plant dominated. Secondly^ 
the behaviour of dominant plants in relation to otherwise similar 
plants operating in non-dominated LIMs is investigated. Thirdly^ the 
behaviour of dominant plants in relation to other plants within the 
same LIM is examined. Finally^ the study analyses the underlying 
efficiency and principal behavioural characteristics of dominated as 
opposed to non-dominated LIMs. The principal results to emerge from 
each of these four sections are summarised very briefly below.
3 THE IDENTIFICATION OF LUVIS AND TSSEIR INDUSTRIAL STRUCTUEE
This section forms the starting point for much of the
subsequent analysis of dominant plant behaviour in that the
calculations form the basis and framework for a detailed
examination of the impact of dominance on both plant behaviour and 
LIM efficiency. In the UK the identification and classification of 
LIMs has not previously been attempted on such a comprehensive 
scale. Consequently, isolating the LIMs involved working from a set 
of theoretical propositions and definitions through to a series of 
operational criteria which were then used to identify and
subsequently categorise LLMs.
With respect to the definition of LIMs a geographical area had 
to fulfil two basic considerations before being considered as a LIM; 
f irstly^ the area had to be relatively small so that the workforce 
could travel easily throughout; and secondly^(in order to constitute 
a unified market) the area had to be relatively self-contained in 
terms of journey-to-work patterns. Although both these conditions 
are not difficult to understand, operationalising the concepts was a 
difficult exercise since there are no arguments to support a 
particular size of geographical area, a particular level of self­
containment, or any combination of the two, as representing an 
obvious threshold for defining a LIM. Consequently, and in the 
absence of any such index, it was decided to set arbitrary cut-off 
points based largely on pragmatic considerations (see Appendix 1) . 
Accordingly, to qualify as a LIM an area had to meet the following 
conditions :
-at least 70% of the resident workforce had to be employed 
within the LIM area;
-at least 70% of the area's workforce had to reside within the 
LIM area;
-the area had to contain at least 10,000 inhabitants in urban 
areas;
-the area had not to exceed 50,000 acres^and finally 
-the population density had to exceed one person per acre.
Using these criteria and the 1961 Journey to Work statistics 299 
LLMs were identified. The distribution and principal 
characteristics of the selected LIMs are shown in Appendix 2.
7Having isolated the LLMs the next step was to identify and 
classify the industrial structure of the individual markets, and in 
particular^) distinguish between dominant and non-dominant areas. 
This was achieved using Factory Inspectorate figures and ER II data 
supplied by the Department of Employment which was aggregated to 
match the predefined LIM boundaries, using this data the project 
initially attempted to draw a distinction between LIMs where there 
was a normal or rank -size distribution, and other areas where the 
distribution was of a primate form. In practice, however, there was 
no such distinction and in the absence of any alternative ^dominance 
was defined statistically. On the basis of pragmatic considerations 
the dominance threshold value was set that dominant plants should 
employ more than 12.5% of the workforce in the area. Given that 
approximately 50% of employment is in services this in practice 
means that a dominant plant will account for at least 25% of 
manufacturing employment in an area, and therefore should have a 
major impact on LIM behaviour.
Using this definition of dominance 95 plant-dominated LIMs were 
identified, and with 3 of these LLMs being dominated by two separate 
employers^ this gave a total of 98 plants as a basis for further 
investigation. In terms of workers these 98 plants employed 
570,000. The largest plant employed 25,000 with the average number 
of employees being just below 6000. Cnly 6 plants employed less 
than 1000 workers. The distribution of dominant plants was 
reasonably widely spread between the Regions, but there was a 
relatively high proportion located in the more depressed areas.
(4) Much of the information on the identification and
classification of LIMs is very detailed, and at the same time is 
only indirectly related to the focus of the research in that it 
merely provides the geographical basis for testing hypotheses on the 
impact of plant dominance. Consequentlypthe detailed outline of the 
methodology and workings behind defining LIMs and the identification 
of plant dominance have been placed in Appendices rather than 
included in the main text. Furthermore, since most of the work was 
undertaken for the project as a whole, rather than merely in 
relation to the labour market implications of dominance to include 
this as totally original work would have been misleading.
4 THE BEHAVIQÜR OF DOMINANT PLANTS IN RELATION TO SIMILAR NON -
DOMINANT PLANTS
One of the central themes of the study is that dominant plants 
behave differently from similar but non-dominant plants operating in 
more competitive LIMs. The prime reason put forward for these 
behavioural
differences is the impact monopsones tic influences have on the 
dominant plant. The theory behind this proposition, and therefore 
the nature of the characteristic attitudes adopted by dominant 
plants in their personnel policies is developed in Chapter 2. The 
chapter begins with a detailed presentation of the standard
monopsony model. However, since the model has a number of
shortcomings for any practical analysis of dominant plant personnel 
policy an enhanced monopsony model is developed incorporating 
factors previously excluded from the more abstract standard 
treatment. From this model a series of hypotheses are developed 
which form the basis of the subsequent empirical investigation into 
the impact of dominance.
As mentioned previously it is difficult to generate a series of 
precise and unambiguous hypotheses when analysing dominance. 
Nonetheless, and bearing this consideration in mind, it is still 
possible to develop the following propositions on the basis of the 
detailed review of monopsony theory:
- Dominant plants will tend to offer a level of wages below 
that prevailirg in otherwise similar plants operating in 
more competitive LIMs.
- Dominant plants will experience labour shortages when 
offering their 'equilibrium* level of wages.
5)Note that the hypotheses listed here are stated at their most
s impli stic^ "^ '^hnd a much more detailed presentation is given in 
Chapter 2. In particular, this chapter recognises that the 
interrelationships between variables may ultimately condition some 
of the hypotheses usually associated with monopsony theory.
- Dominant plants will adopt characteristic recruitment 
policies to overcome the problem of supply inelasticities 
created by monopsony.
- The level of unionisation in dominant plants will be 
enhanced by monopsonistic conditions.
- Monopsonistic pressures will lead to relatively high levels 
of training in dominant plants.
- The level of quits will be lower in dominant plants than in 
otherwise similar plants operating in a competitive 
environment.
Data to test the hypotheses relating to dominance was 
generated from questionnaires returned from the previously 
identified dominant plants and a carefully selected control group of 
similar plants operating in more competitive LLMs (see i^pendix 3 
and several later ^peo^ices) . Where possible the questionnaire 
results were supplemented by previously completed research into 
associated labour market issues. The principal results emerging 
from the analysis of the questionnaire returns are set out in detail 
in Chapter 3 and tend to support many, but not necessarily all, of 
the theoretical predictions associated with the monopsonistic 
interpretation of dominant plant behaviour. However, by way of 
setting the scene, the principal results are summarised below.
The first hypothesis to be tested was that dominant plants tend 
to offer a level of wages below that prevailing in otherwise similar 
plants operating in competitive LLMs. In general this hypothesis 
was sipported by quanti tab v€and qualitabi/e evidence although problems 
with the data set casts some doubt on the true nature of the 
differences. The possible impact of monopsony on wages and earnings 
was also examined by comparing the determinants of wages in the two 
sample groups and it was found that influences consistent with 
monopsony generally seemed to be more important in the dominant 
plant sample although the evidence on this was limited.
(6) It was again felt that the detailed discussion of the survey 
methods and the statistical technique employed should not be 
included in the main text and therefore the results are presented in 
Aboendix.S:.
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Monopsony theory also suggests that dominant plants tend to 
suffer from labour shortages whilst at the same time offering an 
equilibrium market wage rate. The empirical evidence on this only 
partly supports this proposition. That is, although many
dominant plants suffer from labour shortages, particularly for 
skilled workers^the position is worse in the control group sample. 
Nonetheless, looking in more detail at the causes of labour
shortages it would appear that monopsonistic pressures are more 
important, although not significantly so, in the dominant plant
sample. A number of possible explanations may be put forward to
explain why dominant plants do not appear to suffer dii^rtionate ly 
from labour shortages ranging from variations in the level of 
unemployment in the LIM to the dominant plant’s ability to cope more 
readily with labour shortages through their recruitment policies and 
screening techniques. Unfortunately  ^ without more detailed
information on the nature and cause of labour shortages it is 
difficult^ ^ 5ec if y precisely the role of monopsony in influencing 
labour supply within the LIM.
As predicted^plant recruitment also appears to be influenced by 
monopsonistic considerations, although this is only apparent in the 
secondary and less important recruiting methods adopted by employers 
which tend to be used mainly when LIM conditions tighten. That is, 
under normal LIM conditions dominant plants tend to behave like 
other plants by relying primarily on relatively inexpensive and 
passive recruitment channels. It is only when the particular 
characteristics of dominated LIMs become more important that 
management appear to rej^ond by adopting specialist recruitment 
policies to overcome the monopsonistically induced supply 
inelasticities. This appears to be especially true for the high 
skilled groups where supply inelasticities seem to be more prevalent.
Dominant plant training is another aspect of personnel policy 
theoretically subject to monopsonistic pressures due to the partial 
loss of the distinction between general and specific training and 
the tendency towards low quit rates in this particular market 
structure. Without detailed data on training it is difficult to
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empirically test this hypothesis, nonetheless the available 
quantitative and qualitative information from the questionnaires 
would seem to be consistent with the hypothesis and support the view 
that dominant plants train more, both in total and on a per-capita 
basis, than, equivalent plants operating in a more competitive 
environment.
The structural characteristics associated with dominated LIM 
also appear to influence the level of unionisation in dominant 
plants as theory suggests. More specifically the questionnaire 
evidence shows that levels of unionisation for males are 
significantly higher in the dominant plant sample, and this is not 
explained by any obvious sampling bias.
Finally ^  the relationship between dominance and quits was 
examined and in this case the relatively general evidence on the 
relationship was inconclusive. Although quits were marginally lower 
in the dominant plant sample, and therefore the results seem to 
support the original hypothesis, the individual differences were 
statistically insignificant. In part this reflects the 
concentration of high quit rate industries in the dominant plant 
sample, and when the bias is corrected the expected difference 
between the control group and dominant sample becomes more 
pronounced supporting the original hypothesis.
In overall terms, and considering dominant plant personnel 
policy as an interrelated system rather than as separate components, 
it does appear that monopsony has a wide^read, if not profound, 
influence on dominant plant personnel policy. In fact, it seems 
that monopsonistic influences in one area of dominant plant 
personnel policy do tend to influence other a^ects of personnel 
policy. As a result of these influences, and although precise 
measurement is not possible, the total impact of monopsony on 
dominant plant appears to be significant in that their overall 
behavioural characteristics are different from similar plants 
operating in a more competitive labour market environment.
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5 THE BEHAVIQÜR OF DOMINANT PLANTS IN RELATION TO SMATT.FIR PLANTS
CPERATENG WITHIN THE SAME LIM
The impact of dominance on plant personnel policy may not be 
fully reflected in the monopsonistic framework developed previously 
since the model largely ignores the influence which other firms 
operating in the same LIM may have on dominant plant behaviour. As 
a result it is important to examine how the dominant plant relates 
to other establishments operating within the LIM, and on this basis 
explore how these relationships condition and qualify the 
monopsonistically based predictions. That is, as dominant plants 
are not true monopsonists it is only when interactions between these 
and other plants in the area are taken into account that it is then 
possible to establish the overall impact and influence of dominance 
on plant personnel policy.
As Chapter 4 in the research explains the labour market 
behaviour of dominant plants tends to differ radically from other 
plants operating within the same LIM. The most important 
differentiating feature of dominant plant intra-LIM behaviour is the 
large absolute size of these establishments relative to other plants 
within the area. The impact of the size effect on dominant plant 
personnel policy is important since within the plant it conditions 
levels of job satisfaction and attitudes to work, industrial 
relations and workforce cohesion, and hence ultimately many 
fundamental a^)ects of the economics of plant manpower and personnel 
policy management.
The full impact of plant size on personnel policy is summarised 
in Diagram 1.1. As the diagram shows there are essentially four 
structural characteristics associated with plant size: 
bureaucratisation and organisational complexity, functional 
specialisation, product market concentration, and economies of 
scale. Each of these effects is of fundamental importance to 
personnel policy as they ultimately influence the operational 
effects of size either jointly or in isolation as is again shown in 
the diagram.
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On the basis of the model of the size effect it is possible to 
develop a series of predictions on how the dominant plant will 
relate to other plants within the same LIM. At their most 
sin^listic level these hypotheses are as follows :
- Ihe dominant plant, because of its size, will offer a higher 
level of earnings than the other smaller plants operating 
within the same LIM.
- Ihe dominant plant, because of its size, will recruit high 
quality workers.
- As a result of wishing to enploy high quality workers the 
dominant plant will adopt characteristic recruitment methods 
which will also include a relatively strict screening 
process.
- Dominant plants will tend to offer above average levels of 
training.
- Dominant plants will display relatively high levels of 
unionisation.
The empirical approach to identify how size influences dominant 
plant behaviour is basically similar to the approach adopted when 
making inter-LEM comparisons of plant behaviour, in that much of the 
required data was collected from the questionnaires sent to the 
dominant plants.^ However, in this case a control group was not 
generated by sending the questionnaire to other plants operating in 
the same LIM. This decision/.......
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This decision was prompted by the inherently poor response rate to 
questionnaires characteristic of small plants. As an alternative 
means of comparison it was decided to include in the schedules sent 
to dominant plants direct questions on their relationship to other 
plants operating in the same LIM. Asa further back-up results of 
previous studies into small plant behaviour were used to test the 
general hypothesis that there were considerable differences between 
the behaviour of the dominant plant and other manufacturing units in 
the area. In general terms the evidence, collected suggests that 
within the LIM dominant plants seem to exhibit characteristic 
behaviour patterns which are in fact consistent with the hypotheses 
relating to the size effect. Moreover, when these are considered 
together they produce an economically consistent and rational 
explanation of dominant plant attitudes and behaviour.
One of the most important results of the analysis shows that 
dominant plant wages and earnings are generally higher than other 
plants in the LIM. From the available data this appears to be a 
strategy deliberat^y promoted and maintained by dominant plant 
management. The questionnaire results and other considerations also 
suggest that the high wage policy was the result of the structural 
characteristics associated with plant size.
The high wage strategy of dominant plants also appears to have 
direct implications for other aspects of personnel policy. In 
particular, the questionnaire evidence suggests that as a result of 
their high wage policy dominant plants are able to recruit and 
retain workers of above average quality. The dominant plants also 
appear to recruit workers of a higher skill level. Both these 
conclusions support the theoretical predictions developed previously.
Ihe above average earnings package and the high quality and 
skill requirements also appear to influence dominant plant 
recruitment methods as suggested by the 'size effect* model. In 
most cases it appears that there is a well organised list of 
applicants willing to work in dominant plants. From this queue 
dominant plants are subsequently able to select the most promising 
recruits through a series of screening processes. Unfortunately^it
16
was not possible to conclude whether these selection procedures were 
any stricter than other plants operating in the LIM as the model 
developed in Chapter 3 suggests.
Dominant plant training policies also appear to differ 
from other LIM plants^with the dominant plants generally providing a 
relatively high level of training. This supports the argument about 
the considerable economies of scale available to dominant plants on 
training and the need for dominant plants to maintain the quality 
and skill of their labour force. The high level of training 
provided by dominant plant s is probably also influenced by the 
dominant plants relatively high wage rates, in that dominant plants 
can be confident that trained workers will generally be unable to 
quit and move to plants offering superior earnings.
Finally) the levels of unionisation in dominant plants appeared 
to be higher than in other plants in the LIM. This again appears to 
reflect the structural characteristics associated with the plant 
size and is in line with the theoretical predictions relating to 
this variable. The high levels of unionisation, in turn, appear to 
influence other aspects of dominant plant personnel policy including 
the nature of collective bargaining, and the level of earnings and 
fringe benefits.
In a more general sense the model of dominant plant intra-IIM 
behaviour tends to support a somewhat modified but nonetheless 
basically competitive explanation of labour market behaviour. Each 
policy or reaction adopted by the dominant plants has a valid 
economic interpretation based on the plant's interrelated and often 
complex requirements to operate efficiently. That is, the dominant 
plants are reacting to the conditions iirposed by their relatively 
large absolute size in an economically efficient manner. Therefore, 
the behaviour of wages, earnings, maipower quality, selection 
procedures, unionisation and training programmes, all reflect the 
pressures inposed by plant size.
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Finally, but nonetheless of considerable inportance, it seems 
that the relationship between the dominant plant and the other 
plants in the LIM may well have important implications for the 
monopsony model. In particular, the position of the dominant plant 
as the LIM wage leader may serve to reduce the depressing impact of 
monopsony on dominant plant wages. The leading position ^ of the 
dominant plants in the LIM wage hierarchy may also help to overcome 
the shortage problem associated with monopsony, which in turn should 
preempt the need for dominant plants to use recruitment methods 
specifically designed to overcome supply inelasticities. Having 
said this perhaps it is anple testament to the importance of 
monopsony that, débité the iirplications of the plant size for 
dominant plant behaviour, the influence of supply inelasticities 
still appear to affect dominant plant behaviour.
6 The Efficiency of Dominated LIMs
The second major section of the research into dominance is 
concerned with the impact this feature of the local economy may have 
on the underlying efficiency of the LIM, as measured by local 
unemployment and vacancy rates. This part of the research,
therefore, approaches the topic of dominance from a much wider 
peri^ctive in that it is concerned with the behaviour of the entire 
labour market rather than one particular plant. The theoretical 
justification for the view that dominance may affect LIM performance 
is presented in Chapter 6 which initially investigates possible 
measures of LIM efficiency based on UV data and subsequently goes on 
to explore how dominance and other LIM characteristics may influence 
aggregate LIM behaviour. The empirical results of the UV analysis 
are presented in Chapter 7 with supportive material contained in 
i^pendices 13 to 17. The major theoretical conclusions developed in 
Chapter 6, couched in their simplest form, are as follows
- LIM UV curves can be modelled using the standard UV equation 
U=aV^
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The efficiency of a LIM is measured by^ where the UV function 
crosses the U=V line, but as a back up measure it is also 
possible to use the UV function's elastic>L(^ which is the 
value B.
- The structure of unemployment and vacancies in plant and 
industry dominated LIM's will tend to reduce the coexistence 
of unemployment and vacancies and therefore will improve LIM 
efficiency.
- The nature of information flows in plant and industry 
dominated LIM's will tend to improve LIM efficiency.
- The efficiency of a LIM as measured by the UV curve, is 
likely to be inversely related to its size.
- The level of self-containment in a LIM is likely to 
influence the position of the UV curve and hence LIM 
efficiency.
- The nature of the dominating sector will tend to influence 
the efficiency of the LIM, and more specifically it is 
likely that stable industries will be the most efficient 
whereas rapidly expanding or declining industries will tend 
to be the least efficient.
TO test the hypotheses relating dominance to LIM efficiency 
involved collecting a suitably comprehensive and accurate data base 
on unemployment, vacancy and employment figures. To ensure that 
each LIM UV curve was estimated accurately it was decided to collect 
100 quarterly observations for each variable covering the period 
1951 - 1975. In some cases the data was not available, but débité 
this there were generally sufficient observations to calculate a UV 
equation for most LLMs. Although in general data availability was 
not a problem it was recognised that the accuracy of the data was 
questionable and this could lead to interpretative problems unless 
handled with care (see i^pendix 13). Indeed ^ even by introducing
19
sophisticated controls it is unlikely that all the shortcomings 
associated with the data could be overcome and, as a result, any 
conclusions drawn on the basis of the empirical results will be 
subject to qualification.
Related to the data set another important issue facing the UV 
analysis concerned the adoption of the most suitable econometric 
approach. Failure to use the most appropriate method would once 
again generate potentially misleading conclusions based on the
misinterpretation of the available statistics. Given the data set 
under examination, and remembering the hypotheses under test, the 
most économetrically correct analytical method would be to use
least âqua/'es (see ^pendix 15) . Unfortunately,
however, and for several substantive reasons it was not practical to 
use this technique and as an alternative it was decided to run the 
standard UV equation on a LIM basis. More precisely this involved 
estimating the equation Log U = Log A + BLog V for each individual 
LIM data set. Having calculated the measures of LIM efficiency from 
each equation it is then possible to test the hypotheses on
dominance by relating these results to the characteristics of the 
LIM. It should be borne in mind;, however, that although this
approach appears to be relatively straight-forward it is subject to 
several important econometric shortcomings. As a result of this
largely unavoidable problem the analysis of the UV data is
restricted to suggesting what the results may imply rather than
deriving ar^ more positive conclusions.
In terms of the actual results of the UV analysis one of the 
most important findings was that, as predicted, the efficiency of 
industrially dominated LIM's was much higher than non-dominated 
LIM's. However, and contrary to expectations, there was no 
meaningful difference in efficiency between plant dominated and
non-dominated LIMs. By and large this pattern still prevailed when 
different controls were introduced into the calculations. In terms 
of the original hypothesis, therefore, it seems as if the available 
evidence only in part supports the more general proposition that 
dominated LIMs will be more efficient than non-dominated areas.
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The analysis of the UV equation results also indicated that 
there was no obvious relationship between LIM size and LIM 
efficiency, or LLM se If-containment and LIM efficiency. Given the 
nature of the data set and the perhaps rather tenuous nature of the 
hypotheses these results were not particularly surprising. On the 
other hand there did appear to be a marked relationship between both 
measures of LIM efficiency and industrial sector. Indeed, the 
results were broadly consistent with the original hypothesis that 
stable industries would be characterised by the highest level of LIM 
efficiency and growing and declining sectors would be associated 
with less efficient UV curves.
7 Overall Conclusions and Implications
In general terms the fundamental objective of the research was 
to identify the nature and extent of any possible impact dominance 
may have on labour market behaviour. Unfortunately^ this relatively 
straightforward hypothesis was not quite as simple to test as it 
first appeared. Cne fundamental difficulty was that there was no 
readily adoptable theoretical framework upon which to base testable 
hypotheses ^ and therefore for the most part the research was forced 
to develop its own model of dominance. Reinforcing this^the task of 
developing theory was made particularly difficult because the 
project chose to investigate dominance on two levels : firstly, in 
relation to how it influenced plant behaviour and secondly^ how it 
influenced local labour market behaviour. In addition to these 
points a further problem which had to be overcome was that when 
developing these two relatively independent models the researcher 
was confronted with a wide range of interrelated labour market 
variables each of which may be associated with dominance in a number 
of ways. A final, but nonetheless substantial, difficulty was that 
for the most part it was necessary to generate, often from scratch, 
a data base in a form appropriate to test the hypotheses relating to 
dominance. This was an extremely tedious and time consuming 
exercise which, even when every care is taken to ensure the validity 
of the figures, cannot realistically be expected to produce a 
totally satisfactory set of statistics.
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Despite these problems however, it was still possible to 
devel<ï> two overlapping, reasonably coherent and relatively general 
models to explain how dominance may affect plant and LIM behaviour. 
In testing the hypotheses generated by the process it seemed that, 
in broad terms, dominance did in fact influence labour market 
behaviour. The evidence for this was most clearly demonstrated at 
plant level where many of the original hypotheses were sipported by 
empirical evidence. Nonetheless, although the inpact of dominance 
on plant behaviour is evident, it appeared to be of secondary 
inportance and its influence should not be exaggerated. At a LIM 
level the impact of plant dominance is not particularly observable 
despite being much in evidence in industry dominated areas.
As a final conclusion to the exercise it does seem worthwhile 
making the relatively general point that the available evidence does 
not suggest that plant dominance has a significant adverse affect on 
the economic well being of the LIM or the plant's workforce. More 
precisely^ whilst it is certainly true that dominant plants seem to 
pay relatively low wages when conpared to other plants operating in 
more conpetitive LIM's, this is in many respects offset by other 
more positive considerations such as the dominant plants training 
activities. Of course ^  given the dominant plant's quasi 
monopsonistic position in the LIM this relatively neutral conclusion 
would not hold if such a plant was forced into major cut backs or 
indeed closure. Under these circumstances the effects on the local 
economy would be profoundly negative, but this is a rather different 
topic from the one under review and deserves separate 
investigation. As a final point it should also be said that from 
the enployer's point of view there does not seem to be any serious 
disadvantages associated with occipying a position of dominance in 
the LIM.
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CHAPTER TWO
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF MONOPSONY
ON DOMINANT PLANT PERSONNEL POLICY
The distinguishing characteristic of dominant plants is that 
they employ a relatively high proportion of manufacturing employment 
in a LIM, and hence occupy a quasi monopsonistic position in the 
labour market. This Chapter seeks to establish from a theoretical 
standpoint how these monopsonistic pressures influence dominant 
plant personnel policy. The Chapter begins by presenting the 
standard model of monopsony focussing in particular on the theory's 
underlying assumptions and principal predictions. On the basis of 
the standard exposition an augmented monopsony model is developed 
incorporating factors previously ignored in most models. The 
operational implications of the augmented model are subsequently set 
out as hypotheses which may be tested by contrasting dominant plant 
personnel policy with similar non-dominant plants operating in more 
competitive labour markets. The hypotheses are devised bearing in 
mind that whilst monopsony theory relates to a single employer LIM 
dominance implies that, although one plant constitutes a high 
proportion of the marked labour supply, other smaller, 
establishments operate in the area.
1. THE BASIC MONOPSONY MODEL
When analysing dominant plant behaviour in relation to similar 
plants operating in a competitive environment the natural reference 
point is monopsony theory and the traditional labour market approach 
to the problem, using the basic monopsony model it is possible to
(1) The nature of dominance is discussed in depth in Section 6 of 
this Chapter and Appendix 2.
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identify, at a conceptual level, the most important influences 
labour market# dominance has on dominant plant personnel policy. 
However, this standard exposition, due to its many simplifying 
assumptions, only offers a starting point for any practical analysis 
of dominant plant labour market behaviour. A more realistic 
interpretation of dominant plant attitude and policies requires 
additional development and further refinement of the standard 
treatment as is shown below.
The standard monopsony model is based on the following 
simplifying assumptions (see Rees, 1973, PP 75-80; and Hunter and 
Robertson, 1969, PP 239-241):
(i) There is perfect information in the LIM available at zero cost ^
(ii) Workers have equal productivity,
(iii) There is full-employment,
(iv) There is only one occupation within the plant,
(v) The operation of the LIM is not influenced by non-economic
factors, either social or institutional,
(vi) There is only one employer in the LIM and,
(vii) Employers are profit maximisers
Using these simplifying assumptions a determinate solution to 
monopsonistic labour market equilibrium may be reached by 
introducing the relevant labour demand and supply schedules. As 
usual the monopsonistic establishment ' s demand for labour is based 
on the workers' marginal revenue product curve. However, the 
monopsonist's labour supply schedule is that of the market and
therefore is upward sloping. This aspect of the supply curve is the
major distinguishing feature of monopsony and will ultimately 
influence the personnel policies adopted by monopsonistic plants. 
In particular, instead of being able to recruit any quantity of 
labour at the ruling market price, as in a competitive environment, 
monopsonists cannot neglect the effect of changes in their demand 
for labour on the equilibrium wage rate and the resultant supply of 
potential recruits. Another related feature of monopsony is that 
the marginal cost of recruiting additional staff lies above the 
supply price, in that besides offering higher wages to new employees
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the monopsonist also has to offer higher wages to existing 
workers.
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The impact of the rising supply curve associated with monopsony 
is shown in Diagram 2.1. Given that the monopsonist is a profit 
maximiser the equilibrium labour market solution will be where the 
marginal wage cost (MWC) equals the marginal revenue product (MEP). 
Therefore, the equilibrium solution for the employer is at E, where 
the wage rate is CW|, and the employment level ON^. There are 
several important points to note about this equilibrium. Firstly, 
both the wage rate and the employment level are lower than the 
competitive equilibrium since under perfectly competitive conditions 
the wage would be 0 ^ 2 and the associated level of employment 
0^2" Secondly, wages are no longer fixed for the employer as a 
result of exogenously determined market conditions, but are 
determined by demand within the firm and the marginal cost of hiring 
additional labour. Thirdly, the firm faces job vacancies in 
equilibrium since in the diagram the monopsonist would be willing to 
hire additional workers at the equilibrium wage rate, but
(2) This, realistically, assumes that the monopsonist cannot 
discriminate between workers by only offering higher wages to new 
recruits.
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the rising supply curve rules out this possibility since it involves 
the payment of higher wages, Fourthly, strictly speaking the 
establishment's marginal revenue product curve is not a labour 
demand curve. A monopsonist has no labour demand curve in the sense 
of a sinple relationship where the quantity of workers demanded is a 
function of the prevailing wage rate. ihe number of workers 
employed depends not merely on the height of the supply curve in 
relation to the marginal revenue product schedule, but also on the 
gradient. That is, the slope determines the position of the 
marginal wage cost curve which in turn influences the quantity of 
labour demanded.
2. MDNCPSONY THEDRy REVIEWED; RELAXING THE MODEL'S UM3ERLYING 
ASSUMPTIONS
The diagramatic representation of monopsony illustrates the 
textbook case of one buyer in the labour market facing a positively 
sloped supply curve. Hence the employer sets wages at an 
"exploitation" rate below marginal revenue product, and creates a 
lower overall level of employment in the local labour market. The 
model as it stands, particularly in relation to its underlying 
assumptions, bears little resemblance to identified local labour 
market structures. Therefore, to test the strength and
flexibility of the theory, the model must be further, developed and 
the restrictive assumptions imposed by the original model either 
dropped or relaxed.
2.1 Imperfect information
There is ample evidence to suggest that imperfect information 
inhibits the operation of labour markets (see Rees, 1973, Chapters 4 
& 5; Stigler, 1962; Robinson, 1970; MacKay et al 1971; and Rees 
1966) .
(3) In terms of the diagram, if a more inelastic supply function 
passed through point G this would generate a marginal wage cost 
curve lying above the present schedule and this means that the level 
of employment in the plant would be lower.
(4) See Section 6 of this Chapter.
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Consequently^ the assumption that monopsonists have perfect 
information at zero cost may seriously restrict the predictive value 
of the standard monopsony model. However, it has been demonstrated 
that the relaxation of the assumption of perfect information, and 
therefore of zero recruitment costs, may be incorporated into the 
monopsony model without changing the basic predictions of the 
theory. For example, Devine (1969) has shown that it is possible to 
derive a unique least-cost combination of recruitment and wage costs 
for every quantity of workers demanded (see also Wolitz 1970).
Moreo ver, the resulting minimum average outlay curve is positively 
biased and therefore has a marginal outlay curve lying above it. In 
this way imperfect information may be treated as a cost and 
incorporated into the standard monopsony treatment. Calculating the 
equilibrium solution follows as before providing answers of a
similar nature to the original model with the mosiopsonist offering a
wage below the competitive rate in association with a restricted 
level of employment. This approach to imperfect information and 
recruitment costs may be extended to other forms of personnel costs 
which could be substituted for high wages in an effort to increase 
the supply of labour.
Unfortunately, dealing with information deficiencies in this way 
does not solve another of the problems associated with this 
characteristic of labour market behaviour, which is that as soon as 
imperfect information is introduced into labour market analysis the 
concept of a rising supply curve is no longer unambiguously
associated with a monopsonist. That is, labour market information 
deficiencies imply that even non-dominant firms may face a 
positively sloped labour supply schedule, in that to offset 
information deficiency es among workers all employers must increase
wages if they wish to attract additional w o r k e r s . T h i s  upward
(5) FDr example, when workers are considering changing jobs they may be 
viewed as weighing up their prospective earnings in their present job 
against a similar calculation for prospective earnings in a new job. 
However, workers will differ in their judgement of which wage to transfer 
at because their time horizons, rate of discount, and estimated 
unemployment related to alternative jobs cannot be accurately calculated 
due to information deficiencies. To counteract these difficulties 
employers seeking to expand must offer higher wages. In doing so the new 
wage will exceed the break-even point for more workers but this will
necessarily impart a positive bias to the employers labour supply 
functions. For a more detailed discussion on the problem see Reynolds 
(1945, PP390-411).
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slope in the supply schedule may be reinforced by the indirect, but 
important, costs associated with changing jobs in that workers may 
be reluctant to leave a workplace and workgroup with its familiar 
surroundings and well-known associates. In sum, therefore, to 
overcome either of these factors any employer expanding his 
workforce may have to offer higher wages to overcome this inertia.
Although the introduction of imperfect information and labour 
market-inertia may in general impart a positive slope to any 
employers' labour supply schedule, this should not substantively 
affect the predictions of the monopsony model in relation to more 
competitive plants. In particular, it should be stressed that the 
monopsonist also has to take account of the slope generated by LIM 
information imperfections over and above contending with supply 
inelasticities caused by the constraints imposed by the structure of 
the LIM. Therefore, although the labour supply curve faced by most 
firms may not be perfectly elastic, ceteris paribus, it will remain 
more elastic than the supply schedule facing a monopsonist. 
Consequently, the impact of the positively sloped supply curve on 
wage and employment levels will be significantly more important in 
monopsonistic LIMs.
2.2 NOn-Homogeneous Labour
One fundamental characteristic of a LIM is the non-homogeneous 
nature of the workforce, fortunately^ this feature of the labour 
market may also be incorporated into the monopsony model without 
radically altering the predictions of the original theory although 
initially this may not appear to be the case.
Theoretically, most firms will rank potential workers by 
considering an individual's output in terms of a composite vector of 
productivity which reflects an overall measure of net worth. In 
practice, such evaluation will be undertaken subjectively but, 
nonetheless, some form of ranking will usually be attempted. Using 
this ranking the employer will list workers in decreasing order of 
efficiency, which means that ultimately, additional employees will 
tend to have a lower productivity than the existing labour force,
and yet will probably be paid the same wage. Bearing this in mind.
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if the Y axis of the standard labour market supply and demand 
diagram is slightly modified to represent the wage cost per worker 
of standard efficiency then relaxing the assumption of labour 
homogeneity will again result in all employers facing a positively 
sloped supply curve.
Débité suggesting that all employers face an upward sloping 
labour supply schedule because of non-homogeneous labour this may 
not, however, seriously affect the characteristic predictions of the 
standard monopsony model. For example, this will be the case if 
differences in productivities between workers in a specific job or 
within a specific occupation are minimal. under these 
circumstances, the slope will be negligible and the labour supply 
curve may be considered as being perfectly elastic. It may also be 
argued that any inelasticity induced by non-homogeneity will again 
be low because the impact of differences in productivity are 
severely constrained by other factors. For example, it may be that 
due to union rules and imperfect information employers cannot 
recruit labour in a perfectly rational manner. Finally, even 
accepting that non-homogeneous labour imparts a slope to the labour 
supply function, this will only serve to compound any basic 
monopsony result rather than reduce existing differences in 
variation of elasticity between monopsonistic and competitive 
establishments.
2.3 EUll-Ennployment
The assumption of full-employment is another feature of the 
standard theory which should be relaxed if the monopsony model is to
(6) This will normally be the case unless there is some form of 
payment by result system operating in the plant. For a more 
detailed assessment of this point see Pencavel (1977).
(7) Although it has been argued that differences in worker 
productivity do . not substantially alter the predictions of the 
monopsony model this does not imply that qualitative differences 
between workers do; not play an important role in LIM behaviour. 
This topic will be discussed later in this Chapter and in Chapters 3 
and 5.
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accurately reflect present labour market realities. Dropping the 
assumption, however, may potentially remove the distinguishing 
characteristic of monopsony since the presence of a substantial pool 
of ui employed workers implies that even a monopsonist need not offer 
higher wages to secure additional labour. That is, the monopsonist 
no longer faces a rising supply curve and the marginal cost of 
hiring an extra worker no longer lies above the supply price. As a 
result, monopsonistic pricing policies will not prevail and the 
employer can behave as if the LIM was competitive.
Nonetheless, even in times of high unemployment, there remain 
instances whereby the monopsonist would face a positively sloped 
supply curve. It may, for instance, be the case that the supply 
curve for the unemployed is itself upward sloping. This is a 
possibility if the pool of unemployed constitutes workers of skill 
or considerable seniority, or unemployment benefit is high . 
under these circumstances workers will then be reluctant to accept a 
payment below their aspiration level and will instead wait for a 
higher offer more in keeping with their expectations (see Burton et 
al, 1971; and Kasper, 1967). In other words if the assumption about 
non-hoimogeneous labour is relaxed in association with the assumption 
of below full-employment then the upward sloping supply curve, and 
therefore the standard monopsonistic predictions, will still 
prevail.
A second possibility where unemployment would not affect the 
supply inelasticity is where unemployment within the LIM is 
structural and hence job vacancies do not match the skill 
characteristics of the unemployed. The monopsonistic employer then 
effectively still faces a situation of full employment, and 
therefore a rising labour supply curve. A third possibility is a 
variation of the structural hypothesis. Reflection on the character 
of monopsonistic employees suggests that such plants will tend to 
recruit the "primary" or more stable members of the workforce (see 
Chapter 3 for evidence supporting this), ïfence, as many unemployed 
are primarily unskilled or similarly disadvantaged workers, they are 
effectively excluded from the monopsonist's supply curve. As
(8) With continuing increases in the level of unemployment this 
point is becoming less valid.
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a result if such an employer wishes to increase his labour force he 
may have to consider methods other than recruiting from the pool of 
unemployede such decision will again invariably impart the
characteristic inelasticity in the plant's labour supply schedule.
In all, therefore, although conditions of below full-employment 
initially suggest that a monopsonist will face an elastic labour 
supply this may not happen in practice. There are a series of 
overlapping arguments suggesting that ^  despite unemployment, a 
monopsonist will face a rising labour supply schedule and will price 
and recruit workers accordingly.
2.4 Occupational Specialisation Within The Plant
A further general problem associated with analysing a 
monopsonistic plant's labour market behaviour is that without 
exception such plants will employ a wide variety of occupations and 
each group may have a different and distinctive occupational supply 
schedule. Taking account of different occupational supply curves 
within the plant could pose significant problems for the empirical 
identification of monopsonistic influences. That is, each
occupational supply curve may have a different characteristic and 
consequently a unique wage when considered in relation to the 
plant's labour requirements. ■ Consequently^ in aggregate it may be 
difficult to identify the impact of monopsony on the establishment's 
overall supply curve (as illustrated in Diagram 2.1) which will tend 
to reflect several inter-related factors including the occupational 
distribution of the plant's labour force and the supply conditions 
facing each occupation. In practical terms, therefore, this means 
that the concept of one labour supply curve for a plant becomes an
(9) Theoretically the problem of inter-plant occupational supply 
curves will be more acute in a monopsonistic establishment than in 
an otherwise similar plant operating under competitive conditions. 
That is, although a competitive plant may face individual 
occupational supply curves these will all tend to be perfectly 
elastic at the prevailing wage rate. By contrast in monopsonistic 
plants there is a further problem in that the elasticities 
associated with each schedule may differ.
increasingly abstract concept of little use in empirical work.
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(10)
The only feasible means of overcoming the problem of intra-plant 
occupational specialisation is at the empirical level. Hence^ when 
analysing the influence of monopsony on individual plants care 
should be taken where possible to distinguish between key 
occupational groups. Cnly at this level of disaggregation will it 
be possible to begin to realistically attempt to identify 
monopsonistic influence on plant labour market behaviour.
2.5 Social And institutional Influences; The Role Of Trade Unions 
Pnd Administered Wages
The neglect, so far, of social and institutional forces on 
labour market behaviour is a potentially important shortcoming in 
the conventional monopsony model of wage and employment 
determination, in particular, the failure to consider the impact of 
unions on a monopsonist's labour market behaviour may be considered 
unrealistic and misleading especially since there is ample 
theoretical evidence to suggest that unions may be well represented 
in monopsonistic plants (see Section 3.2), and that such a union 
presence will, in turn, push wages upwards (See Mulvey, 1978; 
Metcalf, 1979; and Burton et al 1971).
The above observations may be used to argue that if wages are 
"administered" by unions in some part independently of market forces 
then monopsonistic considerations are redundant. Where wages are no 
longer determined by the interaction of supply and demand it is of 
less importance if a raonposonist faces a rising supply curve since 
under such circumstances both the low wage and employment levels 
associated with monopsony will tend to be removed. This feature of
(10) For example, a general wage increase in a plant may lead to a 
significant increase in the supply of labour to one occupational 
group, but have little impact on the supply of a more inelastic 
group. Therefore, focussing on an aggregate supply curve may be 
quite misleading as regards the wage increase involved in a given 
expansion of employment.
32
monopsonistic behaviour is illustrated in Diagram 2.2. In 
particular Figure (a) shows that the union negotiated wage will 
normally lie between the points WM and WE  (for example WU in the 
diagram) where WM*\he monopsonistic equilibrium and M E  is the level 
of wages where workers receive their marginal products, and hence 
monopsonistic exploitation is removed. For a more detailed analysis 
of this see Perlman (1969). The band WM-WE, therefore, is the 
bargaining range where unions can operate without reducing 
employment. Within this band is the competitive wage
equilibrium. Ip to this point (that is, between WM and WC) unions 
can increase the level of employment as well as wages in the plant 
(for example, N| to N ) , beyond this point higher wages will reduce 
the level of employment.
Despite this it is important to note that, even if unions do 
influence the monopsonistic wage rate, it does not necessarily 
follow that this will reduce the differential between competitive 
and monopsonistic wages. The situation is more complicated than 
this first figure suggests since if there is also union activity in 
the "competitive" LIM plants, and if the mark-up in the competitive 
and monopsonistic markets are the same then, since the monopsonistic 
LIM starts from a lower base, the wage differential between the two 
market categories may remain. This feature of the labour market is 
shown in Figure (b) of Diagram 2.2. In this case (WM + is the
monopsonistic wage following a union mark-up, and (WC + is the
higher competitive wage after the same mark-up.
However, and to further complicate matters^it can be argued that 
even although both competitive and monopsonistic employers may be 
subject to a union mark-up the level of mark-up may be higher in 
monopsonistic areas. There are three reasons to support this view:
(i) unions may be stronger in monopsonistic areas (see 
Section 3.2).
(ii) Monopsonisitic unions when bargaining are not always 
sacrificing jobs for higher wages^whereas "competitive" 
based unions will always face this difficult trade-off.
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(iii) unions may support a policy of eliminating wage 
differences between LTMs^ particularly if the negotiating 
group were of a similar skill level or worked for the 
same employer. (see Ross, 1948; Rees, 1978; Rees, 1962; 
and Benson and Soffer, 1959),
If any of these arguments are sufficiently powerful then again 
the distinction between competitive and monopsonistic wages will be 
clouded.
Ihe only remaining argument to support a distinction between 
monopsonistic and competitve wages is that ultimately underlying 
market forces, as represented by the local labour market's labour 
supply and demand conditions, will be too powerful to sustain the 
institutionall y imposed wage structure. Ihat is, through time 
market forces may begin to reassert themselves as employers and 
employees react to the effect of a non-market wage. This does not 
mean that broad based wage negotiations will no longer be relevant, 
but rather that these will be considered as a first level of 
negotiation. Subsequent localised bargaining at plant level will 
follow, bearing in mind LIM conditions and the influence of factors 
such as monopsony (for a more detailed explanation of the UK 
bargaining framework system and the distinctions between national 
and local bargaining see Donovan, 1968^ ,and Flanders, 1965).
Whether the job vacancy or shortage effects, which are also 
associated with monopsony, still prevail under the influence of 
non-market pressures will depend on the extent of the administered 
wage, in terms of Figure (a) in Diagram 2.2j> if the wage increase 
falls within the region WM-WC then job vacancies in equilibrium will 
continue to exist. If the administered wage is pushed above this 
then the
(11) Pressures for such a policy designed to take wages out of 
competition may also be applied by multiplant employers who, in 
wishing to simplify their bargaining structure ^ and thereby avoid 
administrative and negotiating difficulties, may seek to adopt an 
"equitable" wage structure throughout the organisation. Naturally
this policy will also tend to eliminate inter-LEM wage differentials.
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inonopsonist will not face shortages. Ihe impact of an administered 
wage on the employment effect associated with monopsony is less 
clear. Between WM and WC an , administered wage will increase 
employment up to the competitive level N3, above WC employment will 
fall until it ultimately reaches N at W . Bow this compares to a 
competitive type local labour market also with an administered wage 
is indeterminate since the respective employment levels depend on 
the particular size of the mark-ups and the shape of the labour 
supply and marginal product schedules.
The different and inconclusive possibilities proposals suggested 
in this section can only be resolved empirically by trying to 
establish whether institutional forces do influence the monopsony 
model and its associated predictions. This will involve examining 
the nature and extent of trade union bargaining in such plants and 
the monopsonistic employer's overall attitude towards the wage 
determination process. Furthermore^ the research will also have to 
investigate the additional factors influencing wage determination so 
that it should ultimately be possible to indicate to what extent a 
monopsonistic employer has freedom to develop the establishment's 
own wage structure in response to its unique local labour market 
environment.
2.6 The Empirical Representation Of Monopsony ; Dominated LIMs
Monopsony theory has been developed primarily as a useful 
abstraction designed to explain the fundamental pressures 
influencing behaviour in a very specialised and polarised category 
of local labour market. Not surprisingly, therefore, monopsony in 
the text book sense is strictly not applicable to a study based on 
the analysis of LIMs which without exception will contain more than 
one employer. The closest approximation to a monopsonistic LIM or 
plant is where a single plant dominates the local labour market 
enployment structure. under these circumstances the dominant plant 
may be expected to emibody many of the characteristics associated 
with the monopsony model.
(12) Assuming, of course, that the empirical definition of 
dominance is sufficiently close to monopsony and not more applicable
to another model of local labour market behaviour (see below).
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Within the context of this study, but temporarily departing from 
the theoretical discussion. Table 2.1 summarises the degree of 
monopsony associated with the dominant plants investigated in this 
study. Examining the key figures presented in the table provides a 
tentative indication of how realistic it is to apply a
monopsonistically based model to dominated LIM structures. One of 
the characteristics of dominance which is highlighted in the table 
is the extent to which the identified local labour markets are 
concentrated in the lower range of the dominance spectrum. 
Approximately 57% of dominated local labour markets fall within the 
lowest category of plant dominance (12.5 - 22.5% of total LIM
employment), whereas only 16% of the LIMs fall into the 2 highest
categories of dominance (over 36% of the local labour market
employed in the dominant plant). Assuming that most local
labour markets have a reasonably balanced industrial structure and 
establishment hierarchy, this result is not surprising. That is, 
since dominance itself is relatively unusual it will be even more 
unusual for a LIM to be associated with the extreme or polar version 
of this characteristic. That is, since in the first place it is 
unlikely that a local labour market will be dominated, the greater 
the extent of dominance the less likely it will become.
Despite the bias towards plants in the lower end of the 
dominance range the effect of monopsony should stilly at least partly^ 
be evident in the behaviour of the identified LIMs. Nonetheless,
(13) See Appendix 2 for a definition of dominance.
(14) Naturally when only manufacturing employment is considered the 
extent of dominance is significantly increased.
(15) unfortunately^ due to time and resource constraints it was not 
possible to extend this analysis to cover the non-dominant control 
group used in the analysis and thereby compare dominance levels 
between the two categories. Nonetheless, appendix 2 does indicate 
that there is a high number of LIMs well below the 12.5% threshold. 
That is, there is not merely a marginal distinction between the 
dominant and non-dominant groups.
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given the bias towards the lower end of the dominance spectrum there 
remains a danger that some monopsonistic trends will not be so
readily identified when analysing the entire dominant sample. To 
overcome this problem it will be advisable, where appropriate, to 
analyse the low dominance and high dominance group separately. That 
is, the more tenuous manifestations of monopsony may only be
identified at the more extreme levels of dominance where supply 
inelasticities and the other characteris>U:s associated with dominance 
become more prevalent.
Table 2.1 also shows the relationship between the extent of
plant dominance and some of the other characteristics of the LIM. 
Focussing on this, one point that emerges from the table is that the 
lower dominance group also tend to be located in the larger LIMs. 
For example, the average total population in the lowest dominance 
category is 75,000^ whereas the figure for the two highest groups is 
approximately 60,000. It is important to recognise this pattern as 
this trend may ultimately influence some of the hypotheses under 
test. However, given the range of LIM sizes and the
distribution of sizes this pattern is as expected. The smaller the 
LIM the more likely it is that a single plant, whose size is
presumably for the most part determined by non-local consideration, 
will dominate the area. Furthermore, within the dominant group the 
most dominant plants will be associated with smallest LIM. It is 
also worthwhile noting from the table that there does not appear to 
be any relationship between the extent of dominance and LIM 
acreage. Therefore there is no relationship between population 
density and
(16) For example, LIM size may affect the level of wages paid by 
dominant plants since there may be a positive relationship between 
LIM size and wages (see Richs , 1967). That is, LIM size rather 
than monopsony may be the cause of wage differences.
(17) Note that the dominated sample (in total) will tend to be 
located in smaller LIMs than the control group of plants used in the 
empirical analysis, unfortunately^ it is not possible to show exact 
figures of this,as in many cases the sizesof the Control Group LIM's 
are unknown. Nonetheless^ since they are all in major conurbations 
it is realistic to assume that these plants operate in large markets.
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dominance. This is perhaps a little unusual given the relationship 
between population and dominance.
Returning to the theoretical considerations related to whether a 
monopsony model is a sufficiently realistic representation of 
dominance it should be said that in view of the multi-plant 
structure of the dominated LIM sample it may be more appropriate to 
develop oligopsonistic rather than monopsonistic models to explain 
dominant plant policies. That is, as there will be at least several 
plants in each LIM it may not be sufficiently realistic to suggest 
that one establishment, albeit dominant, can act independently of 
others when operating in the LIM. A more realistic interpretation 
of dominant plant personnel policy and labour market behaviour may 
involve taking into account the actions and responses of other 
employers.
unfortunately ^ given the available data on LIM structure (see 
Appendix 2 for details) it is not possible to test 
oligopsonistically based hypotheses. More specifically, the data 
available to the project was severely limited in terms of accurately 
identifying the plant size hierarchy in any LIM. In practice it was 
often only feasible to identify the dominant plant within the LIM 
and also establish whether or not there were other plants in the 
area approaching its size, in other words the detailed information 
required to meaningfully identify oligopsonistic LIMs was, generally 
speaking, not available.
Allied to this severe practical constraint it should also be 
noted that developing models of oligopsony also poses difficult 
theoretical problems, not least of which is the variety of 
oligopsonistic models available. Depending on LIM characteristics, 
such as enployer size structure and occupational mix, a number of 
complex oligopsony models may be developed each one with its unique 
predictions. As a result it will be difficult to identify any 
underlying characteristics associated with dominant plants.
(18) This feature of oligopsony parallels developnents in models of 
oligopoly. For a more detailed discussion of these, and by
implication the problems facing oligopsony see Scherer (1970).
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In addition to this danger of theoretical fragmentation the other 
principal technical drawback with oligopsonishltype models is that in 
many cases their predictions are indeterminate. This conclusion is 
based on the observation that because of the nature of the 
conjectural variations between plants it is not possible to derive 
stable predictions on plant behaviour, or to subsequently test 
hypotheses on this basis. As a result, trying to develop 
oligopsonistically based models which are also operationally 
meaningful is by and large a fruitless exercise.
Bearing in mind the serious practical and theoretical
shortcomings associated with using oligopsonistic models as a basis
for explaining dominant plant behaviour the only feasible solution
to the problem lies with a modified, but enhanced, version of the
standard monopsony model. Following this approach the simplicity
of monopsony theory should be retained^provide a reasonably general
but nonetheless accurate interpretation of the labour market forces
influencing dominant plants, without introducing the complexities
and uncertainties associated with oligopsonistic models.
(21)
Although oligopsonistic models of LLM behaviour are not 
considered in this section of the study the notion of interaction
(19) TO be more technical^ oligopsonistic competition for workers 
implies that the labour supply schedule for one firm cannot be 
determined without knowing the characteristics of the remaining 
employers' schedules. However, given the existence of conjectural 
variations, these supply curves depend on the nature of the dominant 
plant's supply curves which is the original unknown. Consequently, 
the oligopsonistic system and the LIM system is indetefminate. Fbr a 
more detailed discussion of this type of problem see Pelfner (1959).
(20) The applicability of the monopsony model may be greater than 
the general statistics presented in Table 2.1 suggest. in 
particular, the figures in the table may considerably understate the 
importance of monopsony elements. The true nature of monopsony will 
tend to be a ftwttion of the supply inelasticities associated with 
specific occupations, some of which may be concentrated in the 
dominant plant. As a result^ at a lower level of disaggregation 
occupational supply inelasticities may be more acute in dominant 
plants than the level of monopsony in the LIM indicates.
(21) Given the nature of the dominant LIMs it should be recognised
that where monopsonistic hypotheses are rejected in the empirical 
work a more meaningful explanation may lie in either the oligopsony 
or competitive models.
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between different plants in the LIM is examined in detail in the two 
later Chapters focusing on the intra-IIM activity of dominant 
plants. More specifically, this section of the research examines 
how the presence of other plants within the area may condition the 
monopsonistic hypotheses developed and tested in this section. As a 
result it should be possible to quantify more precisely how 
important oligopsonistic influences are to the monopsony model. 
Débité this additional work it would be unrealistic to suggest that 
this sort of approach could point to a single or set of 
oligopsonistic models appropriate to dominance. All that can 
reasonably be expected is that such results will suitably qualify 
the monopsonistic hypotheses under test by helping to explain any 
unresolved issues emerging from the empirical evidence.
TO summarise, considering the serious shortcomings associated 
with oligopsonistic models and the operational advantages
inherent in adopting the more straight forward monopsony model, it 
would appear that the latter is the most appropriate starting point 
for research into dominant plant behaviour. The monopsony model and 
the fundamental idea of the dominant plant facing labour supply 
(nelasticities is a sufficiently realistic abstraction upon which to 
develop and test hypotheses related to dominant plant personnel 
policy. Nonetheless, and rather than ignore the presence of other 
plants in the LIM, the inter-relationships between the dominant 
plant and other plants in the LIM are considered separately and at a 
later stage of the analysis,
2.7 Summary & Conclusions
The objectives of this section were twofold. Firstly, to 
establish whether the predictions of the monopsony model still 
prevailed when the restrictive and unrealistic assumptions 
associated with the standard theory were either relaxed or 
subsequently enhanced to embody important practical considerations. 
And secondly, to determine the extent to which the monopsony model 
is the most appropriate theory on which to base testable hypotheses 
related to dominant plant behaviour. In both instances it appears 
that monopsony theory is sufficiently robust and flexible to
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withstand these challenges.
When the numerous siiri^ ify»<i^  assumptions surrounding the 
monopsony model were relaxed it was shown that, with the possible 
exception of union and other institutional influences on LIM 
behaviour, the fundamental predictions characterising monopsony are 
not radically affected, Monopsonistic plants will continue to be 
characterised by a relatively inelastic labour supply curve and 
therefore tend to set wages and employment levels below the 
comparable competitive equilibrium. At the same time, monopsonistic 
plants will also face labour shortages as a result of these supply 
inelasticities. On this basis the standard treatment was considered 
as an acceptable model to both predict and explain behaviour in 
monopsonistic markets.
With respect to the applicability of monopsony theory as a basis 
for interpreting dominant plant behaviour it appears to be the most 
appropriate operational and yet general model available. This 
conclusion was reached by considering the conceptual and practical 
problems associated with olCgopsonistic models, and reviewing the 
statistical evidence which suggests that monopsonistic influences 
may be stronger than initially suggested by the identified levels of 
dominance.
3. EXTENSIONS TO THE MONOPSONY MODEL
The wider implications of monopsony for plant personnel policy 
are not considered in conventional monopsony theory since the model 
is primarily concerned with explaining the fundamental parameters of 
labour market behaviour, and in particular the wider implications 
monopsony has for wage and employment theory. Standard monopsony 
theory, therefore, is restricted to representing a component part of 
a system developed to explain micro-economic behaviour and resource 
allocation within a neo-classical framework. As such monopsony 
theory remains an abstract and highly simplified representation of 
reality largely unconcerned with the more indirect manifestations 
and detailed impact of monopsonistic pressures on plant personnel 
policy.
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Tb establish the overall effect of monopsony on dominant plant 
behaviour requires further consideration of how, at a more detailed 
and practical level, the structural characteristics associated with 
monopsony influence the dominant employer's personnel policy. 
Theoretical considerations suggest that monopsony will have an 
impact on plant personnel policy across a wide range of labour 
market variables. These include: plant recruitment policy; the
manner in which the employer reacts to labour shortages; union 
behaviour in the plant; plant turnover and quit rate behaviour; and 
employer training policies. Many of these features are
inter-related and when combined will serve to reinforce existing 
differences between dominant plant labour market behaviour and 
otherwise similar non-dominant plants operating in competitive
LIMs.
The extent of monopsonistic influences on plant labour market 
behaviour may also vary according to the extent of dominance, the 
nature of the skill groups involved, and other related plant level 
considerations. Nonetheless, considering the potentially widespread 
impact of monopsonistic influences its effects should be observable 
in the identified dominant plant sample.
The way in which each of the additional variables under
consideration is influenced by the structural characteristics
associated with monopsonistic LIMs is developed in the remainder of 
the chapter. Each feature of personnel policy is examined on an 
individual basis dealing initially with the more general features 
associated with each topic and subsequent^ focussing specifically on 
how monopsonistic considerations may influence each of the variables 
being analysed. In addition to this, since many of the components 
of plant personnel policy are inter-related the final section of the
(22) Of course ;> besides extending the influence of monopsony to 
incorporate the effects of additional variables> analysing plant 
behaviour at a more detailed level will also help identify how 
dominant plant personnel policy reflects the previously identified 
wage, employment and shortage effects conventionally associated with 
monopsony.
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Chapter considers how the different aspects of dominant plant 
personnel policy are connected, and the possible implications this 
may have on the plant's labour market policies, where possible, 
specific hypotheses are formulated relating to the effect monopsony 
has on each variable. As a result^this exercise provides the basis 
for the subsequent empirical attempt to identify monopsonistic 
influences on dominant plant personnel policy.
3.1 The Impact of Mpnopsony Cn Dominant Plant Recruitment Policies
Given the quas i-monopsonistic nature of a dominant plant's 
position within the LIM it seems likely that such employers will 
adopt recruitment policies which will in some way reflect this 
characteristic. The objective of this section is to identify 
whether this argument can be sustained on a more formal theoretical 
basis. Bearing in mind the wide variations in available recruitment 
methods this section initially examines the general determinants of 
plant hiring policies and the effects these often complex influences 
ultimately have on recruitment methods. Subsequently, and within 
the general theoretical framework, the impact of monopsony on 
recruitment methods is discussed. This identifies both the 
constraints monopsony imposes on dominant plant recruiting policy 
and the way in which dominant employers react to those pressures and 
limitations.
Recruitment theory; General Considerations. The prime aim of an 
employer's recruitment policy is to minimise the overall costs 
associated with hiring workers, whilst at the same time securing an 
adequate and continuous flow of suitably qualified manpower to the 
establishment. TO achieve this aim effectively, employers will 
deploy a range of overlapping and complementary recruitment methods 
which are designed to enhance the employer's ability to search for 
and to attract the type of worker required in the plant.
The principal recruitment methods available to employers (See 
Norris 1976, and Doeringer and Piorg,. 1971) include:
- advertising in the local press
- advertising in the national press
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- notifying vacancies to the local Job Centre
- notifying vacancies to non-local Job Centres
- participation in the Brployment Transfer Scheme (ETS)
- contacting local Skill Centres
- contacting schools and technical colleges
- hiring private employment agencies
- recruiting "on-spec" job applicants
- using a list of previous job applicants
- contacting former employees
- accepting recommendations from existing employees
- upgrading, training or transferring existing employees and
- offering higher earnings than other local employers.
This list of potential recruitment instruments, whilst not fully 
comprehensive, covers most hiring methods open to employers. The 
range of available instruments and the variety of possible
combinations, also highlights the flexibility open to an employer 
when developing an overall recruitment strategy. Therefore, to 
ensure an effective recruitment policy employers have to consider in 
their decision-making process, a variety of factors all of which
condition the plant's hiring behaviour. These influences include: 
the cost of implementing recruitment methods; the overall level of 
demand in the LIM; the occupational skill which the employer is 
seeking to recruit; the industry the plant operates in; the 
institutional constraints imposed from both within the plant and 
within the IIM; the competitive position of the plant within the
LIM; and finally the structural characteristics of the LIM which may
include the extent of plant dominance or monopsony. The cumulative 
influence of all these factors underlines the complexity surrounding 
a plant's hiring policy and highlights why they will often be 
subject to periodic reappraisal and change. This will be especially 
the case if the labour market is characterised by information 
déficiences making it difficult for an establishment to accurately 
interpret labour market signals and consequently adjust its 
recruitment policy appropriately.
Bearing in mind the range of recruitment methods available to 
employers and the variety of considerations determining plant
recruitment policy, it is difficult to establish a single unified 
theory of recruitment which may be used to test specific hypotheses 
about plant hiring policies. Normally, as Doeringer and Piore
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(1971) point out, and as is suggested above, a combination of 
recruitment methods will be employed at any one time reflecting the 
often unique position of a plant in terms of the underlying 
determinants of recruitment policy. The mix and sequence of 
instruments used will vary considerably between enterprises with no 
single and obvious optimal approach which every employer will adapt 
in response to specific market stimuli . In more detail^ it
would seem that the selection of some recruitment methods will 
remain stable whilst the use of others will vary systematically with 
external labour market conditions (again see Doeringer and pioreu 
1971). individual plants, therefore, are likely to gradually evolve 
recruitment policies which represent the combined effects of 
different economic and institutional stimuli ^with the employer 
likely to make an implicit valuation of the probable costs and 
benefits of alternative strategies.
Despite the obvious complexity of a plant's recruitment process^ 
it remains possible to derive basic predictions about employer 
recruitment strategy by dividing hiring methods into two categories 
which may be called passive recruitment instruments and active 
recruitment instruments. Each of the groups is united by several 
common characteristics which enable broad based hypotheses and 
predictions to be developed regarding employer attitudes towards 
recruitment.
Passive hiring policies are characterised by relatively informal 
and inactive employer attitudes towards hiring labour and generally 
involve relatively inexpensive or costless methods of recruiting 
since, in most cases, the costs are ^orne by the worker.
(23) That is, selecting between alternative instruments will 
reflect estimates of their absolute and relative costs and benefits, 
although it is difficult to rank recruitment methods into a clearly 
defined cost hierarchy (see again Doeringer and Piore, (1971) for a 
more detailed review of the arguments).
(24) In general^passive recruitment methods embody several major 
advantages besides their relatively low cost. One of the principle 
benefits is that these instruments are relatively easy to manage in 
that the recruitment methods are directly controlled by the employer 
and therefore can be modified quickly. In addition some of the 
recruitment methods incorporate a preliminary screening mechanism. 
Fbr example, existing employees referring applicants to the plants 
will be reluctant to nominate unsuitable workers.
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Passive recruitment methods include; recruiting on-spec applicants, 
accepting recommendations from existing employees, using a list of 
previous applicants, and contacting former employees. The
use of passive recruitment methods are normally associated with 
periods of unemployment when there is an available supply of labour 
seeking employment. Under these circumstances using passive 
recruitment methods will be the most cost-effective solution to a 
plant's recruitment options.
Active recruitment methods differ significantly from passive 
instruments in that they largely reflect situations where the 
employer adopts a more aggressive role towards recruitment and 
which, as a result, often involves significant costs to the employer 
rather than the employee. The most widely recognised active hiring 
mechanisms are: local and national advertising; offering higher
earnings; upgrading training and transferring existing employees; 
contacting Skill Centres, schools and technical colleges; and using 
private employment agencies. In view of the costs associated with 
active recruitment methods employers tend only to use them 
intensively when faced with low unemployment or specific labour 
shortages (see Deoringer and Piore, 1971). That is, as the LIM 
tightens the more passive methods of recruitment will no longer 
operate effectively reflecting the increased scarcity of prospective 
employees. in turn, this shortage of suitable recruits dictates 
that establishments adopt a more aggressive and resource intensive 
approach towards recruitment and the burden of search effectively 
shifts from worker to employer.
Besides the relatively employer-expensive recruitment options^ 
there are other active recruitment methods that to some extent 
embody the characteristics of the passive group in that their costs 
are borne by government in order to increase the efficiency of the 
market. These include: the notification and handling of job
vacancies by local and other Job Centres, and making use of the
(25) The distinction between active and passive recruitment 
methods is not always clear cut, for example, contacting former
employees could be viewed as an active recruitment method.
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Brployment Transfer Scheme. Given the cost characteristics 
associated with these recruitment methods they will tend to be used 
even under circumstances of high unemployment, and their use will 
not increase significantly as the labour market tightens.
Within a plant's overall recruitment strategy it is also 
important to distinguish between the principal skill groups under 
recruitment by an employer, especially as the supply characteristics 
facing each group may vary considerably and this may significantly 
ffect recruitment efforts. In particular^ recent evidence suggests 
(see HUnter and Beaumont, 1978; and the Scottish Council, 1979) that 
it will be more difficult to recruit skilled workers than other 
manual groups. In time, this problem should manifest itself in 
plant recruitment policy through the relatively high use of active 
and generally more costly recruitment methods when an employer is 
seeking to hire skilled workers.
Summarising the general discussion on recruitment it seems that 
a complex and inter-related range of factors will influence plant 
recruitment policies, which correspondingly have to be sufficiently 
flexible to cope with most LIM situations. Employers, reflecting 
this, will tend to develop particular combinations of recruitment 
patterns to handle a specific market environment. Passive and 
government sponsored recruitment methods will tend to be used in 
time of high unemployment, and active instruments will assume more 
lasting importance in tighter labour markets. Within any LIM 
prolonged shortages of skilled labour also suggests that active 
recruitment methods will be used more intensively to increase the 
supply of the appropriate shortage groups.
Recruitment Theory ; Monopsonistic Considerations ^  In addition to 
the general economic conditions influencing employer hiring patterns
(26) TD briefly mention a complication to this basic model, note
that whilst some methods may be cheap for securing candidates (for
example, the public employment service) compared to others (for
example, private agencies) there may be a trade-off in that private
agencies may produce better candidates in the sense that they better 
reflect the employer's specification.
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dominant plant recruitment policies may also be influenced by the 
quasi-monopsonistic conditions prevailing in the LIM, That is, the 
relationship between the plant and the market in a dominanted LIM 
will tend to produce characteristic recruitment patterns as the 
dominant plant adjusts to meet the constrains imposed by its 
environment.
The most important characteristic of monopsony which may 
influence dominant plant recruitment policy will be the inelasticity 
of the dominant plant's labour supply curve, and the resultant 
tendency for monopsonistic conditions to create labour shortages. 
That is the inelasticity of the labour supply curve will tend to 
encourage dominant plant to adopt recruitment policies which, other 
things being equal, will differ from those adopted by otherwise 
similar non-dominant plants. In particular, the principal impact of 
the relatively high inelasticity facing the dominant plant will be 
to induce such employers into devoting proportionately more of their 
recruitment effort into attracting labour from outside the LIM. 
This suggests that ^ given the appropriate market conditions ^ dominant 
plants will tend to favour the following recruitment methods : 
advertising in the national press; asking the Department of 
Employment to notify vacancies to Job Centres in other areas; and 
using the Employment Transfer scheme. These policies may all
be considered as alternative methods of extending the dominant 
plant's LIM boundary and reducing the recruitment constraints 
imposed by an inelastic labour supply curve. In adopting this 
policy dominant employers are effectively increasing the elasticity 
of their labour supply schedule and thereby Stimulating more
(27) Increasing the wage-rate in dominant plants may also broaden 
the scope of the LIM. However, besides purely economic 
considerations, the ability of the plant to make short-run 
adjustments to wages in response to recruitment pressures may be 
limited since wage determination tends to be dominated by other 
considerations. See, for example, Doeringer and Pior&^ (1971). Note 
also that the use of the Eiployment Transfer Scheme Cs an extremely 
limited phenomenon and is largely controlled by the Employment 
Service.
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competitive LLM conditions. By contrast ^similar plants operating in 
a competitive M M  will not require to adopt such a strategy since 
the perfectly elastic nature of their labour supply curve at the 
prevailing wage rate implies that they have sufficient labour 
supplies within the boundaries of their LIM.
The tendency for the dominant plant to face shortages as a 
consequence of the rising labour supply schedule also suggests that 
the plant will have to recruit more actively and aggressively than 
similar competitive plants. in practice ^ this means that dominant 
employer recruitment methods will be biased towards the more costly 
recruitment policies normally associated with tighter LIMs. under 
these circumstances dominant plants may also seek to alleviate 
shortages by concentrating on personnel policies designed to 
alleviate shortages from within the plant. In particular^this would 
be reflected in efforts by such employers to "upgrade, train, or 
transfer" their existing staff.
Besides directly effecting the recruitment policies adopted by 
dominant plants, monopsonistic conditions may also influence the 
procedures adopted when recruiting labour. More specifically, if 
dominant plants suffer disproportionately from shortages then 
screening procedures will tend to be relatively slack when compared 
to control group operations. This is because the use of less 
stringent procedures will effectively enable the dominant plant to 
increase the size of its available labour pool. This policy, 
therefore, will help reduce LIM labour supply inelasticities, albeit 
at the cost of recruiting lower quality workers.
In addition to the effects of labour supply inelasticities on 
dominant plant recruitment behaviour the pre-eminent position of the 
dominant plant in the LIM may also influence the approach the 
employer adopts when using the recruitment services provided by'^ 'Sob 
Centre. The nature of the dominant plant's association with the 
public employment agency is conjectural as there are two separate 
and opposing arguments on how the relationship may develop. On the 
one hand, the importance of the dominant plant in relation to the 
LIM and its welfare may lead to the dominant plant and the Job
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centre developing close links with one another. If this type of 
cooperation is developed in a quasi-monopsonistic LIM it may tend to 
manifest itself through a series of special arrangements designed to 
help the dominant plant overcome its recruitment difficulties and 
supply inelasticities. Such special arrangements might include more 
intensive use of the Job Centre, help with the recruitment of 
particular types of workers, or help with interviewing and selecting 
employees. The same level of co-operation and
interdependence will probably not exist in more competitive LIMs 
where the local Job Centre will have a number of equally important 
clients.
The alternative and opposing argument on the use of the Job 
centre is that the visibility of the dominant plant within the LIM 
means that the employer will not require Job Centre assistance when 
recruiting labour. Workers will be sufficiently aware of the 
dominant plant and the work conditions prevailing in the 
establishment to by-pass the Job Centre as a means of helping them 
secure employment. Of course, under conditions of total monopsony 
there would be no need for the Employment Service because there 
would only be one employer in the LIM. Resolving these conflicting 
arguments is an empirical exercise the results of which are examined 
in Chapter 3. However, it should be borne in mind that the attitude 
of the dominant plant to the Job Centre may change depending on 
prevailing labour market conditions and the skill groups under 
recruitment. Consequently ^  the relationship between the dominant 
plant and job Centre may be unstable.
Bearing in mind the previous discussion on the basic 
determinants of recruitment policy it should also be recognised that 
the impact of monopsony will tend to vary depending on the level of 
demand within the LIM, and the type of labour being recruited. 
Generally the tighter the LIM, and the higher the proportion of
(28) NDte that even if dominant plants do not use Job Centres more 
frequently than the control group this does not necessarily imply 
that Job Centres do not provide specialised assistance, or indeed 
that the dominant plants do not use the Job Centre on a more 
intensive basis.
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skilled workers under recruitment, then the more important 
monopsonistic conditions become. It will also tend to be the case 
that the higher the level of LIM dominance then the more appropriate 
the monopsony model will become, and correspondingly so to will the 
recruitment characteristics associated with it.
In summary, monopsony may affect plant recruitment policies in 
several ways depending on its significance within the LIM and the 
skill group under recruitment. Nonetheless, other considerations 
remaining equal, dominant plants will tend to respond to 
monopsonistic constraints by focus: in^ more of their recruitment 
efforts outside the LIM. At the same time dominant plants will tend 
to recruit more aggressively than comparable plants operating in a 
competitive LIM. These circumstances may also induce dominant 
plants to relax their screening procedures in an effort to broaden 
their available labour supply. The institutional relationship 
between the dominant plant and the Job Centre may also result in 
characteristic recruitment policies and even serve to offset the 
effect monopsony has on recruitment methods.
3.2 The Impact of Monopsony On Dominant Plant Oiionisation
unionisation levels and union behaviour are subject to a variety 
of political, sociological, ethical, legal and institutional 
forces. However, despite these combined influences on union 
behaviour the most important reason for workers joining a union 
appears to be for personal gain and to protect or improve their 
economic position (see, for example. Van De Vail, 1970; and Seidman 
et al, 1951). By unionising workers develop an effective 
countervailing power against the employer, thereby allowing their 
representatives to bargain from a position of increased strength and 
solidarity. Therefore, by joining a trade union, workers may 
satisfy their objectives either directly through negotiations at 
plant level, or indirectly through wider economic and politically 
based union activities. in addition to, but also related to, 
improving an individual employee's economic position many workers 
join unions as an effective means of providing "conflict 
insurance". In this case the collective power of the
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union helps strengthen a worker's grievance claim where otherwise he 
would be forced to act alone against the more powerful employer (for 
example, see Van De Vail, 1970, P125).
Ohe ability of workers to organise effectively, and thereby take 
full advantage of the potential benefits offered by unionisation, 
will, in part, be influenced by the environment facing workers 
within the plant and within the LIM. In this respect monopsony will 
be important since its presence has implications for the 
distribution of economic power both within the LIM and the plant. 
One important characteristic of monopsony, and therefore to an 
extent dominance, is that in such LIMS the workforce will tend to 
both live and work in a shared environment. This may effect the 
level of unionisation in a dominant plant since in such an 
environment the degree of interaction between workers will tend to 
increase. That is, bonds between workers will strengthen as they 
develop a common identity associated with their compatible aims and 
problems, and one means of developing these common feelings is 
through joining a union. Monopsonistic plants may also display 
relatively high levels of unionisation as a result of the greater 
need for conflict insurance in such LIMs. That is, as there are 
relatively few alternative job opportunities in dominated LIMs 
workers in quasi-monopsonistic plants will be more inclined to join 
unions thereby forming an effective countervailing power to protect 
their interests against a relatively powerful opponent.
Observable differences in the level of unionisation in dominant 
plants may also reflect active campaigning by unions rather than 
simply a reaction by the workforce precipitated by environmental 
conditions (see Boraston et al, 1975), More precisely, as the 
dominant plant is the largest employer in the area, and to some 
extent the focal point of the LIM, it may become a target for union 
activities. That is, union officials may believe that if the 
dominant .plant can be successfully organised then other LIM 
employers will follow. Accordingly, union actions may serve to 
reinforce the pro-union attitude of the dominant plant workforce 
which will again result in relatively high levels of unionisation in 
such plants.
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Although there are strong arguments in favour of dominant plants 
displaying above average levels of unionisation these need not 
always prevail as there may also be monopsonistically induced 
pressures serving to restrain union activity. The economic power of 
the quasi-monopsonistic employer is one potential constraint to 
effective unionisation. in many cases if the dominant employer's 
philosophy was strongly against unionisation this would tend to 
discourage workers from becoming union members, given the limited 
employment opportunities available in the LIM outside the dominant 
plant. To overcome this barrier would involve a long process of 
attrition between worker and employer, and employees may decide that 
the costs of such industrial conflict outweigh the benefits 
associated with unionisation. A related argument is that dominant 
employers may follow personnel policies which avoid the need for 
union representation within the plant. For example, and bearing in 
mind the nature of dominance ^ employers may adopt a paternalistic 
attitude towards their workforce. Under these conditions a spirit 
of common goals rather than conflict would be engendered (see 
Norris, 1976, lane and Roberts, 1971; and Bain and Elsheikl, 1980) 
and there would be little need for unions either to promote separate 
worker aims or act as a source of conflict insurance.
In summary, there are strong arguments to suggest that dominant 
plants may display higher levels of unionisation than otherwise 
similar non-dominant plants. Such relatively high levels of
(29) In particular, Bain and Elsheikk (1980 P 176) suggest that in 
a paternalistic firm, "employees are more likely to be treated as 
individuals rather than as members of categories or groups, and 
their terms and conditions of employment are more likely to be 
determined by the personal relationship between them and their 
managers rather than by formal rules which apply impersonally to all 
employees. In such circumstances employees are less likely to be 
aware of their common interests, and the growth of trade unionism is 
likely to be retarded. in addition, paternalistic employers and 
managers are much more likely to be opposed to recognising trade 
unions in their establishments, regarding them as external bodies 
which interfere in what is essentially a private relationship 
between employer and employee."
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unionisation would probably reflect the attitudes developed whilst 
working in a monopsonistic environment and active union pressure to 
organise the key employer within the LIM. However, under certain 
circumstances the reverse may prevail and unionisation may be 
constrained in a dominant plant. This may result from the dominant 
plant exercising its economic power in resisting attempts to 
organise, or by the quasi-monopsonistic environment generating a 
conciliatory rather than a conflict relationship between the 
unorganised workforce and plant management.
3.3 The mpact of Monopsony Cn Dominant Plant Training Policies
Bnployee training programmes are one of the most widely used, 
flexible, and easily implemented methods of improving worker 
efficiency and output (for example, see Proctor and Thornton, 
1971). However, taking account of, and subsequently trying to 
explain j,the many factors conditioning an employer's training 
strategy is an extremely involved exercise. Nonetheless for 
practical purposes, and as a first step towards identifying the 
impact of monopsony on dominant plant training policies, this 
difficulty may be overcome by assuming that the single basic 
objective of a training strategy is to maximise the benefits and 
economic return to the employer from investments in human capital.
By accepting this one simplified aim it is the/v possible to 
derive an economic model of an establishment’s training policy by 
dividing human capital investment decisions into general training 
programmes and specific training programmes. General training 
relates to the investment in human capital which raises the 
productivity of the worker not only with his present employer but 
also with others in the area. Specific training, by contrast, only 
increases the. productivity of the worker in the plant providing the 
training. Each of the two categories has radically different 
implications for plant training policies and highlights the basic 
economic parameters determining an employer's training strategy, in 
particular, by distinguishing between general and specific 
investments, an employer will be able to assess both the optimal 
quantity of training required, and the allocation of training costs 
between employer and employee. For a formal exposition of the
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theory underlying this model of training see Becker (19 6f) and Blaug 
(1970) .
The distinction between general and specific investment, and the 
resultant impact on plant training decision will to some extent be 
affected by the structural characteristics of the LTM environment. 
Cne of these LIM characteristics will be the level of monopsony 
prevailing in the market, in this section the impact of monopsony 
on industrial training will be evaluated once the distinguishing 
features of general and specific training have been identified, 
since this provides the economic framework for predicting how 
monopsony may influence an employer's investment in human capital.
General training has been defined as an investment in human 
capital which increases a worker's marginal product and wage in all 
LIM establishments. Cne consequence of this characteristic is that 
an employer has no economic incentive to finance an investment in 
general training since there would be no guarantee that an employer 
could successfully amortise any investment in human capital. That 
is, under circumstances of employer financed general training the 
worker would receive a wage equal to his enhanced marginal product. 
However, as this wage would be equal to his marginal product in 
other establishments there would be a continual danger of generally 
trained workers quitting and the employer thereby forfeiting his 
investment. As a result of these market pressures rational
employers will seek to shift the cost of general training onto 
employees thereby avoiding the financial losses associated with this 
type of training. Biployees, for their part, will be willing to 
bear the cost of general training as their outlay, usually 
represented by a training period wage set below their marginal 
product, will subsequently be offset by higher earnings in future 
periods of employment.
(30) Indeed^ in a perfectly competitive LIM any employer financing 
general training would be unable to match an employee's alternative 
wage due to incurred training costs. As a result ^ an employer 
financing general training would be at a competitive disadvantage.
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Specific training differs from general training in that it only 
enhances workers' marginal productivity in establishments where the 
training is provided. This restricted applicability of specific 
training has important implications for the allocation of training 
costs between employer and employee. In contrast to the general 
training case there is no incentive for an employee to invest in 
specific training, investment in specific training does not raise 
an employee's alternative marginal product, and therefore an 
employer is not under any economic pressure from other 
establishments in the area to increase the earnings of a worker 
investing in specific training. Consequently, an employee investing 
in specific training will be unable to capture the benefits of his 
augmented, yet plant specific, marginal productivity through higher 
wages. Employers, on the other hand, will have an incentive to 
invest in specific training since, through time, they may recoup 
their investment costs by capturing the difference between the 
employees enhanced marginal product and his alternative or transfer 
wage. Investment in specific training, therefore, leads to a 
difference between the workers marginal productivity and his wage, 
with the size of the difference reflecting the extent of the 
specific training costs. In practise, however, as Pencavel (1972) 
and Blaug (1970, PP191-199) suggest, this wage differential will 
tend to be offset 1:^  employers offering a wage above the workers' 
opportunity wage rate. Employers have a clear incentive to follow 
this policy since their ability to maximise their return on specific 
training investments will also be dependent on the length of time 
the workers remain with the employer and by offering a wage above 
the LIM opportunity rate the employer, by reducing turnover, will be 
able to retain this workers over a longer period. An employer 
behaving rationally will continue to increase his wage premium until 
the marginal gain from the increased length of service equals the 
marginal cost of the increased wage bill. At the equilibrium wage 
rate the harmful effects of turnover will just be matched by the 
wage, hiring and training costs associated with the reduced turnover 
rate,
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Monopsony has important consequences for plant training policies 
since its presence effectively clouds the distinction between 
general and specific training, and thereby modifies the manner in 
which an employer evaluates his training programme, in particular^ 
the presence of monopsonistic elements will effect the allocation of 
training costs between employer and employee which, in turn, will 
have implications for the equilibrium wage offered by the 
monopsonist. Similarly, the extent of training in a plant will be 
influenced by monopsonistic considerations operating through the 
influence monoposony has on both labour turnover and wages (see 
Section 2 and Section 3.4) .
Looking first at the wage implications of monopsonistic training 
programmes involves recognising that the most important 
characteristic associated with training in a monopsonistic plant is 
the absence of truly general training where the employees' augmented 
product also raises their wage in other LIM establishments. In a 
truely monopsonistic LIM there are no alternative employers, 
therefore the employee's enhanced productivity will be restricted to 
the monopsonistic plant. in effect  ^the structure of the LIM 
dictates that training undertaken in a monopsonistic plant will be 
specific. Accordingly, the employer will fund all training 
undertaken in the plant and will subsequently recoup his investment 
by offering a wage below the employee's enhanced marginal product. 
In comparison with similar plants operating in competitive liJM's 
this implies that.
(31) For an alternative view of the allocation of training costs
and their associate 4 implications see Thurow (1975, Chapter 4). In
brief, in his job competition model of the LIM Ihurow argues that 
marginal productivity is inherent in the job and not the worker.
Ihurow states that the job competition model of labour market
behaviour will also lead to the development of well structured 
internal labour markets. As a result of both these features of LIM 
behaviour the distinction between general and specific training 
becomes a lot more hazy and the vast majority of training will be 
provided by the employer. However, rather than adopi^'plausible, but 
largely untested, approach to the problem this study adopted the 
more conventional model of training and cost allocation.
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ceteris paribus, the wages of what would normally be considered as 
generally trained workers will be lower in a monopsonistic plant. 
Ihis reasoning, therefore, supports the previously stated hypothesis 
that wages will be lower in monopsonistic plants.
Ihe economics of specific training will generally remain 
unchanged in a monopsonistic LEM with the employer financing 
training and subsequently amortising his investment by capturing the 
difference between the market wage rate and the employee's increased 
marginal product. However, in view of the restricted extent of job 
mobility characterising monopsonistic plants, the post training wage 
premium required to induce employers to remain with an establishment 
will be lower than the level required in a competitive LEM. 
Consequently, ceteris paribus, the wage of a specifically trained 
worker will be lower than that of a comparable worker employed in a 
competitive plant, Again, therefore, monopsony has a depressing 
effect on wages.
The lower level of turnover characterising monopsonistic plants 
(see below), may also influence the level of per capita training 
undertaken by the employer in that low labour turnover will increase 
the benefits to the establishment of investing in training. More 
precisely, the employer will automatically capture over a longer 
period the difference between the workers' enhanced marginal product 
and their wage. This, in turn, will provide an incentive to 
increase the optimal level of training in a monopsonistic plant 
above the level appropriate to similar non-dominant plants. 
Uhfortunately, however, the model is more complicated than this, 
since whether the extent of per capita training will be higher in a 
monopsonistic plant will also depend on the nature of the wage 
premia offered by plants in order to reduce labour turnover. That 
is, the differences between monopsonistic and competitive plants in 
the extent of per capita training may be offset by variations in the 
wage rate prevailing in each.
Although the level of per capita training of new recruits and 
specific workgroups in monopsonistic plants may be relatively high 
this need not imply that monopsony positively influences total plant
expenditure on training, indeed if monopsonistic plants are in fact 
characterised by low quit rates then the need to train new recruits
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will be reduced and this will tend to cut plant expenditure on 
training (for further details on this point see Ulman 1955, P155). 
Which of the two opposing influences effects training costs the most 
is difficult to asses. Therefore, whether an employer's total 
training bill is higher or lower under monopsonistic conditions will 
have to be resolved empirically.
Naturally, in dominated, as opposed to monopsonistic, LIM s the 
training implications associated with the monopsony model will be 
less pronounced given that other employers operate within the same 
LIM area. As a result, in dominated LIM's it will only be possible 
to observe tendencies towards the predictions offered by the 
monopsony model. Bor example, general training programmes may exist 
in dominant plants but they will be limited due to the restricted 
alternative job opportunities available to workers financing such an 
investment. Therefore, the wages of generally trained workers will 
remain lower in dominant plants. Similarly^ turnover will remain 
relatively low in dominant plants, and so this will also continue to 
depress wages. Finally , dominance may or may not increase the 
optimal level of total and per capita training in the dominant plant 
depending on which of the pressures mentioned previously are the 
most important.
3.4 The mpact of Monopsony on Dominant Plant Labour Turnover
Labour turnover is a complicated phenomenon subject to many 
diverse and complex influences including macro economic conditions, 
the personal characteristics of employees, the conditions prevailing 
within a plant, and the features of the LIM environment (for 
example, see Parsons 1977). Ihe most important component of the 
aggregate labour turnover figure is normally the quit rate 
experienced by the plant, where the quit rate is defined as the 
proportion of voluntary separations to the total workforce.
Ihe quit rate is considered to be important because it reflects the 
competitive position of an employer's benefit package as compared to
(32) Ihat is, the quit rate excludes worker retirement, 
redundancies, and other forms of employer initiatd terminations.
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other plants in the area. If the plants benefit package is 
relatively high then the quit rate will be low, and conversely if 
the plant is uncompetitive then the quit rate will be high.
Although the principal factor influencing a plant's quit rate is 
the level of net advantages offered to employees, the quit rate may 
also be affected by the structural conditions prevailing in the LIM 
and the presence of monopsony is one such structural consideration 
which may condition plant quit rates. Monopsonistic, or 
quasi-monopsonistic, conditions effectively restricts the number of 
alternative job opportunities open to workers within the LIM. As a 
result^ a monopsonistic employee may face a prolonged job search and 
its associated costs if he chose to quit, Ihis should act as a 
major disincentive to either considering alternative employment or 
leaving the plant. In addition, any employee taking a long term 
view would recognise that quitting a job in a
quasi-monopsonistic plant may effectively restrict any further job 
changes within the LIM as the monopsonist may be wary about 
recruiting an ex-employee. Bearing both these factors in mind, 
therefore, monopsony will tend to reduce an employee's propensity to 
quit relative to similar non-dominant plants operating in a 
competitive LIM. Ihe more extreme the monopsonistic influence the 
fewer the number of alternative job opportunities and the lower the 
quit rate. Ihis constraint will apply in particular to the lower 
skilled groups where geographical mobility and hence the ability to 
find jobs outside the LIM will be more difficult.
3.5 THE INTEREELATIONSHÎP BEIWEEN PERSONNEL POLICY VARIABLES AND THE 
IMPACT OF DOMINANCE
Many aspects of dominant plant personnel policy are closely 
interrelated and as a result individual components of plant 
personnel policy are rarely considered in isolation by management, 
indeed ^  most employers tend to treat personnel policy as an 
integrated system rather than as a series of discrete and isolated 
components. Consequently, and to be realistic, this approach should 
be incorporated into any model of dominant plant behaviour. Ihis is 
particularly true since analysing dominant plant personnel policy
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as an interdependent model has inportant consequences for the iinpact 
of monopsony on establishment behaviour. In particular, when all 
aspects of a plant's personnel policy are considered as an
interrelated strategy the ultimate manifestation of monopsony on an
individual variable may differ significantly from the effects 
originally hypothesised when each conponent of personnel policy was 
reviewed in isolation. 10 determine the extent to which the
original hypotheses developed above have to be revised or qualified^ 
the impact of the more obvious interrelationships between the 
different aspects of dominant plant manpower policy are considered 
below for each component of the augmented monopsony model.
The Inter-Relationship between Monopsonistic Influences: The impact
on Dominant Plant Wages. The extent to which the original low wage 
hypothesis associated with monpsony is affected by other 
monopsonistic considerations is shown in Diagram 2.3. The diagram 
shows that dominant plant wages will be influenced by three other 
factors; dominant plant training policy, the quit rate, and the
level of unionisation. As mentioned previously, and in support of 
the original hypothesis, the training policies adopted by dominant 
plants and the restricted employment alternatives characteristic of 
such LIM's will both tend to produce a depressing effect on dominant 
wages. By contrast, as monopsony may have a positive 
influence on the level of unionisation in dominant plants this 
influence may force wages upwards. Accordingly, the net effect of 
monopsony on wages is indeterminate.
DIAŒAM 2.3 THE OVERALL IMPACT OF MONOPSONY ON WAGES
Primary Monopsony Influence
Secondary Influences
Wages
QuitsTraining
Inelestic Labour supply curve 
Power of dominant plant in LIM
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The Inter -Relationship Between Monopsonistic Influences; The impact 
on Labour Shortages, introducing the interrelationship between 
monopsonistic pressures has important implications for the labour 
shortages characteristically associated with the standard monopsony 
model. Firstly, and as Diagram 2.4 shows, dominant plant training 
policies will influence labour shortages. On the basis of the 
previous analysis this will happen in two opposing ways. On the one 
hand since the dominant plant's training strategy tends to depress 
wages this will accentuate shortages. On the other hand, if the 
dominant plant has a relatively high propensity to train this will, 
to some extent, reduce shortages by increasing the quality and 
productivity of the existing workforce. Similarly, the effect of. 
the characteristically low dominant plant quit rate on shortages is 
also ambiguous since although it may produce a depressing effect on 
wages the low quit rate will also minimise the need to recruit, 
thereby indirectly easing labour shortages. The other monopsonistic 
incluences affecting shortages are more straightforward in that they 
will all probably serve to lessen the plant's labour supply 
problems. Firstly, monopsonistic pressures to unionise will tend to 
bias wages upwards and thereby in some measure help attract labour 
to dominant plants. Secondly, monopsonistically induced recruitment 
policies will help reduce shortages by improving the attraction of 
labour from outside the LIM. Finally, special arrangements with the 
local Job Centre may also help minimise labour shortages and ease 
recruitment. These last two effects may be considered as more of a 
response of dominant plants to monopsonistically taduced pressures 
rather than as secondary influences generated by the impact of 
monopsony on other variables.
D I A Œ m  2.4 THE OVERALL IMPACT OF MONOPSONY ON LABOUR SHORTAGES
Primary Monopsony Influence
Inelostic labour supply curve 
Power of dominant plant in LIM
Training Quits unionisation Recruitment
methods
Labour Shortages
Relationship 
with Job Centre
Secondary Influences Responses
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The net effect of all of these considerations makes it difficult 
to forecast whether shortages will remain a characteristic of 
dominant plants as the standard model predicts, NOt only are there 
more subtle monopsonistic pressures operating in opposing 
directions, but the response of the dominant employer to labour 
shortages may effectively disguise the underlying presence of any 
monopsonistically induced shortages.
The Inter-Relationship Between Monopsonistic Influences: The Impact
on Becruitment Methods, Monopsonistically induced recruitment 
policies were initially considered as a response to the combined 
effects of labour supply inelasticities and the related labour 
shortages. However, Diagram 2,5 suggests that before it is possible 
to reach a firm conclusion about the impact of monopsony on 
recruitment, a wider interpretation of the problen is required 
incorporating several additional influences , In particular, the 
low wage effect associated with monopsonistic training policies and 
the low quit rate may accentuate the adverse impact of monopsony on 
recruitment. However, the effect of training and turnover policies 
on recruitment makes the overall impact of monopsony less clear cut 
since these factors may serve either to generate suitable workers 
internally, or alternatively may induce workers to stay with the 
plant. The development of special relationships with the Job Centre 
is the only other additional monopsonistically induced effect 
influencing dominant plant recruitment policy. If special 
relationships develop between the Job Centre and the dominant plant 
then this will serve to reduce the impact of monopsony on 
recruitment methods, i^ain 3 developing special relationships with 
the Job Centre may be considered partly as a direct response to the 
recruitment policies faced by the plant rather than as a completely 
independent monopsonistic influence.
DIAGRm 2,5 THE OVERALL IMPACT OF MONOPSONY ON RECRUITMENT
Primary Monopsonistic Influence
Secondary Influences
WagesTraining
Recruitment Methods
Relationship 
with the Job
Centre
An inelastic labour 
supply curve 
Power of dominant plant 
in the LEM
Direct Response
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The Inter -Relationship Between Monopsonistic Influences; The mpact 
on Relations wit±i the Job Centre. The wider iirpact of monopsony on 
the relationship between the dominant plant and the local Job Centre 
is summarised in Diagram 2.6. For this aspect of dominant plant 
behaviour training policies, quit rates and recruitment strategies 
all tend to further condition the development of special 
relationships between the dominant plant and the Job Centre. In all 
cases monopsonistic influences operating on this variable act in 
the same way by tending to reduce the need for special relationships 
with the Job Centre, particularly if the adopted policies succeed in 
alleviating dominant plant recruitment problems and labour 
shortages. Accordingly^the secondary monopsonistic influences will 
tend to strengthen the arguments for the dominant plant retaining 
its independence. However, whether these additional considerations 
are sufficient to overcome the advantages associated with close 
cooperation with the Job Centre remains a priori indeterminate.
DIAG 2.6 THE OVERALL IMPACT OF MONOPSONY ON RELATIONS WITH THE JOB 
CENTRE
Primary Monopsony influence
QuitsTraining Recruitment
Special Relationship 
with Job Centre
Inelastic labour supply curve 
power of dominant plant in LIM
Secondary Influences
The Inter-Relationship between Monopsonistic Influences; The Impact 
on unionisation. The level of unionisation in dominant plants is 
one of the few areas where other monopsonistic influences appear to 
have little impact. The only factor conditioning unionisation (see 
Diagram 2.7) will be dominant plant training policies where, by 
further depressing the equilibrium wage, the employer will increase 
the tendency for employees to unionise. Hence, the impact of 
training policies on unionisation (via low wages) supports the 
original monopsony hypothesis which suggested that dominant plants 
would be characterised by high levels of unionisation.
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DIAG 2.7 THE OVERALL IMPACT OF MONOPSONY ON DOMIMNT PLANT 
UNIONISATION
Primary Monopsony influences
Training
unionisationLabour Supply Inelasticity 
Power of dominant plant in the LIM
Secondary Influence
Ihe Inter-Relationship Between Monopsonistic Influences; Ihe impact 
on Dominant Plant Training, As Diagram 2.8 shows ^  the effect of 
monopsony may influence dominant plant training programmes through 
the impact on shortages as welf^more directly through the low quit 
rate associated with monopsony. Ihat is, a dominant plant may 
decide that increasing the level of training within the plant would 
be one effective means of reducing the manpower shortages caused by 
labour supply inelasticities. If this is the case then the original 
hypothesis suggesting that dominant plants favour relatively high 
training levels will be reinforced.
DIAG 2.8 THE OVERALL IMPACT OF MONOPSONY ON TRAINING 
Primary Monopsony influence
Quits
Shortages
Training
Labour Supply Inelasticity
Secondary Influence
The Inter-relationship Between Monopsonistic Influences; Ihe Impact 
on Oiits,
Ihe one aspect of dominant plant personnel policy which is not 
subject to other monopsonistic pressures is the plant’s quit rate. 
Ihe only monopsonistic factor influencing quits remains the 
restricted availibility of alternative enployment opportunities. 
This, however, may be an over-simplification of the issues involved, 
since it may be that dominant plants, to protect their investment in 
training, may pay a premium wage above the opportunity rate thereby 
further reducing potentially wasteful turnover. Iherefore, under 
certain circumstances, dominant plant training policies will
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indirectly serve to further reduce quits. Ihis tendency reinforces 
the original hypothesis regarding the effect of monopsony on 
dominant plant quit rates.
The Interrelationships between Monopsonistic Pressures; Overall 
Conclusions, In conclusion, it should also be recognised that the 
interrelationships and consequent interaction effects operating 
between the component parts of dominant plant personnel policy 
restricts the extent to which the overall impact of monopsony may be 
predicted, identified and quantified. Moreover, as plant personnel 
policy is determined simultaneously it will be very difficult to 
accurately determine the principal causal factors influencing 
dominant plant personnel policy. At an empirical level, therefore, 
pragmatic considerations dictate that it will only be feasible to 
identify broad trends in dominant plant personnel policy by tracing 
the principal factors influenced by monopsony, and investigating the 
manner in which dominant plants react to these LIM pressures. Ihis 
approach is justifiable as there are no theoretical reasons to 
support a single theory of monopsonistic behaviour. That is, given 
the different options open to employers when faced with 
monopsonistic conditions different plants may react in different 
ways. Similarly, plants may vary their policies over time in 
response to changes in the variables affecting their decision making 
process.
(33) Although dominant plants may pay a low wage this is relative 
to otherwise similar competitive UMs and as such should not 
influence the quit rate which is determined largely by intra-LIM 
considerations.
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CHAPTER .3
THE IMPACT. OF MONOPSONY ON DOMINANT PLANT BEHAVIOUR;
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents the results of the enpirical investigation 
into dominant plant personnel policy by testing the propositions 
developed in Chapter 2 against the data collected from the dominant 
plant and control group questionnaire returns (see J^pendi x 3).
Based on the standard monopsony model, which has been enhanced to 
identify the operational characteristics of monopsony, the analysis 
attenpts to provide an explanation of the impact of dominance ^ 
bearing in mind the constraints imposed upon the analysis by the 
limited statistical base and the occasionally indeterminate and 
complex theoretical predictions. In the Chapter each of the major 
features associated with dominance jV  discussed in turn firstly by 
summarising the hypothesis being tested and then byexamining the
evidence for and against each proposition. The final section in the
Chapter draws together the empirical evidence in an attempt to 
quantify the overall impact of monopsony on dominant plant personnel 
policy.
Before analysing the questionnaire returns it is perhaps 
advisable to briefly reiterate the steps associated with developing 
an adequate control group since this will have an important bearing 
on the way in which the empirical results are interpreted and the 
level of confidence associated with the conclusions based on the 
responses. Key differences between the dominant plant and the
control group plants were examined in ippendix 3, and the principal 
conclusions developed there are summarised in Figure 3.1.
As the Figure shows there are four potentially important 
differences between the two samples and these are; differences in 
LIM size, differences in geographical location, differences in 
industrial structure and differences in the unemployment rate. As a 
result when analysing the results, and in particular trying to
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isolate monopsonistic pressures, an attempt should be made to take 
into account these additional influences. However, this will not 
always be easy since the available evidence on the differences 
between the two groups is, in part, contradictory and hence it is 
difficult to decide conclusively how best to control for these 
additional factors. Another major drawback to introducing effective 
controls is the lack of information of either a sufficient quantity 
or sufficient quality on some of the LIM variables under 
examination. Unfortunately, apart from recognising this as a 
problem there is little that can be done to improve the available 
statistics. As a result of all of these factors the only sensible 
way to proceed is to examine the evidence related to each aspect of 
personnel policy on a pragmatic basis whilst bearing in mind how 
these qualifications may modify the study's conclusions.
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONOPSONY AND DOMINANT PLANT WAGES AND 
EARNINGS
One of the fundamental predictions of the monopsony model was 
that the wage rate in a monopsonistic or quasi-monopsonistic plant 
will be lower than the level experienced by otherwise similar plants 
operating in competitive markets. The dominant plants upward 
sloping labour supply curve lies above the average wage cost curve 
and therefore the equilibrium cost of labour is reduced below the 
competitive rate.
The attempted identification of the effect of monopsony on plant 
remuneration was undertaken in three stages. Firstly ^  broad 
comparisons were made between hourly wage rates for similar work 
groups in dominant and non-dominant plants. Secondly^ the total 
earnings differential between dominant and non-dominant workers was 
examined so as to incorporate the influence of overtime,
(1) This hypothesis is subject to qualification due to possible 
secondary monopsony effects (see Chapter 2). However, in broad 
terms it would appear that the weight of theoretical considerations 
suggests that wages in the dominant plant will remain below their 
competitive equivalent.
71
shift-premia, and other incentive related payments. Finally, and in 
view of the limited nature of the quantitative data, a qualitative 
analysis of dominant plant managements' perception of their position 
in the inter-LIM and inter-industry earnings leagues was 
undertaken.
Testir^ the monopsonistic propostions on dominant plant wages 
and earnings is a difficult exercise since, in association with the 
considerable statistical problems inherent in the research, there 
are numerous variables besides monopsony which combine to determine 
the level of plant wages. For an indication of the number of 
variables involved, see Sawyer (1973) and Hood & Rees (1973).Given 
the limited number of dominant plant and control group returns it is 
not possible to standardise for all these potentially important wage 
determinants. Accordingly, in trying to identify the impact of 
monopsony only a relatively crude comparison of wages and earnings 
between the dominant plant and control group samples is feasible, 
and only then after considerable qualification.
Table 3.1 shows the reported average hourly wage for the 
dominant plant and control group for the three skill groups 
identified in the questionnaire. The results indicate that in all 
three cases the average hourly wage rate is lower in the dominant 
plant sample. The largest difference is for female manual workers 
where the basic wage of the control group is 12.5% higher than the 
average for the dominant plant sample. This difference is 
significant at a 95% level of confidence. For skilled male manual 
workers the difference is 7.3% which is also significant at the 95% 
level. For other male manuals the difference is 4.4% but this is 
not significant at any meaningful level of confidence. 
Consequently, for two out of the three skill groups the results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that monopsony has a depressing 
influence on wages.
(2) The qualitative analysis also set out to identify the most 
important determinants of wages in the dominant plant in order to 
assess the perceived importance of monopsony to the dominant 
employers when formulating wage policy and reacting to wage demands.
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TABLE 3.1 AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES IN THE IX3MINANT PLANT SAMPLE AND 
CONTROL GROUP
AVERAGE. HOURLY WAGES (PENCE)
SKILL GROUPS DOMINANT
PLANTS
CONTROL
GROUP
% DIFFERENCE IN 
HOURLY WAGE
Skilled Male Manua Ls 160 171.8 7.3% **
Other Male Manuals 138.7 144.9 4.4%
Female Manuals 126.0 140.5 12.5% **
NOTE: (i) ** equals significant at the 95% level of confidence on
one tailed t-test
TABLE 3.2 WAGES IN HIGH AND LOW DOMINANCE PLANTS
Average Hourly Wages (Pence)
Dominant
Plant
Grouping Skilled Male Manual Other Male Manual Female Manual
High Dominance Plants 151 133 126
Low Dominance Plants 170 144 125
NOTE (i) ** signifies differences significant at 95% confidence level 
(ii) * signifies differences significant at 90% confidence level
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As suggested previously, the data on hourly wages may be subject 
to a number of other influences besides monopsony which may also 
serve to reduce wages in the dominant plant sample. In an attempt 
to overcome these problems and further isolate the impact of 
monopsony the differences between wages in "high" and "low" 
dominance plants (see Table 3.2) and between coal and steel and 
other dominant plants (see Table 3.3) were examined. The
results in Table 3.2 show that there is a tendency in the skilled 
male manual and other male manual groups for high dominance plants 
to pay less than low dominance plants. In the case of skilled male 
manuals the difference is significant at the 95% confidence level, 
and for other male manuals it is significant at the 90% level. The 
small difference between the female manuals is not significant.
These figures, therefore, are also consistent with the hypothesis 
that monopsonistic pressures depress wages downwards. The results 
in Table 3.3 suggest that for male manuals the lower wage in the
dominant plant sample is not due to the concentration in coal and
steel plants. For skilled male manual workers wages are
significantly higher in coal and steel plants, whereas for other 
male manuals there is no significant difference between the two sets 
of figures. The results for female manuals different. In this 
case female wages are significantly lower in the coal and steel 
industry and this may partly help explain why female manual wages 
are significantly lower in the dominant plant sample when compared 
to the control group.
Focusrng : exclusively on dominant plant and control group hourly 
wage rates may distort the true extent of overall differences 
between the two samples as the hourly wage rate does not adequately 
reflect a plant's total benefit package. In many cases basic rates 
will be extensively supplemented by additional incentives such as 
overtime payments, shift-premia and payments related to output. The
(3) High dominance plants were defined as establishments employing 
over 22.5% of the LIM population, and low dominance plants as 
employing between 12.5% and 22.5% of the LIM. The distinction 
between steel and coal plarfe and the non-nationalised industries was 
made because the dominant plant sample is biased towards this group 
and it was felt this may hide or override monopsonistic influences
if personnel policy decisions were made centrally.
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TABLE 3.3 DOMINANT PLANT WAGES; DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COAL AND STFFr. 
PLANTS AND OTHER INDUSTRIES
Dominant
AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES (Pence)
Plant
Grouping
*
Skilled Male Manual Other Male Manual
**
Female Manual
Coal & Steel Plants 179.8 141.8 99.0
Other Plants 156.8 138.2 131.6
NOTE: (i) * equals significant at the 90% confidence level
(ii) ** equals significant at the 95% confidence level
TABLE 3.4. THE NATURE AND EXTENT . OF SUPPLEMENTARY WAGE PATENTS IN 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS
EARNINGS COMPONENT
DOMINANT PLANT SAMPLE CONTROL GROUP
SMM's OMM's EM'S SMM’s OMM's EM'S
ELEMENT FOR OVERTIME 49 49 22 62 50 42
ELEMENT FOR SHIFTWORK 62 68 30 46 42 33
ELEMENT RELATED TO 
PAYMENT-BY-RESULT
54 59 35 71 54 54
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS 37 37 37 24 24 24
NOTE; (i) the figures relate to the proportion of each sample which 
offer a particular supplement to the hourly wage rate.
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significance of these payments is summarised in Table 3.4 which 
shows in percentage terms the number of plants in each sample 
offering payments in addition to the basic hourly rate. The data 
indicates that for both the dominant plant and control group samples 
there is considerable scope in many plants to increase earnings 
above the basic weekly wage-rate, particularly for other male manual 
and skilled male manual workers. The most important incremental 
earnings element varies between the two samples. In the dominant 
plant group it is shiftwork followed by an element related to 
payment by result. For the control group sample it is payment by 
result bonuses followed by overtime payments. However, the nature 
of the additional payments is not particularly important^ the main 
point being that management has considerable scope to increase 
earnings above the level set by the wage rate.
Accordingly, to take account of these additional earnings 
components Table 3.5 incorporates the supplementary payments to 
employees giving an estimated level of total weekly earnings for 
each skill group. The figures indicate that although there appears 
to be a relationship between dominance and earnings in all skill 
groups the differences between the two samples are less pronounced 
than in the case of the wage rate calculations. A similar pattern 
(see also Table 3.5) appears when the differences between high and 
low dominance plants are considered, in that although the
earnings differentials are in the predicted direction they are not 
statistically significant. Without more data on the nature of the 
earnings components it is difficult to establish why the difference 
between the dominant plants and the control group should be reduced 
once the additional elements of pay are introduced.
One possible explanation of the reduced differences may be as a 
result of unions bargaining for inter-plant comparability through 
these additional elements of pay. This argument is strengthened by 
the tendency for unions to generally be stronger in dominant plants 
(see Section 3 . 5 ) . Similarly^the lower differential may also
(4) See also Table 3.8 which indicates that unions do make 
comparisons between plants and LIM's.
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TABLE 3.5 AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS IN THE DOMINANT PLANT AND CONTROL 
GROUPS
SKILL GROUP
AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS {£)
DOMINANT PLANTS CONTROL GROUP
Skilled Male Manual 84.9 88.3
Other Male Manual 71.9 76.9
Female Manual * 58.1 65.3
SKILL GROUP HIGH DOMINANCE LOW DOMINANCE
Skilled Male Manuals 83.9 86.1
Other Male Manuals 71.1 72.8
Female Manuals 57.7 58.5
NOra; (i) * equals significant at the 90% level of confidence.
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be as a result of active management pressure to reduce inter-plant 
earnings differences as a means of simplifying a multipfent company's 
overall bargaining system.
Although looking at earnings levels presents the total payment 
offered by plants ^  it does not necessarily provide the most 
appropriate indication of whether dominant plants are influenced by 
monopsonistic pressures. Earnings tend to fluctuate considerably 
and are sensitive to short-run variations in demand and plant 
specific overtime and shiftwork payments. By contrast the hourly 
rate measure is not as susceptible to such changes and therefore may 
provide a more accurate indication of underlying LIM pressures. 
Consequently, although the apparent impact of monopsonistic 
pressures is not so pronounced when considering earnings, the 
difference between dominant plant and control group hourly wages is 
probably sufficient to indicate that dominant plants may in fact be 
influenced by such pressures.
When trying to identify the impact of monopsony it is also 
important to take account of the extent to which earnings are 
locally determined since this, in part, will influence the freedom 
employers have to react to monopsonistic pressures. For the 
dominant plant and control group sample the situation is summarised 
in Table 3.6 which showsjfor the three skill groups under review^to 
what extent each element of total earnings is determined locally. 
The figures indicate that although earnings in the control group are 
generally determined at plant level there is still sufficient 
flexibility within the dominant plant group to allow management to 
react to monopsonistic pressures. This is
(5) One element of the benefit package not yet discussed » but where 
dominant plants appear to offer better provision than the control 
groupais in the provision of fringe benefits. As Table 2 in 
^pendix 17 shows, 70% of dominant plants stated that they offered 
more extensive fringe benefits than other firms. This compares with 
only 30% in the control group sample. This tendency may well 
reflect the more paternalistic nature of the dominant plants (see 
Norris, 1976). Unfortunately, the paucity of the data and the 
complexity of the fringe benefits makes it difficult to accurately 
quantify this effect and therefore estimate whether it compensates
for other factors.
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TABLE 3.6. THE . PROPORTION OF DOMINANT AND OONTRQL GROUP PLANTS WHERE 
EARNINGS OQMPONENTS ARE DETERMINED LOCALLY
ELEMENT OF PAY 
STRUCTURE
DOMINANCE PLANT SAMPLE 
(% of plants)
COraOL GROUP 
(% of plants)
SMM CMM EM SMM OMM EM
Basic Rate 43 51 49 70 70 70
Overtime Rate 30 27 27 35 35 35
Shift Premia 30 27 27 43 48 43
Production Bonuses, 
Incentive Bonuses, TBR
68 70 68 78 78 78
Total Number of 
Observations
37 37 37 24 24 24
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particularly true in the case of the basic wage rate and bonuses 
related to p r o d u c t i o n . I n  addition to this, it should also be 
remembered that although earnings may be centrally determined, this 
does not necessarily imply that headquarters * staff will not take 
into account local conditions and therefore monopsonistic 
considerations. This view was supported when a comparison was drawn 
between plants whose wages were determined locally and those where 
wages were negotiated nationally. In both cases, and for all skill 
groups, the apparent monopsony effect was equally strong in the 
nationally determined sub-group.
Although the result of the quantitative analysis on balance appears 
to be consistent with the original monopsony hypothesis the figures 
have to be treated with caution.Since the samples are small it is 
difficult to adequately standardise for the effect of other 
variables, including either occupational differences or variations 
in labour quality within a specific skill group. Similarly, 
locational and industrial differences and variations in general 
demand are not included in the analysis and this may also threaten 
the validity of the the results. More specifically, since the 
dominant plant sample appears to be concentrated in the assisted 
areas and in more depressed areas this may in part explain the 
relatively low level of wages and earnings in that group. 
Nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest that demand pressures, 
as measured by LUVi unemployment rates, are lower in the dominant 
plant group.
A further drawback associated with the statistical approach to 
wage and earnings comparisons is that it does not take account of 
whether the sample plants have incorporated current wage-round 
agreements into their earnings e s t i m a t e s . T o  overcome this 
problem Table 3.7
(6) Note that the relatively high elements of local flexibility may 
partly explain why the differences between the dominant plant and 
control group samples is higher for wages than earnings. Note also 
that the more centralised wage determination policies followed by 
the dominant plant samples may in part reflect the non-local wage 
determination policies followed by the coal and steel industries.
(7) This may tend to push domiinant plant wages downwards as many of
the establishments are located in relatively small self-contained 
LIM%isolated from major industrial areas where the settlement and 
diffusion of wage settlements may be faster.
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TABLE 3.7 QUALITATIVE INTRA-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS OF EARNINGS LEAGUE POSITION 
FOR DOMINANT PLANTS
Position in Earnings League
DOMINANT PLANT SAMPLE
Skilled Male 
Manuals (%)
Other Male 
Manuals (%)
Female 
Manuals (%)
Amongst the highest 9 9 9
Above average 23 21 25
About average 41 44 50
Below Average 18 18 6
Amongst the lowest 0 0 0
Don't know 9 8 9
Total Number of observations 34 (100) 34 (100) 32 (100)
NOTE (i) No significant CHISQ differences recorded
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presents a qualitative and more subjective analysis of dominant 
plant earnings relative to other plants operating in the same 
industry but in a different location. The results for all
skill groups indicate that there is a wide variation in perceived 
levels of earnings between dominant plants and other compatible 
enployers. However, a significant proportion of dominant plants 
consider that they pay about average for the industry. This may at 
first appear to refute the monopsony hypothesis. However, 
considering that the dominant plants are probably well above the 
average size of plant in the industry, and this influence will 
probably push their earnings upwards (see Chapter 4), the 
qualitative analysis whilst not directly supporting the monopsony 
hypothesis does not refute it.
In addition to both qualitative and quantitative attempts to 
identify monopsonistic pricing policies through the direct 
comparison of wages and earnings in broadly compatible plants the 
questionnaire also sought to identify monopsonistic influences by 
asking employers to rank the most important determinants of 
earnings. The results of the exercise are presented in Table 
3.8. From the table the most important influences on plant
(8) The plant's assessment of its position in the earnings league 
is not totally subjective as many plants are well informed about 
earnings relativities. For example, as Table 3 in ^pendix 17 shows 
50% of dominant plants carried out wage surveys into firms operating 
in the same industry outside the LIM and many others collected 
similar information from trade association data.
(9) Unfortunately j,given the nature of the questionnaire it is not 
possible to explicitly introduce size and therefore develop more 
meaningful comparisons. As a proxy though, and as Table 5.1 in 
Chapter 5 shows, within the LIM a lot more dominant plants consider 
themselves to be above the market wage rate when compared to smaller 
firms. Although not reported, note also that the control group 
earnings tend to be slightly more biased towards the top of the 
earnings league. The same applies when the dominant plant group is 
split into low dominance and high dominance sub-groups (see ^pendix 
20 Table 1). However, in both cases the differences are 
insignificant.
(10) The determinants of earnings in the control group are also 
broadly similar. Note also that in this and other statements the 
respondents were asked to mark how important a particular factor was 
according to a loosely defined index running from "very important"
to "not important". This will have been subjectively answered and 
therefore introduces a degree of imprecision into the results.
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TABLE 3.8 THE PRINCIPAL DETERMINANTS OF EARNINGS IN DOjyaNANT PLANTS
IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS DETERMINANTS
DETERMINANT OF 
EARNINGS
VERY
IMPORT.
(%)
IMPORT.
{%)
QUITE
IMPORT.
(%)
OF LITTLE 
IMPORT.
(%)
NOT
IMPORT.
(%)
NO. OF 
OBSERV.
Labour recruitment 
and retention proble 
caused by the action 
other plants in the 
area
ms
of
9 18 21 23 29
37
(100)
The earnings of othe 
firms corrpeting in t 
same product market
r
he
15 15 12 24 33
37
(100)
Union pressure for 
comparability with 
other firms in the 
area 0 14 26 34 26
37
(100)
Union pressure for 
conparability with 
firms in the same 
industry but a 
different LIM 15 15 18 23 29
37
(100)
Union pressure for 
conparability with 
other plants in the 
same Company 24 18 24 12 21
37
(100)
Union pressure for 
comparability with 
other firms not in 
the same area or 
industry 0 3 10 38 48
37
(100)
Government incomes 
policy 85 12 6 0 3
37
(100)
The cost of 
living 35 32 11 3 5
37
(100)
NOTE (i) The figures in each cell relate to the percentage of the sanple 
falling into each category.
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earnings are, not surprisingly, government incomes policy and the 
cost of living ^  both of which are determined by macro-economic 
conditions. However, even at a more disaggregated level there is 
little evidence that monopsony is an inportant determinant of 
earnings. The only factor specified in the table where monopsony 
may have an influence is in union behaviour. That is, dominant 
plant unions when tryng to influence wages tend to make comparisons 
with industry rates and those of other plants in the Company. By 
contrast (and although for brevity the results are not shown in the 
table) control group plants tend to make comparisons within the 
LIM. A tactic few dominant plants favour.
In conclusion,it appears that the quanitfc«éive evidence is by and 
large consistent with the hypothesis that monopsony depresses 
wages. This seems to be particularly true for the hourly wage rate 
estimates, both when the dominant plant returns were compared to the 
control group, and when the high dominance plants were compared to 
the low dominance plants within the dominated sample. Although the 
qualitative analysis is also largely consistent with the standard 
monopsony hypothesis the available evidence is not as conclusive. 
Despite the consistency of these results they cannot be accepted 
without major qualifications regarding the accuracy of the data and 
the adequacy of the controls.
3. THE. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN. MONOPSONY AND DOMINANT PLANT LABOUR 
SHORTAGES
A second basic proposition of the original monopsony model was 
that monopsonistic plants will inherently face labour shortages 
since the inelasticity of the labour supply curve leads to job 
vacancies in situations of plant wage equilibrium. Labour shortages 
will become particularly evident when labour demand is; high and the 
inelasticity of the labour supply curve becomes more 
pronounced. In practice, however, this statement has to be
(11) In this case the differences are significantly different from the 
control group at the 95% confidence level, and this does not seem to 
reflect structural differences between the two samples.
(12) This statement may be difficult to reconcile with the dominant 
plant offering the highest level of wage within the LIM (see Chuter 
5). However, as dominant plants also tend to recruit workers of the 
highest quality the apparent contradiction is at least partly resolved.
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significantly qualified to take account of both the indirect impact 
of other monopsonistic pressures and the dominant plant's réponse 
to LIM supply inelasticities. The net result being that, a priori/ 
it is not possible to establish theoretically whether dominant 
plants will face persistent labour shortages.
To some extent the proposition that dominant plants will face 
labour shortages is borne out by the questionnaire evidence as Table 
3.9 illustrates. As expectedj,and on the basis of previous research, 
the most serious shortages appear in the skilled male manual group, 
with 79% of the dominant plant sample experiencing skill shortages 
over the past two years. However, the figures for the other work 
groups are significantly lower with only 27% of the plants 
experiencing a shortage of other male manual employees, and 11% of 
plants reporting a shortage of female manuals. The latter results 
reflect the depressed state of the UK labour market and the relative 
abundance of unemployed semi-skilled and unskilled labour.
In relative terms, and despite the widespread dominant plant 
shortage of skilled male workers and the intermittent recruitment 
difficulties for other work groups, shortages are surprisingly more 
acute in the control group of non-dominant plants (see Table 3.9). 
For skilled male manual workers 83% of the control group experienced 
shortages over the previous two years. For non-skilled male manuals 
the figure was 40% and for female manuals the proportion fell to 
20%. Therefore, in all three categories shortages were more 
prevalent in the control group plants. These differences, however, 
were not significant at any meaningfully high confidence level. A 
similar pattern emerges when the differences between the high and 
low dominance sub-groups are concerned in that shortages are more 
prevalent in the low dominant group (see Table 3.10), although these 
differences are again not statistically significant.
Reinforcing the pattern of more acute shortages in the control 
group. Table 3.11 shows that the skill shortages also appear to be 
of a more persistent nature in the control group. This is 
especially evident in the case of skilled workers where 90% of the 
control group plants suffered from long-term skill shortages
compared to 61% of the dominant plant re^ondends. This difference
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TABLE 3.9 THE IDENTIFICATION OF. SKILL SHORTAGES FACED BY PLANTS IN THE 
PREVIOUS TWO YEARS
Recruitment Difficulty
Dominant Plant 
Group
Control Group
SMM CMM EM SMM OMM FM
Proportion of Plants 
experiencing no difficulty
22 73 78 17 60 80
Proportion of Plants 
experiencing some difficulty
79 27 11 83 40 20
Total No. of Observations 37
(100)
37
(100)
33
(100)
24
(100)
20
(100)
20
(100)
TABLE .3.10 - LABOUR SHORTAGES: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW
DOMINANCE SUB-GRQUPS
RECRUITMENT DIFFICULTY
HIGH DOMINANCE LOW DOMINANCE
SMM OMM FM SMM om FM .
Proportion of Plants 
experiencing no difficulty
25 69 93 19 76 83
Proportion of Plants 
experiencing some difficulty
75 31 7 81 24 17
Total Number of Observations 16
(100)
16
(100)
15
(100)
21
(100)
21
(100)
18
(100)
NOTE; (i) No significant differences between the two samples were 
identified.
TABLE 3.11 THE PERSISTENOB OF SKILL SHORTAGES
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Nature of Shortages
Dominant Plant 
Sample
Control Group
SMM* OMM EM* SMM* OMM EM*
Proportion of plants 
experiencing temporary 
shortages
32 25 8 5 26 28
Proportion of plants 
experiencing persistent 
shortages
61 18 0 . 90 26 6
Proportion of plants 
experiencing no recruitment 
difficulty
6 57 92 5 47 67
Total No. of Observations 31 28 25 20 19 18 
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
NOTE (i) * denotes differences significant at the 90% level of 
confidence.
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is significant at the 90% confidence level. This pattern is 
supported, although not to the same extent, by the results for the 
other two groups. Just over 52% of the non-dominant plants suffered 
from some form of shortages for non-skilled male manuals compared to 
43% in the dominant plant sample. Similarly ^  33% of this group 
reported persistent or temporary female manual shortages, whereas 
only 8% of the dominant plants faced this problem.
There are several possible explanations of why the control group 
sample has experienced more serious labour shortages when compared 
to the dominant plant group. One possible reason may be that the 
level of unemployment is lower in non-dominated LIMs, and therefore 
the more difficult it is to recruit under these circumstances. 
Unfortunately, accurate unemployment data for the control group of 
LIMs was not readily available to establish conclusively whether 
this may have had a bearing on the impact of shortages. Nonetheless^ 
using the regional proxy adopted in Fig A 3.9 of Appendix 3 it does 
not appear to be the case that demand is lower in the dominant plant 
group. However, and counter to this, the industrial and locational 
structure of the questionnaire respondents does support the idea of 
higher level of demand in the control group sample as the dominant 
plants are concentrated to a greater extent in declining industries 
and regions (see Appendix 3).
Another reason why dominant plants appear to suffer less from 
labour shortages is that their quasi-monopsonistic position within
(13) One possible reason wl^ skill shortages may be less prevalent 
in the dominant plant sample relates to the size distribution of 
plants in LLMc,. In quasi-monopsonistic LIM s the dominant plant, 
because of its relative size, will tend to pay a relatively high 
wage rate (see Chapter 4 and also Bronfenbrenner, 1956), This in 
turn will attract workers towards the large dominant plant and help 
reduce the extent of labour shortages in the plant. The labour 
shortages, therefore, will be transmitted to the smaller^ lower wage 
plants within the LIM. By contrastj in more competitive LIMs there 
is no reason to suggest that the control group plants are also LIM 
wage leaders. Accordingly, the same pattern need not be repeated 
and shortages will not necessarily be alleviated. That is, inter- 
LIM differences in the plant size hierarchy may produce differences
between dominant plant and control group behaviour which will help 
explain the different shortage levels.
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Tto
the LIM probably allows them''plan their manpower strategy within an 
environment where they can exercise a significant amount of 
influence. In particular, dominant plants can probably implement 
their labour market policies without the immediate threat of serious 
competition for marpower, or the disruption of their plans by 
equally powerful neighbours.
A paternalistic attitude towards workers, which may be another 
trait of dominant plant management, is another possible explanation 
of the relatively low level of shortages in dominant plants.
That is, the dominant plant philosopl^ may be to provide additional 
security to the workforce whilst reducing the high level of 
alienation commonly associated with large plants. As a result of 
this policy the dominant plant working environment may be enhanced 
and the tendency towards labour shortages subsequently reduced. 
Unfortunately, owing to the sensitivities of the issues involved it 
was difficult to collect information on the relationship between 
paternalism and dominant plant management philosophy. Indeed where 
this was attempted in the questionnaire the responses were not of 
sufficient quality to analyse with any confidence.
Although dominant plant and control groups both suffer from 
labour shortages this may reflect quite different pressures, as the 
prior investigation into the differing levels of shortages 
suggests. Accordingly, when the causes of labour shortages are 
examined in more detail it may be that monopsonistic pressures are 
more prevalent within the dominant plant sample although they are 
not necessarily manifested in more acute shortages.
The principal causes of labour shortages in the ■ dominant and 
control group plants are summarised in Table 3 . 1 2 . Not
(14) Shortages in dominant plants may also be alleviated if plants 
develop close ties with the local Job Centre. This aspect of 
dominant plant behaviour is examined in more detail in the section 
in this chapter on recruitment.
(15) See Norris (1976) for a summary of the arguments. Note also 
from the previous section on earning that dominant plants seem to
offer a higher level of fringe benefits both in relation to the LIM 
and the control group.
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surprisingly the two most important causes of labour shortages
within the dominant plant category are; a general rise in the level 
of demand for the shortage category, cited by 46% of the respondents 
as a very important cause of recruitment difficulties; and the poor 
quality of the unemployed, a very important cause of recruitment 
problems in 42% of cases. However, and of more interest and 
relevance, are the secondary causes of labour shortages identified 
by the respondents as this is where the consequences of dominating 
the LIM begin to emerge more clearly. In particular^ the third most 
important cause of labour shortages for dominant plant is the
constraining influence of the small size of the LIM, a factor
mentioned by 33% of the plants as a very important contribution to 
labour shortages. In addition, other factors more indirectly 
associated with monopsony also appear to be important determinants 
of labour shortages. For example, local firms not contributing 
sufficiently to training was cited as a factor contributing to 
shortages by 31% of respondents. Similarly, 21% of dominant
plant employers found that shortages were generated by employees
attracted to other LIMs by higher wages. One factor associated with 
monopsony which had little impact on shortages was any difficulty 
associated with the journey to work, as this was only mentioned by 
the dominant plant respondents as an important contributing factor 
in 13% of the c a s e s . T o  some extent, therefore, these
(16) To explain the relative importance of the different reasons for 
shortages the table illustates on an index of one to five the 
relative importance of the potential explanations of the observed 
labour shortages. It should be borne in mind, however, that the
interpretation of the index by the redondants must again be
subjective. There fore ^ within the framework of a questionnaire it is 
not possible to devise a completely accurate and objective
interpretation of the cause of labour shortages. Nonetheless, the 
figures in the table should provide sufficiently unambiguous and 
accurate answers to the principal cases of dominant plant
recruitment problems.
(17) See Chapter 3, Section 3 for a summary of the hypothesis 
involved here.
(18) All other non monopsonistic "very important" determinants of 
labour shortages were ranked as follows; the anti-social hours 
involved in working in dominant plants 32% of respondants; labour 
attracted away by other LIM employers, 23% of redondants; and
housing problems, 17% of the repondent s. All other explanations of 
labour shortages were of minor importance.
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figures support the hypothesis that quasi-monopsonistic conditions 
do induce labour shortages within dominant plants.
In analysing the data for the control group the explanations of 
shortages are broadly similar (see also Table 3.12)^although a more 
detailed examination of the figures indicates that monopsonistically 
induced shortages are not as prevalent in the control group.
The level of demand and the low quality of the unemployed are again 
the most important causes of labour shortages. Similarly, the 
secondary causes of recruitment difficulties are broadly the same as 
identified in the dominant plant group. However, in all cases where 
shortages may be either directly or indirectly attributed to 
monopsony their impact is stronger in the dominant plant sample. In 
more specific terms the dominant plant sample suffer more from 
shortages caused by employees attracted away from the area by higher 
pay; the small size of the LIM; the tendency for some firms not to 
contribute sufficiently to training; and the journey-to-work 
difficulties posed for potential employees. However, on an isolated 
basis the extent of these differences between the two groups are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the impact of monopsony does 
not provide either an important or distinguishing explanation of 
labour shortages in dominant plants. This is not really surprising 
given the small size of the samples and the tendency for 
monopsonistic considerations to be swamped by other factors.
In support of the results presented in Table 3.12, Table 3.13 
summarises the causes of recruitment difficulties but this time 
analyses the high dominance and low dominance sub-groups 
separately. The results are broadly the same as the preceding 
analysis with monopsonistic influences relegated to secondary causes 
of recruitment difficulties. Nonetheless jonce again the figures 
show that monopsonistic pressures appear to be marginally stronger 
in the high dominance sub-group, although the results are again not 
statistically significant.
(19) This is even more surprising considering that the extent of the 
shortages are at least as high in the control group and hence if 
anything this should have made the use of all recruitment methods
more intensive in the control group.
13 THE EXPIARflTICK CP EECRtJITOEKT DIFFICDLmS; CIFFEKEMCES BETOEEM HIGH AND LCW CCMINflNŒ SGE-GROOPS
BIGS CCUZKASCE SUB-GECDP - LCMCCMINANŒ SUB-CBCQP
LABCOR SQCRCAOES V IMPT QDITE IMPT NOT IMFT TQEAI 
NO GE
V IMPT Con-E IMPT NOT IMPT TOTAL 
NO OF
1 2 3 4 5 CBS 1 2 3 4 5 CBS
s attracted 
n area by high pay 23.1 0 0 23.1 53.8
13
(100) 5.9 11.8 17.6 23.5 41.2
17
(100)
s attracted 
3ther local
3 15.4 7.7 30.8 7.7 38.5
13
(100) 5.9 17.6 41.2 29.4 5.9
17
(100)
:e o£ local 
irket 7.7 23.1 38.5 15,4 15.4
13
(100) 17.6 17.6 29.4 11.8 23.5
17
(100)
zaX firms 
ributing to
8.3 16.7 16.7 16.7 41.7
13
(100) 17.6 17.6 11.8 17.6 35.3
17
(100)
brictions 
5 to increase 
=Fiy 0 0 0 8.3 91.7
12
(100) 11.1 0 0 5.6 83.3
18 ; 
aoo)
a training 
local skill
0 8.3 0 16.7 76.0
12
(100) 0 0 0 12.5 87.5
16
(100)
txe training 
îd to local
8.3 8,3 16.7 8,3 58.3
12
(100) 0 0 6.2 12.5 81.2
16
(100)
Lse in denand 
?pe of
15.4 30.8 15.4 15.4 23.1
13
(100) 22.2 22.2 27.8 11.1 16.7
18
(100)
recruits 
irking in
IS 0 8.3 0 33.8 58.3
12
(100) 0 0 17.6 23.5 58.8
17
aoo)
Lves anti-
ITS 7.7 23.1 15.4 15.4 38.5
13
(100) 10.5 21.1 15.8 21.1 31.6
19
aoo)
I are
' unfit for
i 0 0 9.1 27.3 63.6
11
(100) 11.8 5.9 17.6 11.8 52.9
17
(100)
i 2ire of
■ty 0 54.5 25.0 16,7 8.3-
12
(100) 10.5 45.5 36.8 15.8 10.5
19
(100)
tract new 
ecause of 
rohlans 15.4 7.7 0 38.5 38.5
13
(100) 0 11.8 11.8 5.9 70.6
17
(100)
o  work 
; for
enployees 15.4 7.7 7.7 38.5 30.8
13
(100) 5.9 0 11.8 23.5 58.8
17
(100)
the figures in each cell relate to the percentage ot the sample falling into each category between the dominant 
plant and the control group. None of the differences between the two groups is significant
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The policies adopted by dominant plants to ease recruitment 
difficulties to some degree also reflect the impact of monopsony on 
dominant plant behaviour. However, as with the earlier analysis, 
monopsonistic considerations do not feature prominently in the 
employers' strategy for easing labour shortages. Table 3.14 shows
that the principal methods employed to ease recruitment difficulties 
are: the use of more overtime, preferred fcy 68% of firms; investment
in labour saving equipment, used by 57% of firms; increased
apprentice recruitment also favoured by 57% of firms; and training, 
used by 54% of firms. None of these policies relates directly to 
the impact of monopsony on shortages. Débité these results,
policies geared to overcome monopsonistic recruitment difficulties, 
that is problems caused by the inelasticity of the firms labour 
supply curve, were used more frequently by the dominant plants when 
compared to the strategies adopted by the control group. This 
applied to actively attracting employees from outside the local 
area, using the Employment Transfer Scheme, and transferring
employees from other branches of the company. However, although the 
nature of the effect was in the predicted direction the size of the 
effect in each case was statistically insignificant.
To summarise the results of the analysis into labour shortages 
it would appear that the evidence to some extent refutes the 
original hypothesis that labour shortages will be more serious in 
quasi-monopsonistic LIMs. That is, although labour shortages are 
often present in dominant plants they are relatively more serious in 
the control group. However, this need not refute the hypothesis 
that dominant plants inherently face labour shortages, rather the 
observed pattern may reflect other differences between the dominant 
plant and control group sampleé- Alternatively, it may suggest that 
the dominant plants are in fact better able and more experienced in
(20) These policies are generally favoured by employers since they 
are flexible, reversible, relatively inexpensive and generally 
produce a relatively quick reduction in shortages facing the 
employer.
(21) Distinguishing between high and low dominance sub-groups there 
is also a tendency, although it is again not statistically
significant, for the high dominance groups to favour easing 
recruitment by trying to reduce the labour supply curves in 
elasticity.
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table 3.14 THE METHODS ADOPTED TO EASE RECRÜI1MENT DIFFICULTIES
Percentage of Sample Adopting 
Method to Ease Recruitment 
Difficulty
Method used to ease 
recruitment difficulties
Dominant Plant 
Sample Control Group
Increasing apprentice recuitment 57 58
Increasing training in firm 54 75
I^rading less skilled employees 43 54
Reducing standards required by recruits 13 4
Subcontracting work 43 33
Investing in labour saving equipment 57 54
Using more overtime 68 50
Using part-time employees 22 12
Using seasonal or temporary arployees 19 29
Using retired employees 11 21
Transferring from other branches 
of the company 19 12
Increasing relative earnings for 
particular groups
13 25
Improving working conditions 40 46
Attracting employees from outside 
the local area 43 37
Using the Employment Transfer Scheme 24 21
Others 8 0
note (i) None of the differences between samples are significant at the 
95% level of confidence.
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coping with labour shortages. The available evidence on the
underlying causes of plant shortages and the methods adopted by the 
employers to overcome these shortages both to some extent support 
this contention, although because of statistical and data 
limitations it is not possible to demonstrate this conclusively and 
without qualification.
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONOPSŒY.AND.DOYENANT PLANT RECRUITMENT 
METHODS
In theory monopsonistic considerations should also condition 
management's attitude and strategy towards recruitment (see Chapter 
2, Section 3)• In particular labour supply inelasticities will tend 
to force dominant plants to recruit outside the LIM. As a result, 
and in terms of available recruitment policies, practical 
considerations suggest that dominant plants will tend to favour
advertising in the national press, notifying vacancies to Job
Centres in other areas, and using the Employment Transfer Scheme. 
Dei^ite this, however, it is not expected that monopsonistic 
influences need figure prominently in the dominant plant's
recruitment strategy. In the main^^dominant plants, in common with 
other similar but non-dominated employers, will tend to favour
relatively more passive and less expensive means of recruiting 
labour. Accordingly monopsonistic influences on dominant plant
recruitment should only constitute a secondary influence on the 
employers attitude towards hiring. Nonetheless, monopsonistic 
influences may become more important as labour market conditions
tighten and employers are forced to adopt a more active and 
resource-intensive approach towards recruitment.
To identify and quantify the impact of monopsony on dominant 
plant behaviour, and in more general terms the overall recruitment 
strategy adopted by dominant employers, this section begins by 
presenting the questionnaire evidence on the principal recruitment 
policies used by dominant plant. Subsequently, the effect of
monopsony is discussed explicitly by relating the questionnaire
responses to the previously developed theoretical propositions. The
(22) See the sections in this chapter on dominant plant recruitment 
and training for further evidence on this.
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effect of changes in the level of labour demand on dominant plant 
recruitment policy is also considered to establish whether the 
impact of monopsony fluctuates depending on conditions in the LIM.
4.1 General Recruitment Considerations
The recruitment methods adopted by the dominant plants in the 
six months prior to questionnairing are presented in Table 
3.15. In general the results support the hypotheses developed
in Chapter 3 on the dominant plants’ overall attitude towards 
recruitment. In particular, and as predicted, the table shows very 
clearly the importance to many dominant plants of passive 
recruitment methods when hiring each skill group. The most favoured 
methods used by the dominant plant were; recruiting on-spec 
applicants, drawing from a list of previous applicants, accepting 
recommendations from previous employees, and upgrading, training and 
transferring existing employees. Complimenting these methods on a 
more active formal basis the dominant plants also useci advertising in 
the local press as an important recruitment channel for skilled male 
manual workërs. This pattern of recruitment by the dominant
(23) In this case "recruitment methods" means the approach adopted 
by the plant when hiring labour. Obviously it is not a perfect 
measure of a firm's recruitment policy since it does not measure 
either the success or intensity of the different options open. 
Nonetheless, it does seem a reasonable proxy to adopt given the 
purpose of the study.
(24) Perhaps one of the more surprising features of Table 3.15 is 
the unimportance of wages as a means of encouraging recruitment. 
One reason why there should be such a marked reluctance to use wage 
for recruitment is the operations of an incomes policy at the time 
of questionnairing which in effect severly restricted the ability of 
employers to improve their position in the wage hierarchy. 
Nonetheless, besides the impact of incomes policy there are other 
reasons why wages would not be considered as an effective means of 
recruitment and these include:
- the fear of initiating a wage spiral between competing employers.
- the possibility of disturbing sensitive plant wage differentials 
which may result in cumulative bidding and LIM instability.
- wages are an expensive recruitment method since the marginal 
cost of recruitment rises more rapidly than the supply price.
- wage negotiation procedures are usually subject to a decision 
making process outside normal considerations associated with
recruitment.
For a more comprehensive discussion on this subject see Fogarty, 
().965>
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TABLE 3.15 AN ANALYSIS OF RECRUITMENT METHODS USED IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS
RECRUITMENT METHOD
Percentage number of Plants Using 
Recruitment Methods
Dominant Plant 
Sample
Control Group
SMM CMM EM SMM OMM EM
Advertise in local press 70 24 19 75 46 42
Advertise in national press 27 3 3 17 0 0
Notify vacancy to local Job 
Centre/Tinployment Office 92 89 76 83 79 71
Notify Job Centres in other 
area 46 19 11 37 12 8
Use Employment Transfer Scheme 16 5 0 8 0 0
Contact Skill Centre 13 11 3 17 29 12
Contact schools/technical 
colleges 22 13 8 37 12 12
Use private enployment agency 5 3 0 29 4 4
Take on-spec applicants 65 73 49 58 67 50
Use list of previous 
applicants 68 62 54 46 46 46
Contact fonner enployees 19 16 16 17 12 21
Recaimendation from existing 
employees 54 54 49 62 67 54
Opgrade/train/transfer 
existing enployees 59 70 43 67 67 58
Offer higher earnings than 
other local employers 5 11 11 8 4 • 4
Other Methods 8 8 3 17 12 8
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plants suggests that LIM conditions are relatively slack and there 
is little need to use more expensive recruitment policies to meet 
the company's requirements.
Another of the more striking features of the table is the
different attitudes and levels of activity adopted by the dominant 
plants when recruiting different skill groups. In particular, for
all the widely used recruitment methods the dominant plant sample
recruits skilled male manual workers most actively, in that this is 
the group where each recruitment method is most used. Other male 
manuals are the second most actively recruited workers, with female 
manuals the least sought after group. For example, 70% of the
dominant plant sample favoured advertising in the local press when 
recruiting skilled male manuals, whereas the proportion fell to 24% 
in the case of other male manuals, and for female manuals the figure 
was still lower at 19%. Referring back to the analysis of labour 
shortages this recruitment pattern probably reflects the variation 
in the extent of shortages felt by the dominant plant for the skill 
groups under consideration, and supports the hypothesis that an 
employer will recruit most actively where labour shortages are most 
acute.(25)
The principal recruitment policies adopted by the control group 
sample follow a pattern very similar to the methods adopted by the 
dominant plants, and indeed there are no statistically significant 
differences between the two groups. Again the accent is on 
recruiting skilled male manual workers where shortages are most 
prevalent. Similarly the control group also relies heavily on the 
same passive and relatively inexpensive methods of recruiting labour
(25) Bearing in mind the continued presence of labour shortages the 
evidence from the recruitment table shows that although the dominant 
employer uses specialised recruitment methods to overcome the 
problem of labour shortages this is not always totally successful. 
These results tend to support the contention of Devine (1969) (see 
Chapter 2) that although monopsonists may substitute non-wage costs 
to overcome labour shortages the characteristics associated with 
monopsony remain and continue to frustrate the dominant plant. For 
any combination of wage and non-wage hiring costs the resultant 
minimum average cost curve will still be positively biased with the
associated MCC lying above it. The net result being that labour 
shortages and wages below competitive rates will continue to prevail.
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whenever possible. This pattern is as expected given that the 
fundamental determinants of recruitment policy are the same for both 
the control group and the dominant plant samples.
4.2 Monopsonistic Considerations
Although the principal determinants of dominant plant 
recruitment policies do not in general reflect monopsonistic 
pressures this does not apply to the same extent to the secondary 
recruitment channels used by dominant plants. In this case, as 
Table 3.15 shows, the impact of monopsony is more in evidence. This 
is particularly true for skilled male manual workers where shortages 
are more prevalent and workers are corre^ondingly more difficult to 
recruit. The most popular recruitment channel used to overcome 
possible monopsonistic pressures and LIM supply inelasticities is 
the notification of job vacancies to Job Centres in other areas. 
For skilled male manuals 46% of dominant plants used non-local Job 
Centres to augment their labour catchment area. This proportion 
fell to 19% for other male manuals and to 11% for female manuals. 
The preference for this method of extending the LIM reflects the low 
cost associated with recruiting through the Job Centre. Advertising 
in the national press and using the Employment Transfer Scheme are 
additional, although less important, recruitment methods used by 
dominant plants to overcome LIM supply inelasticities.
In support of the hypothesis that monopsony influences dominant 
plant recruitment policies Table 3.15 also shows the extent to which 
the control group adopts recruitment methods able to extend their 
labour catchment area. In each case the control group plants make 
proportinately less use of recruitment methods which may help 
overcome monopsonistic constraints. However, the individual 
differences are not statistically significant, which is not really 
surprising given the limited sample size and the probability that 
the recruitment methods in question are not exclusively used to 
overcome monopsonistic pressures. The overall impact of monopsony 
is more clearly illustrated if the recruitment policies associated 
with dominance are aggregated as in Table 3.16. The table shows 
that when all monopsonistic policies are
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considered together the differences become more pronounced. This 
holds for all three skill groups but i.s particularly marked in the 
case of Skilled Male Manuals.(26)
TABLE 3.16 THE OVERALL IMPACT OF MONOPSONY ON DOMINATED PLANT 
RECRUITMENT
Dominant Plant Control Group
Skilled Other Skilled Other
Male Male Female Male Male Female
Manuals Manuals Manuals Manuals Manuals Manuals
Use.of ... ■
Monopsonistically
Based 33 10 5 15 3 2
Recruitment
methods (30) (9) (5) (21) (4) (3)
Note (i) The unbracketed figures are the total number of times 
monopsonistic methods are "used" to recruit workers.
(ii) The bracketed figures are calculated as proportion of the 
maximum possible use of each method.
Although the above evidence is consistent with monopsonistic 
pressures in some measure it could also be explained by the limited 
size and relatively high self-containment associated with dominated 
LIMs (see ^pendix 2 and Chapter 2 Table 2.1). That is, these 
characteristics may well be the most important pressures forcing the 
dominant employer to recruit from outside the IIM.' Nonetheless, on 
inspection these characteristics are really a different way of 
looking at the monopsony problem in that they both serve to generate 
labour supply inelasticities. Consequently, it would be potentially 
misleading to treat them as totally separate influences.
(26) unfortunately, in aggregating the results in the manner shown 
it is not possible to test for statistical differences between the 
two samples.
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Besides the more obvious impact of monopsony on recruitment 
methods it is also possible that monopsony influences the extent to 
which the dominant plant notifies vacancies to the Job Centre. 
Theoretically, as Chapter 2 suggests, the tendency to notify 
vacancies may result from pressures from both the dominant plant and 
the Job Centre. On the one hand the dominant plants may be 
encouraged to notify vacancies » because, as the LIMs leading 
enployer, it should be possible to develop mutually beneficial links 
with the Job Centre. The Job Centre on the other hand would also 
actively encourage the dominant plant to notify vacancies since the 
plants position in the LIM ensures that it is a major source of 
employment and therefore placements from the unemployment register. 
However contmy _ to these arguments there is also the possibility 
that the absolute and relative size and independence of dominant 
plants may render the Job Centre red Want and hence such employers 
may tend not to use the services offered by the Job Centre
The evidence in Table 3.15 above suggests that the first 
hypothesis holds, since for all skill groups the propensity to 
notify vacancies is higher in the dominant plant sample. However, 
the differences are marginal and not statistically significant at 
any meaningful confidencft interval. Supplementing the results of 
Table 3.15, Table 3.17 shows that although the Job Centres are 
perhaps more active in the dominant plant sample it would appear 
that they are not more successful in helping with recruitment than 
the Job Centres associated with the control group plants. Indeed, 
although the differences between the two groups are small the 
opposite seems to be the case with the control group Job Centres'^ 
being more successful in assisting the plants. Table 3.18 shows the 
nature of the specialised assistance received from the Job Centres 
to help overcome IIM shortages. Although the differences between 
the samples are statistically insignificant with respect to each 
type of assistance the figures indicate that the assistance given to 
the dominant plants is generally to help overcome problems 
associated with monopsony.
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table 3.17 THE EXTENT OF JOB CENTRE ASSISTANCE
Number of Plants
- Dominant Control
Sample Sample
Plants where Job Centre has been 26 18
of assistance in filling vacancies (70.3) (75.0)
Plant where Job Centre has not been 11 6
of assistance in filling vacancies (29.7) (25.0)
Total number of observations 37 24
(100) (100)
TABLE 3.18 THE NATURE OF SPECIAL HELP FROM THE JOB CENTRE
NATURE OF ASSISTANCE
proportion of 
Dominant Plants 
Involved
Proportion of 
Control Group 
Plants 
Involved
Circulation of vacancies to 
other Job Centres 19 17
Help with recruitment of particular 
type of workers 4 11
Help with the Brployment Transfer 
Scheme 4 0
Helping with interviewing potential 
recruits 8 0
General help and advice 31 55
Special vacancy campaign 4 0
Exclusive service geared to the 
specific needs of the plant 8 0
Combination of assistance 23 17
Total
26
(100)
18
(100)
.
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In particular a higher proportion of dominant plant Job Centres were 
involved in circulating vacancies to other Job Centres, helping with the 
Employment Transfer Scheme, and providing a service geared to the 
specific needs of the plant. In conclusion, therefore, it seems that 
although the level of association between the Job Centre and employers is 
no higher for the dominant plant sample it would appear that the nature 
of the help offered by the Job Centre to dominant plants primarily 
relates to overcoming problems associated with monopsony.
Theoretical considerations also suggest that as LIM conditions 
tighten employers place more emphasis on secondary recruitment methods 
since passive and largely informal strategies will fail to supply a 
sufficient number of recruits. That is, when LIM demand changes so too 
will the emphasis placed on active plant recruitment methods. To 
establish whether this holds for dominant plant behaviour and, 
consequently, whether the impact of monopsony is more pronouned in this 
environment the dominant employers were also asked to outline their 
recruitment strategy when the demand for labour was high. The results of 
this exercise are presented in Table 3.19. The data in the table 
confirms the general hypothesis that as the LIM tightens there is a 
change in emphasis in plant hiring practises away from standard 
recruitment methods and towards a more active and formalised system. For 
example 3 for skilled male manuals the use of each of the more formal 
recruitment methods increased markedly. (2?) (28) shift of
(27) See in particular the use of advertising both at local and 
national level, using the Employment Transfer Scheme, contacting 
Skill Centres, and using private employment agencies.
(28) The figues in Appendix 17, Table 4 also indicate that as the 
LIM tightens the dominant plant tends to use more hiring methods in 
its efforts to recruit. That is, it appears that the scope as well 
as the focus of the plants' attitude towards recruitment policy 
changes. This is true for all skill groups (the table also reflects 
the high level of labour shortages in the control group, in that 
this group tends on average, to employ more recruitment methods than 
the dominant plants) . In terms of statistical testing, for the 
combined sample of both the dominant and the control group there are 
highly significant differences (95% confidence level) between;
(i) each of the skill groups and the other skill groups, and
(ii) within each of the skill groups but under different LIM 
conditions.
As a result %the hypothesis that the type of labour being recruited 
and the nature of the LIM environment makes a substantial difference 
to the importance of recruitment methods is supported.
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emphasis in the dominant plant recruitment strategy also involves a 
marked increase in the use of recrutiroent methods which would help 
to alleviate any monopsonistic pressure being felt by the plant. 
Relative to the strategy adopted under existing tiM conditions. 
Table 3.19 indicates that for skilled male manual workers the use of 
advertising in the national press has increased by 40%. Similarly 
under the tighter labour market conditions the number of plants 
notifying vacancies in non-local Job Centres increased by 
1 2 %.(29) Finally, the number of plants using the Hnployment 
Transfer Scheme rose by 67.1%.(^ ^^
The recruitment policies followed by the control group when 
faced by a tight LIM environment were also analysed and the results 
are summarised in Table 3.19. In some respects the changes 
experienced in their recruitment policy are similar to those in the 
dominant plant sample, especially with respect to the shift from a 
less to a more formal recruitment strategy. However, an important 
difference between the two samples is that the shift in control 
group hiring strategy does not place such an emjhasis on using 
recruitment methods which are consistent with overcoming 
monopsonistic pressures. It would appear that the preferred 
strategy for the control group is to concentrate on increasing the 
supply of labour from within the LIM. This is achieved principally 
by using local Skill Centres, increased contact with schools and 
technical colleges, and through the use of private employment 
agencies. Accordingly these results
(29) Qhe number of dominant plants notifying vacancies to the local 
job centre did not increase which suggests that this method is an 
accepted strategy irrespective of IIM conditions. This has 
implications for the second major section of the research covered in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7; the analysis of LIM efficiency as defined 
by the UV ratio.
(30) Table 3.19 also indicates that in times of high labour demand 
the dominant plants reduce the extent they use passive and informal 
recruitment methods. This change of emphasis applies to hiring 
on-spec applicants, using a list of previous applicants, taking 
recomnendations from existing employees, and up-grading and training 
exi sting employee s.
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Table 3.19 An Analysis of Recruitment Methods Used When Difficult to Recruit
Dominant Plant Sample Control Group
Recruitment Method
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Advertise in local press 81.1 54.1 35.1 95.8 75.0 66.7
Advertise in national press 37.8 18.9 8.1 37.5 12.5 16.7
Notify vacancy to local Job
Centre/Employment Office 91.9 89.2 78.4 91.7 79.2 75.0
Notify Job Centres in other
areas 51.4 29.7 21.6 45.8 25.0 10.7
use Employment Transfer
schemes 27.0 8.1 0 8.3 0 0
Contact Skill centre 18.9 8.1 2.7 29.2 25.0 12.5
Contact schools/technical
colleges 18.9 16.2 10.8 29.2 12.5 12.5
Use private employment
agencies 10.8 0 0 33.3 8.3 8.3
Take on spec applicants 59.5 62.2 48.6 50.0 41.7 37.5
Use list of previous
applicants 64.9 62.2 51.4 62.3 54.2 50.0
Contact former employees 29.7 27.0 24.3 37.5 20.8 29.2
Recommendations from
Existing employees • 48.6 48.6 43.2 62.5 58,3 45.8
Cpgrade/train/transfer
existing employees 54.1 67.6 45.9 58.3 62.5 50.0
Offer higher earnings than
other local employers 5.4 10.8 10.8 8.3 8.3 8.3
Other methods 10.8 10.8 5.4 12.5 8.3 ‘ 4.2
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Table 3.20 An Analysis of Recruitment Methods Used When Easy to Recruit
Dominant Plant Sample Control Group
•
Skilled Other Skilled Other
Male Male Female Male Male Female
Recruitment Method Manuals Manuals Manuals Manuals Manuals Manuals
Advertise in local press 35.1 12.5 12,5 54.2 41.7 37.5
Advertise in national press 5.4 2.7 2.7 4.2 0 0
Notify vacancy to local Job
Centre/Employment Office 78.4 81.1 70.3 62.5 66.7 58.3
notify Job Centres in other
areas 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.3 4.2 4.2
use Employment Transfer
Schemes 2.7 0 0 0 0 0
Contact Skill Centre 8.1 8.1 2.7 8.3 16.7 8.3
Contact schools/technical
colleges 13.5 18.5 8.1 20.8 12.5 12.5
use private employment
agencies 0 0 0 4.2 4.2 4.2
Take on-spec applicants 51.4 56.8 45.9 62.5 66.7 54.2
Use list of previous
applicants 54.1 48.6 40.5 41.7 45.8 45.8
Contact former employees 13.5 13.5 10.8 16.7 12.5 16.7
Recommendations from
existing employees 45.9 51.4 45.9 62.5 66.7 50.0
Upgrade/train/transfer
existing employees 45.9 62.2 43.2 37.5 41.7 29.2
Offer higher earnings than
Other local employers 2.7 8.1 10.8 8.3 12.5 12.5
Other 5.4 5.4 2.7 8,3 8.3 8.3
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tend to support the hypothesis that the LIM environment and 
structure will to some extent determine the recruitment policy 
adopted by employers.
In contrast to the recruitment policies followed in tight LIM 
conditions, Table 3.20 summarises the policies adopted by dominant 
plants when LIM conditions are slack and unemployment 
correspondingly high. CXice again the results confirm many of the 
predictions of labour market theory. Uhder conditions of weak 
labour demand relatively expensive recruitment methods become 
insignificant since when unemployment is high employer initiated and 
relatively active recruitment policies are both unnecessary and 
uneconomic. Instead ^ plants can rely almost exclusively, as the 
table shows, on applicants channeled through the Job Centre and on 
passive recruitment methods such as on-spec applicants and employee 
recommendations. Therefore, under these circumstances dominant 
plants do not employ monopsonistically orientated recruitment 
methods to meet their labour supply requirements as there will 
usually be significant labour within the LIM. (^ 3) 
Accordingly there are even smaller differences between dominant 
plant and control group recruitment methods when such LIM conditions 
prevail.
(31) Once again, in terms of CHI SQ , calculated on the individual 
recruitment methods, these differences are not statistically 
significant. However, it should be remembered that given these 
circumstances CHI SQ cannot be used to measure whether there are 
overall statistically significant differences between the daninant 
plants and the control group when all possible recruitment methods 
associated with monopsony are combined. Calculating an aggregate 
measure of the impact of monopsony under tight LIM conditions is 
shown in Appendix 17, Table 5. In this case the differences between 
the dominant plant and control group become more apparent.
(32) The one possible exception to this is in the use of Job 
Centres where for all skill groups dominant plants appear to make 
more use of the service provided,
(33)  ^Table 4 in Appendix 17 also shows that the intensity of the 
plants recruitment drive lessens as LIM conditions slacken.
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4.3 Summary
Although monopsonistic considerations are not a primary 
feature of plant recruitment policy the impact of dominance seems to 
influence the plants' attitude towards secondary recruitment 
methods, lhat is, in relation to the control group, dominant plants 
tend to use to a greater extent recruitment methods which reflect 
the monopsonistic structure of their labour market. Ihe differences 
between this dominant plant sample and the control group in this 
respect are, nonetheless, only marginal. These differences, 
however, increased when the plants were questioned about recruitment 
methods adopted in a tighter LIM situation where labour supply 
inelasticities probably become more acute and the emphasis on 
secondary and more active hiring policies is greater. In times of 
low labour demand monopsonistic considerations seemed to be of 
little importance to dominant plants. In this case labour supply 
inelasticities were not a constraint on recruitment and there was 
little need to hire from outside the LIM. As a result there were no 
meaningful differences between dominant plant and control group 
recruitment strategies under these conditions.
5. THE RELATIONSHIP BEIWEEN MONOPSONY AM3 DOMINANT PLANT TRAINING
The theoretical relationship between monopsony and training 
suggests that dominant plants will offer a relatively high level of 
training to .employees, as measured on a per capita basis, Ihe 
dominant plant's relatively high propensity to train is jointly 
associated with the hypothesised tendency towards specific rather 
than general training in quasi-monopsonistic establishments, and the 
relatively low quit rates which are also considered to be a 
characteristic of dominant plants. Ihat is, the emphasis on 
specific training in dominant plants indicates that employers.
(34) Although the results are not presented here a similar 
recruitment pattern develops for all skill groups ' and LIM conditions 
if the dominant plant sample is divided into high and low dominance 
sub-groups ^in that the high dominance group is more inclined to use 
monopsonistically induced recruitment methods.
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rather than workers, finance investment in human capital. ihe
employers subsequently recoup their costs by capturing thedifference
a
between the workers enhanced marginal product and their wage.
Combining this with the low quit rate associated with dominant
plants subsequently allows employers to take advantage of this 
differential over a longer time period thereby increasing their
return. in response to this economic incentive, dominant plants
will be encouraged to expand their training programmes until the 
marginal cost of per capita training equals the marginal
return. (^ 5)
Although the level of per capita training in dominant plants 
may be relatively high this need not imply that monopsony positively 
influences total plant expenditure on training. Ihe net effect of
monopsony on a plant's overall training level is a priori
indeterminate since the influence of higher per capita training on 
the dominant plant's total training effort will be offset to some 
extent by the relatively low requirement to train new recruits. As 
a result ^ it is impossible to establish which of the conflicting 
effects will be the stronger, and the question has to be resolved 
empirically.
Testing the training hypotheses associated with monopsony and 
plant dominance ideally requires a substantial amount of detailed 
information well beyond the scope of an exercise based exclusively 
on questionnaire d a t a . T h e r e f o r e ,  for practical reasons it
(35) Compatible establishments operating in more competitive LIMs 
are not subject to the same pressures to increase their level of 
training. This primarily reflects their relatively high quit rate 
but is also a direct implication of the greater importance of 
general training in the LEM which results in employer and employee 
training decision being influenced by a different set of economic 
considerations (for more details on this argument see Chapter 2).
(36) It was also felt that it may be counter-productive to ask 
questions on the nature of training, and whether the enployer or 
employee-financed training, since many potential respondents may 
have doubted the motive behind such an enquiry.
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was decided that it would be counter productive to establish 
detailed points, such as whether training was considered to be 
general or specific and, related to this, whether the employer or 
employee financed such investments. Similarly, it was felt that it 
would not be possible to accurately test whether monopsonistic 
presures had a differential impact on particular occupational 
groups. Instead, the analysis concentrated on the more fundamental 
and basic aspects of training and in particular quantifying the 
total and per capita training programmes offered by the dominant 
plants and the control group. In fact focussing on these broader 
aspects of training is not a serious problem when attempting to test 
the monopsonistic hypotheses as it remains possible to infer even 
from the general results a significant amount about how 
monopsonistic considerations influence training. Bearing this in 
mind the approach adopted in the analysis was to initially examine 
the establishment's overall approach to training and from this try 
and establish whether per capita levels were higher in the dominant 
plant sample, in particular, if it could be shown that the total 
training effort was higher in dominant plants and that quit rates 
were compatible to or lower than the control group then, ceteris 
paribus, this also implies higher per capita training levels in the 
dominant plants.
Table 3.21 provides some indication of the overal extent of 
training (as measured by the proportion of plants providing training 
for the work groups specified in the table) undertaken by the 
dominant plants and the control group.(^ 7) The results suggest 
that, on balance, the dominant plants provide more training than the 
control group sample in that a higher proportion of monopsonistic 
establishments offer training courses to the major categories of 
workers employed in the plant, in particular, the figures indicate 
that in six out of seven categories of manual employment the 
dominant plants offer training courses to a higher proportion of 
workers in the sample when compared to the control group
(37) It is worthwhile noting that the pattern of training within 
plants is, in some measure^ predictable with the skill groups
receiving more training than the semi-skilled and unskilled workers.
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f i g u r e s . I n  all cases, however, the differences between the 
two samples are marginal and in terms of CHI SQ insignificant at any 
meaningful confidence level. Nonetheless, the fact that the bias is 
constantly in favour of the dominant plant sample does strengthen 
the suggestion that dominant plants provide more training in overall 
terms. This of course, assumes that the provision of training 
courses can be accepted as an adequate proxy for overall training 
levels in the plant.(^ 9) considering that labour shortages seem 
to be more prevalent in the control group the reported differences 
in the table may in fact conceal that larger discrepancies would 
have become more apparent in a controlled comparison. (^ 0) %t is 
also worthwhile noting that the largest differences in the provision 
of training courses between the two samples are in the low and 
semi-skilled groups. The key point here is that this is probably 
where most of the generally trained workers are concentrated, and 
this is the group which training theory predicts will be trained at 
the employer's expense only in a monopsonistic IIM. That is, 
although the table does not provide a measure of who bears the 
training cost this result does suggest that the dominant employers 
are more concerned with training these workers. Therefore, 
statistical evidenced consistent with the hypothesis developed in 
Chapter 2.
(38) unskilled employees is the only work group where the 
prevalance of dominant plant training is exceeded by the control 
group. This can partly be explained by the relatively more serious 
shortage of skilled manual workers faced by the control group which 
may be sufficient to induce these plants to increase the level of 
training for lower skill groups.
(39) This pattern is repeated when high dominance and low dominance 
companies are analysed separately. That is, the high dominance 
companies appear to train more than the low dominance sub-sample.
(40) As Table 6 in ippendix 17 shows there are not significant 
differences between the use of external training courses between the 
dominant plant and the control group sample. Nor are there any 
significant differences between the high and low dominance 
sub-groups of the dominant plant sample.
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TABLE 3.21 THE PROPORTION OF PLANTS ERCVIDING TRAINING PROGRAMMES 
FOR DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
Extent of Training
Dominant Plant Control Group
Manpower Category Sample (%) Sample (%)
Apprentices 97 96
Post apprentices 86 83
Skilled employees 89 79
(non-appr entice)
Semi-skilled employees 89 75
unskilled employees 65 46
Clerical employees 86 83
Technical staff 89 92
Supervisory grades 97 96
Management 92 96
None of these 3 4
Total No of observations 37 24
TABLE 3,22 THE NUMBER OF WORKERS PER FULL TIME TRAINER
No of Workers per
Trainer
Dominant Plant Sample 185
Control Group Sample 377
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The pattern of training presented in Table 3.21 is in many 
respects repeated in Table 3.22 which measures the average number of 
workers per full-time training official in each of the two samples. 
Although the results can only give a limited indication of the 
emphasis each group puts on training the figures are revealing. 
Indeed the number of workers to trainers in the control group is 
over 100% higher than in the dominant plant sample. This difference 
is significant at a 90% confidence level. On a more qualitative 
basis data on the dominant plants' estimation of their position on 
the intra LEM training hierarchy (see Chapter 5, Section 4) also 
suggests that dominant plants train more than the control group. 
Again, however, the differences are not statistically different to 
the pattern generated by the control group.
Although it cannot be demonstrated conclusively in view of the 
inadequacies of the data if it is assumed that the extent of courses 
and the number of training officers provided by the dominant plant 
and the control group reflects the overall level of training in the 
establishments, and that there are no significant differences in the 
quit rates between the groups (see Section 3.6) then this implies 
that per capita training is higher in the dominant plant groups, 
under these circumstances, therefore, the available data also 
supports the original hypothesis developed in Chapter 2 that 
dominant employers will provide an above average level of training.
(41) It should also be noted that the figures do not take account 
of the size distribution of plants within the LIM, and therefore the 
table is not adequately controlling for variables such as plant size.
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6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONOPSONY AND DOMINANT PLANT 
UNIONISATION
Theoretically it is difficult to establish the direction of 
monopsonistic influences on unionisation levels in dominant plants 
as pressures to organise are subject to a range of diverse forces 
which are difficult to quantify. On the one hand there are strong 
arguments to suggest that dominant plants will have relatively high 
levels of unionisation, both in response to 
monopsonistically-induced feelings of solidarity, and as a function 
of active union pressure to organise the area's leading employer. 
On the other hand, since the dominant plant has significant power in 
the LIM and can impose sanctions on both employees and unions 
seeking to organise, dominant plants may equally well reduce levels 
of unionisation.
To identify the impact of monopsony and help resolve the 
problem of indeterminancy questionnaire respondents were asked about 
the level of unionisation in their plant for each of the skill 
groups under consideration. The results of the analysis are
presented in TWole 3.23 and appear to support the hypothesis that 
daninant plants have relatively high levels of union membership. 
For skilled male manuals the average level of unionisation in the 
dominant plant sanple was 98%. The figure for other male manuals 
was 97% whilst for female manuals it was also relatively high at 87%.
Contrasting the level of unionisation in the dominant plant 
with the control group, and thereby in part controlling for 
potentially significant determinants of unionisation such as plant 
size, also to some extent supports the original hypothesis. However,
(42) Unfortunately, due to the sensitivity surrounding issues like 
union behaviour and industrial relations it was not felt possible to 
ask detailed questions on these topics. This constraint, therefore, 
effectively prohibits examining topics like the process of 
unionisation, management attitudes^ and the number of unions in the 
plant.
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this picture is only confirmed for the two male groups where in both 
cases levels of unionisation are significantly higher in the 
daninant plant sample at a 90% confidence level. For female
manuals there is no significant difference beween the two samples. 
Without further information it is difficult to establish why the 
pattern should differ between males and females although the higher 
turnover (see Section 3.6) of female manuals in the dominant plant 
sample may frustrate their efforts to unionise.(^ 4) (45)
TABLE 3.23 THE EXTENT OF UNIONISATION
Extent of unionisation
Skilled*
Male
Manuals
Other*
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Average percentage union 
membership in dominant plants 98 97 87
Average percentage union 
membership in control group 94 91 89
Average union membership in 
dominant plants excluding 
coal and steel plants 94 96 83
Note; (i) * denotes difference significant at the 90% confidence
level
(43) An important statistical point worth noting here is that 
marginal differences in unionisation at the top end of the scale may 
in fact relfect fairly significant differences in the pressure to 
unionise. That is, there is no reason to assume that the 
relationship between pressure to unionise and unionisation levels is 
linear. It is more likely that^ultimately^ progressive increases in 
the pressure to unionise meets diminishing returns in terms of the 
level of unionisation.
(44) As Table 7 in ^pendix 17 shows there is also a difference 
between high dominance and low dominance sub-groups and the extent 
of unionisation. For all skill groups unionisation tends to be 
higher in the high dominance groups supporting the original 
hypothesis. However, these differences are only significant in the 
case of skilled male manuals.
(45) Note that the level of unionisation for females in both the 
dominant plant and the control group samples is unusually high.
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Oie possible explanation of the higher levels of unionisation 
in the dominant plant male groups may be the prevalence of 
nationalised industries in the sample. In particular, this refers 
to the responses from the mining and steel plants which tend to bias 
the industrial composition of the dominant plant sample. TO test 
this hypothesis unionisation estimates were recomputed for both 
samples exluding the coal and steel industry replies. The results 
are shown in Table 3.24 and indicate that whilst the same pattern 
prevails the differences between the two groups are reduced and are 
no longer statistically significant at an acceptable confidence 
interval. However, whether this reflects the absence of the coal 
and steel plants or is a result of the reduced sample size it is 
difficult to tell.
TABLE 3.24 UNIONISATION LEVEES IN NON COAL AND STEEL PLANTS
Extent of Unionisation
Average percentage union 
Membership in Dominant Plar
Average Percentage union 
Membership in Control Group
Skilled
Male
Manuals
ts 98
s 94
Other
Male
Manuals
96
91
Female
Manuals
84
89
TO summarise the results presented in this sectior^ ■ . most
of the available evidence seems to be consistent with the suggestion 
that monopsonistic pressures have a positive impact on levels of 
unionisation, although the effect is restricted to male workers. As 
far as it is possible to tell this result does not reflect 
compositional differences between the dominant plant and the control 
group samples.
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TABLE 3.25 QUIT AND TURNOVER RATES IN THE DOMINANT PLANT AND 
CONTROL GROUP SAMPLES
Dominant Plants Control Group
Skilled
^^le
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Turnover Rate 8.1 13.5 15.4 9.2 15.0 14.9
Quit Rate 5.3 7.6 11.2 6.9 9.5 10.6
TABLE 3.26 QUIT RATES AND TURNOVER IN THE DOMINANT PLANT SAMPLE 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NATIONALISED AND OTHER INDUSTRIES
QUIT RATES
Nbn-Nationalised
Industries
Nationalised
Industries
Total manual quit rate** 6.8
Oiit rate skilled male manuals 4.8
Quit rate other male manuals* 6.6
Quit rate female manuals 9.4
Total manual turnover rate* 11.4
Turnover rate skilled male manuals 7.6
I
Turnover rate other male manuals 12.5
Turnover rate female manuals* 13.0
11.0
7.3
11.0
18.2
16.1
10.5
17.6
24.7
Note (i) ** indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
(ii) * indicates significance at the 90% confidence level
TABLE 3.27 NON COAL AND STEEL DOMINANT PLANT AND CONTROL GROUP QUIT 
RATE AND TURNOVER FIGURES
Skilled Other Skilled Other
Male Male Female &^le Male Female
Manuals* Manuals* Manuals Manuals* Manuals* Manuals
Turnover Rate 7.6 12.5 13.0 9.2 15.0 14.9
Quit Rate 4.8 6.6 9.4 6.9 9.5 10.6
Note (i) * indicates differences significant at the 90% confidence 
level
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7. The Relationship Between Monopsony and Quits
Theoretical considerations suggest that monopsony will reduce 
the number of alternative job opportunities within the LIM, and 
consequently reduces the propensity of workers to leave their 
current employment. The higher level of training associated with 
plant dominance may also reduce the quit rate.
The evidence on the quit rate hypothesis gathered from the 
questionnaire data is presented in Table 3.25. unfortunately the 
results are generally inconclusive and tend to show that although 
quiA%ahd indeed turnover figures also) are generally lower in the 
daninant plant sample the differences are not statistically 
significant. This probably reflects both the limited
size of the sample and the large standard deviations associated with 
the average rates in each skill group, to overcome problems-,
and therefore determine more precisely the impact of monopsony on 
quits, would require a significant amount of additional research 
well beyond the scope of this study.
Another possible reason why quit rate and turnover differences 
between the dominant plant and control group samples are not 
significant may be because there is a bias towards steel and coal
(46) Lower quit rates in monopsonistic markets is indirectly 
suggested by MacKay ^  ^  (1971, pl71-172). The argument is 
that "the nature of the labour market,tetln particular its size 
compactness and the availability of alternative employers may affect 
wastage rates, (In smaller LIMs) the employee has a wide choice of 
alternatives only if he is prepared to move house, whereas (in 
larger LIMs) most employees can choose from a greater variety of 
jobs and alternative employers simply by varying their travel-to^ork 
journeys".
(47) The results also apply to the total quit rates calculated for 
the dominant plant and control group sample as Table 8 in Appendix 
17 shows.
(48) T-tests were also run to establish whether quits were lower in 
the high-dominance sub-groups. The results showed that whilst quits 
were marginally lower in the high dominance group the differences in 
all cases were statistically insignificant.
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returns in the dominant plant sample. As Table 3.26 shows quits and 
turnover rates are generally higher in these nationalised 
industries, and indeed the differences are often statistically 
significant even although sample sizes are small and standard 
deviations high. Therefore, reworking the dominant plant and 
control group statistics leaving out the coal and steel plants 
should provide a more accurate and meaningful measure of the
apparent impact of monopsony on the dominant plant sample. The 
results of this exercise are shown in Table 3.27. In this case the 
figures, not surprisingly, show a wider gap between dominant plant 
and control group quit rates, and in the case of skilled male
manuals and other male manuals the differences are significant at
the 90% confidence level. As a result it appears that there are 
statistical grounds to support the hypothesis that monopsony 
effectively reduces the level of quits in dominant plants.
8. SUMMARY AND ODNCLUSIQNS
This chapter set out to show that dominant plant personnel 
policy would be influenced by the monopsonistic or 
quasi-monopsonistic conditions prevailing in these LIMs. The 
analysis covered all the major features associated with personnel 
policy and the results were based on questionnaires sent to the
previously identified dominant plants and a carefully selected 
control group. Where possible the study results were supplemented 
by previously completed research.
The first hypothesis tested was that dominant plants tend to 
offer a level of wages below that prevailing in otherwise similar 
plants operating in competitive LIMs. in general this hypotheses 
was supported both by quantitative and qualitative evidence although
(49) Of course the results presented in this section are subject to 
the usual qualification that it was impossible to introduce 
meaningful controls into the analysis and thereby increase the level 
of confidence in the reported conclusions.
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problems with the data set casts some doubt on the true nature of 
the differences. The possible impact of monopsony on wages and 
earnings was also examined by comparing the determinants of wages in 
the two sample groups: generally, influences consistent with
monopsony seemed to be more important to the dominant plant sample 
although the evidence on this was limited and restricted to union 
behaviour.
Monopsony theory also suggests that monopsonistic plants tend 
to suffer from labour shortages whilst at the same time offering an 
equilibrium market wage rate. The empirical evidence on this only 
partly supports this proposition in that whilst many dominant plants 
suffer from labour shortages, particularly for skilled workers, the 
position was worse in the control group sample. Nonetheless, 
looking in more detail at the causes of labour shortages it would 
appear that monopsonistic pressures are more important, although not 
significantly so, in the dominant plant sample. A number of 
possible explanations were also put forward why dominant plants do 
not appear to suffer disporportionately from labour shortages.These 
ranged from variations in the level of unemployment in the LIM to 
the dominant plant's ability to cope more readily with labour 
shortages through their recruitment policies and screening 
techniques, unfortunately, without more detailed information on the 
nature and cause of labour shortages it is difficult to be more 
specific and specify precisely the role of monopsony in influencing 
a plant's labour supply.
Dominant plant recruitment also appears to be influenced by 
monopsonistic considerations, although this is only apparent in the 
secondary and less important hiring methods which tend to be used 
mainly when LIM conditions tighten. That is, under normal LIM 
conditions dominant plants in general tend to behave like other 
plants by relying primarily ■ on relatively inexpensive and passive 
recruitment channels. It is only when the particular 
characteristics of the LIM become more important that management 
appear to respond by adopting specialist recruitment policies to 
overcome the particular problems associated with monopsonistically- 
induced supply inelasticities. This appears to be especially true 
for the high skilled groups where supply inelasticities are more 
prevalent.
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Dominant plant training is another aspect of personnel policy 
theoretically subject to monopsonistic pressures due to the partial 
loss of distinction between general and specific training and the 
tendency towards low quit rates in this particular market
structure. Without detailed data on training it is difficult to 
empirically test this proposition. Nonetheless, the available 
quantitative and qualitative information from the questionnaires
seem to support the hypothesis that dominant plants train more*)both 
in total and on a per capita basis ^  than an equivalent plant 
operating in a more competitive environment.
The structural characteristics associated with a dominated LLM 
also appear to influence the level of unionisation in dominant 
plants. The questionnaire evidence shows that levels of
unionisation for males are significantly higher in the dominant 
plant sample and this is not explained by any obvious sampling 
biases. This result supports the original hypothesis that for a 
variety of reasons dominance will tend to increase pressures to 
unionise.
Finally ^  the relationship between monopsony and quits was 
examined and in this case the relatively general evidence on the 
relationship was inconclusive in that although quits were marginally 
lower in the dominant plant sample, and therefore the results seem 
to support the original hypothesis, the individual differences were 
statistically insignificant. In part this appears to reflect the 
concentration of high quit rate industries in the dominant plant 
sample. That is, when the bias is corrected the expected difference 
between the control group and dominant plant group becomes more 
pronounced supporting the original hypothesis.
In overall terms, and considering dominant plant personnel
policy as an interrelated system rather than separate components,^ it 
does appear that monopsony has a widespread, if not ‘ profound, 
influence on dominant plant personnel policy. That is, it seems 
that monopsonistic influences in one area of dominant plant 
personnel
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policy do tend to influence other aspects of personnel policy. As a 
result of these influences, and although precise measurement is 
impossible, the total impact of monopsony on dominant plants appear 
to be significant*, In other words overall behavioural characteristics 
are different from similar plants operating in a more competitive 
environment.
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CHAPTER .4
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF INTRA-LIM 
DOMINANT PLANT BEHAVIOUR 
THE IMPACT OF PLANT. SIZE ON PERSONNEL POLICY
1. INTRODUCTION
Earlier considerations (op c.it Chapter 2, Section 2.6) suggest 
that the impact of dominance on plant personnel policy may not be 
fully reflected in the monopsonistic framework developed and tested 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, since this model largely ignores the 
influence other firms in the local labour market may have on 
dominant plant behaviour. As a result^ it is important to examine 
how the dominant plant relates to other establishments within the 
local labour market, and on this basis explore how these 
relationships condition and qualify the monopsonistic based 
predictions. That is, as dominant plants are not true 
monopsonists, it is only when interactions between these and other 
plants in the area are fully taken into account that it is then 
possible to establish the overall impact of dominance on plant 
personnel policy.
As this chapter explains the labour market behaviour of dominant 
plants tends to differ radically from other plants operating within 
the same local labour market. The most important differentiating 
feature of dominant plant intra-local labour market behaviour is the 
large absolute size of these establishments relative to other plants 
within the area. The impact of the size effect on dominant plant 
personnel policy is important since within the plant it conditions 
levels of job satisfaction and attitudes to work,industrial 
relations and work-place cohesion, and hence the fundamental a^ects
(i) Recognising the importance of other plants in the area may help 
explain why, for certain aspects of personnel policy, monopsony is 
perhaps less in evidence than theoretical considerations would 
suggest.
125
of the economics of plant manpower and personnel policy management 
{for a brief summary of the theory and evidence see**’review article 
by George et. al, 1977.)
Recognising the impact of size on dominant plant behaviour 
complicates the process of modifying the monopsony based 
interpretation of dominant plant behaviour. No longer is it simply 
a matter of acknowledging that there are other plants in the local 
labour market, and that these behave and interact in a broadly 
similar fashion to condition the impact of monopsony on the dominant 
plant. Instead the radical differences in personnel policy between 
the dominant plant and other establishments in the local labour 
market have to be incorporated into a highly specific model of 
intra-firm local labour market behaviour. This then forms the
framework for determining the interrelationships between 
establishments in the area, and as a consequence should identify the 
need to qualify the original monopsony model and the findings of the 
related empirical work.
Although the rationale for developing an intra-LIM model of 
dominant plant behaviour has, up until now, been couched exclusively 
in terms of seeking to refine the predictions of the monopsony model 
the analysis is also important for other reasons. One major
consideration is that examining the intra-local labour market
behaviour of dominant plants deals with the particular case of how a 
quasi-monopsonistic plant relates to the other establishments in the 
area. This differentiates the research both from earlier 
contributions on the size effect and earlier investigations into
local labour market behaviour since previous studies do not consider 
in any depth the plant size distribution within the LIM and its 
related implications. Consequently, and no matter which way the 
problem has been approached in the past, previous models and 
research have been couched in a wider framework which has been too
(2) Gize may be measured using different indices, such as employment, 
capital or output. This research focuses exclusively on employment, 
but since all measures tend to be closely correlated this makes 
little practical difference. For example, see George et al (1977).
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general to capture and identify the specific effects associated with 
plant dominance. As a result the approach adopted in this study 
should complement and add significantly to the understanding of the 
total impact of dominance on plant and local labour market behaviour.
Another reason why intra-LIM analysis is an important 
contribution to the analysis of dominance is that it lays the 
foundation for the investigation into how dominant plants influence 
the underlying efficiency of the local labour market. This aspect 
of LIM behaviour is considered in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 and is 
based on the analysis of local labour market üV ratios. 
Nonetheless, underlying this analysis is a model of how the dominant 
plant relates to other plants within the local labour market and 
influences information flows in the area. Consequently^ it is of 
fundamental importance to develop and test a model of intra-local 
labour market behaviour associated with plant dominance which can 
then be further extended into the analysis of LIM efficiency.
For practical purposes the most appropriate way to incorporate 
all aspects of the intra-local labour market analysis into the 
investigation of plant dominance is to examine the theory and 
evidence behind the size effect and develop their related 
operational predictions. These should be set out whilst 
continually bearing in mind the possible interrelationships between 
the dominant plant and other establishments in the area. 
Subsequently, the principal and most relevant conclusions emerging 
from the model should be tested using the questionnaire returns and 
any other relevant control data. Having examined how the dominant 
plant relates to the remainder of the local labour market, the 
principal results should, where necessary, be used to qualify the 
original conclusions based on the monopsonistic model and the 
related inter-local labour market empirical analysis.
Although the approach to the problem is perhaps self-evident it 
should be recognised that both the size effect and local labour 
market analysis are both complicated aspects of labour market 
behaviour incorporating a number of analytical and empirical 
problems which have not, as yet, been fully resolved in the
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literature. Therefore, it should be stressed that under these
circumstances it is not intended to develop a detailed and
comprehensive model of dominant plant intra-local labour market
behaviour. Instead j,the key features of both the size effect and
intra-local labour market behaviour, as identified by previous
(3)research, form the basis of the investigation.
(3) In particular, in several cases it became evident that although 
a labour market variable may have been affected by plant size it 
would be difficult to isolate the impact with any degree of 
precision given that the project was restricted to questionnaire 
analysis. Under these circumstances those aspects of personnel 
policy are not considered in depth in the theoretical analysis. 
This problem relates mostly to industrial relations behaviour and 
particularly strike-proneness which previous research suggests is 
strongly influenced by plant size. For detailed evidence see 
Eisele (1973-74) P.561 onwards; Prais (1978) PP.388-394; and Shorey 
(1976).
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2. THE STRUCTURAL CHAI^CTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH SIZE
As Diagram 4.1 indicates, there are essentially four structural 
characteristics associated with plant size and these are bureau­
cratisation and organisational complexity; functional
specialisation; product market concentration; and economies of 
scale. Bearing this in mind this section briefly discusses the way 
in which large plant size induces these particular characteristics 
so that in the following sections it is then possible to demonstrate 
how these factors, operating either jointly or in isolation, 
ultimately influence the operational characteristics of large plants 
as manifested in their distinctive attitude towards key aspects of 
personnel policy. Conveniently the principal structural 
characteristics associated with plant size have been relatively well 
researched and it is only necessary to present a brief summary of 
the main results and conclusions.
Size, Bureaucratisation and. Organisational Complexity. 
Industrial relations theory and supporting empirical evidence 
(George et al 1977, Brown and Schoenker, 1971; Hall et. al, 1967; 
Indik, 1963; Tallacci, 1960; Blauner, 1964; and Shorey, 1976) 
suggests that there is a direct link between plant size and 
bureaucratisation. The larger the plant then the more complex the 
organisation becomes and the more difficult it is to exercise 
authority through informal channels, direct managenent surveillance 
and contact with the workforce. That is, as plant size increases 
and the resultant hierarchical decision chain expands, the greater 
the likelihood of distorted and inadequate information being passed 
to the workforce. This, in turn, leads to a substitution of 
informal authority relationships by formal rules and bureaucratic 
procedures,, these being the only feasible means whereby management 
may maintain adequate control over communication, discipline and 
output. However, and in terms of the workers* psychic income, 
increased
(4) The correlation between size and product market concentration 
shown in Diagram 4.1 is not discussed in this section since it 
appears to reflect a statistical correlation rather than a causal 
influence. The effect of product market concentration on large
p l a n t  la b o u r  m a rk et b e h a v io u r  i s ,  h o w ev er , in tr o d u c e d  i n  S e c t io n  3 .
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bureaucratisation will tend to reduce job satisfaction by 
restricting the workers ^ freedom and identification with plant and 
management objectives (see Shorey, 1976; Williamson, 1967; and 
Beer, 1964).(5)
Bureaucratisation, besides influencing organisational 
procedures, may also have an effect on worker satisfaction by 
limiting the extent of shop floor interaction (see Ingham 1970, 
P.38). As a result of any such separation^problems of status and
differentials may develop between different work groups (see Shorey, 
1976, P.177).(^) Related to this a further potential problem
associated with the separation of work groups is that it may serve 
to reinforce the feeling that an individual's contribution within 
such a large organisation is apparently insignificant, with the net 
result that worker alienation will be further increased (see Shorey, 
1976, P.12; Indik 1963; and Revans, 1956).
In sum, existing evidence suggests that bureaucratisation and 
organisational conplexity increases formalisation, reduces worker 
and management flexibility, and inhibits meaningful interaction 
between peer and authority groups. Consequently feelings of 
isolation and dissatisfaction will develop amongst large plant 
enployees, with the result that the net effect of bureaucratisation 
on a large plant workforce will be negative.
(5) It has also been suggested that large plants do not suffer from 
these problems because they devote a di^roportionately high amount 
of resources to the personnel function. For exanple, see George
et al (1977, P.267).
(6) These features of worker behaviour are also in part associated 
with technology which may not be related to plant size (see below).
(7) This trend may also be reinforced by bureaucratic limits imposed 
upon worker interaction with authority groups. See Ingham (1970, PP 
38-39).
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Size, Technology and Functional Specialisation. Much of the 
evidence in the literature (George et al, 1977; Shorey, 1976; 
Masters, 1969; and Sawyer, 1973) also suggests that there is a 
relationship between plant size and job content since as plant size 
increases eiiployers are able to practice extensive division of 
labour and increase worker specialisation. As a result, in large 
plants more jobs become standardised and routine thereby reducing 
the level of job satisfaction in large plants by depriving workers 
of non-material rewards such as pride in workmanship and recognition
/g\
of achievement. Accordingly, other things remaining equal,
there will be a further disutility associated with working in a 
large plant. Despite this conclusion it should be recognised that 
other research (Woodward, 1970; Blauner, 1964; Ingham, 1970; and 
Sayles, 1970) does not fully support this conclusion. Indeed there 
appears to be considerable evidence to suggest that job content is 
primarily determined by technology rather than size, and technology 
is not clearly related to size, If this is the case then the
suggested inverse relationship between job satisfaction and plant 
size may be less significant.
Some of the confusion on the relationship between size, 
technology and the division of labour may be resolved by considering 
the relationship between plant size and capital intensity. Several
(8) The high levels of bureaucratisation associated with large 
plants will also, to a limited extent, influence job content 
(Ingham; 1970, P.37). That is, since informal procedures are no 
longer a practical method of controlling production they will tend 
to be replaced by strict rules governing job content and working 
practices. As a result g management will be forced into adopting a 
more formal and standardised approach towards job definition.
(9) Woodward (1971), in particular, contends that unit and batch 
technologies retain a wide variety of job content whereas in more 
mass production industries work tasks are normally heavily 
sub-divided. Woodward (1971) also attempts to show that there is 
no relationship between size and technology.
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researchers (Pryor, 1972; Bolton, 1971; Hood and Rees, 1974; George 
et. a l 1977; and Haworth and Rasmussen^ 1971) have suggested that 
there is a strong positive correlation between establishment size 
and capital intensity which is different but obviously related to 
the suggestion that there is a relationship between plant size, 
technology and hence job content. The correlation between size and 
capital intensity also has more direct implications for the 
characteristics associated with size in that there appear to be two 
relatively well established and important results associated with 
the relationship:
(i) the high capital intensity associated with large plants 
suggests that these employers will recruit a particular 
type of worker in order to minimise expensive plant 
downtime and damage to machinery.
(ii) the high capital intensity associated with size increases 
workers bargaining power in that a small proportion of the 
plant's total cost function controls the unit's output and 
productivity. In terms of the workforce it is therefore 
important to be unimportant (see Ulman, 1971).
The operational implications of both these conclusions are 
examined in detail in the following section alongside any separate 
effect size may have on job content.
EcQDtanlcs..of .Scale, in . the Personnel Eurctipn. Large plants 
will generally be in a position to take advantage of economies of 
scale in many aspects of personnel policy behaviour. The impact of 
economies of scale on plant labour market behaviour will vary 
depending on the nature of the plant and the a^ect of personnel 
policy under consideration. Nevertheless, these effects are 
probably both sufficiently important and wide ranging to 
significantly influence management's overall attitude towards 
personnel policy. For example, size and its associated economies
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of scale will allow management to operate a sophisticated personnel 
department staffed with experienced specialists responsible for 
particular aspects of plant personnel policy and labour market 
behaviour. Such socialisation will allow large employers to adopt 
a more efficient and objective approach to marpower management. As 
a result this will enable large plants to plan personnel policies in 
the light of both perceived internal requirements and in relation to 
external local labour market conditions. In view of their more 
limited resources this option is not open to smaller plants and so 
their attitude towards a similar LIM environment may differ.
In more economic terms large plant size and the resultant scale 
economies will also influence the unit costs associated with many 
aspects of personnel policy in that such plant will be able to 
spread their overheads over a larger workforce. As a result, large 
plants will in many rejects benefit from significant financial 
advantages in the provision of personnel functions, and this will 
once again result in differences in labour market behaviour between 
large and small units.
134
3. THE OPEEATIONAL. EFFECTS. OF SIZE
The structural characteristics associated with plant size, 
operating either in isolation or together, have widespread 
inplications for both worker and management attitudes towards 
personnel policy. That is, the combination of the separate 
conponents of the size effect suggests that large plants will have a 
distinctive approach to personnel policy and their relationship with 
the local labour market. However, in enpirical terms, predicting 
the precise nature of the inpact of size on a ^ecific labour market 
variable is difficult since so many influences may condition any 
single a^ect of personnel policy.
To try and overcome this problem the approach adopted in this 
research is to review the principal determinants operating on each 
variable, and by reference to previous theoretical and enpirical 
evidence suggest how these will ultimately influence large plant 
personnel policies. No serious attempt is made to develop or 
reappraise previous research and therefore the model under test is 
for the most part a hybrid version of existing contributions on the 
subject. In addition, no attempt is made to accurately determine 
the lines of causation between the interrelated variables beyond the 
relationships suggested in the existing literature.
3.1 The Relationship, between Plant Size and Earnings
As previous writers have pointed out (Masters, 1969; Sawyer, 
1973; Hood and Rees, 1975; George et al  ^1977; .Haworth and 
Rasmussen, 1971; Lester, 1967; Mayhew, 1976, and Rees and Shultz, 
1970) the structural characteristics associated with large plant 
size have important implications for the level of earnings in the 
establishment. In particular, since the high level of 
bureaucratisation and functional specialisation inhibits worker 
satisfaction in the plant this may force the employer to offer high 
earnings thereby helping to equate the level of pecuniary and non- 
peauniary benefits between plants competing for labour.
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Large employers not adopting this strategy would be faced with high 
turnover, high absenteeism and the threat of more direct forms of 
industrial action (see Ingham, 1970; Shorey, 1976, and Eisele 
1973-74, for further details).
The tendency for large plants to offer high wages to compensate 
for the disadvantageous working conditions will be reinforced by the 
high capital intensity characterising such establishments. Workers 
in large plants will often constitute a relatively low proportion of 
an employer's total costs. Therefore the cost to management of 
accepting a worker's wage claim will usually be less than the costs 
associated with industrial action (see Hood and Rees, 1974, P.174; 
and George et . al ^1977, P.267). Similarly, it has been
suggested ( ^wworth and Rasmussen ^ 1971, P.376) that under certain 
circumstances a worker's marginal productivity, and therefore his 
wage, will be determined by the capital to labour ratio prevalent in 
the plant. If this argument can be sustained then the higher the 
capital intensity the higher the wage.
Higher wages in larger plants may also reflect the correlation
between plant size and product market concentration. It has been
suggested (Masters, 1969, PP.341-342; Hood and Rees, 1975, P.172;
and Weiss, 1966) that plants operating in highly concentrated
industries pay higher wages since generally peaking they earn
higher levels of profits and consequently have a high ability to
pay. Accordingly, although there is no apparent causal
relationship between product market concentration, plant size and
(11)wages there will be a statistical relationship.
The ability of the workforce to bargain for the high wages 
suggested by the fundamental structural characteristics associated 
with size will also be helped by the higher levels of unionisation
(10) Ulman (1971) points out that it is only "important to be 
unimportant" under certain conditions, and if these are not 
fulfilled then wages will not necessarily be pushed upwards.
(11) For some conflicting views on this hypothesis see Levinson, 
(1967, P.204); and Masters, (1969, P.341).
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prevalent in large establishments (see Section 3.3; and Bain and 
Elsheiklv 1980). More specifically it has been suggested (see Hood 
and Rees, 1975, P.173; Shister, 1953; Berhowitz, 1954; Hawworth and 
Rasmussen, 1971, P.378; and Sawyer, 1973, P.147) that since a large 
plant environment is generally conducive to the growth of strong 
well-organised unions this will help translate worker wage demands 
into earnings above the rate prevailing in otherwise similar but 
smaller plants.
In conclusion, the combined effect, both direct and indirect, of 
the structural characteristics associated with size appear to have a
(13)
positive effect on wages and earnings. Accordingly, and
within the context of the local labour market, the dominant plant 
because of its size, will offer higher earnings than otherwise 
similar smaller units.
If a high intra-Local Labour Market wage effect is identified in 
the dominant plant group then this willalso have implications for
(12) Again some authors (for example. Masters, 1969, P.343) have 
suggested that the opposite effect may prevail in that since large 
plants are also characterised by strong management this may act as 
an effective countervailing power to any union or worker pressure.
(13) The method of wage payment and the quality of work demanded by 
large employers will also have a positive influence on wages. These 
effects are discussed in Section 3.2.
(14) Empirical evidence also suggests that large plants will tend to 
provide an above-average level of fringe benefits thereby 
supplementing earnings and the overall compensation package (see 
Lester, 1967). Providing high levels of fringe rewards is a 
particularly attractive way of boosting the benefit package in large 
units since it is one effective method of reducing worker alienation 
and the associated non-pecuniary disadvantages associated with 
working in the plant. In addition large plants will also favour 
providing fringe benefits since many aspects of such efforts are 
subject to significant economies of scale.
(15) There is some evidence to suggest that wages are to some extent 
influenced by local labour market size (Rees and Shultz, 1970; 
Pucbs , 1967). Consequently since large plants are generally 
associated with larger local labour markets large plants will tend 
to have higher wages. However, as this research concentrates on 
intra-local labour market comparisons the problem of controlling ftv* 
this influence does not arise.
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the monopsony model. Most importantly a dominant plant paying 
relatively high wages in the local labour market will tend not to be 
faced with an inelastic labour supply curve, which means that the 
marginal costs of labour will not lie above the supply price. 
Therefore, the key element in depressing wages in these plants is 
absent. Consequently, the size effect^when related to the presence 
of other establishments in the area^may serve to offset the impact 
of monopsonistic wage pricing on the dominant plant. However, the 
process will tend to be more complex than this in that the labour 
supply inelasticities will not be completely removed from the local 
labour market but may, somewhat paradoxically, be transmitted to the 
smaller plants in the area. In other words, monopsonistic 
influences will filter down the labour market plant size hierarchy 
and ultimately the smallest plants in the local labour market will 
be more inclined to experience monopsonistic influences. Moreover, 
as long as the effect of monopsony is experienced by some plants in 
the area then it is likely to depress wages throughout the area. 
With reject to the dominant plant this means that their wages only 
have to exceed the levels set by the monopsonistically affected 
smaller plants in order to become the area's leading wage payer.
As a result, it should be possible to continue to observe the impact 
of monopsonistic pressures on wages although this may be less 
important than the original monopsony model suggested.
3..^_Plant_ _Size,__Worker_^0uality^. Recruitament. .Methods . and . Labour 
Shortages
Plant size also affects an employer's worker quality 
requirements, recruitment methods, and selection procedures. All 
these factors, in turn, have implications for the possible impact of 
labour shortages on large plants. Since all these facets of labour 
market behaviour seem to be closely related they are dealt with 
together in this section. As with earnings this section will also 
show that, once the impact of plant size is taken into account, this 
will influence the results and conclusions drawn by the monopsony 
based model.
In terms of labour quality the structural characteristics 
associated with large plant size tend to increase the level of
performance demanded by these establishments from their workforce,
138
and as a result management will actively seek to recruit only 
relatively high quality workers. (See George ,et al 1977, P.206?
Master?^ 1969, P.342? Haworth and Rasmussen, 1971, P.378; Sawyer, 
1973 PP.148-149; Salt, 1967; and Prais, 1978, PP.368-384.) As 
highlighted previously one major reason for this preference is that 
large plants are characterised by organisational complexity which is 
reflected in a high degree of process and employee
inter-dependence. This implies that output will be at least partly 
determined by the least efficient workers on the production line.
As a direct consequence, and remembering that many large plants are
relatively capital intensive, it is important to have a strategy 
that will help minimise relatively expensive downtime and production 
stoppages by reducing the probability of erratic employee 
performance and error. One of the simplest methods of ensuring 
this is by recruiting and retaining high quality workers. Large 
plants may also prefer to employ quality workers to avoid the need 
for close supervision which would otherwise be necessary in such a 
complex and highly interdependent organisation (see Lester, 1967; 
and Pencavel, 1977). That is, foremen and managers in large units 
will be less able to provide close supervision of their front line 
workers and as a result will be inclined to recruit higher quality 
workers who can perform without their constant attention.
Accepting that in large plants management need to employ high 
quality workers implies that such establishments will have to
(16) Concerning the need for intensive monitoring in large plants 
such employers have an alternative course of action available to 
overcome the problems of supervision and efficient production 
management. Rather than recruiting high <^ality and therefore 
expensive workers, management may prefer to introduce a method of 
wage payment which will fulfill the supervisory function. The most 
appropriate method for such a role is some form of payment by 
results (EBR) system whereby employees have an incentive to work 
without direct or close supervision. Empirical evidence (George 
et. al ^1977, P.266; Sawyer, 1953, P.145; McCormick, 1977; and
Metcalf, 1976) confirms that large plants adopt EBR methods more 
frequently than smaller plants. Moreover, in many cases the prime 
reason put forward for using EBR is that the bureaucratic nature of 
the large plant inhibits effective control of the workforce and 
therefore output. The positive correlation between the size of the 
plant and the use of EBR also has implications for earnings since 
whatever the advantages of EBR methods for the employer, it is not a 
payment method favoured by the workforce. In particular, case
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develop an appropriate policy to recruit and retain this category of 
worker. Perhaps the only important and distinctive approach that 
management can offer to achieve this objective is to offer a high 
level of earnings relative to the remainder of the local labour 
market. If the predictions of competitive theory are fulfilled 
this will result in a surplus of protective recruits being 
attracted to the large plant, from which the employer may then 
select only the most promising applicants. Restricting recruitment 
in this way will prevent the wages in the large plant being bid down 
with the resultant loss in their power to attract a surplus of 
workers. That is, the only recruitment policy which will meet the 
large plant requirements in the long-run will be to offer a benefit 
package superior to that offered by competitors in the local labour 
market (see Bronfenbrenner (1956) for a detailed e3q»sition of this 
model, and Rees and Shultz (1971) for supportive evidence).
The selection methods associated with such a high wage 
recruitment policy will also be distinctive. It is likely that in 
recense to the relatively high level of earnings in the large plant 
new job applicants will form a nominal queue from which management 
may select on a discretionary basis wherever necessary. To aid the 
process of attracting and subsequently selecting the best workers, 
and at the same time instituting an organised queuing system, large 
plant management may also tend to adopt a characteristic attitude 
towards hiring procedures by maintaining a comprehensive list of on- 
spec applicants attracted by the offer of high wages. In so doing 
management may select appropriate applicants as requirements 
dictate. Smaller firms need not maintain such a formalised system 
as their labour needs in terms of both quantity and quality would 
not justify the administrative costs associated with such a system 
(see Doeringer and Piore, 1971).
(16)(contd) . studies have shown that the advantages associated with 
EBR are widely offset by a sense of insecurity among workers which 
arises in the fluctuations in earnings commonly associated with such 
systems. Therefore to overcome these non-pecuniary disadvantages 
eitployers adopting EBR systems will also tend to offer a relatively 
high level of earnings (see Sav^er, 1973, P.145; and Metcalf,
1976). Note, however, that more recent evidence suggests that EBR 
methods are becoming less popular and this iirplies that, on balance, 
large plants will probably favour recruiting high quality workers.
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Allied to the notion of hiring quality workers and maintaining a 
coirprehensive list of on-spec applicants, large plants should also 
favour distinctive screening procedures. In particular, the 
quality constraints imposed by the structural chracteristies 
associated with size will dictate that selection criteria will be 
relatively strict and rigourously imposed. In operational terms 
this suggests that job applicants in large plants will be subjected 
to a number of technical and personal interviews. By contrast 
smaller establishments operating with less sophisticated personnel 
departments will recruit on a more informal basis, particularly 
given that the need for quality is not of such paramount 
importance.
The larger plants' overall attitude towards labour quality, 
recruitment and screening, plus their tendency to offer above 
average earnings will have a direct bearing on the impact of labour 
shortages on the plant. It follows that if the plant is offering 
relatively high wages then a surplus of workers will be 
automatically attracted towards the plant, and this will be 
manifested in a waiting list for future vacancies. The only 
problem with the labour supply situation may be if the relatively 
high wage does not produce workers of sufficient quality or of the 
correct skill mix. Under these circumstances such a mismatch may 
still lead to the joint presence of high earnings, shortages and a 
waiting list.
To summarise this section in relation to the analysis of 
dominant plant behaviour, the existing evidence suggests that in 
relation to their local labour market competitors dominant plants, 
because they are large, will seek to recruit high quality workers. 
Furthermore, it will be possible to meet this objective since 
dominant plants tend to pay relatively high wages in relation to 
other local labour market employers. The need to select 
appropriate workers from the resultant over-supply of workers means 
that dominant plants will tend to develop specialised recruitment 
and screening methods. Recognising these a^ects of dominant plant
(17) For example, Mackay et al (1971) state that: "where large wage
differentials are found they are accompanied by the application of 
stricter hiring standards in the high wage units".
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behaviour and the associated inter-relationship with other plants in 
the area may have fundamental implications for the inter-local 
labour market monopsony based model of dominant plant behaviour.
In particular, the dominant plant's ability, via the impact of size 
on earnings, to attract labour from within the local labour market 
may reduce the need for dominant plants to implement 
monopsonistically induced recruitment methods. Similarly, if 
dominant plants are faced with an over supply of recruits as a 
result of their high wage policy then it is less likely that 
dominant plants will be characterised by shortages, an important 
feature of the monopsony model.
3.3 Plant Size and Unionisation
From an organisational viewpoint the high level of bureau­
cratisation and the consequent separation of management from the 
workforce (and to some extent workers from each other) which 
characterises large plant behaviour has inportant implications for 
the level of unionisation in such establishments. More 
specifically it has been suggested (Hood and Rees, 1975; Shister, 
1953; Berhowitz, 1954; Haworth and Rasmussen, 1971; and Sawyer, 
1973) that these features, coupled with a high degree of intra-work 
group horizontal communication, will serve to divide worker and 
management interests and increase suspicion and mistrust about their 
re^ective motives and actions. Under these circumstances 
employees in large units will be more inclined to join a union in an 
effort to act against the adverse social environment and working 
conditions in the plant. From a bargaining point of view within a 
large plant, the act of joining a union will also help consolidate 
the workers' negotiating position, and develop an effective 
countervailing power against a relatively powerful employer. 
Ultimately, therefore, these economic characteristics will also lead 
to high levels of unionisation in large plants.
Supporting these points there is also an argument that suggests 
that rather than relying solely on employee initiated efforts to 
unionise, large plants will probably find themselves selected as 
prime targets for union activity since many large units will be easy
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to organise and at the same time particularly vulnerable to outside 
pressure given^%.8% separation of management and the workforce. This 
process will be particularly evident in areas where unions consider 
that in organising large plants in the local labour market other 
establishments in the area or industry will follow.
Empirical evidence for the view that unions are better 
represented and organised in large plants comes from Price and Bain 
{1976, P.348); "the available evidence suggests that establishment 
size is a critical determinant of u n i o n i s a t i o n " . I n  direct 
support of this conclusion Bolton (1971) found that only 8% of small 
firms were completely unionised, and in each industry these tended 
to be the larger of the smaller firms. Moreover, almost two-thirds 
of smaller firms had no trade union members on their payroll.
In operational terms the principal effect of unionisation will 
be to increase wages and improve working conditions within the 
plant. This outcome reflects union bargaining experience and their 
ability to marshall the workforce effectively as a sirgle unit. 
The empirical isolation of the impact of unions on wages is an 
extremely complicated exercise since many other factors have to be 
controlled for in any such investigation. Nevertheless, recent 
estimates of the union/non-union differential seems to support the 
argument that, ceteris paribus, unionisation biases wages upwards. 
For example see the relatively recent work by Mulvey (1978) or 
Metcalf (1977).
In terms of dominant plant behaviour, and drawing together the 
conclusions set out above, the questionnaire analysis presented in 
the following chapter should show that because of their size, union
(18) Unions may also be more prevalent in large plants indirectly 
through their association with highly concentrated industries where 
profits and therefore ability to pay tend to be above average.
(19) See also Bain and Elsheiklu (1980) for further supportive 
evidence.
(20) On a different but related point, Boraston, et al (1975) also 
found that even if small plants are unionised they tend to be less 
well organised within the plant when compared to larger
establishments.
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levels in dominant plants are high relative to other plants in the 
area. Moreover, this union activity should effectively support and 
add substance to the previously highlighted propensity for these 
plants to offer relatively high earnings. It may also be possible 
to identify union negotiated improvements in working conditions 
within dominant plants.
Although plant size influences unionisation it is not expected 
to materially alter the prédictions of the monopsony model or the 
conclusions drawn on the basis of the empirical evidence presented 
in Chapter 3. This is largely because this aspect of the size 
effect will probably not have such direct implications for other 
plants in the areas, as was the case with earnings and as a 
consequence recruitment and shortages.
3.4 Plant Size and Industrial Training
Industrial training is normally considered as an effective and 
direct means of enhancing worker productivity. Moreover it has 
also been recognised (Proctor and Thornton ^1961) that trainir^ may 
also enhance worker performance more indirectly by helping improve 
intra-plant communication, bolstering morale and co-operation, 
lessening the burden of supervision, and reducing worker 
grievances. These effects are particularly relevant to large 
plants since their structural characteristics significantly restrict 
the non-pecuniary benefits associated with work. Accordingly, and 
to overcome the problems created by size, large plants would 
normally be expected to undertake a disproportionately high amount 
of training relative to otherwise similar smaller plants.
Another reason why large plants may train more than smaller 
establishments is that often they can take advantage of substantial 
economies of scale in their training activities. That is, many 
training programmes have relatively high fixed costs, in terms of 
both equipment and manpower, with the result that the more workers a 
plant trains the lower the per-capita cost. Consequently, large 
plants will have major cost advantages over small units. 
Reinforcing this are the benefits large plants enjoy in planning
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training programmes. In particular, a large plant with its more 
sophisticated personnel department will be able to accurately 
estimate its training needs on the basis of previous enployee 
behaviour and labour wastage rates. This will allow the plant to 
significantly reduce the obstacles to rational and planned training 
programmes. Smaller firms, by contrast, tend to operate in a more 
uncertain environment where it is more difficult to estimate 
training needs. Consequently, smaller firms will tend to recruit 
experienced and previously trained workers.
There is a considerable amount of enpirical evidence to support 
the theoretical arguments suggesting a positive relationship between 
plant size and training. At an aggregate level the published 
figures on the 1964 UK Labour Costs (see IMSO, 1964) show a strong 
correlation between plant size and the propensity to train.
A relationship between size and training has also been highlighted 
in several more disaggregated studies. For example, Giles' (1968) 
study of the initial impact of the 1964 Industrial Training Act 
shows that on a per-capita basis for every category of training 
covered the larger plants ^ent more than smaller firms. 
Similarly, Serbien (1961) in his survey of industrial training 
practices found that plant size was a crucial determinant of all 
aspects of training. Finally, Foltman (1964) in his work on US 
labour markets found that larger firms prefer to train, whereas 
smaller firms regard training as too expensive and prefer to recruit 
experienced personnel in the labour market.
The positive correlation between plant size and industrial 
training also has important repercussions for other aspects of plant 
personnel policy, and especially large plant attitudes towards wage 
determination (for example, see Pencavel, 1972). The nature of 
these wage effects will tend to differ depending on whether the 
training is plant ^ecific or of a more general nature.
(21) The same pattern applies to the 1968 figures. For example, 
the data shows that for all manufacturing industry the largest size 
category when compared to the other groups spends 59% more per 
employee on training.
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With respect to plant ^ecific training g theory states that 
employers will finance the cost of industrial education and 
subsequently recoup the benefits by offering a wage below the 
workers augmented marginal product. However, and as Chuter 2 has 
already illustrated, in order to minimise the long-run difference 
between the wage rate and the augmented marginal product management 
will offer a wage premium to ensure that specifically trained 
workers remain with the plant. ^plying this model to large plant 
training policies implies that such plants should offer a relatively 
high wage premium, since by investing highly in specific training 
they have the most to lose if a worker quits. In the case of
a dominated local labour market, however, the size of the wage 
differential between large and small plants will tend to be 
minimised because the potential for mobility is restricted by the 
structure of the market.
Variations in the propensity to provide general training will 
not necessarily result in wage differentials between large and small 
plants. As Chapter 2 demonstrated a generally trained worker 
finances his own industrial education since once trained he could 
leave his current occupation for an equally attractive job without 
the employer being able to successfully amortise his investment in 
human capital. To compensate the worker for financing his training 
the generally trained employee is rewarded with a higher 
post-training wage to reflect his increased productivity. The 
logic of this system suggests that even if large plants do "provide" 
more facilities for general training and are more efficient in 
running their training programmes this will . affect the wage 
offered by establishments within the local labour market. This is 
because the augmented productivity applies to all employers and will
(22) Within the context of the local labour market and inter-firm 
comparisons it may seem that this result has little meaning since, 
by definition, specific training only relates to a particular plant 
and hence any comparison cannot be strictly controlled. 
Nonetheless, in practical terms it is still important to recognise 
that differences in the extent of plant specific training will 
result in wage differentials between broadly similar groups.
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be reflected in the wage offered by all plants in the local labour 
market.
This simplistic division between large and small plant general 
training has to be modified in a dominated local labour market where 
the lack of mobility associated with the markets means that workers 
may not be prepared to bear the full burden of financing general 
training. Under these circumstances the employer will have to bear 
part of the cost of the quasi-^ecific training which in turn 
implies that a wage differential will emerge between establishments 
reflecting their size and propensity to train.
In sum, therefore, it appears that the size effect will 
influence dominant plant training practices in relation to the rest 
of the local labour market. In particular, it should be possible 
to show that dominant plants have a relatively high propensity to 
train. This will also influence the level of earnings offered by 
the dominant plant relative to other plants in the area, but the net 
effect of this is difficult to predict given the distinction between 
general and specific training, and the obvious limits to mobility 
associated with dominated local labour markets. In terms of the 
wider implication for the monopsony model, the variations in 
training behaviour are only relevant in that they serve to support 
higher earnings in the dominant plant relative to the rest of the 
local labour market and thereby may ultimately offset the problems 
related to recruitment and shortages.
(23) This reasoning suggests that large plant apprenticeship wages 
will be lower than those prevailing in small plants. However, if 
the large plants are sufficiently more efficient in their training 
programmes this need not be the case.
(24) In talking about the provision of training courses and formal 
schooling within the plant the model of trainirg adopted in this 
section may be criticised for overlooking on-the-job training. This 
shortcoming may be important if on-the-job training is an important 
component of total plant training as suggested ^  for example^ by 
Thurow, (1976; Chapter 4). It is also worth noting that due to its 
informal nature this type of training is maybe more important in 
smaller plants. Therefore, in terms of total training effort^ 
differences in the extent of training between large and small plants 
may be lower than originally hypothesised.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The principal objective of this Chapter was to identify the most 
important determinants of large plant personnel policy and relate 
the results to the labour market strategies adopted by such 
plants. The way in which large plant personnel policies affect the 
establishment's relationship with the remainder of the local labour 
market was also considered. In adopting this approach it was then 
possible to suggest how dominant plants behave in relation to their 
local labour market environment since the only factor distinguishing 
them from other plants in the area is size. Moreover, once these 
intra-local labour market results are considered it is also possible 
to establish how these predictions affect the monopsony model 
developed and tested in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
The results of the investigation into the determinants of plant 
personnel policy shows that dominant establishments, because of 
their size, are characterised by bureaucratisation, organisational 
complexity, functional specialisation and economies of scale. 
Within the local labour market dominant plants will react to both 
the dangers and opportunities associated with these features with 
the result that their personnel policy will differ significantly 
from the approach adopted by smaller establishments operating within 
the same local labour market.
Perhaps the most important réponse of dominant plants to the 
structural characteristics associated with size will be to offer a 
wage above the local labour market equivalent in order to overcome 
the disadvantages associated with a large plant environment. At 
the same time this wage premium will have to be sufficiently high to 
attract and retain the high quality workers required by large plants 
to ensure optimal efficiency. Pressure to pay above average 
earnings may also result from the high levels of unionisation and 
training often associated with plant size. Finally, as a result of 
paying above average wages relative to the rest of the local labour 
market dominant plants will also be characterised by highly 
selective recruitment and selection procedures.
(25)(cont.) Various authors (George et. aljl977, P.269; Sawyer, 1973, 
P. 148; and Stoikov and Miisaon, 1968) have also suggested that there 
is a relationship between plant size and quits. However, both 
theory and empirical work make it very difficult to develop any 
clear propositions which can be tested in the research. This 
problem is eKcxcerbated by the problems associated with gathering 
accurate data on quits at a plant level. As a result of these 
observations it was decided not to consider the impact of plant size 
on quits in the research.
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As Diagram 4.1 shows the operational effects of size are inter­
related and to a large extent self reinforcing. For example, in 
addition to worker quality requirements being influenced by bureau­
cratisation and related structural considerations, it will also be 
influenced by the plant's prevailing wage rate and management's 
propensity to train. As a result of these often complex inter­
relationships between variables it is extremely difficult to 
determine the principal causal factors influencing and 
characterising dominant plant personnel policy relative to the rest 
of the local labour market. Nonetheless the overall end result is 
predictable.
The model of large plant behaviour may also be used to develop 
hypotheses relating dominant plant behaviour to the rest of the LIM 
since within the context of the local labour market the term 
"dominant" may effectively be substituted for large. In broad 
terms this analytical framework is consistent with the predictions 
of the competitive model, whilst at the same time recognising that 
significant earnings differentials between plants may prevail over 
time. Such a model relies heavily on illustrating that the labour 
quality requirements of large and small plants differ markedly and 
this provides a sufficient economic justification for large plants 
to offer a relatively high level of earnings.. These differentials 
are maintained by the strict hiring and screening procedures adopted 
by large plants, and the allied restriction on the number of workers 
recruited by the large employer. This strategy will be 
complemented by a sound understanding within the large plant's 
personnel department of the aspects of the local labour market 
relating to wages, employment conditions and similar information 
required to accurately assess the plant's standing in the local 
labour market. The model of large plant personnel policy, 
therefore, suggests that despite widespread variations in earnings 
within the local labour market there is an economically justifiable 
and planned relationship between plants operating in the local 
labour market. Moreover, wage differentials between plants may still 
act as an allocative mechanism in direct response to the labour 
requirements of a particular plant.
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Recognising the existence of other plants within the local 
labour market, and the ways in which they are related to each other 
through worker mobility, has implications for some of the 
predictions associated with the monopsony model and the inter-local 
labour market analysis of dominant plant behaviour. Of most 
importance is the observation that relatively high earnings in the 
dominant plant relative to other plants in the area will serve to 
offset the need for dominant plants to adopt recruitment methods 
designed to overcome monopsonistic pressures. Similarly ^ the 
earnings differential within the local labour market will reduce the 
severity of labour shortages induced by monopsonistic conditions. 
The possible absence of monopsonistic pressures in dominant plants 
does not imply that the feature is totally removed from the local 
labour market. Instead, theoretical considerations suggest that, 
paradoxically, monopsonistic influences may filter down the local 
labour market plant hierarchy so that their associated pressures are 
felt most severely by the smaller establishments in the area.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMINANCE, PLANT SIZE 
AND INTRA-LIM BEHAVIOUR?
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Chapter 4 demonstrated that theoretically the local labour 
market behaviour of dominant plants should be heavily influenced by 
the structural characteristics associated with establishment size. 
These influences are, in turn, reflected in the dominant plant's 
attitude towards personnel policy. Bearing this in mind this 
Chapter seeks to identify the impact of establishment size on 
dominant plant personnel policy using the information gathered from 
the questionnaire, and where appropriate contrasting the results 
with complementary evidence from other studies. in particular the 
influence of size on earnings, manpower quality, screening and 
hiring procedure, training policies, and unionisation are 
considered.
It should be remembered that this part of the project, 
although it is of interest in its own right, is really of secondary 
importance when compared to the preceding inter-LIM analysis and the 
identification of monopsonistic influences. Consequently, the 
empirical analysis only briefly examines the various hypotheses 
under test. Nonetheless, the evidence collected and the conclusions 
drawn are sufficient to . provide a relatively general, if not 
rigorous, interpretation of how dominant plants
(1) In this section of the analysis no attempt was made to generate 
a control group (see appendix 2 for the problems this would have 
entailed), As an alternative g dominant plant respondents were 
explicitly asked to compare specific aspects of their behaviour with
other firms in the LIM. In addition, and wherever possible, the
results of other studies were also used as a proxy control group for
the questionnaire returns. In this exercise large plants were 
defined as those employing over 1000. In some measure this
threshold level must be arbitrary, but it is a figure used in 
previous studies seeking to identify size effects (for example ;see 
Eisele, 1973-74). Ihat is, once a plant employs 1000 workers it 
often seems that the characteristics associated with size become 
evident. Ideally, of course, it would have been more appropriate to 
have a continuous rather than a discrete size variable, but such an 
approach was beyond the scope of this study.
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behave within their LIM. On this basis it is also possible to 
suggest how the results may condition the previously tested 
hypotheses relating to monopsony.
1 THE IMPACT OF SIZE ON DCKENANT PLANT WAGES AND EARNINGS
One central proposition of Chapter 4 was that dominant plants, 
as a direct result of their large absolute size, will offer the 
highest level of earnings in the LIM. Ihis hypothesis was initially 
tested by asking plants to estimate their relative position in the 
LIM wage hierarchy. The results of this exercise are shown in Table
5.1 and tend to confirm the propost ion developed previously. For 
skilled male manuals 72% of the respondents paid above the average 
level of LIM earnings, 66% in the case of other male manuals, and
78% for female manuals. By contrast, it follows that few
firms paid their workforce below the LIM average, and indeed for 
skilled male manuals this was only reported on two occasions.
The evidence examined so far has assumed that dominant plants
set their own wages. However, Chapter 3 indicated that this is only
partly true, and therefore there is a danger that the high wage 
phenomenon experienced by dominant plants is caused by features 
related to the central wage bargaining position rather than plant
(2) The tendency to pay amongst the highest was most prevalent in 
the skilled male manual group where 53% of the sampled plants were 
in this top category,
(3) It is significant to note, although the results are not 
presented here, that the tendency for the dominant plants to be over 
represented at the top of the LIM earnings league is higher than for 
the control group plants used in Chapter 3 (however, these 
differences are not significant). This probably reflects the 
structure of the respective LIMs and particularly that the control 
group LIMs are more likely to have plants of a similar size and 
hence a similar wage structure. As a result of such structural 
considerations the dominant plant operations will tend to be very 
much more in evidence at a LIM level. This posibility is examined 
in more detail in subsequent sections.
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size. Tb overcome this problem Table 5.1 also analyses plants where 
wages (as measured by the basic rate) are determined locally, in
this case dominant plants once again are clustered towards the top
of the wage hierarchy. This is further evidence supporting the
original hypothesis and suggests that centralised wage negotiations 
do not seem to alter the plant's standing within the LIM.
Additional evidence from Table 5.1 suggests that the decision 
by most dominant plants to pay above LIM earnings is taken
deliberately, either as part of the establishments overall LIM 
strategy or as a result of internal presures within the
establishment. That is, the figures show all dominant plants bar 
one were aware, or thought they were aware, of their position in the 
LIM. Similarly, the evidence on the extent of wage surveys 
undertaken by dominant plants (see Chapter 3, footnote 8) indicates 
that the nature and extent of wage surveys undertaken by dominant 
plant management are both widespread and comprehensive. Over 50% of 
the dominant plants carry out wage surveys of other firms in the 
same industry operating in the same LIM, and 47% survey other firms 
in the LIM but not in the same industry. Considering the structure 
of dominated LIMs the combination of these two categories suggests 
that most dominant plants carry out some form of regular survey into 
LIM wages and employment conditions. The results of the analysis 
into the principal determinants of earnings also suggest that 
dominant plants are aware of the earnings of other firms in the 
area. The table shows that labour recruitment and retention
problems caused by the actions of other plants in the area and union 
pressure for comparability with other firms in the area both play a 
role in determining the levels of earnings in the plant. As a 
result dominant plants would be expected to monitor continually the 
behaviour of these firms if they have been identified as influencing 
the plant's LIM policies.
To futher assess the overall attractiveness of working in 
dominant plants questionnaire respond0:its were also asked about the
(4) See Table 3.8 in Chapter 3
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level of fringe benefits offered by the plant in relation to other 
firms operating in the LIM. The results of this exercise have 
already been presented in the table discussed in footnote 5 of 
Chapter 3, and repeat the pattern followed by dominant plant 
earnings discussed above. In this case, 26 plants, 70% of the total 
sample, stated that they offered more extensive fringe benefits than 
other establishments operating in the area. Another 24% offered 
average fringe benefits, and only 2 plants reported offering below 
average fringe b e n e f i t s . A l t h o u g h  a more accurate 
specification of the extent of dominant plant fringe benefits was 
beyond the scope and capability of the study, the questionnaire 
analysis nevertheless did measure the extent of non-pecuniary 
rewards in dominant plants for three important aspects of fringe 
benefits (see Table 5.2). The results showed that all dominant 
plants provided both a pension scheme and sickness benefits, and 
only one plant in the sanple did not provide a sports and recreation 
club. Generally speaking this is above the level of fringe benefits 
provided by small and medium sized plants and may give some 
indication of the economies of scale associated with such 
activities,
(5) It is worthwhile noting that the control group plants shown in 
the table did not consider themselves as providing such a relatively 
high level of fringe benefits. Again  ^Üiis may reflect the 
structural differences between the LIM types. Alternatively, 
however, it may also indicate that dominant plant employers tend to 
favour fringe benefits as a means of boosting the total benefit 
package offered to the workers. unfortunately, without further 
evidence it is difficult to substantiate this possibility. For 
further details on the issues involved see Morris 19 65.
(6) For example, see Reid and Robertson (1976) and MacKay etal 
(1971)
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TABLE 5.2 THE PROVISION OF MAJOR FRINGE BENEFITS IN DOMINANT PLANTS
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No & Proportion 
Offering Sickness 
Benefit-Scheme
No & Proportion 
Offering Pension 
Scheme
No & Proportion 
Providing Sports 
& Social Club
36(97.3) 37(100) 36(97.3)
Overall, therefore, it appears from the available evidence 
that plant size influences earnings and other elements of the
benefit package to such an extent that the dominant plants tend to 
be clustered at the top of the LIM wage hierarchy as predicted in 
Chapter 4. However, having identified the positive association 
between plant size and earnings, it is difficult to move a stage 
further and pinpoint the key labour market variables associated with 
size and which in turn influence earnings. Nonetheless, evidence 
from the questionnaire returns does suggest that the strong union 
presence in dominant plants may be one explanation of their wage 
policy (see section 5.5). Another potential explanation is the high 
quality labour recruited by these plants (see section 5.2).
Note also that as the available evidence supports the
proposition that dominant plants offer the highest benefit package 
in the LIM this may also reduce ’ the depressing effect monopsony 
has on dominant plant earnings. Although this offsetting effect 
will probably be minimal it should have a more pronounced effect on 
other monopsonistic aspects of dominant plant LIM behaviour, and in 
particular will serve to minimise labour shortages and the
characteristic recruitment methods associated with these 
quasi-monopsonistic plants.
2 THE IMPACT OF PLANT SIZE ON DOMINANT PLANT MANPOWER QUALITY
A second predicted consequence of size for dominant plant 
personnel policy was that large plants tend to recruit high quality 
manpower to meet the demands associated with working in a relatively 
difficult environment.
(7) See Chapter 3 and 4
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This hypothesis on manpower quality is consistent with the 
evidence presented in Table 5.3, Table 5.4. Table 5.3 focuses on 
the dominant plant's employment strategy for skilled male manuals 
and shows that 100% of the dominant plants in the sample employ 
silled workers with at least average, but often above average skill 
levels. Similarly Table 5.4 shows that, for the other two work 
groups under review, dominant plants also appear to employ workers 
of average and above average q u a l i t y . H o w e v e r  in this case, 
the tendency to hire workers of well-above average quality is not as 
pronounced as the pattern for skilled workers. In the case of
skilled male manuals 46% of the plants employed workers of above 
average skills, whereas for other manual groups the figure fell to 
1 9 % . These results, therefore, appear to support the 
hypothesis that dominant plants, in response to the structural 
characteristics associated with plant size, tend to recruit highly 
skilled and highly qualified manpower.
(8) As expected^ the same pattern is repeated in the control groups 
used in Chapter 3 but the results are not reported here since they 
are of limited interest.
(9) The distinction between highly skilled in the skilled male 
manual group and the high quality specified in the other manual 
groups reflects the way in which managers were considered to think 
about different sections of the workforce. In particular, all 
skilled workers are of a high quality almost by definition.
(10) Once again, and as expected, the same pattern is repeated in 
the control group generated for the inter-LIM analysis although the 
results are not reported here.
(11) To an extent this helps resolve the argument on whether large 
plants need to recruit a skilled and high quality workforce (see 
Chapter 3 ) . However, due to the sensitivities involved it was not 
possible to determine specifically the internal pressures prompting 
dominant plants to adopt this policy. There is no reason^ 
nonetheless, why the factors outlined in the theory Chapter should 
not be the principal determinants.
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dominant plants decision to employ skilled and high
quality workers, has implications for the plants' recruitment
methods and screening techniques which, as a result, should be
biased towards policies designed to select only the best available
labour. Similarly, the apparent need for quality workers should
also encourage management to increase the level of training in the
plant. Both these suggestions are examined in subsequent
sections of this Chapter. The dominant plants* high manpower quality
standards may also partly explain the shortages of skilled and high
quality recruits identified in Chapter 3, although this reason was
not explicitly highlighted in any of the dominant plant replies.
(12) See Section 4, Chapter 3.
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TABLE 5.3 THE PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SKILLS IN DOMINANT PLANTS RELATIVE 
TO THE REST OF THE LIM FOR SKILLED MALE MANUAL WORKERS
Extent of Skill Proportion of Plants in Each Category
Hi^ly skilled 45.9
About average skill 51.1
Less skilled 0.0
No particular reputation 0.0
Don't know 0.0
total no of observations 37(100)
TABLE 5.4 THE QUALITY OF MANPOWER IN DOMINANT PLANTS RELATIVE TO THE 
REST OF THE LIM FOR NON-SKILLED WORK GROUPS
Level of Quality
proportion of Plants in Each 
Category
Above average quality 18.9
About average quality 75.7
Less than average quality 5.4
NO particular reputation 0.0
Dont know 0.0
Total no of observations 37 ( 100)
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3 THE IMPACT OF PLANT SIZE ON DOMINANT PLANT SELECTION PROCEDURES
Ihe combination of high earnings and the need to recruit 
quality labour suggests that dominant plant hiring standards should 
be both comprehensive and highly s e l e c t i v e . T h i s  section 
tests this hypothesis using the dominant plant questionnaire replies 
and by comparing the results with other similar studies into 
recruitment procedures. The study first examines the dominant 
plants' attitude towards the screening of potential recruits and 
this is followed by an investigation into the dominant plants' 
policy on hiring on-spec applicants.
3.1 Screening Procedures
Table 5.5 summarises the selection procedures followed by 
dominant plants when recruiting. Ihe results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that all work groups are subject to several screening 
filters before being accepted or rejected by management. Ihe 
screening procedure most widely used by dominant plants was 
personnel department interviews. For each skill group this 
procedure was used in over 90% of cases Medical tests were the 
second most popular screening procedure, once again widely used by 
over 90% of respondent plants but of particular importance when 
recruiting female manual enployees. Another important screening 
technique was for a plant foreman to interview potential recruits? 
over 75% of the dominant plants used this form of screening 
extensively. Other popular screening techniques included obtaining 
references from the applicant's previous employer, and (for skilled 
male manuals) interviews by non personnel management staff.
(13) See Chapter 4, Section 2.
(14) Applicants for employment in dominant plants, therefore, have 
to pass through a relatively stringent series of screening processes 
before being accepted as suitable employees. However, in view of 
this it is surprising that so few applicants are subjected to any 
formal test of skill or competence. This screening procedure was 
used by only 11% of dominant plants when recruiting skilled manual 
workers and was rarely considered by any of the establishments when 
screening unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers.
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Although the relative importance of the different screening 
methods are the same for the three categories of employee there are 
differences between the work-groups in the extent to which 
individual procedures are used. The most important distinction 
between screening procedures for skilled male manual workers and the 
other two groups was that the dominant plants generally screen the 
skilled candidates more intensively than the other manual 
employees. This is true for five of the six screening methods 
listed in T&ble 5.5 and highlights the greater concern of the plants 
to ensure that they recruit suitable candidates for jobs requiring 
above average skill levels (see Section 5.2). Accepting this 
interpretation of plant behaviour suggests that the dominant plants' 
policy may be considered as rational and reflecting the costs and 
benefits of selecting appropriate recruits for each category of 
employment.
It is difficult to establish whether the screening methods 
used by the dominant plants can justifiably be described as 
intensive as there are no control group statistics available to 
allow adequate comparison. Moreover, since little specific research 
has been undertaken on small and medium sized plant selection 
procedures it is also not possible to use a previous study as a 
proxy control group. Nonetheless, it is feasible to establish 
whether any of the more generally based LIM studies seem to offer 
support for the original hypothesis. For example MacKay etal (1971, 
P360) found that the selection procedures anployed in their sample 
of firms in Birmingham and Glasgow were as follows?
(15) For example, intensive screening of female manual enployees 
would be of limited value as this is generally a high turnover 
relatively homogeneous work group with its quit rate being partly 
determined by family influences and other factors outside the 
control of the plant.
(16) Table A17.9 in ^pendix 17 shows 3n "average screening index" 
for dominant plants which confirms the hypothesis that screening is 
most intensive for skilled male manuals g less intensive for other 
male manuals^and lowest for female manuals. The differences between 
the groups are statistically significant at a 95% confidence
interval for the following work group pairs:
"Few plants in these two conurbations applied any formal 
test at the first stage of selection, and decisions as to 
the short list were made by the personnel officer on the 
basis of his ability to gauge suitability through a shorty 
often informal  ^interview. It seldom fell to the 
personnel officer to attenpt any judgement of skill and 
technical competence. Instead ^  factors such as age, 
personal appearance, colour and previous eitployment 
experience were the hiring standards applied in this 
initial screening process. Formal tests of technical 
competence and proficiency were also rare at the second 
stage. The foreman usually deciding whether the 
individual possessed the necessary degree of experience 
or ability by ascertaining his previous job experience, 
and, at this stage also, subjective assessments were 
extremely important".
The evidence presented by this study seems to be 
basically similar to the findings in Table 5.5. As a result 
there is no direct evidence to support the proposition that 
large plant selection procedures are more rigorously applied 
than the policies adopted by others. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to be any more precise on this since the size 
distribution of plants in the MacKay study is unknown, so it is 
not clear that this study reflects the behaviour of relatively 
small units.
3.2 Handling of on Spec j^plicants
Another posb&ated characteristic aspect of dominant plant 
screening procedures concerns the attitude adopted by maniement 
when dealing with on-spec applicants for employment. It is 
considered that this should be an important feature of dominant 
plant selection procedures if the relatively high benefit 
package associated with these establishments succeeds in 
attracting a large number of on-spec applicants. That is, to 
benefit most from this situation dominant plants should develop 
and maintain an efficient mechanism for dealing with on-spec 
applicants.
(16) cont.
(i) between skilled male manuals and other male manuals, and 
skilled male manuals and female manuals in the dominant group
(ii) between skilled male manuals and other male manuals and 
skilled male manuals and female manuals for the combined samples 
(that is where the non-dominant large plants are included).
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Table 5.6 shows that whether a list of on-spec applicants is 
kept by dominant plants depends to some extent on the skill group 
involved. For skilled male manuals only 11% ^ firms failed to record 
details of on-spec applicants. For other male manuals and female 
manuals the number increased to 22% and 21% of plants respectively. 
The nature of information collected also varied according to skill 
groups. Although the same proportion of plants kept details of only 
the most suitable applicants for all work groups, a higher 
proportion of the sample kept details of all skilled male manual, 
on-spec applicants. This bias towards skilled male manual probably 
reflects the shortages experienced by the dominant plants for this 
type of worker.
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TABLE 5.6 DOMINANT PLANT METHODS OF DEALING WITH ON-SPEC APPLICANTS
Porportional Use of On-Spec List 
by Skill Group
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
female
Manuals
No details of on spec 
applicants kept. 10.8 21,6 20.6
Details of most suitable 
applicants only kept. 43.2 40.5 43.2
Details of almost all on-spec 
applicants kept. 43.2 35.1 29.4
Other 2.7 2.7 2.9
Total no of observations 37(100) 37(100) 34(100)
.....
TABLE 5.7 REASONS WHY NO ON-SPEC LIST KEPT BY DOMINANT PLANfTS
R6/)gON WHY NO ON-SPEC LIST KEPT FREQUENCY I
High unemployment in the area would make 
the list uncontrolable 2
All applicants are channelled to the Job Centre 4
Require formal application 1
Long waiting list 1
Recruitment depends on internal recommendation 1
List becomes obsolete quickly 1
Total 10
164
The reasons why some dominant plants chose not to keep a list 
of on-spec applicants are presented in Table 5.7. The most 
important reason was a preference by the plant for applicants to be 
channelled through the local Job Centre which would then undertake 
the initial screening on the behalf of the plant. Other 
explanations, although of minor importance, included; high levels of 
unenployment making an on-spec list unworkable? an already long 
waiting list for employment in the dominant plant? a policy by 
management to insist on formal applications? a dependence on 
internal recommendations ? and a tendency for such a list to become 
obsolete quickly.
Returning to the majority of plants that actually maintain a 
list of on-spec applicants Table 5.8 indicates the principal ways in 
which the plants use this list. One characteristic of the table is 
that, once again, the nature and intensity of use differs between 
skill groups. Although in several firms the procedure varies, or 
there is no clear pattern when using the list, there is a tendency 
for dominant plants when recruiting skilled workers to contact the 
best qualified and most skilled applicants on their list. 
Approximately 69% of the sample used this method when selecting 
applicants. That is, skilled workers on the list were generally 
selected on the grounds of ability. Contacting the best qualified 
workers is also the most popular selection procedure in the other 
categories of enployment, but in this case the tendency is less 
pronounced with only 36% of the firms using this technique to 
recruit workers. Therefore, for other male manuals and female 
manuals ^ plants vary their selection methods to a greater extent, and 
often there is no clearly observable pattern in their procedures for 
recruiting on-spec applicants. Overall, then, the policies followed 
by dominant plants in this case are not geared to such an extent to 
selecting the best qualified applicants. This suggests that other 
male manuals and female manuals are more homogeneous groups with 
quality differences being of only marginal importance.
TABLE 5.8 DOMINANT PLANT USE OF THE ON-SPEC APPLICANTS LIST
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SKILL GROUP
Use of on Spec List
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Make very little use of list 0 3 4
Contact most recent on-spec 
applicants on list 3 7 4
Contact appliants on list who 
have been on it for the longest 
time 0 10 12
Contact best qualified/most 
skilled applicants on the list 68 35 36
Varies, no clear pattern 12 28 32
Combination of above 15 14 12
Total number of observations 32(100) 28(100) 25(100)
Within the context of the original hypothesis it appears that 
both the setting-up and the use of an on-spec list tends to support 
the idea of the dominant plant as the leading employer within the 
LIM. In particular, the evidence seems consistent with the view 
that dominant plants tend to offer a relatively high wage rate in 
the LIM. This in turn attracts labour to the plant and the enployer 
is then able to select the most promising recruits from the 
resultant excess supply of applicants. The key point to note is 
that the dominant plant does not recruit all the workers it attracts 
but rather maintains a list of applicants from which it may select 
the most appropriate candidate when a vacancy arises. It would 
appear, therefore, that dominant plants do not offer higher wages 
simply to increase their share of LIM employment. Instead^ they use 
this mechanism as part of the process of ensuring they recruit 
labour of sufficient quality to handle the particular
(17) 166 
characteristics associated with working in a large plant,' ^
4 THE IMPACT OF SIZE ON DOMINANT PLANT TRAINING
The hypothesis under test in this section is that through a 
series of scale economies and a need for highly trained workers it 
seems likely that dominant plants will have a higher propensity to 
train than smaller firms operating in a similar LIM environment.
To a large extent this hypothesis has already been supported
in the inter-LIM analysis of dominant plant and control group
training programmes (see Chapter 3 Section 4) which showed that very
nearly 100% of the plants undertook comprehensive training
programmes with particular emphasis on the training of skilled and
semi-skilled workers and management grades. To complement this
result, and on the basis of data adapted from another study, it is
possible to be more specific and directly compare the dominant
plants' propensity to train with the policy adopted by smaller
plants. The results of this exercise are presented in 
fl8 )Table 5.9. The figures indicate that for every work group
dominant plants provide significantly more training than any of the 
three categories of small and medium sized firms shown in the 
table. Indeed it is possible to identify a clear training gradient
(17) See Bronfenbrenner (1956) for more detailed analysis of 
dominant plant bahaviour in this respect. Note also that this model 
of queuing is in many respects similar to the model of job 
competition developed by Thurow (1975, Chapter 4) whereby employers 
will rank prospective recruits according to the match between their 
background characteristics and the ,. partly unique job requirements.
(18) Ihe comparitive data is taken from a study of training 
practises published by Urwick Orr and Partners (1965).
associated with plant size. Ihat is, as plant size increases the 
scope and intensity of training also increases and serves to support 
the hypothesis outlined in the previous chapter.
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TABLE 5.9 PLANT SIZE TRAINING HIERARCHY
Plant Size Hierarchy
Worker Category 0-100 101-500 501-1000
Dominant
Plants
No % No % No % No %
Apprentice 7 64 33 61 42 91 36 97
Post Apprentice 1 9 4 7 16 35 32 86
Skilled - - 7 12 2 4 33 89
' Semi-Skilled 1 9 6 11 5 11 33 89
Unskilled - - 8 15 3 7 24 65
Clerical - - 8 15 16 35 32 86
Technical 2 18 12 22 25 54 33 89
Supervisory - - 12 22 20 43 36 97
Management — - 9 17 14 30 34 91
No of firms in sample 11 100 54 100 46 100 37 100
Note; (i) Source of NOn-Dominant Figs; Utwick-Orr (1965)
Highlighting intra-LLM training differences more specifically, 
but on a more subjective basis. Table 5.10 shows the dominant plantfs 
assessment of its contribution to training in relation to the rest 
of the LIM. The table shows that 70% of the plants considered that 
they provide a level of training above the LIM average; 16% of the
(19) Although monopsonistic considerations account for part of this 
difference as Chapter2 and Chapter 3 showed, under these 
circumstances this effect will be insignificant and much of the 
observed differences may still be attributed to size.
(20) This comparison, of course, assumes that the engineering 
industry is a fair representation of the training patterns in 
manufacturing and that the propensity to train has not changed since
1965.
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plants estimated that they provide an average amount of training; 
not one considered that it provided a level of training below 
average; and four firms had insufficient information to assess their 
position. These results, therefore, are also consistent with the 
hypothesis that dominant plants provide a relatively high amount of 
training in relation to other smaller plants in the LLM.
TABLE 5.10 EXTENT OF DOMINANT PLANT TRAINING RELATIVE TO THE REST 
OF THE LIM
Extent of Training
proportion of Dominant Plants 
in Each Category
More than average 70.3
About average 16.2
Less than average 2.7
Dont know 10.8
Total number of observations 37(100)
The high propensity to train displayed by dominant plants also 
relates to several other aspects of dominant plant personnel policy 
as Chapter 4 suggested. TO recap, the intensity of training 
activities may partly explain the high level of earnings in dominant 
plants since plants investing in training will have an economic 
incentive to offer a higher level of earnings thereby reducing quits 
in the plant and allowing the firm to amortize its investment over a 
longer time p e r i o d . T h e  higher level of training in dominant 
plants may also be considered as a response to the skilled labour 
shortages faced by many such plants, indeed Table 3.14 showed that 
increased training was one of the most favoured methods of easing 
labour shortages with over 54% of the firms using this technique as 
a method of adjusting to manpower imbalances. Finally, the high 
level of training in dominant plants, and its associated cost to the 
establishment, also helps explain why the plants carefully screen 
potential recruits. Detailed assessment helps lower dominant plant
(21) Unfortunately, it was not possible to gather sufficiently 
detailed data on quit rates to compare the dominant plant averages 
with other smaller establishments. The lack of any other compatible
survey also meant that it was not possible to use such results as a 
proxy control group.
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quit rates, and as a result will further enable the establishment to 
protect its investment in training. In all, therefore, the 
suggestion that dominant plants have a high propensity to train is 
also consistent with the empirical evidence on the variables such a 
policy decision will have a direct influence on.
5. THE IMPACT OF PLANT SIZE ON DCMINANT PLANT UNIONISATION
It was proposed in Chapter 4 that dominant plants, as a result 
of their large absolute size, would also tend to be heavily 
unionised. Table 5.11 strongly indicates that this appears to be 
the case and hence supports the original hypothesis. In more 
precise terms the average level of unionisation in dominant plants 
is 98% for skilled male manuals, 97% for other male manuals, and 87% 
for female manuals. This compares with an average level of 
unionisation in UK manufacturing industry of 62%. Although 
monopsonistic pressure offers some explanation of the result the 
differences are too large to totally explain the high levels of
unionisation. (22) (23) (24)
TJBLE 5.11 UK VERSUS DCMINMSIT PLANT LEVEIS OF UNIONISATION
Average Level of 
Unionisation in UK 
Manufacturing 
industry
Average level 
of Uhionisat- 
tion for 
Dominant 
Plants
Dominant Plant 
Unionisation 
for Skilled 
Male Manuals
Dominant Plant 
unionisation 
for Other Male 
Manuals
Dominant Plant 
unionisation 
for Female 
Manuals
62.2% 94% 98% 97% 87%
Note: (i) Figures taken from Price and Bain (1976)
(22) See Chapter 3, Section 5.
(23) To avoid any danger of bias the steel and coal results were 
taken out of the sample and the average recomputed. However, as 
Table A. 17.10 shows this does not materialy alter the picture.
(24) The mechanism by which the unions influençais the collective 
bargaining process. As Table 3.6 shows the most important elements 
of collective bargaining and wage determination are not focussed at 
plant level. Consequently ^ the impact of local union pressure on 
earnings will tend to be constrained.
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The higher levels of unionisation in dominant plants will 
probably influence a wide range of factors associated with dominant 
plant personnel policy, but unfortunately using the questionnaire 
approach it is generally difficult to either identify or estimate 
these effects. However, one of the few areas where it is possible 
to at least tentatively identify the impact of unionisation is in 
wage determination. In this case, and as Table 5.12 shows, unions 
tend to influence wages through the nature of comparisons they make 
with other plants. The most important comparison is between 
earnings in the dominant plant and other plants in the same company 
or group. The pressure for comparability with similar firms in the 
industry is the next most important comparison. By contrast,
compatability with other LIM and non local firms is not as 
important. As Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 show unions also
appear to have an influence on the most important aspects of fringe 
benefits in instances where these issues are in some measure 
determined at plant level. Far example, in the case of sickness 
benefits it appears that unions were involved in negotiations with 
all but one of the dominant
TABLE 5.12 UNION INFLUENCES ON DOMINANT PLANT EARNINGS
Nature of 
union Influence
Proportion of Responses Falling Into Each Category
Very
Important, important
Quite
Important
Of Little 
Importance
Not
Important
union pressure for 
compatability with 
other firms in the 
area 0.0 14.3 25.7 34.3 25.7
union pressure for 
compatability with 
firms in the same 
industry but differen 
LIM
t
14.7 14.7 17.6 23.5 29.4
union pressure for 
compatability with 
other plants in the 
same company 24.2 18.0 24.2 12.1 21.2
union pressure for 
compatability with 
other firms not in 
the same area, or 
industry 0.0 3.2 9.7 38.7 48.4
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TABLE 5.13 THE DETERMIÎStATiQN OF SICKNESS BENEFITS; THE INFLUENCE OF 
UNIONS
Proportion of Responses Falling into Each 
Category
Negotiation Method
Sickness
Benefit
Eligibility
Level of 
Payment
Length of Time 
Benefit Paid
Collective Agreement 53.6 43.2 37.8)
Management Discretion 2.7 2.7 2.7
Combination 2.7 2.7 5.4
Not Determined at the 
Plant 54.1 51.4 54.1
Total no of observations 37(100) 37(100) 37(100)
TABLE 5.14 THE INFLUENCE OF UNIONS ON DOMINANT PLANT PENSION SCHEMES
proportion of Responses Tailing Into Each 
Category
Negotiation Method Benefit Eligiblity Level of Payment on Pension
Collective Agreement 16.7 16.7
Management Discretion 2.8 2.8 '
Combination 2.8 2.8
Not Determined at 
plant Level 77.8 77.8
Total no of Observations 36 (100) 36(100)
(25) In some areas of dominant plant personnel policy union 
influence appears to be minimal,for example unions were rarely sited 
as causing recruitment problems or labour shortages.
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plants, and the negotiations covered the eligibility of workers for 
fringe benefits, the level of payment, and the length of time the 
payment covers. The pattern is repeated for dominant plant pension 
schemes where once again collective agreements play the major role 
in determining both the eligibility and level of the pension scheme 
operated in dominant plants. It should be noted, however, that in 
this case pension conditions are mostly not determined at plant 
level and this will, of course, limit union activity.
In summary, then, it does seem that plant size influences 
levels of unionisation, and therefore unions are relatively well 
represented in dominant plants. Moreover, there is evidence to 
suggest that the strong union presence ultimately influences the 
level of earnings and fringe benefits in the dominant plants.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite the absence of a tighly specified control group it is 
still possible to identify how dominant plants relate to the rest of 
the LEM by using the questionnaire data and, where possible, 
relating this information to previous labour market research. In 
general the results of the analysis suggest that within the LEM 
dominant plants exhibit characteristic behaviour patterns and these 
seem to reflect the large absolute size differences between dominant 
plants and other LIM employers. In most cases the results support 
the theoretical propositions put forward in Chapter 4, and when 
combined produce an economically consistent and rational explanation 
of dominant plant attitudes and behaviour. However, given the 
nature of the research it is not possible to specify the ways in 
which the obviously interrelated variables influence each other.
One of the first results of the analysis showed that dominant 
plant wages and earnings were generally higher than other plants in 
the LIM, From the available evidence this feature of dominant plant 
behaviour appeared to be a strategy deliberat&ly promoted and
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maintained by management. Moreover ^  the questionnaire results and 
other considerations also suggested that the high wage policy was 
the result of the structural characteristics associated with plant 
size.
The high wage strategy generally followed by dominant plants 
also appeared to have direct Irnplications for other aspects of
personnel policy. For example ^ the questionnaire evidence suggested^
that as a result of their high wage policy, dominant plants were 
able to recruit and retain workers of above average quality.
Similarly, the dominant plants also appeared to recruit workers of a 
higher skill level. A combination of the above average earnings 
package and the high quality and skill requirements also seem to 
influence dominant plant hiring procedures. More specifically^ in 
most cases it appeared that there was a well organised waiting list 
of applicants willing to work in dominant plants. From this "queue" 
dominant plants were able to select the most promising recruits
through a series of screening processes, unfortunately, it was not 
possible to conclude whether these screening procedures were any 
stricter than other plants operating in the LIM.
Dominant plant training policies also appear to differ 
markedly from other LIM plants in that the dominant plants generally 
provided a relatively high level of training. This supports the 
argument about the considerable economies of scale in training 
captured by dominant plants and the need for such plants to maintain 
the quality and skill of their labour force. The high level of 
training provided by dominant plants is probably also influenced by 
the dominant plants' relatively high wage rates, in that dominant 
plants can be confident that trained workers will be reluctant to 
quit to move to a plant offering superior earnings.
Lastly^ the level of unionisation in dominant plants appeared 
to be higher than in smaller plants, and this again seems to reflect 
the structural characteristics associated with plant size. The high 
levels of unionisation, in turn, appeared to influence other aspects
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of dominant plant personnel policy including the nature of 
collective bargaining and as a consequency the level of earnings and 
fringe benefits.
In a more general sense the model of dominant plant intra LIM 
behaviour tends to support a somewhat modified but nonetheless 
basically competitive explanation of labour market bahaviour. Each 
policy adopted by the dominant plants has a valid economic 
interpretation based on the plant's interrelated and often complex 
requirements to operate efficiently within a constrained LIM 
environment. That is, the dominant plants are reacting to the 
conditions imposed by their relatively large absolute size in the 
most economically efficient manner.
Bearing this result in mind it also seems reasonable to suggest 
that the relationship between the dominant plant and the other 
plants in the LIM may well have important inplications for the
monopsony model. In particular, the position of the dominant plant 
as the LIM's wage leader may serve to reduce the depressing impact 
of monopsony on dominant plant wage. Similarly,the leading position 
of the dominant plant in the LIM wage hierarchy may also help to 
alleviate the shortage problems associated with monopsony. This, in 
turn, should pre-empt the need for dominant plants to use
recruitment methods specifically designed to overcome supply 
inelasticities.
Having said this, perhaps it is ample testament to the 
inportance of monopsony that despite the implications of the size 
effect for dominant plant behaviour its influence still appears to 
affect dominant plant behaviour. Note also that, somewhat 
paradoxically, this result does not necessarily inply that
monopsonistic conditions are relaxed in such LIMs since it may in
fact be the case that it is the smaller firms in the llMs which 
actually suffer more , ,Gicutely from the problems associated with 
monopsony, unfortunately^; investigating whether this is the case is 
beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless ^ the point remains 
worthy of further attention.
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CHAPTER 6
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
LABOUR MARKET DCMINANCE AND LOCAL LABOUR MARKET EFFICIENCY
This second part of the research approaches the analysis of 
dominance from a broader perspective than the method adopted in 
Chapter 2 fco Chapter S'. Rather than examining the behaviour of the 
dominant plant, and subsequently contrasting its behaviour with 
other establishments, this part of the study extends the analysis by 
focusing on the overall performance and efficiency of dominated 
LIMs. In particular,this aspect of the research examines the 
behaviour of unenployment and vacancy rates in dominated LIMs.
Tb establish the theoretical framework for such a study this 
Chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines in 
some detail the theoretical measures of LIM efficiency based on 
unemployment and vacancy figures. The second section then uses 
these previously developed measures of performance to explore 
possible relationships between LIM dominance and LIM efficiency. 
This discussion also considers the influence other LIM features may 
have on performance so that their inpact may be controlled for when 
trying to empirically isolate the impact of dominance.
1 THE DERIVATION OF THE UV CURVE AND ITS ASSOCIATED MEASURES OF LIM 
EFFICIENCY
In a perfect LIM, characterised by homogeneous labour, perfect 
mobility and perfect information the relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies may be derived by examining the influence 
different levels of labour demand have on the two variables. The 
relationship is presented graphically in Diagram 6.1 by mapping 
labour demand against both unemployment and vacancies. As the 
diagram shows at low levels of demand, and in particular at the 
origin of the demand axis, unenployment is high and vacancies do not 
exist. As the demand for labour increases unemployment will fall in 
a one-to-one ratio until full employment is reached at the point L.
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Over the range OL vacancies will not exist because of the 
assumptions about perfect mobility and perfect information. Above 
the full employment level if demand increases the number of 
vacancies will increase on a one-to-one ratio, whereas unemployment
will remain at zero, itsminimum value. (1)
DIAGRAM 6.1 TEÎE DERIVATION OF ÜV OJRVE
UV
Adapted from Brown (1976)
VLV^ = Plot of vacancies in a perfect labour market 
ULCJ^  = Plot of unemployed in a perfect labour market 
VRv^ = Plot of vacancies in an inperfect labour market 
URD^ = Plot of unemployed in an iirperfect labour market 
L = Bhll employment
Ihis over-simplified theoretical picture of the relationship 
between unemployment and vacancies changes when labour market 
inperfections are introduced. As before, when demand picks up from 
a position of high unemployment all newly available employment will 
be- quickly taken up by the large pool of unemployed. Consequently^ 
the average duration of the vacancy will be short and the stock of 
vacancies will be minimal. However, as demand increases and the 
level of unemployment continues to fall, employers will find it more
(1) For simplicity this model ignores the additions to the labour 
force resulting from increased demand in the market.
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difficult to secure an adequate supply of labour and it will become 
increasingly common for a mismatch, both qualitatively and 
geographically, to occur between job vacancies and the unemployed. 
This tendency will be further reinforced by imperfections in LIM job 
information. As a result a stock of vacancies will appear before 
full employment is reached, and this is represented in the diagram 
by the broken line Ihat is, in practice the vacancy line
will tend to rise from the horizontal axis far short of the full 
employment point L and merge into the original vacancy line far 
beyond it. A similar situation applies to the unemployed, in that 
once market imperfections are introduced unemployment will not fall 
in a one-to-one ratio with every job created by higher levels of 
demand. Therefore, in terms of the diagram unemployment will tend 
to diverge from the UL 45° line before L and merge into the 
horizontal axis well beyond it as unemployment becomes decreasingly 
sensitive to changes in demand, in the diagram this is represented 
by the URU^ line.
From this more realistic model of UV behaviour the 
relationship between unemployment and vacancies can be calculated by 
reading off the relevant values of the two variables at different 
levels of demand. Ihe result is a relationship similar to that 
shown in Diagram 6.2.
(2) See A J Brown (1976) for a more detailed analysis of the 
derivation.
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In algebraic terms this function may be represented by the equation 
U = which in log terms equals log Ü = log A + B log V.
That is,the UV function is log linear.
(
DIAGRAM 6.2 THE UV OJRVE
V
(3) It is not strictly correct to state that the UV relationship 
can be represented by an equation of the form U = AV^ since the 
point where U = V does not lie on a curve of that nature but rather 
is a point where the separate curves join (see Diagram 6.1). In 
fact the function traced out by Diagram 6.1 can only be calculated 
by using switching regressions, an econometric technique well beyond 
this study. Conveniently, however, an equation of the form
U = A\^ is a very close approximation to the true nature of the 
curve and the difference will be marginal.
(4) Although not of concern here it may also be possible to observe 
loops in the UV relationship depending on whether the local economy 
was expanding or contracting. Indeed^recent contributions to UV 
research seems to suggest that loops may indeed form part of a much 
more involved model of UV behaviour. See, for example, Hyman & 
Palmer (1980) and Bowden (1980).
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From the UV diagram it is possible to develop measures of IlM 
performance and efficiency^ %  distinguishing between the different 
categories of unemployment it is possible to identify from the UV 
e q u a t i o n . I n  particular, by estimating the level of non-demand 
deficient unenployment (%d) it is possible to identify the maximum 
level of unemployment resulting from LIM inperfections which may 
then subsequently be used as one indicator of the efficiency of the 
LIM.
DIAŒAM 6.3 THE UV EQUATION AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Diagram 6.3 illustrates how non-denand deficient unemployment 
is derived from the standard UV diagram. Take AU*B as the best fit 
line through the observed values of unenployment and vacancies. OF 
is a 45^ line cutting AU*B at U*. This is the point where U = V and
(5) Appendix 14 explains the distinction between the different 
categories of unenployment , In particular it distinguishes between 
demand deficient unemployment and the two components of non-demand 
deficient unenployment; structural unenployment and frictional 
unemployment.
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as a consequence demand deficient unemployment (Udd) is zero.
From the diagram the maximum value of Udd is where V = 0, the point 
B in the diagram. Therefore, between OD and OB, Udd runs from its 
mimimum to its maximum value and this is traced out by the line DF. 
Non-demand deficient unemployment comprises structural (Us) and 
frictional (Uf) unemployment, and up to the point D is represented 
by the distance between the U = V line and either axis. That is, 
all unemployment is either structural or frictional because 
unemployment is less than total vacancies. At higher levels of 
unemployment above D, und equals the difference between total 
unemployment and udd, which is represented by the difference between 
the lines of OF and DF. Therefore, from the geometry of the diagram 
it is obvious that Uftid reaches its maximum value when v - U, that 
is, at U*. As a result, by measuring U* for any LLM the maximum 
level of Und can be calculated. Moreover ^ since U* measures the 
extent of unemployment caused by labour market imperfections (Us 
plus Uf), it is possible to measure LIM efficiency directly in that 
the closer U* lies to the origin then the more efficient the LIM 
becomes since the coexistance of unemployment and vacancies is 
reduced. The particular significance of the U* measure is that it 
provides a comparable measure of LT1& efficiency which is 
independent of the level of demand prevailing in a market at any 
particular time.
(6) See Appendix 14. That is, this is the point where labour 
sipply (U) equals labour demand (V).
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Occasionally in practise the U* measure of efficiency will be 
difficult to estimate since in some cases the UV observations will 
not cross the U = V line and, depending on their distribution, it 
may be tenuous to calculate an extrapolated estimate of U*. ihis
problem is illustrated in Diagram 6.4 which shows the underlying
1 1 1nature of the confidence intervals (the lines aa , bb , cc 
and dd^) for determining U* based on an observed cluster of UV 
points. The figure shows that the further away the observed UV 
values lie from the u = V line then the greater the range of values 
U* may fall within when extrapolating. Ihat is, the further the 
observed UV points lie from the U = V line then the wider the 
possible variation in the value of the estimated value of U*. 
Another problem with the U* measure concerns LIMs where the log A 
term is insignificantly different from zero, assuming that for 
simplicity the UV equation is run in its log form. Converting this 
result into natural numbers inplies that the value of the constant 
terms equals one which means that any equation, irrespective of its 
B value, will cut the U = V line at the coordinate (1,1). Uhder 
these circumstances it may not be possible to differentiate between 
the efficiency of different LIMs as measured by U* with an 
insignificant constant term.
DIAGRAM 6.4 AN ILLUSTRATION OF CONFIDENCE LEVELS ASSOCIATED WITH 
EXTRAPOLATING UV OBSERVATIONS
LogU
UV observations
U = V
LogV
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As a result of these considerations on occassion it will be 
more convenient to use an alternative measure of LIM efficiency; the 
elasticity of vacancies with respect to unemployment. Using this 
measure the most efficient type of LIM will be those with a high 
negative elasticity indicating thak. any increase in demand will have 
a significant impact on unemployment without a simultaneous and 
equally large increase in vacancies (see Cheshire, 1979). 
Conveniently, given the functural form of the UV equation, the 
elasticity of the function is a constant equal to B, which is the 
coefficient of the dependent variable in the log linear form of the 
UV equation, Another way of looking at the elasticity of the 
UV function is shown in Diagram 6.5 which relates the curve to the 
original demand based illustration. in this case where two UV 
curves with equal constants are compared (the lines erf and etf) the 
UV curve with the most negative elasticity (etf) lies closer to the 
most efficient path as traced out by the demand based diagram. Ihat 
is, ETF lies closer to EOF than ERF. Ihis means that the UV curve 
represented by etf has fewer mis-matches or problems associated with 
information deficiencies or adjustment lags. Therefore, rather than 
considering B as the UV curve's elasticity it may also be thought of 
as the coefficient that determines how close the observed UV points 
approach the optimum path (EOF) as illustrated by the demand based 
model.
(7) The diagram below shows how the elasticity measure of 
efficiency distinguishes between LIMs where log A is insignificant. 
That is, in tW» case the slope is more negative in the more 
efficient market (UV line aa' ) although both UV curves have the same 
value for U*.
(8) Given that the standard equation is U = A\^ the elasticity of 
the function is;
^  (V)
dv U
(1)
(V)
AVB
= B
Note also that where U = V (that is, U*) the B value is equal to the 
derivitive and therefore measures the absolute rate of change of
unemployment compared to vacancies.
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For expositional purposes the two UV curves mentioned above 
(erf and etf) and illustrated in Diagram 6.5 were assumed to have 
equal constant terms. However, in practice there is no reason why 
this should be the case, and in fact the constant itself as measured 
by A in the UV equation, can also be considered as a measure of LIM 
efficiency since this specifies the level of demand at which 
imperfections begin to appear in the labour market. For example, in 
Diagram 6,5 the UV curves asb and erf both have similar elasticities 
but different constants. That is, asb is further displaced from the 
origin. Tracing this back to the demand based figure shows that in 
the case of asb the appearance of LIM imperfections started at point 
X which is a lower level of demand than the erf curve, where 
imperfections only begin at point w. Therefore, using this measure 
of LIM efficiency asb is more inefficient than erf. As a result, and 
other things being equal, the efficiency of the LIM is also 
dependent on the constant term which is another way of saying that 
performance reflects the level at which demand imperfections begin 
to appear in the LIM.
Although the elasticity and the constant terms in the UV 
equation may be considered as alternative measures of LIM efficiency 
they also have their shortcomings. Firstly, like the U* measure, 
both these indices are subject to measurement errors. Secondly, for 
either of these measures to be meaningful the other has to be held 
constant a procedure which severly restricts the ability to make
(9) Another measure of efficiency would be to examine the leads and 
lags associated with changes in demand at a local labour market 
level, That is, the faster a LIM unemployment rate responds to a 
change in vacancies then the more efficient the LIM. Uhfortunately, 
measuring these responses with sufficient accuracy was beyond the 
scope of the research.
(10) Note that the three measures of efficiency (U*, A and B) will 
only produce similar rankings if A and B are correlated* f*ater 
considerations suggest that this may indeed be the case.
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reasonable and comprehensive conparisons between LIMs. Ihirdly, it 
is also the case that A and B are not really as important as u* 
since the U* index measures the maximum amount of labour market 
imperfections whereas A and B only measure particular aspects of the 
changes in labour market imperfections. Finally, and related to the 
previous comment, it also has to be borne in mind that U* is a more 
powerful measure of LLM efficiency because it takes into account the 
influence that both A and B have on the positioning of the UV
curve. That is, U* encompasses how soon imperfections appear on the 
market and how well the LIM copes with such imperfections.
Cn the basis of the points raised so far it would seem that 
when testing hypotheses related to LIM efficiency that U* should be 
viewed as the key index of performance in that it unambiguously 
measures LIM efficiency by estimating the maximum amount of
non-demand deficient unemployment in the market. Nonetheless, as a 
back-up it may be appropriate to quote values of A and B when 
examining particular aspects of LIM behaviour. Of these two
secondary measures the B value will be the most important since this 
measure has been used by other studies (see for example, Cheshire, 
1976) the result of which may be introduced in the empirical section 
for comparitive purposes, in addition to this^ the B coefficient
will probably be of more value since the constant is less likely to 
show significant variation in value between LIMs.
(11) The validity of the B value as a measure of efficiency, 
depends in part on whether the level of demand is rising or falling 
in the LIM. More specifically, although it is reasonable to suggest 
that an efficient LIM is one where a small increase in vacancies 
will produce a proportionately large decrease in unemployment the 
corollary of this is less convincing. That is, it is difficult to 
accept that a LIM is efficient where a reduction in vacancies 
results in a relatively large increase in unemployment.
(12) For example, if the contstant term is insignificant in any 
regression equation run on log u = log A + B log V then the consent 
term in natural numbers will always equal 1.
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2. THE DETERMINANTS OF LIM EFFICIENCY
Having outlined how LIM efficiency may be measured using the 
UV relationship it is now possible to show how dominance may affect 
the position of the UV curve and hence LEM performance. This 
exercise is the subject of the first part of this section. The 
second part of this exercise examines the way in which other LEM 
characteristics influence dominance so that it will be possible to 
effectively control for these when attempting to empirically isolate 
the impact of dominance. Following this the third and final part of 
the section concentrates specifically on dominated LIMs and tries to 
identify the principal determinants of variations in performance 
within this group by looking at the impact the degree of dominance 
and industrial sector may have oa efficiency. Whenever appropriate 
in both sections an attempt is made to develop hypotheses which may 
subsequently be tested empirically .
2.1 The impact of Dominance on LIM Performance
The preceding analysis suggested that the efficiency of a LEM 
may be measured by the point where the UV equation crosses the U=V 
line, by the rate of substitition between unemployment and 
vacancies, and the value of the log equation's constant term. The 
analysis also indicated that the values associated with all of these 
measures reflects the behaviour of the two components of non-demand 
deficient unemployment, structural unemployment (Us) and frictional 
unemployment (üE).^^^^ Bearing this in mind, and extending the 
logic a stage further, the key objective here is to establish that 
dominance may affect Us and Uf and hence LIM performance.
(13) As will become evident in Chapter 7 and ippendix 15 the nature 
of the hypotheses which can be developed on the relationship between 
efficiency and LIM structure is constrained by both data and 
econometric problems. As a result it is only practical to derive 
broadly based propositions highlighting in general terms the impact 
of LIM characteristics on LIM performance.
(14) See Appendix 14 for details on the nature of both Us and Uf.
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Looking initially at Us, which measures the mismatch between 
available jobs and the unemployed in the LIM, it can be argued that 
this component of the unemployment rate will be relatively low in a 
dominated LIM since there will be a relatively limited opportunity 
for vacancies to appear in the market for skills other than those 
employed by the dominant plant. For example, in dominated
LIMs exhibiting relatively high levels of unemployment it is 
unlikely that there will be high vacancy levels in other skill 
groups since there will be relatively few employers in the remainder 
of the LIM capable of creating such vacancies and consequently the 
associated threat of a mismatch. Extending this argument jif a job 
vacancy arises in a plant dominated U M  then it should be filled 
relatively quickly since the unemployed are more likely to be 
compatible with the skills associated with the job opportunity. 
This implies that if there are unemployed workers in the LIM it will 
tend to reflect a deficiency in demand rather than LIM 
imperfections. The net effect of these pressures will be that the 
UV curve in a monopsonistic LIM will tend to lie closer to the 
origin. Relating this to the earlier discussion suggests that 
dominance will delay the onset, through its impact on us, of LIM 
imperfections and will also tend to minimise their impact once they 
appear.
Frictional unemployment is determined by less quantifiable but 
nonetheless real influences which include imperfect labour market 
information and the lags associated with labour market adjustment. 
Following on from this definition it is also possible to show that 
frictional unemployment may be reduced in dominated LIMs through the 
influence monopsony has on worker job search patterns, where to a 
large extent such search behaviour often relies heavily on informal 
methods operating through family and kinship contacts and by on-spec
(15) Note that through the discussion it is assumed that the 
quasi-monopsonistic position of the dominant plants implies that 
these employers hire a high proportion of many of the skill groups 
within the LLM.
(16) Note that the level of structural unemployment in a LIM is a 
function of the size of the area. Therefore, in sufficiently small 
areas the problem of structural unemployment may be defined away. 
See, for example, HUghes (1974, pp24-25)
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application by the searcher to local employers.
Given this model of job search it is reasonable to assume that the
policies adopted by the dominant plant may help enhance the
effective search for employment. In particular % because of the
dominant plant's pre-eminance in the LIM most workers will be aware 
of the conditions of employment associated with working in such an 
establishment and the precedures associated with its lection 
process. As a result of this widespread availability of information 
on the dominant plant and the consequent reduction in uncertainty 
associated with the job search process frictional unemployment
should be reduced in this type of LIM.
(17) For a summery of Worker Search behaviour and job search models 
under conditions of imperfect information see Lipp'moa and McCall 
(1976) . Note that is was not felt that any of these models could 
have realistically been incorporated into the efficiency model. 
This conclusion was reached largely for two separate reasons. 
Firstly s the models in the literature are generally very
sophisticated and the resultant theoretical propositions cannot be 
tested within the confines of the available data set. Secondly, 
existing search models do not take account of the variables 
specifically under examination in the monopsony model, and it was 
beyond the scope of the study to develop a more comprehensive theory 
in what is already a difficult area. As a result of these
considerations it was decided to concentrate on a far more
simplistic but inherently more testable model.
(18) Search behaviour will be more formalised for white collar
workers and therefore is less subject to the informal information 
network. Note also that the impact of monopsony on the distribution 
of wage offers will also affect white collar workers in the same way 
it affects manual groups.
(19) One qualification to this will be if the dominant plant does 
not recruit centrally, under these circumstances knowledge of the 
dominant plant may become fragmented with adverse implications for 
the length of the job search process. However, it should be 
remembered that the earlier results of the questionnaire analysis 
suggests that this is not the case (see Chapter 5) and that 
recruitment is centrally located.
(20) Another related point is that workers employed by the dominant 
plant will not have to quit the plant to search for alternative 
employment within the establishment. The implication of this is 
that a considerable amount of potential search behaviour is 
internalised within a relatively high proportion of the llMs total 
employment, and observed frictional unemployment may again be 
significantly reduced.
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Complementing this tendency the importance of the dominant plant to 
the local economy may also lead to closer and more productive links 
with the Job Centre and other related LIM institutions. By applying 
logic similar to that outlined above this relationship should also 
help reduce frictional unemployment. The net impact of both these 
pressures should be that once again the onset of LIM imperfections, 
caused this time by frictional unemployment, will be delayed and 
subsequently minimised with the result that plant dominated UV 
curves should lie closer to the optimal path and the origin.
In addition to influencing the quality of information and the 
speed of information flows in the LIM dominance will also affect the 
quantity and variation of information in the LIM. More specifically 
dominated LIMs, as a direct result of theCf quasi - monopsonistic 
nature, will restrict the distribution of wage offers to be searched 
and this in turn will have implications for LIM performance. That 
is, a worker will generally search in the labour market until the 
expected marginal cost of further search and unemployment equals 
the expected marginal benefits of securing employment at a higher 
wage, m  practical terms this process involves the worker sampling 
a number of vacancies in the U M  and from this assessing the LIM job 
environment, and more specifically to what extent an unsampled or 
future vacancy is likely to improve on existing offers. The time 
taken to make such an assessment, and hence the duration of
unemployment will be influenced by plant dominance since a searcher 
sampling the dominant plant will immediately be able to estimate the 
probability of receiving a better offer without being involved in
any significant further searching. That is, as the dominant
plant represents a relatively high proportion of LIM employment the 
likeliehood of finding an improved offer within the LIM is
significantly reduced.
(21) This assumes that job seekers are limited in the number of 
vacancies or offers they can search in a given time period, and 
similarly that otployers are limited in the extent to which they can 
pass on job information in one period. The model also assumes that 
the time taken to "search" a plant is independent of the size and 
that the number of contacts to whom employers pass on vacancy 
information during a period is limited and the same for all plants. 
All these assumptions are sufficiently realistic not to damage the
applicability of the search model.
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and workers will tend to select a job vacancy faster. Dominance, 
therefore, simplifies the distribution of wage offers within the LIM 
with the result that searchers will be in a position- to effectively 
choose quickly between alternative job opportunities. As a result^ 
the average duration of unemployment in dominated LIMs will be 
reduced and the efficiency of the LEM improved. This
same result holds even if there are no job vacancies in the dominant 
plant. That is, by significantly reducing the need to search a 
significant proportion of the LIM job seekers can, by concentrating 
on the remaining opportunities, again assess the remaining available 
jobs in the market and quickly decide on a job offer which satisfies 
their acceptance criteria. Once again the net result is a reduction 
in Uf and a movement of the UV curve towards the origin. (^ 4)
TO sane extent the results of the analysis of the personnel 
policy questionnaire (see Chapter 5) suggest that there may indeed 
be a relationship between the attitude and behaviour of the dominant 
plant and the overall performance of the LIM. At a general level 
the questionnaire evidence was consistent with the view that the 
dominant plant is heavily integrated into the LIM, and in many 
respects may dictate the overall behaviour of the market. More 
specifically the questionnaire evidence also highlighted individual 
practices which will also tend to increase the efficiency of the 
LIM and thereby further confirm the relationships suggested above.
(22) Since the dominant plant is normally considered to be one of 
the leading LIM employers (see Chapters 4 and 5) searchers "sampling" 
this establishment can usually conclude that they are unlikely to 
secure a better job offer. Indeed, because the dominant plant 
generally offers better conditions there may be a waiting list of 
applicants already in alternative employment. under the 
circumstances when a worker changes job there need not be any 
intervening period of unemployment and " LIM efficiency will be 
further improved.
(23) As before 5this mechanism works by both delaying the appearance 
of LIM imperfections and subsequently minimising their impact.
(24) Rather more tentatively the role of the dominant plant as the 
focal point in the LIM may further reduce frictional unemployment if 
the area's communications become focussed on the plant and as a 
result mobility is improved in the area.
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For example, the extent, variety, and sophistication of dominant 
plant recruitmentmethods suggests that job search will tend to be 
minimised in such LIMs thereby helping to increase the overall 
efficiency of the market. Indeed the evidence suggests that, 
depending on circumstances, many plant personnel departments 
actively search out workers rather than merely responding to worker 
search patterns. Finally, and again a general observation, it also 
appears that dominant plants have a detailed knowledge of the LIM 
environment and that their policies and actions are shaped bearing 
this in mind, Accordingly, dominant plants should be able to 
respond rapidly to changing labour market conditions and thereby 
again help minimise structural and frictional unemployment and LIM 
inefficiency.
2.2 The mpact of Other LIM Characteristics on LIM Performance
Besides dominance there are other LIM characteristics which 
influence labour market efficiency and these have to be taken into 
account if the impact of dominance is to be isolated from the other 
variables. Theoretical considerations suggest that these additional 
variables include industrial dominance, LIM size, and LIM self 
containment. The reasoning behind this view is presented below and 
draws on many of the processes mentioned above in the discussion 
relating plant dominance to LIM efficiency.
Industrial dominance is important to LIM efficiency since^like 
plant dominance, it also influences both the structural and 
frictional components of non-demand deficient unemployment. More 
specifically and directly analagous to the reasoning applied in the 
case of plant dominated LIMs, in industrially dominated local labour 
markets. Us will again be relatively low due to the limited 
development of industries with skill requirements not related to the 
areas leading sector. That is, there are unlikely to be many job 
opportunities in the LIM which are not compatible with the dominant 
industry's skill requirements. Consequently, the probability that 
recruitment will involve retraining will be reduced, and employers 
will more readily accept job applications. This will lead to a 
reduction in unemployment duration and, as before, an increase in
the efficiency of the LIM as measured by the UV equation.
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Frictional unemployment may also be reduced in industrially
dominated LIMs due to the beneficial effects the LIM structure may
have on information flows. In many respects the arguments relating
to industrially dominated LIMs once again parallel the propositions
developed to explain the factors influencing LIM efficiency in plant
dominated LIMs. Firstly, the availability and general understanding
of job information may be enhanced in an industrially dominated LIM
since much of the information will tend to relate to the practices
adopted by one particular sector. Therefore, relevant job
information may well be relatively standard and easily interpreted
by both employers and employees. Secondly, the distribution of wage
offers may be reduced and simplified since once again a relatively
high proportion of the job opportunities will have been generated by
the dominating industry. Both these factors suggest that to assess
LIM conditions and subsequently decide on an acceptable vacancy will
involve job seekers in shorter search strategies. This, in turn,
will tend to reduce the duration of unemployment and hence
frictional unemployment. As a result,industrial dominance will also
tend to enhance the efficiency of the LIM as measured by the
(26) Pro
position of the UV curve.
The size of the local labour market, as measured by the number 
of workers or the geographical area under consideration may also 
have an effect on LIM efficiency through its influence on Us and 
Uf. With respect to structural unemployment the larger the LIM the 
more likely it is to be industrially diversified and with the result 
that there will be a higher probability of a mismatch between 
unemployment and vacancies and consequently relatively high levels 
of Us. That is, in an industrially diversified LIM the economic 
situation facing different industries need not be the same and, 
whilst there may be vacancies in one sector, the characteristics of 
the unemployed may only match a quite different industry. The 
resultant mismatch between labour supply and demand will serve to 
reduce LIM e f f i c i e n c y . L a r g e r  LIMs may also be relatively
(25) Note that this argument is open to critisism in that it does 
not look at the effect of size considering all other things as 
equal. This is certainly a valid caranent but it is equally correct 
to say that size and industrial diversity are not independent
variables and it would be unrealistic to control for industrial 
diversities to look exclusively at size.
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inefficient because of higher levels of frictional unemployment 
caused by the difficulties faced by workers searching for jobs in 
these markets. In particular the larger the market the smaller the 
proportion of vacancies which can be searched in a given period. 
Following from this, the smaller the proportion of total vacancies 
searched in a period the higher the probability that subsequent 
search will turn up a more suitable vacancy. As a result workers 
will extend their search period, the duration of unemployment will
rise and so to will frictional unemployment. (26)
Geographical immobility is also likely to increase in larger 
LIMs reflecting the economic costs associated with travelling to 
work. Ihe problem will arise even although LIMs were defined to 
minimise labour imnobility since it is clear that some of the 
selected LIM configurations are large in relation to the typical 
joumey-to-work patterns of many lower paid manual workers. If 
distance does inhibit some workers finding and taking on suitable 
employment will become more difficult and as a result frictional 
unemployment will again increase. The net outcome will be that the 
cost of travelling to work in larger LIMs will increase the level of 
unemployment associated with a given vacancy level and the UV curve 
will lie further from the origin. Once again, therefore, LIM size 
has a negative effect on LIM efficiency.
DIAGRAM 6.6 THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF SELF-OONTAINMEMT ON LIM 
EFFICIENCY
U=V
  high.
self-
containment
low seIf-containment
(26) Employers infofm&tion will also be improved in an industrially 
dominated LIM in the same way and thereby help with the worker
selection process which will also reduce unemployment duration.
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The final characteristic of the LIM which may influence the 
behaviour of the UV equation is the level of self-containment 
experienced by the market. Although self-containment is unlikely to 
affect the level of unenployment associated with particular vacancy 
levels within the middle range of observed values, or indeed the 
sensitivity of changes in unemployment to changes in vacancies 
within the range, it may affect the behaviour of the relationship at 
extreme values and therefore the overall specification of the 
equation. In particular, highly self-contained areas will face 
special problems at very high or very low levels of unemployment. 
That is f in such markets workers can only leave the area to work 
outside by moving house, and similarly new workers coning in will 
also have to move house. Therefore, as the labour market tends 
towards very high or very low levels of unemployment, the 
substantial costs associated with residential mobility will inhibit 
the filling of vacancies at low unemployment, and the search for 
jobs at high unemployment.
The exceptional rise in unemployment or vacancy duration at 
the extremes will lead to higher overall vacancy levels at low 
unemployment, and relatively high unemployment levels when vacancies 
are low. This effect will appear in the UV equation as a more 
markedly non-linear relationship for more self-contained markets. 
In other words for a given value of U* the more self-contained LIM 
may have a higher constant and a more negative coefficient as 
Diagram 6.6 shows.
2.3 Variations in Efficiency Within Plant and Industry Dominated 
LIMs; The Impact of the Degree of Dominance and Industrial Sector
Accepting the hypothesis that both plant and industry 
dominance enhances LIM performance through its beneficial impact on 
both structural and frictional unenployment, it appears reasonable 
to take the argument a stage further. That is, LIMs characterised
(27) Note that the diagram also points to other shortcomings in the 
unqualified use of U* or B as measures of LIM efficiency.
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by relatively high levels of dominance may be more efficient than 
areas which only just fall into the project's definition of 
dominance. Whether this quite straight forward hypothesis can be 
sustained empirically is examined in the following Chapter.
The second and final aspect of behaviour associated 
exclusively with dominated LIMs and considered here, is the impact 
the dominating sector may have on LIM efficiency. Within the
plant and industry dominant group of LIMs there is a wide coverage 
of industries (see Appendices 7 and 8), and each of these sectors 
will tend to be influenced by a range of pressures and 
characteristics which may ultimately manifest themselves in 
differences in LIM performance. However, developing any such
model is beyond the scope of this research in view of the 
difficulties associated with incorporating the relevant variables 
into a reasonably coherent theoretical framework which at the same 
time is also capable of generating hypotheses capable of being 
empirically verified. Therefore, for these important practical 
reasons it was decided to concentrate on a more straightforward 
proposition linking the economic well-being of sectors to LIM 
performance. Following this approach it is possible to develop a 
reasonably simple model with easily tested predictions.
Looking initially at LIMs dominated by declining industries, 
it may well be the case that such areas are characteristed by a 
relatively high level of vacancies given the unemployment rate. 
That is, although job opportunities may exist^ they will tend to be 
in different industries with different skill requirements. As a 
result there will be a problem of a mismatch between the
(28) It should be noted that past attempts to examine industry 
based UV curves (see Thirwall, 1969; and Bowers etal, 1970) were not 
based on any previously developed theoretical propositions. Instead 
differences between regressions were merely reported and a few 
somewhat tentative conclusions drawn.
(29) For example, hiring practices, screening procedures, 
relationships with the Job Centre, the extent of unionisation and 
skill composition will all tend to vary between sectors and as a 
result will tend to affect worker and employee search procedures and 
hence frictional unemployment.
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characteristics of the unemployed and the available job 
opportunities. To some extent this pattern may be exacerbated
by regional policy and the steering of new industries towards the 
more depressed areas. Since although in many cases this policy may 
create opportunités they may be of the wrong type. On
the basis of these arguments the LIMs which should be most seriously 
affected by these pressures are those dominated by older industries 
where job losses have been particularl^severe and government efforts 
to create alternative employment particularly vigourous. More 
i^cifically LIMs dominated by industries like textiles, coalmining 
and shipbuilding are probably the prime examples of LIMs where 
structural problems may adversely influence LIM efficiency.
(30) It is worthwhile noting that this point does not conflict with 
the earlier conclusion that dominated LIMs will not exhibit high 
levels of structural unemployment. Rather ^  this action examines 
variations in the (limited) Os within the dominated group on the 
basis that this will differ between LIMs and will depend on the 
nature of the dominant sector.
(31) For example, in the Greenock UM, which is an area dominated 
by shipbuilding and associated heavy industry^ attempts to alleviate 
job loses in these sectors has resulted in the attraction of 
electronic companies into the area. The resultant skill mismatch 
has not, therefore, created the expected decline in unemployment.
(32) Reinforcing this hypothesis many of the declining industries 
have in the past been associated with relatively low wages and poor 
working conditions. Given these problems even though some of the 
unemployed may have been suitably qualified for a vacancy they will 
have been reluctant to work in such an environment. This form of 
"voluntary" unemployment may therefore compound structural problems 
in these areas.
(33) To some’ extent this hypothesis is supported in the empirical 
section through the positive correlation between unemployment and 
U*. That is, high unemployment areas tend to be associated with low 
levels of efficiency, which suggests these are structural problems 
in these LIMs.
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At the other end of the economic scale LIMs dominated by- 
expanding industries may also appear relatively inefficient since 
once again their presence mayjenerate problems within the LIM. In a 
LIM where the industry is expanding there are likely to be a 
relatively high number of vacancies, unfortunately, given that many 
of the expanding industries are relatively new and often have 
characteristic and rapidly evolving skill requirements, which may 
well be in short supply, the vacancies created by growth may not 
necessarily match the characteristics of the unemployed. Therefore, 
in these LIMs it is likely that there will be labour shortages 
(vacancies) in the expanding plants as well as a pool of labour 
trained and experienced in different skills (the unemployed). 
Consequently, LIMs characterised by new and expanding industries may 
also tend to have relatively low levels of efficiency as manifested 
by UV curves displaced relatively far from the origin. On the basis 
of employment expansion statistics growth sectors which may 
particularly face this problem are mechanical engineering, 
electrical engineering and chemical related industries. In addition 
to these 5 some L I ^  dominated by manufacturers of consumer goods may 
also feel similar pressures.
Given that both rapidly expanding and declining industries may 
experience relatively low levels of efficiency, the group of 
dominated LIMs most likely to perform well would seem to be those 
associated with relatively stable sectors. In such LIMs vacancies 
created within the area are likely to match the characteristics of 
the unemployed and it is less likely that there will be sudden 
shifts in either variable. Again being more specific in relation to 
available data the higher levels of efficiency will probably apply 
to industries like vehicle manufacture and food and drink.
(34) Concentrating exclusively on plant dominated LIMs there is 
also an argument to suggest that ownership characteristics may 
influence LIM efficiency. However, although such pressures may 
operate, they will probably only have a marginal impact on 
performance. indeed, differences in LIM efficiency between 
ownership groups are more likely to reflect the impact of industry. 
As a résultait was decided not to examine this issue either here or 
in the empirical section.
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CHAPTER 7
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
DOMINANCE AND LOCAL LABOUR MARKET EFFICIENCY
The objective of this chapter is to test the previously 
developed hypotheses on how LIM dominance influences the behaviour 
of the LIM in terms of the relationship between local unemployment 
and vacancy rates. Up until now little systematic research has been 
completed on this topic, either at this disaggregated level or in 
testing hypotheses which relate particular LIM characteristics
specifically to LIM performance and efficiency. This reflects both 
an absence of an adequate theoretical framework covering such 
aspects of U M  behaviour, and the availability of a comprehensive 
data base on which to test the propositions. Both these 
shortcomings are to some extent overcome in this work.
This chapter begins by examining the data and econometric
issues relating to the UV analysis and sets out the most appropriate 
approach to the problem bearing in mind the resources available to 
the study. Having resolved the statistical problems the next two 
sections of the chapter tesU, the hypotheses relating dominance to 
LIM performance. In particular, this involves relating the values 
of U*, and B to the characteristics of the LIM. Of the two measures
of efficiency special emphasis is placed on the U* index, since
previous discussion suggests that this is the most important and 
meaningful measure of efficiency.
(1) Hyman and Palmer (1980) have recognised the absence of 
disaggregated UV analysis as a gap in the literature and have begun 
to tackle the problem. However^as yet no results seem to have been 
produced by this initiative.
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1 PRELIMINARy REMARKS AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH
In order to accurately test the hypotheses relating dominance 
to LIM efficiency it is important to consider in some detail how 
best to generate and subsequently analyse the LIM based UV data 
set. Most aspects of this problem are investigated in some depth in 
ippendix 13 and ippendix 15. Therefore, only a summary of the key 
results of this analysis are presented in this discussion in order 
to provide a suitably comprehensive overview of the wide range of 
problems involved with the analysis, and as a means of helping to 
identify how best the obvious constraints on the analysis can be 
overcome.
In this short review the data problems are discussed first, 
highlighting where possible how particular biases in the data set 
may mask any relationship between dominance and LIM efficiency. The 
principal econometric issues are then examined with the objective of 
trying to identify the most appropriate statistical format for the 
analysis. Following this the underlying properties of the UV 
equation generated by following the recommended econometric approach 
are examined and the implications the results have for testing the 
hypothesis relating to dominance are reviewed. Drawing on many of 
the previously developed conclusions, the section ends with a more 
detailed investigation of how best to build effective controls into 
the UV analysis so that problems of colinearity can be avoided when 
investigating the relationship between dominance and efficiency.
1.1 The Data Set
Testing the hypotheses relating to LIM efficiency involved 
gathering data on both registered unemployment and vacancies at an 
appropriately disaggregated level. In addition data on the number 
of LIM employees was also collected so that the rate of unemployment 
and vacancies could be calculated and as a result direct 
comparisions of performance and behaviour could be made between 
LIMs. For statistical resons the data collected, with some minor 
exceptions, was restricted to adult males since these figures are 
less susceptible to pressures exerted by seasonal or cyclical
fluctuations.
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TD ensure that each UV curve was estimated acurately it was 
decided to collect 100 quarterly unemployment and vacancy 
observations for each LIM covering the period 1951-1975. 
Uhfortunately, it was not possible to collect similar data on 
employment since only annual estimates are available. Consequently, 
and as a proxy, it was decided to collect 25 yearly figures over the 
same time-period and use this data to estimate the unemployment and 
vacancy rates for the 100 observations. The data on unemployment, 
vacancies and employees was collected from the Department of 
Employment ' s ten regional offices. In most cases the records kept 
by the Department were fairly comprehensive with only fairly minor 
interruptions in the time-series. Nonetheless, in some cases the 
data deficiencies were more severe and this was particularly evident 
in Scotland, Northern Region, and East Anglia where there were large 
gaps in the early data on employees and the unemployed. Apart from
the data deficiencies common to complete regions there were also
deficiencies in a few LLMs in regions where the data was otherwise 
relatively complete. Despite these intermittent problems of missing 
data in general there were still more than sufficient observations 
to calculate UV equations for most of the identified UMs. However, 
when making ccaiparisions between areas it should be remembered that 
the time-series involved may not match exactly.
Although it is generally possible to gather a sufficient
quantity of data on unemployment, vacancies and employees to 
accurately estimate the UV equation for each LIM it is important to 
recognise the possible shortcomings associated with official data. 
In particular, it is important to realise that apparent differences 
in LIM behaviour may be caused by statistical biases rather than 
economic forces or even measurement errors. In the following brief 
discussion the possible data deficiencies are examined for each 
component of the data set (see Appendix 13 for a more detailed 
review of the problems) . Following this, ways of overcoming these 
problems are considered so that the danger of statistical 
deficiencies conditioning the empirical analysis are reduced.
The unemployment Series . This component of the data-base 
provides perhaps the most reliable statistics in that the figures 
are subject to only relatively minor shortcomings. Nonetheless,
where analysing unemployment figures the following problems may
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influence the results;
unemployment registration may fall below 100%
the treatment of the temporarily stopped will be highly 
sensitive to the patterns of short term working in a particular 
area and the day in which the unemployment count is taken. 
This will influence the unemployment rate in a LIM.
the use of the temporarily stopped mechanism may vary between 
areas and industries and therefore will differentially 
influence the unarployment rate across LIMs.
The Vacancy Series. Although the problems presented by the 
unenployment data are limited both in number and severity the same 
may not be true for the vacancy series. In this case the data has 
to be handled with extreme caution if statistical imperfections and 
biases are to be successfully isolated from substantive economic 
pressures, A detailed examination of the problems associated with 
the vacancy statistics is given in appendix 13 but in summary form 
they are as follows;
in general the statement ratio falls well below unity.
the vacancy statement ratio varies with the demand for labour 
in a manner which is difficult to predict.
the propensity to register vacancies may be influenced by 
particular characteristics of the LIM, of which the most 
problematic is the presence of plant dominance.
there may be differences between industries in the propensity 
to register vacancies.
The Employee Series. This series also has its problems, 
although for the most part these relate to data availability and
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conpatability rather than the more complex and subtle shortcomings 
associated with the unemployment and vacancy series. The principal 
problems are as follows;
the conversion of annual figures into quarterly estimates 
introduces a source of measurement error into the estimation of 
the UV curve.
employee data for 1974 and 1975 was missing.
in some LIM areas the employee figures were subject to 
significant jumps which will disturb the UV function.
the method of collecting employee data changed between 1971 and 
1972 causing a slight discontinuity in the series.
the employee estimates refer to the number of men working in an 
area, whereas the unemployment series relates to men living in 
a particular employment office area. As a result the estimated 
unemployment rate may be biased dpending on whether the U M  is 
a dormitory town or a job centre.
Considering all the data problems together there are obviously 
a wide range of imperfections in the statistics which, if ignored, 
would seriously threaten to underpin any conclusions drawn from Uid 
empirical analysis. îSbnetheless, there are several ways in which 
the impact of these data problems can be minimised without too much 
difficulty. In the first place some of the shortcomings can be 
dismissed as marginal and therefore of little consequence when 
estimating the LIM UV curves. Secondly, where there are serious 
gaps in the data set or particular UMs are subject to unexplicable 
shifts these areas can simply be dropped from the analysis since the 
number of areas involved are unlikely to influence the results of 
the study. Thirdly, it is possible to introduce specific controls 
into the analysis to overcome pre-identified problems. In 
particular, since many of the data problems seem to be related to 
demand , j controlling for unemployment when analysing the results 
should help overcome many of the dangers associated with the data.
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Analysing the data on a regional basis will also achieve a similar 
effect whilst also helping to standardise for any problems which 
appear to be specifically regional rather than demand based.
Although it should be possible to identify most of the 
shortcomings associated with the data set and consequently suggest 
effective ways of controlling for these problems it should be 
recognised that it will only be necessary to introduce controls if 
dominance is correlated with any of these potentially disruptive 
influences. That is, if dominated UMs are not associated with any 
particular region or unemployment grouping then there is little 
danger that the results of the UV equation will be biased. The 
extent to which this is true and a more detailed discussion on the 
nature of any required controls is presented below in Section 1.4. 
As a final point it should be clearly understood that no matter the 
sophistication of the adopted controls it is unlikely that all the 
shortcomings associated with the data can be overcome and as a 
result the conclusions drawn on the basis of the empirical results 
must always be subject to qualification.
1.2 The Appropriate Econometric Approach
Although the hypotheses under test are relatively 
straightforward it is important to recognise the statistical and 
econometric constraints facing the study. Failure to explicitly 
recognise these and as a result select the most appropriate
statistical techniques would almost certainly generate potentially 
misleading conclusions based on the misinterpretation of the 
available data. Given the data-set under examination, and
remembering the hypotheses under test ^ the most econometrically 
correct and elegant method of analyses would be to use generalised 
least squares (see i^pendix 15). Unfortunately, however, it was not 
really practicable to use this approach since the UV data was not 
organised in a form suited to this technique. Reinforcing this
pattern to inplement the generalised least squares effectively would
have required supplementing the existing computer software package 
with a specialised program, and this was well beyond
(2) For example, if dominance affects the propensity to register 
vacancies then it will not be possible to control for this in the 
analysis.
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the scope of the research. A further disadvantage associated with 
the generalised least squares is that this method was not adopted by 
any related studies and therefore to follow this route would 
pre-empt comparisons between the LIM-based UV results and other 
similar work.
Bearing in mind the severe problems associated with adopting 
the generalised least squares the most practicable method of testing 
the hypotheses then becomes to run the standard UV equations on a 
LUM basis. More precisely this involves estimating the equation log 
U - log A +piogV for each individual LIM. Having lifted or 
calculated the B and U* values from each equation it is then 
possible to relate the variations in the two interrelated measures 
of efficiency to the characteristics of the LIM.
Although this approach appears to be relatively straightforward 
it is subject to several important econometric shortcomings which 
have to be taken into account if the results are not to be 
misinterpreted. Cne important failing is that if the estimated B 
cofficient can be explained in terms of other variables, for example 
dominance, which ideally should somehow have been included in the 
equation then the resultant Bs are biased estimates and conclusions 
based on these figures may be misleading. Another and related 
problem with such an equation is that it will be impossible to 
distinguish between the variation in the Bs caused by the structural 
characteristics of the LIM and the random (white noise) variation 
associated with estimating the coefficient. Finally, but of 
fundamental importance, since the B and U* measures are estimates it 
is theoretically not valid to apply statistical tests to separate 
categories or sub-group averages in an attempt to identify 
significant differences between them. However, in the subsequent 
empirical analysis t-test results are quoted in order to at least 
give some impression of the significance of the reported differences 
between key groups.
As a result of all these considerations the analysis of the UV 
data, and the conclusions derived from it, have to be restricted to 
only suggesting what the results may imply rather than deriving the
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more positive conclusions which would have been possible under ideal 
conditions. Nonetheless, it remains possible to overcome some of 
the statistical problems inherent in the data by testing the 
dominance hypotheses whilst controlling for other potential 
influences on LIM efficiency. Adopting this approach makes it 
possible to remove some of the background variation in the 
efficiency measures and therefore identify more accurately any 
systematic relationship between dominance and efficiency. On the 
basis of previous studies two variables which immediately suggest 
themselves as controls are the unemployment rate and region. 
Controlling for these two factors in the empirical analysis will not 
be difficult, and indeed the possible need to build this into the 
investigation has already been highlighted in the discussion on the 
data-set.
1.3. The UV Equation Results ; General Observation and Implications 
for Analysis.
Accepting that the most appropriate way of analysing the UV 
data is as outlined in the previous section this discussion 
summarises the underlying characteristics of the resultant 
regressions and outlines the implications these have for the 
hypotheses being tested, in particular, the section examines how 
well the U = AV^ model explains LIM behaviour given that it is a 
relatively simple formulation of a highly complex environment. The 
results presented here are once again taken from Appendix 15 where 
the topic is dealt with in detail.
One of the first results in Appendix 15 confirms the suspicion 
expressed above that in many cases the standard UV equation falls 
short of a precise statement of UV behaviour, indeed^there is such 
a variation in the UV equation results it was decided to establish a 
set of criteria to help identify which UV equations best match their 
predicted theoretical specification (U = AV^) whilst remaining 
économetrically well-behaved. Bearing in mind the specification of 
the equation and the nature of the problem being examined the 
following were considered appropriate.
206
the estimated equation should have an acceptable Durbin-Watson 
statistic confirming that any autocorrelation has been 
satisfactorily corrected.
o
the reported R should exceed 0.75 thereby indicating that 
the UV equation explains a relatively high proportion of the 
variation in unemployment through the constant term and the 
variation in vacancies.
the B coefficient should be statistically significant, as this 
is the only independent variable in the equation.
the constant term should be statistically significant.
applying these qualifying conditions to each of the LIM UV 
regressions Appendix 15 shows that; in 70% of the LIM regressions 
the value of was above 75%, in 78% of the LIMs the B 
coefficient was significant; in 55% of the sample the constant was 
significant; and in over 98% of the cases the Durbin-Watson 
statistic fell within acceptable bounds. thfortunately, in many 
cases the regression shortcomings were not all concentrated in 
particular LIMs with the result that of the 289 regression equations 
estimated only 73 satisfied all of the qualifying conditions, in 
addition to this a further 20 LIMs had to be dropped because of 
serious data problems. Overall, therefore, only 53 LIMs could 
strictly be classified as well-behaved.
Although it is possible to relate the causes of the regression 
equations shortcomings to particular characteristics of the LIM, 
this does not overcome the fundamental problem that such a high 
proportion of LIM UV regressions failed to meet all the qualifying 
conditions thereby potentially limiting the extent and 
sophistication of the empirical analysis. As a result it was 
decided to investigate ways of retaining as many LIMs as possible in 
the sample, despite the apparent econometric shortcomings associated 
with many of the equations. Conveniently there are several reasons 
to theoretically and statistically justify this course of action.
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In particular, it appears that there are few statistically 
significant differences between the characteristics of the total 
group of UV equations and the well-behaved sub-sample. Related to 
this it is also the case that there are no significant differences 
between the accepted and rejected LIMs on the basis of the measures 
of LIM efficiency used in the study. Taking both these factors into 
account j, it is unlikely that by using the complete sample as a 
statistical base the results of any subsequent investigation will 
differ markedly from those produced by analysing the good-fit LIMs. 
A further argument in favour of extending the sample size is that 
the process of selecting well-behaved LIM appears to be biased in 
that it is related to dominance. Finally ^  it should also be 
remembered that many of the suggested selection criteria were 
subjectively derived and hence are not totally reliable.
Bearing in mind the arguments both for and against restricting 
the number of LIMs to be analysed it is difficult to unambiguously 
establish the most appropriate approach. Inevitably there has to be 
some trade-off between sample size, the performance of the UV 
equation, and any potential bias created by excluding a proportion 
of the estimated equations. As a compromise, therefore, it is 
perhaps most ^propriate to analyse the equations at different 
levels determined by to what extent they meet the predetermined 
econometric performance measures. More specifically it would be 
advisable to examine the UV equation results in parallel within the 
following hierarchy of sample sizes;
(3) FOr example, in the case of LIMs with an insignificant constant 
or B term there is an argument for leaving them in the sample 
because although the estimates may be insignificant they remain the 
"best" available estimates.
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t±ie total sample excluding LIMs where there have either been 
serious boundary changes or employment shifts, where an
unacceptable level of autocorrelation persists, and where there 
are highly anomalous U* values.
Level one above but also excluding LIMs where B is
insignificant.
Level two above but also excluding LIMs where A is
insignificant, and finally
Good Fit LIMs as originally defined.
Differences between the four groups not explicable in terms of 
a bias in the selection procedure may then be attributed to the 
econometric and other difficulties associated with the analysis.
For the practical purposes of recording the results of the research 
and deriving conclusions based on these it should be sufficient to 
record in the main body of the text only the results relating to the 
level one group. Cnly in cases where there are differences between 
the total and the smaller sub-sample need any other results be 
included. However, a complete set of tables covering all the other 
sub-groups is presented for reference in appendix 16.
1.4 The Relationship Between Dominance and Other Variables; the 
Need to Introduce Appropriate Controls.
The discussion on the data and econometric problems associated 
with U M  based UV statistics suggested that there may be a need to 
control for particular variables in order to isolate the impact 
dominance has on labour market efficiency. This section examines 
this issue in more detail and having identified potentially 
important controls suggests how best they can be introduced when 
testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 6. In selecting 
appropriate controls to help analyse the impact of dominance on LIM 
behaviour this section also effectively tests whether there is a 
relationship between LIM efficiency and other labour market
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characteristics. Adopting this approach then makes it possible to 
concentrate exclusively on the relationship between dominance and 
labour market performance in the following section. Although the 
discussion on effective controls is fairly comprehensive it should 
be remembered that it is only practically possible to identify 
first-order relationships between dominance and other LIM 
variables. As a result it is possible that the need to introduce 
more complex and subtle controls are overlooked in the analysis.
When analysing the need to introduce controls the principal 
factor that has to be established is whether dominance is related to 
any of the other characteristics associated with the local labour 
market which may also affect its efficiency. Whether any such 
relationships exist is examined in Table 7.1 for each of the four 
sub-sample groupings identified in the previous section, in general 
terms Table 7.1 suggests that there appears to be only a limited 
relationship between dominance and other IIM characteristics. 
However, where there is a relationship it appears to be slightly 
more pronounced in the larger sample sizes. ihat is, for the 
particularly limited good-fit sub-sample there are no significant 
relationships between dominance and any other feature of the LIM. 
The changing pattern of significance between sub-samples probably 
only reflects the impact of the reduced number of observations in 
sample size as the selection criteria are tightened, although to 
sane extent it may also point to some form of bias related to the 
sub-sample selection criteria. Bearing in mind the results of Table
7.1 the following analysis discusses in more detail the nature of 
the important correlations between variables.
(4) Note that to overcome sane of the econometric problems 
identified in Appendix 15 there will be a need, to group together 
similar types of LIM and hence some form of control will be 
introduced automatically.
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TABLE 7.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMINANCE AND OTHER LIM 
CHARACTERISTICS
Extent of Relationship with Dominance
LIM
Characteristic
Total
Sample
Sample where 
B significant
Sample where 
B and A 
significant
Good fit 
IIMs
unemployment Rate 99 99 90 NS
Region 90 90 NS 99
1971 Population 99 NS NS NS
Acreage NS NS NS NS
Self Containment NS NS NS NS
No of Observations NS NS NS NS
NOTE: (i) Significance is measured in terms of the confidence 
interval produced by running either a CHI SQ or F test.
(ii) NS stands for not significant and applies to confidence
interval measures falling below 90%.
TABLE 7.2 AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT BY DOMINANCE GROUP
Nature of Dominance Average unemployment Rate
Plant Dominance 2.8
Industry Dominance 1.9
Non Dominated 3.4
Total 3.0
Note; (i) Differences between all groups significant of 95% 
confidence level.
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One of the strongest relationships identified in the table is 
that between dominance and unemployment. For the complete sample 
this relationship is summarised in Table 7.2 which shows that 
industrially dominated LTMs have the lowest unemployment rate 
(1.9%), plant dominated the second lowest (2.8%) and non-dominated 
the highest (3.4%). These differences are significant at a 95% 
confidence level. On the basis of these results it would appear 
that controlling for variations in unemployment may be an important 
element in isolating the impact of dominance on the grounds that 
unemployment itself may influence efficiency. The argument that 
unemployment influences LIM efficiency need not depend on a direct 
theoretical connection between the two variables but rather on the 
influence the unemployment rate has on the UV data and hence 
ultimately on the LIM performance measures, in particular, and as 
appendix 13 illustrates the propensity for employers to register 
vacancies and employees to register as unemployed varies with LIM 
demand and therefore unemployment. Similarly, the problem of the 
temporarily stopped also varies with unemployment levels. Both 
these considerations will influence the observed levels of LIM 
efficiency and so mask any impact dominance may have on LIM 
behaviour.
The problem of controlling for unemployment is, however, more 
complex than mentioned above in that according to the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter dominance may influence both u* 
and B and consequently unemployment. That is, the line of causation 
may run from U* and B to unemployment and not the reverse, under 
these circumstances by controlling for variations in unemployment 
any real effect of dominance on LIM efficiency may be artificially 
removed, unfortunately,without more detailed evidence on the likely 
impact of unemployment levels on efficiency it is difficult to 
resolve this problem satisfactorily. As a result it is probably 
advisable to initially analyse the LIM data without controlling for
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unemployment but subsequently introduce a control in case the 
variable exerts an independent effect on IIM efficiency.
Accepting the need to standardise for unemployment at some 
stage of the analysis only leaves the problem of how to effectively 
implement the control procedure. For practical purposes it was 
decided to merely draw a distinction between high and low 
unemployment areas, where high unemployment LIMs were arbitrarily 
defined as those with an average unemployment rate greater than 3%. 
Although the distinction is limited it can be defended since it 
retains a sufficient number of observations in each category to 
allow meaningful conclusions to be d r a w n . I n  addition, it 
should be remembered that the underlying reason for adopting the 
control is to identify^ at a relatively general level, whether 
unemployment influences efficiency rather than to examine the impact 
of unemployment in detail.
Table 7.1 also identified a relationship between dominance and 
region, and this is more precisely quantified in Table 7.3. 
Although the pattern is by no means clear-cut it appears from a more 
detailed examination of the data that some regions are less inclined 
than others to be plant dominated. For example, whilst Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Region and Yorkshire-Humberside are characterised by 
a high proportion of dominated IIMs ^ in the West Midlands, East 
Anglia and the South East there are relatively few such areas. To a 
certain extent this reflects the underlying industrial structure of 
particular regions although it is also, in part, attributable to the 
tendency for smaller IIMs to be concentrated in certain 
regions. The pattern for industrially dominated IIMs is less 
clear, although again there appears to be a similar relationship 
between the regions^albeit more tentative.
(5) Controlling for unemployment will also overcome the problems
identified by Evans (1977) and others who argued that the UV curve
will differ depending on whether it lies above or below U*.
(6) See below for a supplementary method of controlling for
unemployment.
(7) Note, however, that there probably is a link between industrial 
structure and LIM size.
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The observed relationship between region and dominance is 
again a problem since regional considerations appear to influence 
the level of unemployment and vacancy registration, and the use of 
temporarily stopping employment. Such trends will influence the 
measures of efficiency. Therefore, when analysing the true impact 
of dominance on IIM behaviour it is important to control for 
region, unfortunately, it is not possible to control for region 
simply by examining separately each of the 10 geographical areas 
identified in the study since in many cases there will be an 
insufficient number of observations to draw any meaningful 
conclusions. This constraint is, of course, compounded by the 
concentration of particular categories of IIM in certain regions. 
TO overcome this problem it was decided to aggregate the regions 
into three larger groups made up, where possible, of contiguous 
areas but primarily based on the level of unemployment prevailing in 
a particular region (see Table 7.4).
Distinguishing between regional groupings on the basis of 
unemployment rates effectively recognises that the biases generated 
by regional elements are for the most part probably caused by 
differences in demand between the different areas. As a result, 
therefore, controlling for regions in the analysis is essentially 
another method of standardising for demand and hence unemployment 
levels. (9) (1°)
(8) Note that this procedure still does not completely overcome the 
problem of limited numbers of observations in each category.
(9) Note that if there is in fact a particular regional effect this 
is unlikely to be lost since for a large part the regional groupings 
are contiguous. Note also that an alternative way of controlling 
for dominance would be to group together regions depending on 
whether they contained a high or low proportion of dominated IIMs. 
Conveniently, this is largely what happens with the adopted demand- 
based approach and therefore this classification serves both 
purposes.
(10) Note that controlling for unemployment indirectly by region 
has its limitations since the data shows that although indutry 
dominated and plant dominated llMs are concentrated in high 
unemployment regions they themselves have relatively low 
unemployment rates, consequently, it appears that plant dominated 
and industry dominated LIMs perform even better in terms of 
unemployment when standardising for region. Whether this reflects 
industrial characteristics or is, in part, confirmation of the 
hypothesis that efficiency is related to dominance will be
investigated in the following section.
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table 7.4 THE AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY REGION
Region Average
unemployment
Classification of 
unemployment
Scotland 5.1 high
Wales 4.6 high
North 5.5 high
N West 2.4 average
Yorks Humberside 2.5 average
W. Midlands 1.8 low
E. Midlands 1.6 low
E. Anglia 2.7 average
S. East 2.2 low
S. West 2.9 average
TABLE 7.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMINANCE AND LIM SIZE
Nature of Dominance
LIM population (1971) 
LIM Acreage
Plant Dominated 54 15
Industry Dominated 65 11
Non-Dominated 102 14
Total 83 14
Note; (i) Population and acreage figure are in thousands.
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Bearing these considerations in mind the first grouping covers the 
low unemployment regions and incorporates the West Midlands, the 
East Midlands and the South East. The second group, characterised 
by regions of average unemployment, includes the North West, 
Yorkshire-Humberside, East Anglia, and the South West. The final 
grouping covers regions suffering from relatively high unemployment, 
and these are Scotland, Wales and Northern England.
Returning to table 7.1 there also appears to be a limited 
relationship between dominance and LIM population. This 
relationship is presented in more detail in Table 7.5 and the 
observed results are as intuitively would be expected with plant 
dominated LIMs concentrated in the smallest LIMs, industry dominated 
LIMs in medium sized areas, and non-dominated LIMS mostly in the 
largest areas, Qi the basis of this limited relationship between 
LIM size and dominance there is an argument to suggest that LIM size 
should be controlled for when investigating the relationship between 
dominance and efficiency. This is particularly important since 
theoretically (see Chapter 6) the predicted impact of LIM size on 
efficiency is closely correlated with the hypotheses relating 
domina to LIM performance. Without controlling for size, 
therefore, there would be a problem of colinearity.
Colinearity only poses a problem, however, if indeed there is 
a relationship between LIM size and LIM efficiency as measured by U* 
and B. In order to establish whether there is any evidence for this 
Table 7,6 summarises the relationship between size and LIM 
efficiency. From the figures there does not seem to be any
(11) Note that no controls were built into the test. That is, it 
is not run on a standardised basis and therefore the results shown 
in mble 7.6 may be an oversimplification. However, apart from 
dominance it is unlikely that LIM size will be correlated with other 
variables which may also influence dominance. To check that 
dominance did not play an indirect role the data was analysed 
controlling for dominance and as anticipated the results did not 
differ from the pattern shown in Table 7.6.
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TABLE 7.6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIM POPULATION AND LIM EFFICIENCY
LIM Population 
(000s) U* B coefficient NO of Observations
less than 20 2.34 -0.24(0,17) 62
20-40 2.71 -0.25(0.16) 48
40-60 2.77 -0.22(0.17) 37
60—80 2.35 -0.26(0,16) 20
80-100 2.54 -0.27(0.21) 13
100-120 2.73 -0.32(0.24) 8
120-140 2,24 -0.21(0.13) 7
140-160 2.27 -0.42(0.12) 4
160-180 4.16 -0.18(0.33) 4
180-200 2.32 -0.26(0.31) 2
Above 200 3.75 -0.31(0.24) 13
Total 2.63 -0.25 218
TABLE 7.7 VARIATIONS IN B AND LOG A BY HIGH AND LCW SELF-CONTAINMENT 
CONTROLLING FOR U*
Ü*
Value
log A B
Total 
No of Observations
low High low High Low High
SC SC SC SC sc SC
0-2 0.4 0.5 -0.34 -0.33 90 17 107
2-4 1.2 1.1 -0.23 -0.21 58 16 74
4-6 1.7 1.6 -0.10 -0.76 17 7 24
6-8 2.0 1.8 -0.05 -0.08 8 3 11
8-10 2.3 - -0,04 - 3 - 3
above 10 — 2.3 — -0.03 - 1 1
Note: (i) SC represents self containment
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systematic variation between LIM efficiency and LIM size although 
there is considerable variation between categories. Consequently, 
on this evidence there appears to be little support for the 
hypothesis that LIM size influences efficiency. As a résultait will 
not be necessary to control for LIM size when investigating the 
relationship between dominance and efficiency.
Again from table 7.1 there appears to be no relationship 
between dominance and LIM self-containment, and on this basis there 
is no need to control for self-containment levels when investigating 
the impact of dominance. Nonetheless, since it was hypothesised 
that there may be a relationship between self-containment and the 
characteristics of the UV equation (see Chapter 6) this should be 
further investigated before concentrating on the impact dominance 
may have on LIM efficiency. More specifically it was suggested in 
Chapter 6 that high self-containment LIMs will, other things being 
equal, be characterised by a more markedly non-linear UV 
relationship. That is, for LIMS with similar U* values the high 
self containment LIMs will have higher values of log A and more 
negative B coefficients (see Diagram 6.6, Chapter 6). The results 
presented in Table 7.7, however, do not support this hypothesis. 
The table shows that holding the value of CJ* relatively stable does 
not generally produce a higher value of log A in the high self 
containment LIMs. Similarly the value of B associated with each U* 
band is not more negative in the highly by self-contained IIMs,
(12) LIM acreage was also used as a measure of IIM size, in this 
case there again was no significant relationship with dominance, and 
similarly there was no apparent relationship between acreage and IIM 
efficiency. This may in part explain why there is no relationship 
between population and efficiency in that all IIMs fall within the 
same LIM size category and as such actual population levels, or 
population densities, are not as important as space in terms of 
information networks which has been viewed as a key determinant of 
efficiency.
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The only remaining variable in Table 7.1 to be discussed is 
the number of UV observations associated with dominated groups. 
This characteristic was included in the analysis in case there were 
significant differences in the number of observations between 
dominance categories, or that certain LIMs were restricted to 
^ecific time-periods. under such circumstances there would have 
been a danger that the UV equation could have been influenced by 
data availability. The figures, however, show that there are no 
significant differences between the groups, and therefore it is 
externely unlikely that this will affect the position of the UV 
curve. As a result there will be no need to control for the number 
of observations in the analysis.
Although not mentioned so far there is a further variable, 
industrial sector, which should be taken into account when analysing 
the impact of dominance on LIM efficiency. Although this is
investigated in detail in the following section when variations 
within plant and industry dominated LIMs are considered, there is 
sufficient evidence from previous studies (see Bowers e±'. al, 1970; 
and Thirlwall, 1969) to suggest that industry influences 
efficiency. If this is correct and dominated LIMs tend to be 
disproportionately represented by specific industries, then an 
observed relationship between dominance and LIM efficiency may only 
be a manifestation of the true relationship running between industry 
and LIM efficiency. To avoid making this particular mistake will 
involve • excluding industries from the analysis which are 
disproportionately represented in either the industry or plant 
dominated samples and where it is considered that these exhibit 
characteristics differentiating them from other LIMs. m  practical 
terms this exercise is relatively straightforward since by examining 
the industrial structure of plant and industry dominated LIMs (see 
J^pendix 3) it appears that only LIMs dominated by coal and steel 
fall into this category. That is, these industries are concentrated
(13) Industry type was not included in Table 7.1 because, by 
definition, it was not possible to classify the non-daninated LIMs 
by industry.
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almost exclusively in plant dominated LIMS and they are also in some 
important respects different from other industrial sectors. 
this basis, therefore, it may be advisable at some stage to control 
for industrial structure by excluding UMs dominated by steel plants 
and coal mines.
In conclusion, from the preceding discussion there are 
substantive arguments to support analysing the UV regression results 
in aggregate and subsequently controlling for unemployment, region 
and industry. Conversely, on the available evidence there appears 
to be little need to control for the impact of LIM size, as measured 
by population and acreage, or LIM self-containment since there is no 
obvious relationship between these two variables and dominance. 
Moreover, although theoretical consideration suggest that self 
containment levels and the LIM population may influence IIM 
efficiency this is not borne out by the analysis of the available 
data. On this basis it is not possible to support the hypotheses 
relating these two variables to LIM performance.
2 THE IMPACT OF DOMINANCE ON LIM EFFICIENCY
This section specifically tests the proposition that dominance 
influences the position of the UV curve, and therefore LIM 
efficiency, through its impact on structural unemployment and 
through its effect on LIM wage dispersion, IIM job search patterns 
and hence, ultimately, on frictional unemployment. That is, the net 
result of these pressures should be an inward movement of the UV 
curve in dominated LIMs. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
predict whether plant or industry dominated LIMs will be the most 
efficient, M onetheless both should perform better than otherwise 
similar non-dominated liMs.
(14) In particularj both the coal and steel industries are in 
long-term decline and are nationalised, in addition coal mining is 
not a manufacturing industry.
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In terms of the structure of this section the results of the 
analysis into UV efficiency are initially examined at a general 
level and then in more detail by systematically controlling for 
other variables which are related to dominance and may also 
influence LIM efficiency. The figures presented are only suggestive 
since econometric considerations and the nature of the data base 
prohibit any rigorous testing of the hypotheses under examination, 
m  the text the reported figures only relate to the complete sample 
of LIMs, however, where major differences exist between this group 
and the more tightly specified but smaller sub-samples these results 
are also referred to.
Table 7.8 shows the overall relationship between dominance and 
the two measures of efficiency U* and B. The results for U* show 
that the efficiency of industrially dominated IIMs is much higher 
than either plant or non-dominated LIMs. With a U* value of 1.58% 
the industrially dominated IIMs are approximately 70% more efficient 
that the other two groups, and this difference is significant at the 
99% level of c o n f i d e n c e . A l t h o u g h  there is a small difference 
between plant dominated and non dominated LIMs in the predicted 
direction it is not significant. The results for the elasticity 
measure very much follow the same pattern with the only significant 
differences being between the industry dominated U M s  and the other 
two groups. m  terms of the original hypotheses, therefore, it
appears that the evidence in Table 7.8 only in part supports the
general proposition that dominated LIMs will be more efficient than 
non-dominated areas.
Table 7.9 summarises in more detail the nature of the UV curve
for each category of LIM by introducing the value of the constant
and the average level of unemployment into the analysis. From these 
figures it is possible to illustrate diagramatically (see Diagram
7.1 and Diagram 7.2) the nature of each UV equation on the basis of 
both the standard UV diagram and the demand based model used to 
derive the UV curve. From these figures, and particularly Diagram 7.2, 
it is possible to show that in industrially dominated LIMs
(15) Nate that although t-tests were run they are not strictly 
valid in view of the points raised in the previous section.
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TABLE 7.8 LIM EFFICIENCY BY DOMINANCE
U* B
Nature of 
Dominance Value Ranking Value Ranking
No. of
observations
Plant Dominance 2.7 2 —0.22 1 67
Industry Dominance 1.6 3 -0.32 3 26
Non Dominance 2.8 1 —0.26 2 127
Total 2.6 - -0.25 — 220
Note: a matrix of t-test results is given in ^pendix 17
TABLE 7.9 THE NATURE OF THE UV CURVE BY DOMINANCE
U* B log A U
Nature of 
Dominance Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
NO of
Observations
Plant
Dominance 2.7 2 -0.22 1 0.91 2 2.8 2 67
Industry
Dominance 1.6 3 -0.32 3 0.47 3 1.9 3 26
Non
Dominance 2.8 1 -0.26 2 1.0 1 3.4 1 127
Total 2.6 - -0.25 - 0.93 - 3.0 — 220
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imperfections appear late (see point OH  in Diagram 7.2) and do not 
seriously hinder LIM performance as demand increases. That is shown 
by the line DF which lies relatively close the the optimum path DE. 
AS a result U*, the maximum level of non demand deficient 
unenployment, is relatively low (1.58%) in industrially dominated 
LIMs. Average unemployment is also relatively low at 1.9% which, in 
part, probably reflects the underlying efficiency of the market. In 
plant dominated IIMs imperfections appear earlier (OL), whilst at 
the same time the relatively poor B coefficient means that its 
inpact deepens relatively quickly as demand rises. Hence the 
average U* value in such LIMs is relatively high (2.7%) and so too 
is the average level of unemploymnt 2.8%. Finally^in non-dominated 
LIMs the picture again differs, albeit marginally. In this case LIM 
imperfections appear earliest at the point OK, although because the 
responsiveness of the LIM to demand changes is superior to the
figure quoted for the plant dominated IIMs, the U* value is only
marginally different.
Table 7.10 tests the dominance-efficiency hypothesis but by 
controlling for unenployment levels by distinguishing between high 
and low unemployment IIMS. Broadly speaking the results are similar 
to those previously discussed, with the industrially dominated IIMs 
remaining more efficient than the other two groups. Although the 
variations between categories are substantially reduced, this fall 
in the variation between groups is illustrated by the reduced level 
of significance associated with the t-tests (see Appendix 17) ^ That 
is, although the pattern of significance remains the same the
associated confidence intervals are generally lower. The only 
difference evident in the table is that for high unemployment IIMs 
the level of U* in nori-dominated LIMS is lower than in plant
dominated IIMs. Ihis switch in rankings is not surprising given the 
marginal difference between the two values identified previously. 
However and to explain in more detail, this switch probably reflects 
the
(16) Note that the diagrams also clearly illustrate the association 
between unemployment and IIM efficiency. That is, low unemployment 
areas are associated with high LIM efficiency as measured in terms 
of both B and U*.
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TABLE 7.10 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIM EFFICIENCY AND DOMINANCE 
CONTROLLING FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
U* B
Uhenployment
Category Value Ranking Value Ranking
Average
Unemployment
No of
Observations
Low Unemployment 
Plant Dominance 1 . 8 2 -0.27 1 1.7 46
Industry Dominance 1.3 3 -0.34 3 1 . 6 22
Non Dominance 1.9 1 -0.31 2 1.9 70
Total 1.7 - -0.30 - 138
High Uhanployment 
Plant Dominance 4.6 1 -0 . 1 1 1 5.2 2 1
Industry Dominance 2 . 8 3 -0.24 3 3.8 4
Non Dominance 4.0 2 -0.19 2 5.2 .b;
Total 4.1 — -0.17 — 3.0 2 2 0
TOTAL 2 . 6 - -0.25 - — 2 2 0
% 7
relatively high B value (-0.11) associated with high unemployment 
plant dominated LIMs. That is, under certain more controlled 
conditions B in plant dominated LIM is less negative than when 
compared to the more general table and this will tend to increase 
U* (17)
Table 7.11 presents the relationship between dominance and LIM 
efficiency controlling for unenployment on a regional basis. In terms 
of the U* measure the results for each of the regional groups are 
almost identical to the original uncontrolled table. That is, 
industrially dominated UMs remain the most efficient with plant and 
non-daninated LIMs considerably less efficient. This pattern is 
reflected by significant t-test differences between the appropriate 
groups. This result is not repeated so clearly for the UV equations' 
B values. Although the uncontrolled pattern is repeated for the
low unemployment regional groupings the same cannot be said about the 
high and medium unemployment regions where the rankings vary quite 
markedly. However, in terms of the t-test results it would appear 
that there are no significant differences between the dominance groups 
for any of the three regional sub-sanples. It is difficult to provide 
a convincing interpretation of all these results except that, although 
the pattern shows some variation from the uncontrolled table, the 
results remain similar. It is also worth noting that by introducing 
regional controls the variation between groups is considerably reduced 
making it increasingly tenuous to rank UMs by efficiency given the 
measurement errors associated with estimating the UV equation. 
Similarly, even at this relatively limited level of standardisation 
there are problems associated with the limited number of observations 
in a few of the sub-group categories and this must cast further doubt 
on the validity of some of the results. Bearing these points in mind 
it would be sensible to treat the controlled results with some 
caution, and when drawing conclusions place more emphasis on the 
uncontrolled results.
(17) Under these circumstances, where rankings differ between sub­
groups, that is low and high unemployment, the overall rank is 
determined by the largest sub-group, which in this case is the low 
unemployment group,
(18) This is also reflected in a limited internal consistency across 
the four sub-sample groups: see Appendix 16.
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TABLE 7.11 THE IMPACT OF DOMINANCE ON LIM EFFICIENCY ODNTROLLING FOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT THROUGH REGION
r ...
unemployment Bands 
by Region
u*
value ranking
B
value ranking
Average
Unemploy-
jment
No of
observations
High unemployment 
plant Dominance 4.4 2 -0 . 1 2 2 4.6 23
Industry Dominance 2 . 1 3 -0 . 1 0 1 2 . 8 4
Non Dominance 4.8 1 -0.29 3 5.6 33
Total 4.5 - -0 . 1 1 - 60
Medium Unemployment 
Plant Dominance 1.7 2 -0.25 1 2 . 2 23
Industry Dominance 1.7 2 -0.26 2 2 . 1 13
Non Dominance 2.3 1 -0.28 3 2.8 48
Total 2 . 1 - -0.27 - 84
Low Unemployment 
Plant Dominance 1 . 8 2 -0.32 1 1 . 6 21
Industry Dominance 1 . 1 3 -0.43 3 1.3 9
Non Dominance 1.9 1 -0.34 2 2.4 46
Total 1 . 8 - -0.34 - - 76
OVERALL TOTAL 2 . 6 -0.25 — 3.0 2 2 0
TABLE 7.12 EFFICIENCY MEASURES BY DOMINANCE EXCLUDING LIMs DOMINATED 
BY GOAL AND STEEL
u* B
Dominance NO of
Group value rank value rank Observations
Plant Dominance 2.3 2 -0.26 1
)
48
Industry Dominance 1.5 3 -0.33 3 25
Non Dominance 2 .8 1 -0.26 1 127
Total 2 . 6 - -0.27 - 2 0 0
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Tîie final control to be considered is that of industrial 
sector, which effectively means excluding IIMs dominated by coal and 
steel (for illustrative purposes the differences between coal and 
steel dominated LIMs and the others are shown in Diagram 7.3). The 
results of this exercise are presented in an otherwise uncontrolled 
basis in Table 7.12. The figures again follow the familiar pattern 
for the U* measure, although excluding the coal and steel dominated 
LIMS does relatively increase the efficiency of the plant dominated 
LIMs as predicated by the original hypothesis. This increase in 
efficiency is less evident for the B statistic in that as before the 
industrially dominated LIMs have the most highly negative B value 
followed jointly by the plant and non-dominated IIMs, Although the 
figures are not reported in the main text the same general pattern 
persists when unemployment and regional controls are introduced into 
the analysis (see j^pendix 16). Overall, therefore, despite the 
differences between coal and steel dominated liMs and the other 
sections the results in Table 7.12 show that their exclusion only 
marginally affects the conclusions drawn previously.
TO conclude this section it appears from the figures produced 
above that there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that IIM 
efficiency is influenced by dominance, but that the inpact varies 
between the industry and plant dominated sub-groups. More 
specifically, the results suggest that industrially dominated IIMs 
are the most efficient group g, but that there are no significant 
behavioural differences between plant dominated and non-dominated 
groups. Although the extent of these differences varies depending 
on the type of control being used, the more detailed analysis tends 
to repeat the more general conclusions.
3 VARIATIONS IN EFFICIENCY WITHIN DOMINATED LIMs
On the basis of the original hypotheses relating dominance to 
LIM efficiency, and bearing in mind the results of the previous 
section, it would seem reasonable to assume that the more dominated 
a IIM then the more efficient it will become. This proposition is
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TABLE 7.13 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIGH AND LCW DOMINANCE AND LIM 
EFFICIENCY
(i) Plant and Industry Dominated UMs
t------É.......... .
U* B
Level of 
Dominance value ranking value ranking
NO Of
Observations
Low Dominance 2 . 2 2 -0.28 2 60
High Dominance 2 . 6 1 -0 . 2 0 1 30
Total 2.4 - -0.25 - 90
(ii) Plant Dominated LIMs
u* B
Level of 
Dominance 
Low Dominance
value
2 . 6
ranking
2
value
-0.25
ranking
2
No of
Observations
39
High Dominance 2.9 1 -0.18 1 26
Total 2.7 - -0 . 2 2 - 65
(iii) Industry Dominated LIMs
Ü* B
Level of 
Dominance value ranking value ranking
NO of
Observations
Low Dominance 1 . 6 1 -0.34 2 21
High Dominance 1 . 2 2 -0.28 1 4
Total 1.5 -0.33 25
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examined on an uncontrolled basis in Table 7.13. The
figures show that for plant and industry dominated LIMs combined 
(Section i of the table) the expected relationship does not exist, 
and indeed the opposite appears to be the case with the U* and B 
indices less efficient in the more dominant areas. This result, 
however, is only confirmed statistically in the case of the B value 
where the difference in efficiency between the two groups is 
significant at the 95% confidence level. This pattern of results is 
sustained even when controlling for unenployment and region (see 
appendix 16).
The above result is less clear cut when distinguishing between 
plant dominated and industry dominated groups (see Table 7.13 
Sections ii and iii). Although the results for the plant dominated 
group are the same as before there is some evidence to suggest that 
in the industry dominated group LIMs with higher levels of 
dominance. However, even controlling for the level of dominance 
industry dominated LiMs are still more efficient than plant 
dominated LIMs are more efficient in that the U* measure is lower in 
the more monopsonistic UMs. However, the extremely limited number 
of observations in the high dominance category implies that little 
confidence should be placed on the result. This conclusion is 
supported by t-test results which indicate that within acceptable 
confidence levels there is no significant difference between the 
groups for either measure of efficiency.
(19) The split between high and low dominance groups was 
subjectively set at 22.5% of the UMs manufacturing population.
(20) The relative bias towards the high dominance category in plant 
dominated UMs may explain why the plant dominated UMs as a group 
are less efficient than industry dominated UMs.
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Within the dominated group another important factor which may 
lead to variations in LIM efficiency is the nature of the dominating 
industry. The inportance of this variable for LIM efficiency has 
already been suggested by previous studies (for example see 
Bowers etal, 1970)j although without any particular theoretical 
basis. In this section, however, the arguments are examined in more
detail by testing the typothesis developed in Chapter 6 which
specifically relate industrial characteristics to IIM performance. 
Briefly^ this hypothesis suggested that both declining and expanding 
industries would tend to be associated with inefficient IIMs since 
both groups would tend to face a mismatch between labour supply and 
demand. In contrasty the most efficient dominated IIMs will be those 
associated with well-established but relatively bouyant industries 
where unemployment and vacancy mismatches are, as a result, less
likely to appear.
The results of analysing both plant and industry dominated 
LIMs hy sector are presented in Table 7.14. Although the number of 
observations in each sector is limited, and therefore the results 
are necessarily subject to qualification, it is still possible to 
draw some general conclusions related to the hypothesis under test. 
One of the most striking features of the table is that the variation 
between industries in terms of both U* and B is substantial and
hence the figures seem to support the underlying proposition that
efficiency is in part influenced by industry. For example^ the value
of U* ranges from 0.9% in rubber through to 4.1% in the case of coal 
mining. Similarly the value of B extends from a maximum of -0.05,
again in mining, to a minimum of -0.47 in timber related products.
In terms of the arguments relating efficiency to the growth 
characteristics of specific industry Table 7.14 compared with Table 
7.15 seems to provide support for the propositions developed in 
Chapter 6 . lOr example, and although U * and B are not perfectly 
related, it would appear that with respect to both measures of IIM 
efficiency the most inefficient industries are coal mining, iron and 
steel, electronics and electrical machinery and chemicals. That is, 
many of the LIMs dominated by rapidly expaning or declining
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industries (see Table 7.15) are the roost inefficient. This is true 
both in terms of the maximum level of non demand deficient 
unenployment in these LIMs and their responsiveness to market 
changes. In other words, the problems of a UV mismatch are highest 
in these areas, which again supports the hypothesis proposed in 
Chapter 6 . Conversely the most efficient IIMs are dominated by 
industries which include rubber, paper and board, glass^pottery and 
bricks, food and drink, vehicles and metal goods NES. All of these 
industries are relatively well-established and between the period 
1951-1975 were not subject to drastic changes either through 
expansion or contraction (again see Table 7 . 1 5 ) . Once again 
therefore, these results seem to be consistent with the hypothesis 
developed in Chapter 6 . However beyond this rather general 
statement it is difficult to make any more precise or meaningful 
conments given that the industries in question cover such a wide 
range.
(21) There are also industrial sectors which do not seem to follow 
the predicted pattern. For example ^ iron and steel although 
relatively stable between 1951 and 1971 still has a relatively low 
level of IIM efficiency. This may, of course, reflect their 
dramatic changes in the industry between 1971 and 1975, the date the 
UV data series ends. The other two industries not following the 
anticipated pattern are textiles and footwear since, although both 
sectors declined significantly over the period, their efficiency 
levels have remained about, average.
(22) As mentioned previously there are differences between the 
industrial composition of plant dominated and industry dominated 
LIMs. Unfortunately, because there is not a significant enough 
overlap between the two groups, it is not possible to conpare 
variations in U* and B on an industry basis. However, it does not 
seem that the differences in industrial structure helps explain the 
variations in efficiency levels between the two groups.
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TABLE 7,14 DOMINATED LIMs ; VARIATIONS IN EFFICIENCY BY SECTOR
industry Ü* B No of Observations
Coalmining 4.07 -0.05 1 1
Food & drink 1.81 -0.23 6
Chemicals 3.50 • -0 . 1 2 3
Iron & steel 2.83 -0 . 2 0 9
Mechanical engineering 2.44 -0.30 8
Electronics & electronic
Engineering
Machinery 3.12 -0.26 9
Shipbuilding 2.16 -0.33 10
Automobiles 1.70 -0.25 5
Metal goods NES 
Cans metal boxes 1.28 -0.39 1
Textiles 1.49 —0.28 1 2
Footwear 1.25 -0.31 7
Glass, pottery & bricks 1.60 -0.45 1
Timber 2 . 0 2 -0.47 1
Paper & board 1.45 -0.36 3
Rubber 0.90 -0.24 1
Double dominated LIMs 2.41 -0.28 6
Total 2.37 -0.25 93
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TABLE 7.15 INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 1951-1971
Nos Employed 
1951
Nos Employed 
1971
Percentage
Charge
Industry (0 0 0s) (0 0 0s) 1951-71
Goal Mining 675 307 -54
Food & Drink 535 552 + 3
Chemicals 397 492 + 24
Iron & Steel 253 246 - 3
Mechanical
Engineering 826 1084 +31
Electrical
Engineering 538 791 +47
Shipbuilding & 
Marine Engineering 2 0 0 139 -30
Vehicles 689 751 + 9
Other Metal Goods 442 494 + 1 2
Tfextiles 8 6 8 515 -41
Footwear 124 94 -24
Brick, Pottery g 
Glass etc. 292 283 - 3
Timber 60 77 +28
Paper & Board 65 67 + 3
Rubber 95 108 +14
Notes; (i) The 1971 figures were taken from the Economie Activity 
Analysis Section of the Census; Table 18, p. 196. The figures 
represent a 10% sample scaled up. The figures are based on the 
returns for England and Wales.
(ii) The 1951 figures were taken from The Industry Tables Section 
of the Census Table 1 beginning on p 4. The figures are based on 
the returns for England and Wales.
(iii) Changes in SIC groupings have been taken account of in the 
calculations.
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APPENDIX 1
THE DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
LOCAL LABOUR MARKETS
This appendix is divided into three sections: firstly, the
theoretical considerations associated with defining local labour 
markets are considered; secondlythe local labour market selection 
criteria adopted by the project are discussed; and third and 
finally^ the characteristics of the identified local labour markets 
are reviewed.
1 THE DEFINITION OF LOCAL LABOUR MARKETS : THEORETICS, CONSIDERATIONS
The distinguishing characteristic of a labour market, as opposed 
to other markets, is that ' the commodity being bought is physically 
inseparable from the seller. Therefore the buyer (the employer) 
and the seller (the enployee) must coexist within some reasonable 
geographical distance. The determinants of the scope of this 
hinterland differ between employer and employee.
For the employee the labour market may be viewed as the 
geographical area within which he is prepared to offer himself for 
enployment at a specific wage. For each pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary "benefit package” offered to the worker by a particular 
job there will be a geographical limit to the distance he will be 
prepared to travel which is determined largely by the costs of 
movement. Clearly, for a better package the worker will be
prepared to spend more on daily travel and therefore the larger will 
be the area covered by the worker's labour market. The 
geographical labour market of an industrial worker, then, will 
consist of the spatial limits to his daily travel for each potential 
enployment package. As the boundary extends further from his home 
the more attractive the benefits package has to become in order to 
induce the worker to travel. The boundary becomes a gradient, and 
as it extends the number of jobs the worker is prepared to accept 
becomes smaller.
2Although the cost of travel will set the outer limits of the 
geographical labour market of the employee, there will often be 
additional factors constraining this boundary. In particular^ the 
nature and extend of information networks in the labour market will 
be important. More ^ecifically^ eirpirical evidence suggests that, 
especially in a slack labour market, employees and employers make 
considerable use of informal information channels when searching for 
employment or employees and these informal networks are likely to be 
geographically restricted. Information on job vacancies will be 
passed on verbally and will only filter slowly beyond the immediate 
neighbourhood of the current employees of a company, For an 
individual this means that although his potential labour market area 
(as determined by travel to work costs) is fairly large, in fact it 
may be much more restricted because of the way in which informal 
information networks tend to only permit him to learn about a 
limited number of job opportunities. Therefore, whilst the 
gradient of the boundary to his labour market, as set by travel 
costs, may be gradual, this slope will be sharply reinforced by the 
inperfect operation of information networks.
From the point of view of the employer, he will have a separate 
labour market area for each group of occupations within the 
organisation depending on the benefit package offered to the 
employee. For occupations offering similar packages employees and 
potential employees can be expected to live within a geographical 
area set by the travel costs that workers in that particular 
category are willing to incur in their journey to work.
(1) The importance of informal recruitment methods is well known and 
well documented. For example, see MacKay et al (1971, PP231-257), 
or Rees & Shultz (1970).
(2) See Stigler (1962) for a discussion on how the costs of 
imperfect information restricts search activities, and by 
implication the extent of a worker's effective local labour market.
(3) Once again in practise, information deficiencies may well 
restrict the extent of the local labour market boundary.
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In general, the higher the costs of travelling to the place of work, 
the lower the probability that an employer will be able to recruit 
workers from a particular area. The better the package being 
offered by the employer, the wider the geographical boundary of the 
labour market. Employers are in a somewhat unique position in 
defining job-h inter lands in that they are able to alter the shape 
and size of their labour markets by changing the basic parameters of 
travel costs through the benefit package being offered. Increasing 
wages or, for example, offering free travel to work will widen the 
scope of the labour market for a particular group of workers. In 
general ÿ these measures may be considered as an additional labour 
cost to which recourse is only made when the labour supply within 
the original boundaries become inadequate. Employers are also able 
to discriminate in favour of or against a particular locality on the 
basis of past recruitment experiences regarding absenteeism, 
productivity, turnover and quits.
Given these determinants of local labour market boundaries the 
mapping of a labour market for a group of employees and employers is 
extremely complex. In its simplest form it will consist of a series 
of overlapping circles as the geographical labour markets of 
different employees and employers merge with one another. 
However, by taking a particular geographical unit and examining the 
labour market of workers and employers located within the area the 
nature of that areas as a local labour market may be defined and 
subsequently classified by two variables, each of which measures a 
separate component of worker movement.
The first variable relates to the boundary of the area and is 
determined by the extent to which the individual markets, or journey
(4) Differences in accessibilities will, of course, ensure that the 
markets are not circular. Indeed, a firm's labour market will tend 
to be star shaped along the main transport routes.
4
to work patterns, of all workers and employers within that boundary 
extend beyond the boundary. The less the individual markets extend 
beyond the boundary, the more closed the boundary and the higher the 
degree of self-containment displayed by the market. Local labour 
market self-containment may be measured by two separate components, 
both related to journey to work patterns; the first measure is the 
proportion of resident workers who are employed outside the area; 
the second measure is the proportion of those who work inside the 
boundary but who live outside. In other words, the two components 
refer to the labour market of workers resident in the area and to 
the labour market of employers located within the boundary.
The second variable delineating a local labour market relates to 
the internal density of the market (see Goodman, 1971). Internal 
density is a function of the extent to which any particular point in 
a geographical area lies within the labour market boundary of all
individuals and employers in the area. Internally dense or active
markets will be spatial configurations where the labour markets of 
both individual's and employer's journey to work boundaries cover 
the entire geographical area. Diagram Al.l outlines in conceptual 
terms the basic differences between an internally dense labour 
market and an internally ^arse labour market. In the internally 
dense market (Figure A) the journey to work patterns generated by 
the employees cover the entire geographical unit. Every part of 
the area is well connected with the remainder of the unit. The
same is not true of an internally sparse unit as Figure B shows.
In this instance it is clear that the journey-to-work patterns do 
not cover the specified area since parts of the unit are not 
affected by journey to work movements. Furthermore, the existing 
journey to work patterns relate to sub-sections of the larger unit 
with little evidence of flows between the adjacent cells. The
concept of internal density therefore is important since to some 
extent it measures the level of unification or locality in a local 
labour market configuration.
It is difficult to operationalise the internal density variable 
using travel-to-work data, since the definition demands that by
DIAGRAM Al.l REPRESENTATICN OF LOCAL LABOUR MARKET INTERNAL DENSITY
Figure A-Internally Dense. Area Figure B-Internally Sparse Area
Note;( i) each line illustrates a journey-to-work or a series of 
journeys.
(ii) although each local labour market is equally self- 
contained internal density varies dramatically.
taking any part of a geographical area there should be a high level 
of journey-to-work movement both in and out of this sub-area and 
from almost any other part of the geographical unit. Indeed for 
the market to be dense and closed the flow of workers between any 
two parts within the market should be greater than the flow from a 
point in the market to a point outside the boundary. That is, a 
high degree of intra-boundary movement should be apparent unifying 
the local labour market. This is a difficult condition to achieve.
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however, in view of the considerable variation in journey to work 
time for different occupational groups which, as noted above, is 
related to variations in pay levels. For example, it might be
totally inappropriate to think of a local, as opposed to a regional 
or national, labour market for highly paid professional male 
occupations. Indeed Hollingsworth (1970) using 1961 Census data 
has shown that rates of migration involving moves of over 40 miles 
are over four times higher for professional workers than for manual 
workers. Accordingly ^ a local labour market definition using 
journey-to-work data can only hope to identify geographical units 
representing local labour markets for almost all female workers and 
most male manual workers.
Accepting that local labour market self-containment and internal 
density are the two major determinants of a local labour market 
area, then it is possible to devise an 8-way typology of 
geographical configurations, only one of which constitutes a self 
contained and internally dense local labour market. This typology 
is presented in Table Al.l, and cell seven is the only 
classification constituting both a self contained and internally 
dense local labour market. Therefore, in the process of 
empirically identifying local labour markets, areas with 
characteristics other than cell seven will be rejected since they 
fail to satisfy one or other, or both, of the necessary conditions 
associated with the definition of local labour markets.
(5) Of course journey to work considerations are also affected by 
other considerations besides pay levels, and in particular 
transportation networks and the time taken to get to work.
TABLE Al. l-CONFIGURATION OF POSSIBIÆ LOCAL LABOUR MARKET STRUCTURES
Proportion of econ­
omically active 
residents working 
outside the Area
Proportion of workers resident outside the area
 ^ ______ High.... .... Low
Internally
dense
Internally
sparse
Internally
dense
Internally 
.. sparse .
High
(i)
Small area 
within 
larger con­
urbation
(ii)
Large town/ 
area within 
industrial 
region
(V)
Small
town
(vi)
Commuter 
belt 
round an 
enployment 
centre.
Low
(iii)
Employment 
centre of 
potentially 
self-con­
tained 
market
(iv)
Large em­
ployment 
centre of 
large
conurbation
(vii) 
Self-con- 
contained 
local 
labour 
market
(viii)
Large
conurbation
2 THE .IDENTIFICATION OF LOCAL LABOUR MARKETS ADOPTED SELECTION 
CRITERIA
The definition of a labour market as a geographical unit where 
travel to work patterns are internally dense, and where there is a 
minimum of cross-boundary travel provides a sufficient theoretical 
base upon which to empirically identify local labour markets. That 
is, using indices of self-containment and internal density to define 
labour markets it is possible to allocate most geographical units to 
a local market. The only substantive problem remaining is to 
explicitly quantify what constitutes "self-contained" and 
"internally dense". For the purpose of this study, and in the 
absence of any theoretically meaningful alternative, the threshold 
values for containment and density were set on a pragmatic basis. 
The choice of cut-off point and the reasoning behind their selection 
are discussed below along with the data used and the results 
achieved.
2.1 Self-Containment Levels
In terms of measuring self-containment the only source of 
sufficiently detailed information is the 1961 Census Journey to Work 
Tables which measure the extent to which workers cross Local 
Authority b o u n d a r i e s . F o r  the purpose of defining local 
labour markets these figures were analysed by examining the number 
of resident enployees working within the area expressed as a 
proportion of the total number of resident employees, and as a 
proportion of total numbers working in the area. The first measure 
is an indicator of the extent to which the area's resident workforce 
is also employed within the area. That is, the index measures the 
extent of resident employee movement to beyond the boundary of a 
specified geographical u n i t . T h e  second measure indicates the 
degree of inward migration of workers to an area; the index 
therefore measures the extent of inward cross boundary movement.
The only problem in using these figures as a basis for defining 
local labour markets is to decide at what level an area becomes 
self-contained. Unfortunately g the self-containment criteria 
selected must necessarily be arbitrary, since there is no obvious or 
readily acceptable threshold delineating what constitutes a 
sufficiently self-contained local labour market. Therefore, and on 
the basis of largely pragmatic considerations, it was decided that 
to qualify as self-contained a labour market had to have at least 
70% of the resident employed population working in the area, and 70% 
of the working population also had to live in the area. The prime 
reason
(6 ) At the time of writing, figures from the 1971 Census were not 
available and some data for areas under a population of 15,000 were 
unavailable in the 1966 sample survey.
(7) For example, if the resident employed population is 100 and the 
resident employees also working in the area number 50, then 50% of 
the resident employed population are employed outside the area.
(8 ) For example, if there are 50 resident employees working in the 
area, and the total number of employees in the area are 1 0 0 , then 50 
workers (50% of the area total) must reside beyond the area's 
boundaries.
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for choosing 70% as a cut-off was to provide a sufficient number of 
local labour markets for the subsequent identification and analysis 
of the dominated sub-group. Choosing a high cut-off would have 
restricted the number of suitable local labour markets, and may have 
reduced the number of dominated local labour markets to a level 
where statistically meaningful analysis would not have been 
possible. The 70-70 threshold may, therefore, be interpreted as a 
rather liberal selection criterion. Nonetheless^ having specified 
constraints which are not particularly stringent will help identify 
the effects of a range of self-containment levels on the functioning
(Q)
of local labour markets at a later stage of the analysis.
Not surprisingly, most Local Authority areas standing in 
isolation failed to meet the set self-containment requirements. 
This was largely because the areas under consideration were too 
small and there was a significant amount of cross boundary journey- 
to-work movement. To overcome this problem it was necessary to 
join contiguous Local Authority areas. Fortunately it was possible 
to avoid many of the tedious calculations associated with 
aggregation since much of the required work had been previously 
undertaken in a related research project (Smart, 1974), which was 
also based on 1961 Census Journey to Work statistics. Smart's 
objective was to divide all of the UK into local labour markets 
using the Census material based on Local Authority Areas. Briefly_^ 
Smart achieved this by starting with the "weakest Local Authority 
Areas", where either the proportion of residents working outside or 
the proportion of workers resident outside was highest. Smart then 
attenpted to link them to all other adjacent areas by using a 
formula which took account of the flows of workers between the areas
(9) That is, whether highly self-contained labour markets behave in 
markedly different ways from areas which are much less isolated, and 
at what levels of self-containment these differences emerge, are 
empirical questions which can be addressed later.
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relative to the resident employed population of the areas.
The Local Authority areas with the highest link values were the 
first to be aggregated. Smart then repeated the process until all 
Local Authority areas had been allocated to a local labour market.
Therefore, by taking advantage of Smart's existing worksheets, 
it is possible to identify local labour markets without having to 
calculate the link values between different areas. However, 
because the underlying aim of Smart's study differed considerably 
from those of the dominant plant research it was necessary to 
reinterpret and subsequently adjust many of Smart's calculations in 
order that the selected local labour markets matched the dominant 
plant study's 70-70 self-containment threshold. The first major 
adjustment to Smart's calculations involved the Local Authority 
aggregation process. Using the dominant plant definition of 
self-containment, aggregation stopped once the threshold 70-70 
criterion was reached. Adopting this procedure implies that 
several Local Authority areas are not allocated to any local labour 
market configuration. Nonetheless, in many respects this approach 
is a more realistic method of delineating local labour markets than 
the procedures adopted by Smart in that many of Smart's final local 
labour markets were fairly large and therefore probably not 
internally dense. That is, quite frequently in Smart's analysis a 
local labour market would comprise an area which although 
self-contained would have non self-contained areas added to it so 
that all Local Authority areas were part of a local labour market.
(10) The actual specification of the formula for the creation of the 
link values was;
link value = a^ ^ + ^ 2
xy  ^.
where a = the number travelling to work from area A to area B 
b = - do - B to area A
X = the resident population in area A 
y - - do - B
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The second difference between Smart's work and the dominant
plant study was that Smart's definition of self-containment required 
that the resident employed population working in the area should 
constitute at least 75% of both the resident employed population and 
the day employed population. This compares to the dominant plant 
project's threshold of 70% for both indices. In practical terms 
this meant that where Smart's worksheets reached a level of 70-70 
self-containment this was considered sufficient for . the dominant
plant study and further aggregation was ignored.
In sum therefore, it was possible to calculate local labour
market self-containment on the basis of the 1961 Census Journey to
Work tables and the calculations used in Smart's work on defining 
local labour markets. However, the selection criteria adopted by 
Smart differed from the dominant plant methodology both in terms of 
the acceptable cut-off point and the method of aggregation used. 
Consequently, many of Smart's original calculations were reworked to 
produce results more suited to the requirements of the dominant 
plant study.
.2.2 Internal Density
With respect to calculating the internal density of geographical 
areas as a means of defining local labour markets, it is not 
possible to take advantage of Smart's work, since the concept of 
internal density was not considered to be relevant to the 
r e s e a r c h . I n  addition,it is also not possible to calculate
(11) Smart ignored internal density because he was primarily 
concerned with allocating every Local Authority area to a local 
labour market irrespective of the resultant journey-to-work 
movements within the configuration. This is a major drawback to 
Smart's work since the presence of a sufficiently high internal 
density is a necessary consideration when meaningfully delineating 
local labour markets. Without a sufficiently high internal density 
it is unrealistic to claim that any geographical area is either a 
local or unified market. As Goodman (1970) warns; "the degree of 
seeking to extend perfection (by minimising cross boundary flows) at 
the expense of losing the essentially local character of the market 
must be guarded against".
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internal density directly from Census Journey to Work tables as 
these statistics only relate to travel involving enployees crossing 
Local Authority boundaries. As no alternative information is 
available to help in calculating internal density it was necessary 
to adopt a proxy measure for the variable. The most appropriate 
and only readily available proxy is local labour market size. The 
choice of size as a proxy for internal density reflects the fact 
that the cost of a journey to work increases with distance, and 
therefore the willingness of the worker to travel, varies inversely 
with size. Therefore, generally speaking the larger the 
geographical size of a local labour market the lower the probability 
that a worker will be willing to commute anywhere within the
boundary, and therefore the lower the internal density. Accepting 
this,it was decided to inpose a constraint on the acceptable size of 
local labour markets as a direct substitute for a measure of 
internal density. The size constraint was set at 50,000 acres 
which represents approximately 80 sq. miles. If this area was 
roughly circular, an enployee living in the centre of the local 
labour market would have a maximum journey-to-work of about 6 miles 
in order to reach all parts of the market.
This size constraint is again an arbitrary figure which may err 
on the large side when it is remembered that a significant
proportion of women and lower paid manual workers walk to
work. A further possible shortcoming of the proxy is
that a maximum physical size constraint ignores differences between 
areas in terms of public transport and general accessibility. 
Allied to this ^ the proxy does not take into account the ^atial 
configuration of different workplaces and residences within the 
local labour market which could also have a significant inpact on 
journey-to- work patterns and therefore internal density.
(12) One study (National Board for Prices and Incomes, 1971) showed 
that 40% of women and 25% of men walked to work.
(13) Selecting a large local labour market area as a cut-off for an 
adequate measure of internal density will allow subsequent testing 
within the selected group as to whether local labour market 
behaviour is sensitive to size.
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However, the fact remains that some form of constraint has to be set 
in order to reject local labour markets which meet the 
self-containment threshold, but do not have a meaningfully high 
internal density.
2.3 Exceptions to Selection Criteria
Although the two basic ground rules for the identification of 
local labour markets are that they should be self-contained and 
internally dense, further pragmatic considerations dictate that, in 
a number of special cases, these rules should be either augmented or 
relaxed.
The first exception concerns the introduction of a minimum 
population figure, either set out in terms of an absolute number or 
expressed as a population density. That is, given that the main
purpose of this study is to examine the behaviour of industrial
labour markets, and particularly local labour markets dominated by a 
single large manufacturing plant, it is necessary to exclude from 
the selected local labour markets areas which have inadequate 
populations to support a sufficiently well developed industrial
environment or a major manufacturing plant. Accordingly, it was
decided to restrict the selection of local labour markets to "urban 
a r e a s " . I n  addition, it was also decided to exclude local 
labour markets where the total urban population resident within the
(14) The types of area this constraint is particularly designed to 
eliminate are conurbations where there is continued "chaining" of 
adjacent areas without ever reaching a reasonable level of 
self-containment, and large sparsely populated rural areas.
(15) Although urban areas may be defined in terms of population 
densities this is not particularly useful as such figures are only 
available at ward level in the Census, Urban areas were therefore 
arbitrarily defined as Census areas designated as Urban Districts, 
Metropolitan Boroughs and Country Boroughs, although some note was 
taken of Rural districts containing wdras with population above or 
near densities of one person per acre.
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labour market was less than 1 0 ,0 0 0 , since it was felt that this 
would be the minimum size whereby a local labour market could 
realistically be expected to contain a major industrial plant 
enploying at least 1 , 0 0 0 workers.
The second group of exceptions concerned what may be termed 
under bounded towns. The problem arises when a labour market area 
is conposed of an Urban Area (or occasionally two or more adjacent 
Urban Areas) which is attached to a Rural District (or occasionally 
two or more Rural Districts) and becomes a self-contained local
labour market but with an overall size of over 50,000 acres. Under 
normal circumstances such a configuration would be rejected as being 
too large. However, if the Urban Area is clearly a Job Centre
(that is the Urban Area has many more jobs than resident employed 
population) and the resident employees working in the area comprise 
more than 70% of the resident employed population, then there is 
clearly the possibility that the Urban Area itself only avoids
becoming a self-contained labour market because some of the Job 
Centre's suburbs fall outside its administrative boundary. That
is, underbounding describes a situation where the administrative 
boundaries of an Urban Area are clearly located within the built up 
area which constitutes the town.
(16) The arithmetic behind the 10,000 population constraint is 
relatively straightforward. The main interest of the project is in 
manufacturing and extractive industries, and such industries 
employed approximately 40% of the working population in 1966. 
Assuming that the smallest dominant plant of interest has a 
workforce of 1 , 0 0 0 and that in the most dominated area the main 
plant employs only half the labour force in manufacturing and 
extractive industries, this implies that there should be a minimum 
labour force in the area of around 5,000 workers. With an economic 
activity rate of around 50% this implies a total population size of 
10,000. The assumption that the smallest dominant plant will have
1 , 0 0 0  employees is also arbitrary, but a figure does have to be 
fixed if an adequate control group is to be selected at a later 
stage of the analysis given the impact of size o a  plant personnel 
policy. Moreover, if much smaller dominant plants were considered 
appropriate there would be serious data problems identifying the 
plants involved. Finally 5 since it was anticipated that the 
research would require sending out a postal questionnaire it was 
decided to focus on large establishments given the notoriously poor 
response rate associated with small plants.
15
Where underbounding occurs the areas concerned have been
accepted as local labour markets, the argument being that if the
administrative boundary included this contiguous residential area
then the towns would become self-contained labour markets.
Underbounded towns were largely identified from the infection of
Ordinance Survey maps and the further analysis of Journey-to-Work
tables. If the map indicated that there were residential areas of
some size outside the administrative boundary, but contiguous to the
towns and with substantial cross boundary travel, then the Area was
(17)accepted as a local labour market.
Although the simplest cases of underbounding reflect the 
relatively common occurrence of a town expanding beyond its borders 
there is, however, another category of underbounding. In this case 
Urban Areas fail to achieve self-containment as a result of a large 
factory or industrial estate immediately outside the administrative 
area. A prime example of this problem concerns the now closed 
Talbot car plant at Linwood in Scotland where the self-contained 
area includes not only the towns of Paislsy and Johnstone, but also 
two District Councils (see Diagram A 1.2). The problem is that the 
two towns are separated by a small strip of District Council land 
which includes the car plant and the small settlements of Linwood 
and Elderslie. In total these areas exceed the 50,000 acre 
constraint. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that 
Paisley, Johnstone, and the small strip of District Council land 
separating the two should be considered as a local labour market and
(17) ^pendix 4 includes a complete list of underbounded local 
labour markets. A good example is Derby Country Borough where in 
1961 98% of the Resident employed population worked in the town but 
only 56% of these working in the town were resident in the area. 
Inspection of the local Ordinance Survey map revealed a considerable 
residential area immediately outside the 1961 County boundary in 
South-East Derbyshire Rural District. If this area had been 
included within the County boundary then over 70% of the population 
working in the new area would have been living in the new area. 
Accordingly the area was accepted as a local labour market.
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DIAGRAM Al.2 : PAISIiEY AND JŒ3NST0NE LOCAL LABOUR MARKET ; AN 
EXAMPLE OF UNDERBOUNDING
• Linwood car plant
  true local labour
I market area
T  1Urban Area
Urban Area
___ !
Large District 
Council
the rest of the District Council land ignored, 
area was accepted as a local labour market.
Therefore, thi s
A third group of exceptions arose with areas consisting of a 
group of contiguous towns surrounded by Rural Districts but which in 
total cover more than 50,000 acres. In Smart's process of 
aggregation it was always the weakest areas which were aggregated 
first. Occasionally, therefore, in these situations a Rural 
District would be attached to one Urban District whilst another 
Rural District would be linked to a separate Urban Area. Only then
would the two resulting combinations be linked together. For the
(18) The small number of towns with similar characteristics are also 
listed in i^pendix 4.
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purposes of the dominant plant research, therefore, occasionally the 
linking process was changed by aggregating the two Urban Districts 
first and ignoring the Rural Districts.
Also in the final list of accepted local labour markets are a 
few areas which fell just below the minimum population size of
10,000 or just exceeded the acreage constraint. This was thought 
justifiable if there was a particularly high level of 
self-containment. Finally, one Rural District (Easington, Co.
Durham) was included as a labour market area because it contained 
one large parish of over 1 1 , 0 0 0 population at a density of 1 1  
persons per acre.
3 CHARACTERISTICS OF IDENTIFIED LOCAL LABOUR MARKETS
^art from a few exceptions, the five criteria developed for 
selecting local labour markets based on both theoretical and 
practical considerations were as follows;
(i) At least 70% of the resident workers were
employed within the local labour market area.
(ii) At least 70% of the workforce resided within
the labour market area.
(iii) There were 10,000 employees in the area in 1971.
(iv) The defined local labour market did not exceed
50,000 acres.
(v) The population density exceeded one person per
acre.
(19) An example of this is Royal Leamington Spa which in Smart's 
procedure was linked to the Rural District before being added to 
Warwick MB: the result being that the final area was too large for
consideration as a local labour market. In fact, Leamington and 
Norwich are contiguous and if they are joined directly form a small 
and self-contained local labour market.
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Using these rules, and taking account of exceptional 
circumstances , yielded 299 local labour markets distributed 
throughout the United Kingdom. The principal characteristics of 
the identified local labour markets are presented in Table A12.
The figures indicate that the local labour markets are fairly evenly 
distributed throughout the Regions, considering existing population 
densities (see. also the map of local labour markets in ^pendix 
5). Nevertheless there does seem to be a disproportionately high 
number of local labour markets in the S. West, E. Midlands and the 
North. Correspondingly, the figures also point to a proportionately 
low number of local labour markets in the S. East and W, 
Midlands. To some extent this pattern reflects the
industrial and demographic characteristics of the regions concerned.
On average the identified local labour markets cover a 
significant proportion of total United Kingdom population; 25.9m 
people or 51% of the 1961 population. As the figures show the 
extent of population coverage varies considerably between regions. 
Again this variation largely reflects the economic and geographical 
attributes of the Regions. For example, in the S. East the local 
labour markets only cover 27% of total population. This low figure 
is largely a result of excluding most of the Greater London Area as 
a local labour market since the prospective local labour market 
areas could not be distinguished from surrounding areas in terms of 
Journey-to-Work patterns. Other Regions where population coverage 
was below average were Wales and E. Anglia. In this case the result 
probably reflects the predominantly rural nature of these areas 
which results in many otherwise acceptable local labour markets 
failing to meet the acreage constraint.(^ 1)
(20) See the final columns of the table for details. For example, 
dividing the total regional population by the number of local labour 
markets identified gives a figure of 85 for the S. West at one 
extreme, and 262 for the S. East at the other. Therefore,there are 
considerably more local labour markets per head of population in the 
S. West conpared to the S. East.
(21) Note, therefore, that both highly industrialised areas (for 
example the South East) and predominantly rural areas (for example, 
E. Anglia) both tend to reduce the level of local labour market 
coverage.
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The average size of a local labour market in population terms is 
87,000 which seems reasonable in terms of potential Journey-to-Work 
movements and internal density. There are, however, widespread 
differences in average local labour market populations between
Regions. The largest average population size is in the W. Midlands 
(142,000) and Yorkshire Humberside (136,000), which largely reflects 
the heavily industrialised and urbanised nature of these 
R e g i o n s . B y  contrast, the lowest population sizes are in
Wales (66,000), E. Anglia (54,000) and the E. Midlands (66,000) 
which, apart from the E. Midlands, tend to be less heavily
industrialised and with a more dispersed population.
The average acreage of the local labour markets is 13,800. In 
general terms this again seems a reasonable figure bearing in mind 
identified Journey-to-Work patterns and the need to maintain an 
acceptable level of internal density. Regional variations in 
average acreages are again fairly significant, ranging from 7,800 in 
E. Anglia to over 17,000 in Wales, the N. West and Yorkshire- 
Humberside. These variations are more difficult to reconcile than 
the population figures and seem to be best e:q)lained by the
^atialconfigurations of the Local Authority areas rather than any 
general regional characteristic. There is also a positive
(22) Obviously there is a distinction between regions like W. 
Midlands and the S. East in terms of population density and travel 
to work densities. In particular, whilst the lack of local labour 
markets in the S.E. reflects the consistent "chaining" of one local 
labour market onto another, this does not occur to the same extent 
in areas like the W. Midlands. That is, although chaining occurs 
the local labour market self-containment criteria are reached before 
the acreage constraint is violated.
(23) Without detailed analysis it is difficult to establish why the 
E. Midlands has a low average population, but it probably reflects 
particular characteristics in the configuration of the local labour 
markets.
(24) Not surprisingly there appears to be a positive correlation 
between local labour market size and average population; i.e. the 
large local labour markets have higher average population levels.
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correlation between local labour market size and average population 
density which seems to suggest that larger local labour markets are 
associated with densely populated Urban Areas where it is difficult 
to restrict the scope of overlapping local labour markets.
In terms of self-containment the average figure for the United 
Kingdom was comfortably above the 70-70 selection criterion. 
Moreover on a regional basis there does not appear to be any 
meaningful differences between areas for either seIf-containment 
index, or even for the conposite self-containment figure. This is 
not surprising given that the key determinants of the 
self-containment cut-off are not likely to depend on regional 
characteristics.
(25) The only two exceptions to the correlation between local labour 
market size and local labour market density are Wales with a high 
average acreage and low population density, and the S. East with a 
low average acreage and high population density. In both cases 
this would appear to reflect particular settlement patterns.
(26) In particular the cut-off points will depend on the spatial 
configuration of Local Authority areas and settlement patterns which 
do not vary systematically by Region.
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APPENDIX 2
THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF UK LOCAL LABOUR 
MARKETS AND THE ISOLATION OF LABOUR MARKET DOMINANCE
This appendix deals with three aspects concerning the 
identification of LIM industrial structure. Firstly^ the employment 
and plant level data available at a LIM level is examined. Secondly, 
the alternative methods of using this data to define plant dominance 
are outlined with the principal objective of developing a 
theoretically acceptable but at the same time operational measure of 
this phenomenon. Finally ^ the results of applying the chosen 
definition are presented attempting where possible to highlight the 
key characteristics of the indentified group of dominated LIMs.
1 DATA AVAILABILITY
The ideal data set for the project would be a nationally 
collected listing of manufacturing plants, their industrial 
classification, location, and employment, two such series exist; the 
intermittent Census of production and the more recently introduced 
Annual Census of Employment. In both cases, however, the individual 
returns are not available because of strict confidentiality rules, 
and hence the data was of little use to the dominant plant project, 
Three further data sets were therefore used to define and identify 
labour market structure and dominant plants. These data sources are 
described below.
(1) Conceptually it may appear preferable to discuss the appropriate 
definition of dominance before examining data sources, but given the 
not inconsiderable problems of data acquisition in this field data 
availability is considered first. That is, it would be 
inappropriate to suggest a definition based upon a measure where 
data was unavailable. The rationale behind this approach becomes 
clear in Section 2.2 where attempts are made to apply several 
different definitions.
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(i)ïhe ERI (supplements) Cn condition that conplete confidentiality 
was maintained permission was granted by the Department of 
Employment in several regions to have access to their ERI records, 
in all cases this data related to 1973, the last year in which local 
employment offices were obliged to collect such data. Using this 
source, data was aquired for the largest manufacturing enployers in 
159 of the 301 LIMs, and for the 10 largest manufacturing employers 
in 74 of these 159 LIMs.
(ii)ERII Census For the remaining 142 IIMs not covered by ERI data 
an alternative approach was adopted. Permission was granted to 
analyse the EEîIl Census for 1973 in all Department of Employment 
Local Office Areas. Ihese records list employee numbers by MLH, 
therefore from these records it should have been possible to 
identify LIMs considered to be industrially dominant. Ancillary 
data sources, primarily business directories, could then be used to 
distinguish between LIMs where such industrial dominance was the 
result of a single establishment. There are a number of situations, 
however, where such an approach encounters problems. Firstly, there 
are cases where, although an establishment employs a high proportion 
of the labour force, it produces many products and therefore the 
plant's workforce is classified into more than one MLH. The 
solution to this type of problem was to try and identify pairings of 
MLHB which might reflect a single, yet multi-product enterprise. 
Secondly, there were situations where a single MLH employed a 
sufficiently high proportion of the labour force, but where 
directory evidence suggested that more than one company was 
involved, under these circumstances the data available was examined 
in more detail to establish whether the two companies were separate 
or
whether the data reflected some form of joint ownership. Rather 
more involved was a third type of situation where both more than one 
conpany and more than one product was involved, in these cases "Who 
CWns Whom" and similar publications were used to investigate 
possible relationships between the plants. A final type of problem 
was the situation where a local labour market had a high proportion 
of its workforce in a single MLH, or a group of related MLHS, where 
directory data suggested this was a result of two or more firms with
no direct connections but where, when examined in more detail, there
24
were relationships such as common directors. Under these 
circumstances the separate plants were not considered as a dominant 
plant given the absence of a formal association.
Accordingly, on the basis of the 1973 ERII data augmented by 
material from business directories on product, employment and 
corporate structure, the remaining 142 LIMs for which ERI 
(Supplement) data was not available were examined in an attempt to 
identify dominant plants.
(iii) Factory inspectorate Data permission to consult the records 
maintained by the Factory Inspectorate, which includes data on 
company product group (but not MLH) and enployment, was granted to 
the project. However, there were a number of problems associated 
with using this data. Firstly) Factory Inspectorate data is held in 
a large number of local offices and it is therefore difficult and 
time consuming to collect and analyse. A second major problem was 
that Factory Inspectorate data, unlike Department of Employment 
statistics, does not relate cross sectionally to a single point in 
time. Rather, data for each plant refers to the most recent record 
update. Finally, the Factory inspectorate data does not cover total 
enployment, but total employment on site, thereby omitting such 
workers as delivery men and sales representatives.
(2) To test whether the two methods (ERI and ERII) were conpatible, 
for one region (Wales) the ERII method was applied and the results 
subsequently checked by reference to ERI data. Of the nineteen 
labour markets involved, the two methods coincided in their 
respective distinctions between dominated and non-dominated labour 
markets in every case.
(3) However, to test the compatibility of the Factory Inspectorate 
data with ERI figures, the corresponding statistics for a number of 
Scottish IIMs were compared and few significant differences were 
found.
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(iv) Miscellaneous Data Sources In a number of cases the principal 
data sources were supported by supplementary directory data, 
personal knowledge as to the identity and inportance of specific 
companies or plants, and ancillary sources such as newspaper 
reports. Data availability referred to 1973 in most cases.
To sum up the major points emerging from the discussion on 
data availability it would appear that there are a variety of DIM 
data sources available to the project to help select dominant plants 
(see Table A2.1). However, in all cases the data bases are limited, 
both in the extent to which they can be used to identify a IIM plant 
hierarchy and in terms of the quality and reliability of the 
figures. Nonetheless taking account of the different data sources, 
and the qualifications associated with each, it is still possible to 
build a sufficiently comprehensive picture of LIM structure and 
thereby identify plant dominated LIMs. Ihe actual definition or 
measurement of dominance should, however, reflect data 
availability. Accordingly the limitations on the available sources 
will constrain the conplexity of the measure adopted. The possible 
approaches to this problem are discussed in the following section.
2 ALTERNATIVE METH3DS OF DEFINING DCMINANCE
The definition of plant dominance may be viewed as either a 
statistical or behavioural p h e n o m e n o n . W h i l s t  the project, 
given this distinction, is interested in behavioural phenomena. , 
data is only available in relation to statistical estimates of LLM 
concentration. Accordingly, dominance initially has to be 
statistically defined. However, on the basis of this definition the 
fundamental objective of the analysis is to subsequently identify 
the behavioural characteristics associated with the statistically 
defined estimate of dominance.
(4) Indeed Bunting (1962) draws the distinction between 
concentration as a purely statistical characteristic in which a few 
employers hire a large percentage of the market, and monopsony or 
oligopsony which is defined as a behavioural characteristic.
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Concentrating on statistical estimates there are two broad 
approaches to the definition of dominance; firstly^a relatively 
simple method where LIMs above a threshold concentration level are 
classed as dominated; and secondly, to set up some "normal" 
distribution of plant sizes from which a distinctive "dominated" 
distribution of plant sizes may be distinguished. Operationally the 
most important distinction between these two approaches lies in 
their data requirements, The former requires only the size of the 
largest manufacturing employer in the LIM, whilst the latter 
requires a complete size distribution for all, or at least the 
larger, plants, The features associated with each approach are 
discussed below although it should be remembered that data on the 
plant size distribution for all LIMs is not available. 
Nevertheless, the alternative more involved definitions are analysed 
on the more limited data base to establish whether there is any 
evidence of a normal and a dominated distribution. This discussion 
also serves to indicate that the more sophisticated measures also 
suffer from problems which would be difficult to overcome even if a 
more complete data set was available.
2.1 The Threshold Approach
The threshold approach to defining dominance has a number of 
advantages, particularly from an operational standpoint. Indeed, 
given the statistical inadequacies of the available data sets, it is 
the only readily applicable indicator of plant dominance. The 
simplicity of the measure also means that it is easy to apply, and 
not subject to the same degree of ambiguity normally associated with 
the more sophisticated indices (see below),
Nonetheless, the apparent simplicity of using a single 
percentage value as the definition of a dominant plant conceals a 
number of difficulties. One major problem involves adequately 
defining a manufacturing plant. At the simplest level a plant may 
be thought of as a single factory but there are a number of more 
complicated situations which serve to confuse this definition, in 
particular there are examples of multiplant companies within a LIM.
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For the purposes of the research all commonly owned plants within a 
LIM are treated as a single establishment. Another similar
problem associated with the threshold approach, and one which is 
more difficult to identify and resolve, concerns plants related 
through a common holding company. Where such plants manufacture 
similar or related products they are treated as though they were a 
single plant.
The remaining problems with the threshold approach relate to 
the definition of total LIM employment which forms the basis of the 
dominance calculation. Three definitions are theoretically 
feasible: the total workforce in the LIM; the workforce in the LIM 
engaged in non tertiary activity; and the economic base of the LIM 
as defined in terms of the standard basic non-basic ratio. The 
basic non-basic ratio was not considered as considerable doubts have 
now been cast upon the export-led urban growth concept which forms 
the basis of economic base theories (see Bumenfeld, 1957). Even if 
this were not so, the calculation of the numbers employed in basic 
employment for each IIM would still raise considerable conceptual 
and statistical difficulties, using the tertiary labour force as a 
definition of LIM employment also raises a number of problems, 
particularly in LIMs where the employment structure is dominated by 
service activities and therefore any dominant plant identified on 
this basis need only employ a low proportion of total 
employment. Accordingly, and partly by default, the total
workforce in the LIM was selected as the most representative and 
appropriate measure of LIM employment.
(5) Given the form of ERI (Supplement) data it is not always 
possible to distinguish between single and multiplant enterprises 
within a LLM, although this is possible from Factory Inspectorate 
data.
(6) For example, the St Andrews LIM has a total workforce of 3,900 
of whom 2,800 are in service occuptions. Thus the largest 
manufacturing employer with a workforce of approximately 450 might 
be considered as dominant if the non-tertiary labour force were used 
as a base. This would clearly be unrealistic given the employment 
structure of the remainder of the LIM.
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Bearing in mind the problems associated with the threshold 
approach the next step in identifying dominant plants using such a 
technique involved deciding on an appropriate cut-off value. The 
proportion of the total labour force employed in the largest 
manufacturing establishment was therefore calculated for the 159 
LIMs where ERI (Supplement) data was available. The results of this 
exercise showed that these values trace out a skewed distribution 
curve. The mean value of dominant plant is 12.3% and, reflecting 
the skew in the distribution, the median value is 9.4% with an 
interquartile range of 5.1% to 15.8%. Over the entire range the 
extreme values are found in Leeds, where the largest plant employs 
exactly 1% of the total workforce, and Coalville, where the largest 
plant employs 66.6% of the total workforce. However, in analysing 
the figures there does not appear to be a natural break in the 
distribution. As a result it is necessary to select a cut-off value 
on a pragmatic basis when trying to distinguish between dominated 
and non-dominated LIMs. The primary requirement in this exercise is 
to ensure that in setting the cut-off value a sufficient number of 
dominated LIMs are included to enable the latter stages of the 
analysis to be performed upon a reasonably large sample. On the 
assumption that the 159 LIMs are typical of the population of 301 
with respect to employment concentration Table A2.2 indicates the 
number of dominated LIMs defined by a range of cut-off values. From 
these figures it would seem that a value within the range 12.5% - 
15.0% generates a sufficient number of dominated LIMs (that is, 
about 100) for detailed study. Accordingly^ any manufacturing plant 
employing over 12.5% of the total LIM workforce was defined as being 
dominant.
(7) The 12.5% cut-off also reflects the assumption that in any 
subsequent questionnaire analysis only a limited proportion of 
plants are likely to respond.
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TABLE A2.2 THE EXTENT OF DOMINANCE BY CONCENTRATION
CONCENTRATION 
CUT-OFF VALUE NO OF DOMINATED LIMs NO OF NON-DCMINATED IIMs
5.0 229 72
7.5 180 121
10.0 141 160
12.5 116 185
15.0 88 213
17.5 61 240
20.0 45 256
22.5 33 268
25.0 29 272
Source: W F Lever (1977)
2.2 A Size Distribution Typology
Although operational considerations dictate that a threshold 
value approach should be adopted as a means of defining plant 
dominance it is also possible to examine whether, by applying more 
sophisticated measures to the LIMs where data on the plant size 
hierarchy was more complete, it is possible to produce a more
precise and more appropriate dominance cut-off point. (8) In
general the alternative ^ d  more complex approach to defining
dominated LIMs relies on identifying some plant size distribution 
which may be regarded in some sense as "normal" and thus
subsequently isolating a group of LIMs whose size distribution
differs significantly from this in respect of the largest plant in 
the size distribution. Four ^proaches to the size distribution
typology are possible using four separate but related measures of 
distribution. These are: the Rank Size Rule; Weavers Statistic; 
Lorentz Curves and Concentration
(8) For this purpose the data available is as shown in Table A2.I 
and ib ; 74 LIMs for which the ten largest plants are listed from the 
ERI (Supplements) ; and 21 Scottish LIMS for which a complete
size-distribution is available from the Factory Inspectorate records.
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Ratios; and Gini coefficiants, (for more details on the nature of 
each statistic see Lever(1977)).
For each of these statistics attempts were made to identify a 
normal distribution and subsequently a dominated distribution. In 
each case, however, there were several major drawbacks associated 
with the statistics from both a theoretical and practical 
viewpoint. The major problem was that in the resultant plant size 
distributions no clear break-point was apparent between the normal 
and dominated group. Rather,the data suggested that the plant size 
distrubutions were continuous and to distinguish between the two 
groups would again involve introducing an arbitrary cut-off point 
and not a natural break.
A second problem, and related specifically to the rank-size 
statistics, concerned the role of the service sector in the 
rank-size measures. The overall size of the service sector has to 
be taken into account to ensure that LIMS with a high proportion of 
employment in service occupations are unlikely to be dominated by a 
small manufacturing plant. However, as there is no size
breakdown of service sector establishments considerable problems 
arise in the treatment of the service sector. In particular^if the 
service sector is considered as a single entity in many cases it 
tends to swamp the largest single manufacturing concern. Although 
some modifications to the calculations may be made to overcome this 
problem there is no generally applicable solution.
A final shortcoming of the various rank-size statistics 
relates to the widespread requirement to index plants to control for 
LIM size and thereby facilitate direct comparison between LIMs and 
the normal distribution. However, by reducing the largest plant to 
an index number the absolute size effect is concealed. Hence there
(9) For example, St Andrews where the University dominates the LIM.
(10) Similarly, in cases where there is only data for the 10 
plants there is also the problem that although a single plant may 
appear dominant if there is a long tail of relatively small 
establishments this will no longer be true.
32
is no measure of how important the plant is within the LIM as a 
whole, merely how ijiportant it is relative to the next largest 
plant. There is no solution to this problem, since either the 
rank-size curve is based on an index number which does not relate to 
the total size of the labour force, or else the absolute value of 
the relative proportions employed in the largest plants are used and 
mathematical comparisions between individual curves and the "normal" 
distribution become ambigious.
Other relatively minor shortcomings are also associated with 
the various individual statistics. HOr these reasons, plus the more 
general failings, it became obvious that there was no meaningful 
alternative to the threshold approach. Accordingly the 12.5% cut 
off value defining dominance was retained.
3 DOMINATED LIMS: OVERALL CHARACTERISTICS
On the basis of the 12.5% cut off definition it was possible 
to identify 95 dominated LIMs (see appendix 6). Of these, three 
(Crewe, Fraserburgh and Llanelli) have two plants which each employ 
more than 12.5% of the labour force; therefore,in total there are 98 
dominant plants. These 98 plants employ approximately 570,000 
workers. Six of the plants employ just below 1000 workers with the 
largest employing almost 25,000. The average plant size is a little 
under 6,000.
Table A2.3 shows the distribution of dominance values for the 
98 plants. The highest single dominance value is 66.57% and the 
median value is 19.28%. Table A2.4 reveals that dominant plants 
cover a wide range of industrial groups even although one-third of 
the plants are engaged in coalmining and vehicle manufacture . The 
only major industrial orders unrepresented are instrument 
engineering and the manufacture of leather goods. On the other hand 
it is not surprising that industries which enjoy considerable scale 
economies such as shipbuilding and vehicles are overrepresented 
amongst the 98 plants. In terms of the spatial distribution of the 
95 dominated LIMs, Table A2.5 indicates that they are more common in 
the depressed Development Area regions than in the Intermediate
Areas, and more common in the Intermediate Regions than the
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TABLE A2.3: THE IHOPORTIONAL SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF DOMINANT PLANTS
EXTENT OF DOMINANCE NtMBER OF PLANTS
12.5 - 14.99 19
15.0 - 17.49 21
17.5 - 19.99 12
20.0 - 24.99 13
25.0 - 29.99 9
30.0 - 34.99 6
35.0 - 39.99 4
40.0 - 44.99 6
45.0 - 49.99 1
50.0 - 5
Tbtal 96
TABLE A2.4 THE INDUSTRIAL BREAKDCWN OF DOMINANT PLANTS
SIC INDUSTRY NO SIC INDUSTRY NO
II Mining 18 XI Vehicles 19
III Food 7 XII Other Metal Goods 2
IV Petroleum Products 1 XIII Textiles 2
V Chemicals 5 XIV Leather 0
VI Metal Mfg. 10 XV Clothing 3
VII Mech. Ehg. 9 XVI Bricks Etc 2
VIII Instrument Bog. 0 XVII Timber 1
IX Electrical Big. 11 XVIII Paper 3
X Shipbuilding 4 XIX Other Mfg 1
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prosperous regions. It would be premature, however, to suggest that 
the frequency with which labour markets are dominated helps explain 
the level of economic well being in interregional comparisions. It 
seems more likely that industrial structure forms an intervening 
variable so that, for example, depressed regions are more dependent 
upon declining industries such as coalmining, shipbuilding and metal 
working for employment and these are the industries in which 
dominant plants are most commonly engaged.
TABLE A2.5 THE REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF DOMINANT PLANTS
REGION NO OF 
LIMS
NO OF
DOMINATED
LIMs
% OF TOTAL
E. Midlands 26 13 50
Scotland 31 14 45
Wales 19 9 42
Northern 27 10 37
South West 40 12 30
Yorks, Humberside 26 7 27
W. Midlands 22 6 27
N. West 36 10 25
E. Anglia 12 3 25
South East 62 11 18
Total 301 95 32
Finally, since it may be interesting at a later stage to 
compare the performance of those LIMs which are dominated by a 
single plant with LIMs where a single industry, but not plant, is 
.dominant it is also worthwhile identifying such areas. As Table 
A2.6 shows from the ERII lists it is possible to identify 34 LIMs in 
which one industry, here defined as a single Minimum List Heading
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(MLH) in the 1968 classification, employs more than 12.5% of the 
total labour force, and in which no one plant is dominant. Two 
related features of the table are worthy of some comment. The first 
point is that the industry dominated IIMs are to a large extent 
different from those characterising the plant dominated areas. In 
particular, the industries where economies of scale are of obvious 
importance tend not to be so well represented in the industry 
dominated IIMs. Secondly, the industry dominated LIMs cover a 
relatively wider range of industries than the plant dominated case, 
and related to this they do not appear to be concentrated in one or 
two sections, although possible exceptions to this are woollens and 
footwear.
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TABLE A2.6 INDUSTRY-DOMINATED LABOUR MARKETS
Minimum List Labour NO Of
Heading Industry Markets
214 Meat and fish products 1
218 Fruit and vegetable products 1
271 General chemicals 2
311 Iron and steel 1
332 Machine tools 1
335 Textile machinery 1
339 Miscellaneous machinery 1
370 Shipbuilding 2
373 Aerospace equipment 2
399 Miscellaneous metal industries 2
413 Cotton weaving 2
414 Woollen and worsted 5
415 Jute 1
417 Hosiery 2
450 Footwear 5
462 Pottery 1
469 Building materials 1
472 Furniture 1
481 Paper and board 2
Tbtal 34
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APPENDIX 3
THE IMPACT OF DOMINANCE on/ PLANT PERSŒNEL POLICY :
DATA COLLECTION
1 UNDERLYING CONSIDERATIONS
The ideal data set for researching the impact of dominance on 
labour market behaviour would be an extensive plant level data bank 
covering relevant labour market variables and other factors
influencing establishment personnel policy. In addition, to
generate meaningful control groups, this information would also have
to be available for a sample of otherwise similar non-dominant 
plants operating in more competitive LIM conditions, and a 
sufficiently large number of smaller plants operating within a
dominated LIM. Not siprisingly such disaggregated data does not 
exist in an accessible and suitably structured form.
Consequently, to test the hypotheses developed in the main body of 
the text involves building an establishment based data set focusing 
exclusively on plant labour market policies.
Considering the detailed and highly specific nature of the data
requirements, and the lack of a meaningful alternative source of
information, the only feasible method of gathering sufficient
in-depth information is by devising a suitably structured postal
questionnaire. In terms of the research this form of data
collection has a number of significant advantages, none more so
than enabling the researcher to formulate questions and prompt both
quantitative and qualitative answers to a specific hypothesis
related to detailed aspects of plant behaviour and labour market
strategy. Therefore, the questionnaire approach partly avoids the
dangers often associated with more general data sets which are
liable to miss important details and lack sufficiently comprehensive
coverage. Another equally important advantage of a questionnaire
approach is the considerable flexibility it allows in selecting a
target group of plants and a sufficiently well-specified control
(2)group.
(1) Other approaches to the data problem, were also considered but 
were not thought to be practical. Nonetheless where possible 
questionnaire material will be suplemented by additional information 
collected from other sources
(2)The Questionnaire approach also suffers from known drawbacks and
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Accepting that the questionnaire approach is the most 
appropriate way of collecting the data a proforma was devised by 
directly addressing the theoretical issues identified in Chapter 2 
and subsequently developing questions designed to highlight the 
impact of dominance on plant personnel policy. As a result the 
questionnaire included sections on : the establishment's general
background; labour supply and labour shortages; dominant plant wages 
and earnings; dominant plant recruitment policies; plant level 
unionisation; training policies; plant turnover and quit rates; and 
the extent of fringe benefits offered in the plant (a copy of the 
final questionnaire is attached to the backcover of the thesis), 
Within each section questions were asked on the labour market 
environment faced by the firm and its implications for plant 
marpower policies. Allied to this, questions were also asked about 
how dominant plants adjust to changes in the LLM environment in 
terms of their approach to personnel policy. Where appropriate the 
questions were designed to distinguish between the main skill groups 
employed in the
In designing the questionnaire, care was taken to ensure that 
responding involved the minimum of effort débité the range of 
issues covered. Therefore, questions which were considered to 
involve time consuming data collection were avoided in favour of 
more impressionistic and occassionally qualitative responses. 
Where possible, and to avoid confusion@the questions were framed in 
accordance with definitions and terms commonly used by personnel 
departments. Similarly, and to further reduce the demands on 
redondants, the questions were also designed to correspond closely 
with government and other similar requests for manpower and labour 
market information. Finally/.....
(3) Specifically the questionnaire sought separate responses on each 
adect of personnel policy for skilled male manuals , other male 
manuals and female manuals. This approach was adopted since on the 
basis of previous research these categories were considered to be 
the principal work groups within the plant that employers would tend 
to adopt different attitudes towards.
(4) Thus unavoidably introduces a degree of inaccuracy and 
subjectivity into the analysis which may influence the final 
results. Nonetheless, in terms of a direct trade-off against a 
satisfactory response rate theffi^  is little choice since either 
subjective evidence and opinions are accepted or the response rate 
falls sharply.
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Finally, in drafting the questionnaire the questions were carefully 
and objectively constructed to avoid subsequently biased redorées. 
In particular, where sections were perceived to be difficult to 
interpret the questionnaire was annotated to guide redori<3ents,
When the draft questionnaire was completed it was piloted on a
sample of large plants operating in West Central Scotland. The
redorise to the pilot exercise confirmed that dominance did seem to
influence personnel policy , and that the questionnaire appeared to
cover the principal elements of madower policy influenced by
monopsonistic pressures. Nonetheless several changes suggested by
the participants were incorporated into the final questionnaire.
For exanple, on the advice of the pilot group personnel managers
several of the more sensitive topics potentially associated with
dominance were excluded from the final version of the document. In
particular, this applied to attenpts to identify the characteristics
and determinants of industrial relations within dominant plants. In
this case it was felt by the pilot managers that detailed
questioning on the sensitive issue of industrial relations may be
misconstrued / and as a result this would reduce the response rate
(7)considerably. Furthermore, on the basis of feedback from the
pilot exercise, it was decided to shorten several of the more 
quantitative sections, and for other topics switch to a more 
impressionistic line of questioning The pilot/........
(5) In constructing the questionnaire other related research reports 
were consulted to provide a suitable framework and to avoid possible 
ambiguities.
(6) A list of participants is presented in ^pendix 10. Although the 
establishments selected for the pilot were not dominant they were 
large local manufacturers enploying a sizeable proportion of the 
area's labour force. Consequently, the plants were familiar with 
many of the possible characteristics associated with dominance,
(7) Fortunately the sensitive issues omttted from the questionnaire 
were only of marginal significance to the research and therefore the 
overall analysis of dominant plant personnel policy was not 
significantly inpaired,
(8) Besides simplifying the questionnaire ^ this approach may also 
provide more meaningful results by avoiding the possible spurious 
accuracy suggested by quantitative estimates.
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The pilot plant managers especially considered that it would be 
unrealistic to quantitatively analyse recruitment methods^ screening 
techniques, training methods, and labour shortages. That is^ if a 
qualitative approach was not adopted it was felt that it would be 
difficult for the respondents to compile accurate and meaningful 
responses quickly.
Although questionnairing dominant plants is the only practical 
means of gathering data on plant personnel policy this approach 
remains subject to a number of drawbacks which should be explicitly 
recognised as they may result in interpretative difficulties when 
analysing the responses. One major drawback already mentioned is 
that the type of question which may be reasonably asked is 
restricted. Respondents will tend to ignore confidential and 
sensitive issues or, and potentially more problematic, will record 
inaccurate and misleading replies. This shortcoming may be 
serious as it is difficult to verify the quality and validity of 
questionnaire responses. Consequently, the figures submitted by the 
respondents generally have to be accepted as an accurate statement 
of plant personnel policy and labour market behaviour.
Another drawback to questionnairing relates to the institutional 
constraints inposed on dominant plant behaviour as this also tends 
to restrict the scope of the research. For example, the inposition 
of incomes policy during the period under study effectively 
contraints attempts to establish how dominant plant wage policies 
relate to the LIM and changes in the LIM environment. Indirectly 
this problem may also influence the behaviour of other aspects of 
labour market behaviour such as plant training and recruitment 
policies.
At a more general level another shortcoming associated with 
questionnaire analysis is that it does not solve the problem of 
determining causality from the responses and thereby the principal
(9) Where potentially sensitive features remain in the schedule care 
was taken to explain the purpose of the question. An assurance was 
also given that the information collected would be treated as 
confidential with the results of the study only being published in 
aggregate.
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factors actually influencing dominant plant personnel policy.
As emphasised in the theoretical and empirical chapters many aspects 
of dominant plant personnel policy are interdependent and similar 
personnel policies may develop in response to different 
stimulii. Accordingly, whilst the questionnaire analysis will
provide a sufficiently comprehensive statistical base to confirm or 
refute previously developed hypotheses it will not be possible to 
accurately or unambigiously establish the importance of particular 
personnel policy variables, Instead, therefore, the
analysis of the questionnaire concentrates on identifying the 
overall characteristics of monopsony rather than the employers 
response to individual factors or stimuli .
2 THE DOMINANT PLANT RESPONDENTS
The finalised questionnaire was sent to each of the dominant 
plants identified in ippendix 6 along with a covering letter 
summarising the objectives of the survey. Considering the
ler^th and complexity of the questionnaire the repsonse rate was 
high, with 41 out of a possible 96 plants replying. Of the 41
(10) Of course the same shortcoming, except perhaps at an even more 
acute level, exists with other approaches.
(11) The inability to determine the principal independent variables 
may be further compounded by two additional factors. Firstly, as 
the dominant plant personnel policy system is prone to 
multicolinearity it is not possible to sequentially identify the 
effect of a change in one variable on others. Secondly, there is no 
theoretical reason to suggest that one model embraces the behaviour 
of all dominant plants . That is, the nature of the dependent and 
independent variables may change depending on the plant under 
investigation.
(12) This is not always strictly true since some sections of the 
questionnaire indicate fairly accurately the nature of the principal 
determinants of personnel policy .
(13) Where appropriate, and to speed up the data collection, 
reminders were sent to dominant plants not replying to the original 
request. In turn these were followed up by contacting the dominant 
plants directly.
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returns 4 were excluded from the subsequent analysis: two because
the plant's employment fell below the stipulated employee size
threshold of 1000 employees, and 2 because they were smaller
(14)branches of firms already operating within the LIM. The
remaining 37 plants, constituting an overall response rate of 40%, 
are listed and in Appendix 9 .
In general the questionnaire returns appear to reflect the 
characteristics of the parent population, and therefore constitute a 
sufficiently accurate starting point for identifying the effect of 
monopsony on dominant plants. The regional distribution of the 
returns is presented in Table A3.1 and indicates no significant 
spatial differences in the structure of replies between the dominant 
plant population and the respondent sample. A similar pattern , is 
repeated with respect to the distribution of responses in terms of 
ownership (Table A3.2) and industry (Table A3.3). In both/......
TABLE A3.1 THE REGIOjAL BREAKDOWN OF THE DOMINANT PLANTS^PQHILATIQN
AND THE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS
REGION
DOMENANT PLAl^  POPULATION QUESTIONNAIRE RETURNS
NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT
Scotland 15 15.6 5 13.5
Wales 10 10.4 4 10.8
Northern 9 9.4 2 5.4
North West 10 10.4 3 8.1
Yorkshire 7 7.3 3 8.1
West Midlands 14 14.6 4 10.8
East Midlands 5 5.2 5 13.5
East Anglia 3 3.1 2 5.4
South East 11 11.5 5 13.5
South West 12 12-5 4 10.8
TOTAL 96 100 37 100
(14) The plants considered to be too small were Crosse & Blackwell 
in Peterhead and Cadbury Schwepps in Montrose. The double 
dominating firms were British Ley land at Cowley and ICI in Ardrossan.
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In both cases the structure of the responses reflects the 
characteristics of the parent population. Again, therefore,
the results of the questionnaire analysis should reflect the 
particular personnel methods and manpower strategies favoured by the 
dominant plant population.
TABLE A3 2 THE OWNERSHIP BREAKDOWN FOR THE DOMENANT PLANT POPULATION 
AND THE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS
OWNERSîIP
DOMINANT PLANT POPULATION QUESTIONNAIRE RETURNS
NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT
Nationalised 27 28.1 10 27.0
State Qflied 9 9.4 5 13.5
Foreign 10 10.4 5 13.5
UK Private 50 52.1 17 45.9
TOTAL 96 100 37 100
(15) One bias in the industrial structure of the respondents is the 
high proportion of vehicle manufacturers . However, the limited 
extent of the bias it is unlikely to lead to any major differences 
when analysing the returns.
44
TABLE A3.3 INDUSTRY BREAKDOWN FOR TEÎE DOMINANT PLANT POLPUIATION AND
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS
DOMENANT PLANT POPULATION QUESTIONNAIRE RETURNS
SECTOR NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT
Coalmining 16 16.6 3 8.1
Food & Drink 
Mineral Oil
8 8.3 3 8.1
Refining
Chemicals
& Plastics 5 5.2 3 8.1
Iron & Steel 12 12.5 6 16.2
Mechanical Eng 
Electronics &
9 9.4 4 10.8
Elect. Eng 10 10.4 3 8.1
Shipbuilding 
Automative &
4 4.2 1 2.7
Aerospace 19 19.8 11 29.7
ffetal Inds 2 2.1 - 2.7
Textiles 1 1.0 - 2.7
Footwear 3 3.1 - -
Timber
Glass Pottery
2
&
2.1 - -
Bricks 1 1.0 — —
Paper & Board 2 2.1 1 2.7
Rubber 2 2.1 1 2.7
TOTAL 96 100 37 100
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Cne potential problem with the dominant plant returns was that 
the level of employment in the plants often fell below the
pre-determined dominance threshold of 12.5% of total LIM
employment. This failure to meet the cut-off value affected 12 out 
of the 37 respondents, and although in some instances the 
differences were marginal in others the changes were quite 
significant. The extent of the change in each of the plantas level 
of dominance is shown in the final colum of impendix 9.
Although the decline in employment is in some cases significant
this does not imply that these establishments should be regarded as
non-dominant, and therefore inappropriate for consideration in the
empirical analysis. That is, a decline in plant employment does not
necessarily imply that the establishment no longer employs a
sufficiently high proportion of the manufacturing employment in the
LIM. In particular, the decline in dominant plant employment may
have been paralleled by a similar decline in LIM working population,
thereby maintaining the plant's quasi-monoponistic position. Indeed
this is likely to have happened following the short and continuous
fl7)rise in unemployment over the past decade. Unfortunately,
as there are no up-to-date unemployment figures available on a LIM 
basis, it is not possible to establish whether this has been the 
case. Nevertheless, and although it is unlikely, even if there has 
been no parallel reduction in overall LIM employment, manufacturing 
jobs in the LIM will probably have declined in line with the general 
trend in the economy (see Bacon & Eltis, 1976). Again, therefore, a 
decline in dominant plant employment need not adversely affect the 
establishment's preeminent position in relation to other LIM 
manufacturer s.
(16) This trend adds to the argument that the research should 
distinguish between high and low dominance sub-groups
(17) For example, between 1970 and 1978 (when the questionnaires 
where returned) unemployment in Great Britain rose from 577,000 to 
1,410,000; an increase of over 100% (figures based on the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, P160, Table 69)
46
The extent of more recent changes in dominant plant employment 
gathered from the questionnaire responses is summarised in Table 
A3.4. The figures show that between 1976 and 1978 the majority of 
plants increased employment. In some cases the increase was 
significant with, for example, 21% of responding firms growing by 
more than 10%. Of the plants experiencing a decline in employment 
85% of these establishments did so marginally. These figures 
suggest that any long run decline in employment has stabilised and 
therefore these plants are likely to remain dominant.
TABLE A3.4 THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN DOMINANT PLANT EMPLOYMENT
1976 - 1978
PERCENTAGES CHANGE FREQUENCY
(percentage)
Above 10% increase 21
0 - 10% increase 15
0 - 5% increase 26
0 - 5% decrease , ' 32
6 - 10% decrease 3
Above 10% decrease 3
Total number of observations
34
(100)
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The skill structure of the questionnaire respondents is an 
additional aspect of plant employment structure which should be 
considered as its composition may also influence personnel policy. 
Table A3.5 breaks down plant employment by skill. The results 
indicate that there is a wide variation between plants in the
proportion of skilled workers in the sample. In almost half the 
sample the proportion of skilled workers to manuals was below 20%. 
Six of the plants employed between 20% and 40% as skilled workers, 
and eight of the plants employed between 40% and 60%. In the
remaining four plants between 60% and 80% of the workforce were
skilled. The variation in the proportion of skilled workers 
employed by the plants will tend to influence the emphasis employers 
place on the different skill groups in their approach to personnel 
policy. However, despite this it remains unlikely that the observed 
variation in the importance of individual skill groups will 
significantly alter the underlying attitude of employers to the 
skill groups identified in the questionnaire.
Irrespective/..........
TABLE A3.5 SKILLED WORKERS AS A PRCPORTION OP MANUALS
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
PERCENTAGE DOMINANT
PLANTS
CONTROL GROUE
0 - 20% 44 • 45
21 - 40% 19 14
41 - 60% 25 23
61 - 80% 12 18
81 - 100% 0.2 0.0
SIo of observations 32 (100) 22 (100)
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Irrespective of the number or proportion of workers in a skill group 
plant management will tend to adopt a characteristic attitude 
towards each category which will depend more on the nature of their 
skill rather than their relative significance within the plant.
Another characteristic of the dominant plant sample which may 
influence personnel strategy is the length of time the establishment 
has been located in the area. Table A3.6 analyses the date of 
establishment in the LIM for the questionnaire redondants. The 
data shows that all the plants, bar one, have been located in the 
LIM for a considerable time. As a result th^ majority of firms 
will have developed well established personnel policies reflecting 
management's knowledge and experience in the area and the possible 
contraints inposed by LIM dominance. Accordingly, when analysing 
the questionnaire responses it should not be necessary to take into 
account the time plants have been operating in the area.
3 THE INTER-IlM CONTROL GROUP ; LARGE PLANTS OPERATING IN A MORE
COMPETITIVE LU4
To effectively isolate the impact of dominance on plant 
personnel policy involves creating a control group of otherwise 
similar but non-dominant establishmeniL^ . Unfortunately creating an 
acceptable control group is an exercise characterised by significant 
difficulties.
One fundamental stumbling block relates to the theoretical 
problem of adequately isolating the effect of monopsony on a 
completely standardised basis since in trying to create an adequate 
control group not only does the structure of the LIM alter but so too 
must the size of the LIM, That is, in attempting to create a 
compatible control group by selecting establishments of a similar 
size operating in a competitive LIM two, rather than one, labour 
market parameters must change. Under these unavoidable conditions 
it may not be possible to accurately distinguish between the effects 
of monopsony from LLM size when examining dominant plant personnel 
policy.
(18) Not all aspects of personnel policy are subject to LLM size 
effects. Therefore when testing some hypotheses this problem 
presents little difficulty. Where LIM size may be expected to have 
an impact attenpts will be made to distinguish them from monopsony.
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TABLE A3.6 DISTRIBUTION OF THE DATE OF DOMINANT PLANT LOCATIOJ
IN THE LIM
DATE DOMINANT PLANTS 
..... . .(%)
CONTROL GROUP 
(%)
Pre 1900 27.3 36.4
1900 - 1929 21.2 22.7
1930 - 1969 48.5 40.9
1970 onwards 3.0 0.0
TOTAL 100 100
A similar control problem faced by the research was that the 
theoretical predictions associated with wage and employment levels 
in a monopsonistic LIM draw a direct comparison with what labour 
market equilibrium would have been in the same area were it 
characterised by . perfectly competitive conditions. However, 
empirically this form of comparison is not possible. Therefore, and 
as proxy. Dominant Plant behaviour has to be compared with a control 
group operating in separate but broadly comparable LLMs. In 
adopting this approach it is assumed that the structure of the 
control LIMs* labour supply curves are broadly compatible with the 
dominated LIM supply curves. Moreover, of equal importance the 
level of labour demand within the control group markets are similar 
to the level prevailing in the dominated LIMs. If either of the 
aspects differ significantly then, in certain cases, observed 
differences between the samples cannot be unambiguously attributed 
to the impact of monopsony.
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Bearing in mind the theoretical and operational problems
associated with defining a satisfactory comparitive sample the
control group was developed almost exclusively on a pragmatic basis.
This involved circulating the dominant plant personnel policy
questionnaire to over 250 major establishments operating in large
urban areas where they only employed a relatively small proportion of
(19)the local workforce. The plants were selected using trade
directories and other similar methods, whilst at the same time 
considering the characteristics of the dominant plant
population. (20)
The réponse rate in the control group exercise was substantially 
lower than the dominant plant survey with only 30 replies from the 
original 273 questionnaire sent out. TO some extent this was to be 
expected since the structure of the questionnaire was geared towards 
identifying the characteristics of dominance. Therefore, the 
questions may not have been of particular relevance to the control 
group. This largely unavoidable shortcoming was often compounded by 
data problems resulting from either inaccurate or outdated 
information in the trade director ces...
TABLE A3.7 THE REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF CONTROL GROUP RESPONSES
REGION NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Scotland 3 12.5
Wales -
Northern — -
North V’fest 2 8.3
Yorkshire Humberside 2 8.3
West Midlands 5 20.8
East Midlands 5 20.8
East Anglia 2 8.3
South East 5 20.8
South Vfest -
rOTAL 24 100
(19) A complete list of the 273 firms involved in the exercise is 
presented in Appendix 10.
(20) For exanple, attempts were made to match the industrial spread 
of the dominant plant population by questionnairing mining and steel 
plants, both of which were commonly associated with dominance.
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In particular, on many occasions it transpired that plants had 
either closed or changed their address, and therefore many 
questionnaires did not reach the targeted establishments.
Of the 30 replies 6 were rejected, largely on the grounds that 
over the last few years the establishments had either considerably 
reduced their workforce or the trade directory used referred to 
company, and not plant, employment. In both instances this meant 
that total enploynent fell well below the 1000 worker size 
threshold. In total, therefore, for the control group*were only 24 
replies of sufficient quality resulting in an overall response rate 
of 9%.(21)
Despite the disappointing number of replies the sample of 
responding firms, with several qualifications, still appears to 
constitute an adequate control group. For example Table A3.7 and 
Table A3.8 show that, like the dominant plant replies, the responses 
cover a broad range of regions and industries. However, there are 
differences within the common spread which should be taken into 
account before comparing the data generated by the two samples. In 
particular it does seem that geographically the control group is 
underrepresented in Wales, Northern Region, and the South West and 
over represented in the West Midlands and the South East. That is, 
the control group plants appear to be concentrated in the more 
prosperous areas. Similarly, but on an industrial basis, it seems 
that the control group are particularly underrepresented in 
coalmining, iron and steel and to a lesser extent in mineral oil 
refining, shipbuilding and automotives. The control group sample is 
overrepresented in mechanical engineering and electronics. Once 
again, therefore, the control group appears to be concentrated in 
the more bouyant sectors of the economy. Both of these results will 
have implications for the empirical isolation of monopsonistic 
influences on dominant plant behaviour.
(21) This slow response rate occured despite strenuous follow-up 
efforts including telephone contacts and sending reminder 
questionnaire s.
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TABLE A3,8 THE INDUSTRIAL BREAKDOWN OP CONTROL OÎOUP RESPONSES
SECTOR NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Coalmining .
Food & Drink 3 12.6
Mineral Oil Refining - -
Chemicals & Plastics 1 4,2
Iron & Steel 2 8.4
Mechanical Eng 6 25.0
Electronics & 
Electric Eng, 5 20.8
Shipbuilding - —
Automotive & Aero 2 8.4
f^etal Industries 1 4.2
Textiles - -
Footwear 1 4.2
Timber 1 4.2
Glass Pottery & 
Bricks - -
Paper & Board 1 4.2
Rubber 1 4.2
TOTAL 24 100
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On the basis of the regional and industrial variations between
the dominant plant and the control group samples it would seem
realistic to suggest that this would also be reflected in
differences between demand levels and unemployment rates between the
two groups of LIM. Whether or not the view can be supported is
examined in Table A3.9 which compares the level of unemployment in
the dominant plant and control group areas©Note, however, that it is
not strictly possible to measure the level of unemployment in the
control group areas as they do not form part of any well defined
LIM. Therefore.^in the table regional unemployment rates are used as
a proxy. The unemployment rates for the dominant plants and the
regions are estimated for the period 1971-1975 since the
questionnaire often refers to previous as well as current policies.
The figures in the table show, quite suprisingly, that the overall
UK unemployment rate between 1971 and 1975 was higher than the
equivalent rate for the dominant plant questionnaire respondents.
Similarly, on a regional basis the table also shows that in all but
two of the regions the unemployment rate is lower for LIMs where the
dominant plants responded to the questionnaire. This picture is
supported by the column showing the unemployment rates for the
non-dominated LIMs, where once again the average unemployment rate
is higher than the average dominated rate. Similarly, in all but
two regions, the average level of unemployment in the dominant plant
LIMs responding to the questionnaire is lower than the non-dominated
(22)
group. Once again these results will have implications for
the way in which the questionnaire data is analysed. In particular 
the figures appear to contrast with the earlier evidence which 
suggested that demand levels were higher in the control group 
sample. That is, it will be difficult to decide whether demand 
levels are materially different between the two samples and, 
therefore, how best to control for this potentially important 
variable. Fortunately/.......
(22) Note that the only group with generally a lower unemployment 
rate than the plant dominated LIMs is the industrially dominated 
group. Note also the unemployment rate for the total dominant plant 
sample in higher than the figure for the questionnaire respondents. 
That is^ the respondents appear to be an above average sample with 
reject to level of LIM unemployment.
54
in
in
3
CTi
in
3
a
g  g  
B 3
S
lO
VO
(M VO VO
r- r~ in
0 0  m  VO
m  CO n  m
r~
ro
m
in
TP
o
on
on
TP
in VO in m  
TP TP CN on
VO rH  
(N Tp
CO ON VO 0 0
m  m  VO on
r-H I***
VO on
Tp H
on Tp
04
on TP
CO
TP
Tp 0 4
in in
ON
on
0 4
Tp
00 in o  o  
04 on in on
TP
0 4
on 04
VO VO
O"
VO
in
in
00
TP
0 4
in
ON
on
ON ON
on 04 in
H
in
si i s ii i
a
s
0 0 
1 1
0
•H
0
'Pi 'P
%
0 S s ê
o s
0 0
Sh 3 3
m ra
a g
# I
i
iw
Ii
S'
i
on
00
4!
g
I
f
$
?
0 <0
O -
ON
&
g
I
ONO'
0
&§ s
0 ^ 
g 3 ONH
55
Fortunately, however, this problem was anticipated when designing 
the questionnaire and in many sections of the document an atten^t 
was made to automatically control for demand and as a result this 
should not be a serious or wide^read problem when analysing the 
responses.
As with the dominant plant sample it is also important to
examine the distribution of skill groups within the control group
plants, and how well established the control group plants are in the
area. As Table A3.5 shows the variation in the proprtion of skilled
workers in the control group is high but nonetheless very similar to
the results observed in the dominant sample. Table A3«6 shows that
all the control group plants are well established in the LIM which
is again similar in pattern to the dominant plant sample.
Accordingly, it would seem reasonable to compare the results of the
dominant plant and control group questionnaires without specifically
having to take account of differences in skill structure and set-up
(23)
dates between the samples.
The limited number of observations in the control group and 
dominant plant samples will also in general, impose restrictions on 
the possible methods of analysing the questionnaire returns. In 
particular it will not be feasible to effectively take account of 
the mary influences on plant personnel policy besides 
dominance.
(23) As lebles 11 & 12 in Appendix 17 indicate there were
significant differences between the control group and the dominant 
plants both in relation to total plant employment and the percentage 
of manual workers in the two samples. Nevertheless it is not 
expected that these differences will significantly affect the 
questionnaire analysis. Referring to average plant size although 
the differences are substantial the average figures are both well 
beyond the level required to induce size effects. Similarly the 
differences between the proportion of manual workers in the two 
samples should not alter management attitude towards personnel 
policy within each manual group,
(24) In addition to those mentioned above this would include 
bargaining structure, industry growth and conderation which are LIM 
specific .
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Therefore, the analysis of the questionnaires will be restricted on 
most occassions to a simple division between dominant and 
non-dominant plants with only limited reference to the way in which
(25)
other variables may influence the results.
This is an important point to remember when trying to isolate
the impact of monopsony on dominant plant behavioursince it may be
the case that results consistent with monopsonistic predictions may
actually reflect other pressures which it was not possible to
control for the analysis. The one way to overcome the problem is by
looking at variations in the extent of dominance within the dominant
plant sample. That is, where possible it will be important to
identify whether the impact of monopsony varies with the level of
plant dominance. Unfortunately, and in view of the contraints
imposed by the limited data set, this can only realistically be
achieved by dividing the sample into low and high dominance 
4M
sub-groups subsequently tesing for differences between the two.
The limited number of respondents also restricts the 
sophistication and extent of the statistical techniques which may be 
used to analyse the dominant plant and control group data. On most 
occasions ttwill only be feasible to use basic statistical tests to 
establish whether there are significant differences either within 
the dominant plant sample or in comparison with the control group. 
In some cases even basic tests are not particularly meaningful and 
the study then has to rely on a more descriptive and impressionistic 
analysis of the questionnaire returns.
(25) For example, there are an insufficient number of observations 
in the sample to investigate in any detail the impact of LIM size in 
determining plant personnel policy.
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4 THE INTRA-LLM OONTROL GROUP : THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOMINANT
PLANTS TO OTHER SELLER LIM ESTABLISHMENTS
When dealing with the intra-LLM impact of dominant plants, which 
is largely the impact of plant size on dominant plant personnel 
policy, it is not practicable to create a suitable control group 
using questionnaire techniques. The rei^onse rate by small firms to 
questionnaires is extremely low and to ensure a sufficiently large 
control group would have involved a major research input. This is 
particularly true as the process of identifying appropriate small 
manufacturing firms would be difficult. In addition,
quantitative data gathered from smaller firms would have to be 
handled with caution as, generally speaking, smaller plants tend not 
to maintain comprehensive personnel records and consequently their 
réponses would be more subject to error than large plant returns.
To overcome the problem of the lack of an adequate small 
establishment control group it was decided to include questions on 
the relationship between the dominant plant and the smaller LIM 
plants in the questionnaire sent to the dominant plants. As a 
result the answers given by the dominant plants, although somewhat 
subjective, will provide an insight into intra-LIM behaviour without 
questionnairing smaller establishments.
(26) Even the experience with the large plant control group 
confirmed this.
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To compliment the questionnaire data the results from previous 
studies into small firm behaviour will be included in the analysis 
where appropriate as a proxy control group. Indeed where possible 
the intra-LIM conparisons incorporated into the dominant plant 
questionnaire were based on the format used in more general studies 
of personnel policy that also covered small plant behaviour. 
Therefore, although a control group was not developed specifically 
to examine the intra-LIM characteristic of dominant behaviour, the 
information gathered from the dominant plant questionnaire and other 
external sources should be sufficient to provide an insight into the 
nature of dominant plant behaviour inrelation to the other (smaller) 
establishments operating in the LIM.
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APPENDIX 5 84
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF IDENTIFIED LLMs
OP
o
o
miles too
km 100
Adapted from Lever (1981)
APPENDIX 7
THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PLANT DOMINATED LLMs
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9 •
100miles
100km
Adapted from Lever (1981)
APPENDIX 8 8 8
KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF 
INDUSTRY DOMINATED LOCAL MARKETS
REGION LIM NO LABOUR MARKET MLH % EMPLOYED
Yorks Humber 117 Bradford 414 13.28
122 Dewsbury 414 13.78
123 Huddersfield 414 21.66
139 Keighly 414 16.67
137 Sheffield 311 13.95
East Midlands 175 Hinkley 417 30.32
182 Kettering 450 16.28
170 Leicester 417 15.07
181 Rushden 450 38.21
184 Wellingborough 450 14.61
Vfest Midlands 142 Coventry 381 24,85
143 Redditch 399 18.32
150 Stoke 462 26.90
146 Walsall 399 15.81
East Anglia 192 Lowestoft 218 12.65
Scotland 007 Forfar 415 15.04
017 Galashiels 414 18.33
North West 078 Accrington 335 12.53
103 Bacup 450 33.45
097 Colne 413 16.39
104 Haslingden 413 25.21
106 Rawtenstall 450 22,83
107 Runcorn 271 25.37
111 Widnes 271 16.89
South East 206 Biggleswade 332 14.05
203 Braintree 399 17.14
251 Gravesend 481 12,83
258 High Wycombe 472 17.41
Northern 069 Penrith 469 23.0
South West 268 Chippenham 214 26,2
269 Cirencester 383 15.22
279 Plymouth 371 13.24
297 Weston-super-mare 383 13.27
301 Newton Abbott 383 13.0
Wales 035 Milford Haven 262 16.51
APPENDIX 10 90
PLANTS OCNTACTED IN PERSONNEL THE POLICY PILOT EXERCISES
1 Phillips Electrical Ltd 
Hamilton 
(Mr T Tait)
6 Anderson Strathclyde Ltd 
Glasgow
(Mr L F G Walker)
2 Rayrolle Belmos Ltd 
Blantyre 
(Mr W Stevens)
7 Babcock & Wilcox Ltd 
Renfrew 
(Mr T Donegan)
3 Singer Corporation (UK) Ltd 
Clydebank 
(Mr D Haldare)
8 Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
Uddingston 
(Mr W Wilkinson)
4 IBM Ltd 
Greenock
(Mr C A Richmond)
9 United Glass Containers 
Ltd
Glasgow 
(Mr W Dunn)
5 Ailsa trucks Ltd 
Irvine
(Mr J C Brownlow)
10 John Brown Engineering 
Ltd
Clydebank 
(Mr W Allan)
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APPENDIX 11
Gode
NO
PERSONNEL POLICY ANALYSIS 
CONTROL GROUP PLANTS CONTACTED
Conpany Comments
400 Wiggins Teape Ltd, Aberdeen
401 Timex Ltd, Dundee
402 Ferranti Ltd, Edinburgh
403 Carron Co Ltd, Falkirk
404 Glynwed Foundries Ltd, Falkirk
405 India Tyres, Glasgow
406 John G Kincaid & Co Ltd,
Greenock
407 B.S.C. Ltd, Cardiff
408 British leyland (UK) Ltd,
Cardiff
409 G.K.N. Rolled & Bright Steel Ltd
Cardiff
410 Ford Motor Co Ltd, Swansea
411 Mettoy Ltd, Swansea
412 A.E.I. cables Ltd, Birtley
413 Austin & Pickersgill Ltd,
Sunderland
414 British Titan Producers Co Ltd
Teeside
415 Hall & Kay Ltd, Ashton-under-Lyne
416 Scapa-Porritt Ltd, Blackburn
417 Duple Coach Builders Ltd,
Blackpool
418 Crosses & Heatons Ltd, Bolton
419 Lambert Hawarch Group Ltd,
Burnley
420 Bibbey & Baron Ltd, Bury
421 Tillie & Henderson, Chester
422 Trutex Ltd, Clitheroe
423 Lansil Ltd, Lancaster
424 Storey Brothers & Co Ltd,
Lancaster
425 Automotive Products Ltd,
Liverpool
426 G Brady & Co Ltd, Manchester
427 Newroyd Ltd, Oldham
428 M G D Graphic Systems Ltd
Preston
429 John Bright & Bros Ltd, Rochdale
430 W Briggs & Co Ltd, Stockport
431 Joseph Crosfield & Sons
Warrington
432 Gullick, Dobson Ltd, Wigan
433 David Brown, Sheffield
Cuestionnaire 
NO response 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
No response 
Questionnaire 
NO response
completed
completed
completed
completed
Refused
Questionnaire completed
NO response
No response 
No response 
No response 
No response
No response
No response 
NO response 
No response
Moved
Questionnaire completed
No response 
Firm ceased trading 
No response 
No response 
NO response
Questionnaire completed
Refused 
Refused 
No response
No response 
NO response 
NO response
Questionnaire completed 
Refused
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434 Shaw Carpets, Barnsley No response
435 Redfearn National Glass, Barnsley Questionnaire completed
436 United Biscuits, Halifax Refused
437 Rowantree Mackintosh, Halifax No response
438 John Crossley & Sons Ltd, Halifax No response
439 I C I  (Fibres), Harrogate Refused
440 Birds Eye Ebods, Hull No response
441 B P Chemicals, Hull Refused
442 Reckitt & Colman, Hull Questionnaire completed
443 Ideal Standard Ltd, Hull No response
444 Metal Box Co Ltd, Ball No response
445 J H Fenner & Co (Holdings) Ltd 
Hull
No response
446 Birds Eye Foods, Grimsby No response
447 Findus Ebods, Cleethorps No response
448 Allied Breweries, Leeds No response
449 Elida Gibbs, Leeds Questionnaire completed
450 West Yorkshire Foundries, Leeds NO response
451 Doncaster's Monk Bridge, Leeds No response
452 Montague Burton, Leeds No response
453 C M Sumrie Claches Ltd, Leeds No response
454 Kirkstall Forge Engineering, Leeds No response
455 N C B, Wakefield No response
456 International Sports, Wakefield NO response
457 Wakefield Shirt Co Ltd, 
Wakefield
No response
458 Parkinson Cowan, Birmingham No response
459 Valor ffêating, Birmingham NO response
460 Southalls, Birmingham Refused
461 Alcan Booth Sheet Ltd, 
Birmingham
NO response
462 Austin Morris, Birmingham Questionnaire completed
463 Dunlop (Accessories) Ltd, 
Birmingham
Not suitable.
464 Laughton & Sons, Birmingham No response
465 Cadbury Schweppes Ebods Ltd, 
Birmingham
No response
466 Birmetals Ltd, Birmingham Refused
467 Birway Engineering Co Ltd, 
Birmingham
No response
468 Triplex Safety Glass, Birmingham No response
469 Kalamazoo, Birmingham No response
470 Bulpitt & Sons Ltd, Birmingham Refusal
471 Wilmatt Breeden, Birmingham NO response
472 Serck Heat Transfer, Birmingham No response
473 Black & Luff Ltd, Birmingham No response
474 Midland Electric Mfg Go Ltd 
Birmingham
Refusal
475 Girling Ltd, Birmingham No response
476 W Canning & Co Ltd, Birmingham Refusal
477 Unigate, Birmingham NO response
478 Allied Breweries, Birmingham No response
479 Tubes Ltd, Birmingham Questionnaire completed
480 Imperial Metal Industries, 
Birmingham
Questionnaire completed
481 Parsons Peebles Motors & 
Generators Ltd, Birmingham
Refusal
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482 Hardy Spicer Ltd, Birmingham No response
483 Radiation Gas Fibres, Birmingham Refusal
484 Tüker Fasteners, Birmingham No response
485 Chance Brothers, Warley No response
486 Dartmouth Auto Casings, 
Warley
No response
487 Midland Motor Cylinder, 
Warley
No response
488 Birmingham Aluminium Casting, No response
Warley
Questionnaire489 W & T Avery, Warley
490 Albright & Wilson Ltd, 
Warley
Questionnaire
491 Tube Products, Warley No response
492 Accles & Pollock, Warley No response
493 Round Oak Steel Works, Dudley No response
494 Ewarts Ltd, Dudley No response
495 B S R Ltd, Warley No response
496 T W Lench, Warley No response
497 H P Bulmer Ltd, Hereford No response
498 îfenry Wiggin & Co, Hereford No response
499 Brittains Paper Ltd, Leek No response
500 Rolls Royce Motors Ltd, 
Shrewsbury
Questionnaire
501 Marston Excelsior, Wolverhampton No response
502 Chubb & Sons Ltd, Wolverhampton No response
503 Turner Manufacturing, 
Wolverhampton
Refusal
504 Lucas Aerospace, Wolverhampton No response
505 Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co 
Wolverhampton
No response
506 Ever Ready, Wolverhampton No response
507 Willenhall Motor Radiator, Moved
Wolverhampton
Questionnaire508 Wednesbury TUbe, Wolverhampton
509 Rockwell Thompson, Wolverhampton NO response
510 Metal Castings Doehler Ltd, 
Worcester
No response
511 Redman, Herman & Freude Ltd, 
Worcester
Questionnaire
512 Sheepbridge Equipment, 
Chesterfield
No response
513 Glass Tube & Components, 
Chesterfield
No response
514 N C B, Chesterfield Refusal
515 G E C Elliot Process Automation 
Ltd, Leicester
Questionnaire
516 Marconi Radar Systems Ltd, 
Leicester
Questionnaire
517 Thorn Lighting Ltd, Leicester NO response
518 Dunlop Ltd, Leicester No response
519 A A Jones & Shipnnan, Leicester Refusal
520 G E C Gas Turbines, Leicester Refusal
521 Wildt, Mellar, Bromley Ltd, 
Leicester
No response
522 Frederick Parker, Leicester Refusal
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523 imperial Typewriters Ltd,
Leicester
524 British united Shoe Machinery,
Leicester
525 Rushton-Bucyrus Ltd, Lincoln
526 Clayton Dewandre, Lincoln
527 Smith-Clayton Forge, Leicester
528 Watney Mann, Northampton
529 Avon Cosmetics, Northampton
530 Express Lift Go, Northampton
531 British Timken, Northampton
532 N C B, Nottingham
533 Meridian Ltd, Nottingham
534 J Player, Nottingham
535 The Boots Co Ltd, Nottingham
536 Jersey Kapwood, Nottingham
537 Marathon Knitwear, Nottingham
538 British Qpsum, Nottingham
539 Lockwood Foods Ltd, Spalding
540 Cadbury Schweppes, Cambridge
5 41 Pye Te lecommunicat ions,
Cambridge
542 Birds Eye, Great Yarmouth
543 Erie Electronics, Great Yarmouth
544 Ransomes, Sims & Jeffries,
Ipswich
545 Lawrence, Scott & Electromotors
Ltd, Norwich
546 Boulton & Paul Group, Norwich
547 Rowantree Mackintosh Ltd, Norwich
548 Reckitt & Colman, Norwich
549 Jarrold & Sons Ltd, Norwich
550 NOrvic Shoe Co Ltd, Norwich
551 Permoli Ltd, Gloucester
552 Winterbatham, Strachan, Playne
Ltd, Stroud
553 John Heathcoat & Co, Tiverton
554 Hazell, Watson & Viney,
Aylesbury
555 International Computers Ltd
Letchworth
556 Borg Warner, Letchworth
557 General Foods, Ltd, Banbury
558 Automotive Products Ltd, Banbury
559 G Fischer Castings Ltd, Bedford
560 Texas Instruments Ltd, Bedford
561 W J Allen & Sons Ltd, Bedford
562 London Brick Co Ltd, Bedford
563 Brookhirst igranic Ltd, Bedford
564 Scot Pfeat Products, Milton Keynes
565 LEC Refrigeration Ltd,
Bognar Regis
566 Aylesford Paper Mills, Maidstone
567 B D H Chemicals Ltd, Poole
568 P D fuels Ltd, Portsmouth
569 Associated Biscuit Manufacturers,
Reading
Liquidated
Questionnaire completed
NO response 
No response 
No response 
NO response 
NO response
Questionnaire completed 
No response 
No response 
No response
Questionnaire completed
Refusal
NO response
Refusal
NO response
No response
NO response
Refusal
NO response 
No response 
No response
Questionnaire completed
Questionnaire completed
No response
NO response
No response
Refusal
No response
No response
Questionnaire completed 
Refusal
No response
No response 
No response 
No response 
Refusal 
No response 
No response 
NO response 
No response 
No response 
No response
Refusal 
No response 
No response 
Refusal
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570 Courage Ltd, Reading NO response
571 Gillette Industries, Reading No response
572 Mars Ltd, Slough Questionnaire completed
573 Kearney & Trecker Manwin Ltd, 
Brighton
No response
574 Rustan paxman Diesels Ltd, 
Colchester
No response
575 The Colchester Lathe Co Ltd, 
Colchester
No response
576 Woods of Colchester, Colchester Questionnaire completed
577 The M E L  Equipment Co Ltd, 
Crawley
NO response
578 Solartron-Schlumberger Ltd, 
Earnborough
Refusal
579 Pitney-Bows Ltd, Harlow No response
580 I T T  Components Group Europe, 
Harlow
No response
581 Cossar Electronics Ltd, Harlow NO response
582 U G Glass Containers Ltd, Harlow NO response
583 Mdressograph-Multigraph Ltd, 
Hsmel Hempstead
NO response
584 Lucas Aerospace Ltd, Hemel 
Eeirpstead
NO response
585 Alford & Alder Components, 
Hemel Hempstead
NO response
586 John Dickinson & Co Ltd, 
Ifemel Ifêmpstead
NO response
587 Kodak ltd, Hemel Hempstead NO response
588 Vandervell Products Ltd, 
Maidenhead
No response
589 Scammell Motors, Watford Refusal
590 Rolls Royce (1971) Ltd, Watford Questionnaire completed
591 John Dickinson Ltd, Watford NO response
592 Odhams (Watford) Ltd, Watford No response
593 Sun Printers, Watford Questionnaire completed
594 Associated Newspapers Ltd, 
London
No response
595 Beautility Furniture Ltd, London No response
596 Sir Josepth Couston & Sons Ltd, 
London
No response
597 Centre Hotels (Cranston) Ltd, 
London
No response
598 Chubb & Sons Lock & Safe Co Ltd, 
London
No response
599 Daks-Simpson Ltd, London Questionnaire completed
600 John Dale Ltd, London Moved
601 Henry Denny & Sons Ltd, London No response
602 Dresser Europe SA-UK Branch, 
London
No response
603 Dubilier Ltd, London NO response
604 Duple Motor Bodies Ltd, London Refusal
605 Edmunsons Electrical Ltd, London Moved
606 Elida Gibbs Ltd, London NO response
607 Foster Wheeler Ltd, London Not in manufacturing
608 Arthur Guiness & Son & Co Ltd 
London
Refusal
609 John Haig & Co Ltd, London NO response
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610
611
612
Hutchinson Printing Trust Ltd, 
London
L R Industries Ltd, London 
Lamson Paragon Ltd, London
Not suitable
No response 
Not suitable
613 The M-0 Valve Co Ltd, London NO response
614 Donald Macpherson Group Ltd, 
London
NO response
615 William Mallinson & Denny Matt 
Ltd, London
NO response
616 Mattessons Meats Ltd, London No response
617 Maynards Ltd, London No response
618 Morris Ashby Ltd, London No response
619 National Plastics Ltd, London No response
620 Patterton international Ltd, 
London
NO response
621 R H M Foods Ltd, London Refusal
622 Rae1-Brook Ltd, London NO response
623 Redifon Telecommunications Ltd, 
London
NO response
624 S C M (UK) Ltd, London No response
625 J H Sankey & Son Ltd, London Moved
626 Selincourt Ltd, London NO response
627 G Brady & Co Ltd, Manchester NO response
628 British Electrical Repairs Ltd, 
Manchester
NO response
629 The Carborundum Co Ltd, Manchester NO response
630 The Clayton Aniline Co Ltd, 
Manchester
NO response
631 Louis C Edwards & Sons Ltd, 
Manchester
NO response
632 G E C Switchgear Ltd, Manchester No response
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TSE OONTROL OîOUP OP LARGE NON - DOMINANT PLANTS
LIM
SERIAL NO
COMPANY LOCATION M L H EMPLOYEES 
IN PLANTS
OWER-
SHIP
REGICNAL
O D E
402 Ferranti Ltd Edinburgh 367 IX 6000 2 1
403 carron Ltd Falkirk 399 XII 1345 4 1
405 India Tyres Ltd Glasgow 491 XIX 1106 4 1
425 Automotive Products Ltd Liverpool 333 VII 1093 4 4
432 GuUich Dobson Ltd Wigan 339 VII 1665 4 4
435 Redfern National Glass Barnsley 463 XVI 1672 4 5
449 Elida Gibbs Ltd Leeds 273 V 922 4 5
452 Austin Morris Castle Bromwich Birmingham 381 XI 7532 2 6
470 Tubes Ltd Birmingham 312 VI 1082 4 6
480 Inçerial Metal Industries Birmingham 322 VI 5966 1 6
489 W. T. Avery Smethwick 339 VII 1886 4 6
500 Rolls Royce Motors Shrewsbury 334 VII 2904 2 6
515 GBC Eliot Process Automation Leicester 361 IX 1229 4 7
516 Marconi Rader Systems Ltd Leicester 367 IX 1182 4 7
524 British United Shoe Machinery Leicester 335 VII 2500 4 7
530 Express Lift Co Northhampton 337 VII 959 4 7
534 John Player Nottingham 240 III 5538 4 7
545 Lawrence Scott & Motors Norwich 361 IX 1358 4 8
546 Boulton St Paul Group Norwich 217 III 4143 4 8
572 Mars Ltd Slough 217 III 3760 3 9
576 Woods of Colchester Ltd Colchester 368 IX 1386 4 9
590 Rolls Royce watford 383 XI 3266 2 9
593 Sun Printers Watford 481 XVIII 1800 4 9
599 Daks Simpson Ltd London 442 XV 1115 4 9
Note : (i) OWIERSIIP œDES 1. State Owned
2. Quasi State CWned
3. Foreign Owned
4. UK Owned.
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APPENDIX 13
LIM EFFICIENCY : DATA OOLIECTION AND INTERPRETATION
1 DATA COLLECTION: METHODS AND AVAILABILITY
Testing the hypotheses relating to LIM efficiency involved 
gathering data on both registered unemployment and vacancies at an 
appropriately disaggregated level. In addition data on the number 
of LIM employees was also collected so that the rate of unemployment 
and vacancies could be calculated, and as a result direct 
comparisons of performance and behaviour could be made between 
LIMs. For statistical reasons the data collected, with some
minor exceptions, was restricted to adult males since these figures 
are less susceptible to pressures exerted by seasonal and cyclical 
fluctuations or non-economic considerations.
(1) That is, by calculating the unemployment and vacancy rates it 
is possible to control for LIM size.
(2) One minor exception to this is that since early 1974 youths 
under 18 have had the option of registering for employment with the 
Employment Office (BO) or the Careers Office (CO) and this has meant 
that since that date instead of distinguishing between men and boys 
the data differentiates between the EO and CO registrations. This 
division is not the same as the previous 18 year old dividing line 
but is similar. The important point is that it is highly probable 
that the propensity for youths under 18 to register at the 
employment office is not systematically related to differences in 
the structure of LIMs. The notification of vacancies has been 
affected in the same way as the registration of unemployment with 
the current distinction now being between BO and 00 vacancies rather 
than adult and juveniles. A second minor exception concerns the 
treatment of the totally unemployed. Between 1951 and 1971 the 
"wholly unenployed" had to be derived by subtracting the number of 
teiiporarily stopped from the total register. In some areas, however, 
there was no distinction between adult and juvenile temporarily 
stopped registrations and therefore the total figure had to be 
subtracted. This is a relatively unimportant problem since in most 
areas the temporarily stoppjed are only a small proportion of the 
total register. Furthermore the proportion of the temporary stopped 
who are youths is also very small.
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This is especially true of the unemployment figures where although 
the registration rate for males approaches 100%, and is relatively 
stable, the figures for females is subject to a variety of pressures 
which vary both geographically and c y c l i c a l l y . S t a t i s t i c s  
covering youth unemployment are also subject to similar problems as 
well as being prone to wide seasonal variations caused by school 
leavers coming onto the register, and the increasing number of 
students registering as unemployed although the latter practice has 
now ceased. Therefore, focussing on employment figures for adult 
males provides a more realistic and precise interpretation of LIM 
bahaviour and the economic pressures affecting LIM performance.
TO ensure that each LIM UV equation was estimated accurately 
it was important to have as many compatible observations as possible 
for each of the three variables. Allied to this since the estimates 
of the UV curve will be enhanced by having values of unemployment, 
vacancies and employeesover a wide range of demand conditions it was 
essential to collect the data over a relatively long period. 
Bearing in mind these considerations, it was decided to gather 100 
quarterly unemployment and vacancy observations covering the period 
1951-1975. Unfortunately, it was not pxDssible to collect similar 
data on employment since estimates are only available on an annual 
basis, consequently and as a proxy, it was decided to collect 25 
yearly figures over the same time period and use these figures to 
estimate the unemployment and vacancy rates for the 100 
observations,
(3) The General Household Survey showed that in 1972 52% of women 
who said they were looking for work were not registered as
unemployed compared to only 9% of men. This is largely because
fanale registration does not provide the same benefits as male 
registration, and therefore there is no similar incentive to
register unless the Department of Employment is considered to be an 
effective method of finding work.
(4) Although this introduces some measurement error into the 
unemployment and vacancies rate calculations the variations in the 
annual employment statistics were generally small and any resultant 
impact on the unemployment and vacancy rate were probably
insignificant. The procedures adopted for LIMs where there were 
significant jumps in the employjnieüt-r series are discussed below.
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Having decided on the data requirements the statistics were 
gathered on a local office basis and subsequently aggregated to 
match the LIM areas as previously defined and set out in terms of 
Local Authority areas (see ^pendix 1). in practice this technique 
presented few problems since Department of Employment local office 
areas were often coterminus with local authority areas. Even where 
there were boundary problems these were generally restricted to 
rural areas and the mismatches were rarely sufficient to 
significantly influence the unemployment and vacancy figures. 
However, in areas where there were significant boundary problems the 
offending LLMswere dropped from the ÜV analysis.
in practice the unemployment, vacancy and employee data was 
collected from the Department of Employment's ten regional 
offices, In most cases the records kept by the Department of 
Employment were fairly comprehensive, as Table A13.1 shows, with 
only fairly minor interruptions in the time-series over the period 
1951-1975. Nonetheless^in some cases the data déficiences were more 
severe and widespread. The main déficiences were concentrated in 
Scotland, Northern I^egion, and East Anglia where there were large 
gaps in the early data on enployees and the unenployed. This meant 
that it was not possible to calculate the early UV ratios for the 
LIMs in these regions, Appart from data deficiencies common to 
complete regions there were also deficiencies in a few LIMs in 
regions where the data was otherwise relatively complete. For 
example, in Louth, Gainsborough and Skegness no data was available 
prior to 1970.
There were no systematic explanations of why data was missing 
at either a regional or local level. In most cases the only reasons 
offered were that the information had been destroyed, mislaid or, 
more infrequently, not collected because of industrial action.
(5) That is, the majority of these rural cases were characterised
by large overbounded Employment Exchanges with the bulk of the
population and the workforce concentrated in the single urban centre.
(6) This data collection exercise was undertaken as part of the
parent project and was not only used for the UV analysis.
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Occassionaly some available data has to be disregarded because of an 
administrative failure to distinguish between males and females, and 
between youths and adults in some of the earlier records which meant 
that it was not possible to derive accurate figures for adult 
males. Despite the problem of an incanplete data base there were 
still more than sufficient observations to calculate UV equations 
for most of the LIMs, although when making comparisons between areas 
it should be remembered that the time-series covered did not match 
exactly. in most cases missing data will be relatively
uniirportant: for example since LIM behaviour has in the past had as 
important cyclical component then it is likely that the economic 
conditions in the LIM will be repeated and hense the UV curve will 
to some extent retrace previously missing areas of the curve.
2 IMERPRETATION OF THE DATA
Although it is generally possible to gather a sufficient 
quantity of data on unemployment, vacancies and employees to 
accurately estimate a UV equation for each LIM it is important to 
recognise the possible shortcomings associated with official data 
and the circumstances under which it is gathered, in particular, it 
is important to recognise that apparent differences in LIM behaviour 
may be caused by statistical biases and measurement errors rather 
than economic forces. This section examines possible data 
déficiences and subsequently considers how best to overcome the 
problems and therefore reduce the danger of statistical anomalies 
conditioning the empirical analysis and resulting in potentially 
misleading inferences and conclusions.
(7) The final number of observations used to calculate each UV 
regression was the time-period where data was available for all 
three variables. Therefore, if different observations were missing 
for each of the time-series then the overall problem becomes more 
serious.
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2.1 The ühenployinent Series
Utienployment figures provide perhaps t±e most reliable 
component of the data base in that they are only subject to 
relatively minor shortcomings. As a result they are a reasonably 
acurate measure of labour supply at the LIM level. Nonetheless, one 
of the potential problems associated with unemployment is that 
registration may fall below 100%. However, because of the benefits 
associated with registering as unemployed it is unlikely that many 
adult males do not register. Moreover, most of the
unregistered unemployed will tend to be workers who, for a variety 
of reasons, expect to find a job relatively quickly. Therefore if 
they remain unregistered the short duration of their period of 
unemployment will have little impact on the total unemployment 
figure.
Another more serious problem associated with the unemployment 
figures is the treatment of the temporarily stopped (TS) in the 
register. The reported unemployment figures reflect a count on a 
particular day, and therefore the figures recorded for the TS will 
be highly sensitive to the particular pattern of short-term working 
in the area. As a result there is no guarantee that the observed TS 
figure accurately reflects the real level of TS in the LIM. To help 
overcome this problem a more appropriate measure would be to count 
the number temporarily stopped in an area irrespective of whether 
they are working on that day. However, it is impossible to estimate 
the TS figure from the available data in this way and therefore it 
was decided to exclude the TS from the unemployment statistics used 
to estimate the UV relationship.
(8) See footnote 3.
(9) Although Evans (1977) has reported some elements of regional 
variation in unemployment registration, this may only reflect the 
level of demand in each area and differences in the expected 
duration of unemployment leading to variations in the registration 
rate. That is, controlling for demand the net difference in 
unemployment registration between regions will be minimal.
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The absence of satisfactory data on temporary lay-offs is an 
unfortunate deficiency since several industries and regions seem to 
have made considerable use of such a device to help minimise the 
level of redundancies. It appears, for example, that the textile 
industry in Lancashire made extensive use of such measures in the 
early 1950s. An examination of the figures for the appropriate LIMs 
reveals large numbers of temporarily stopped workers, relative to 
the number of wholly unemployed, and significant flwwations in these 
numbers over a short period. Accordingly^ the differential use
of this mechanism will influence the unemployment rate in a LIM 
subsequently influencing the UV equation and the associated measure 
of labour market efficiency. As a result the role played by the TS 
will have to be kept in mind when offering explanations for observed 
differences in performance between LIMs. The important point is 
that differences between areas which appear to be explicable in 
terms of differences in industrial structure or degree of dominance 
may actually only reflect differential use by local employers of 
work-sharing devices. Therefore, it will be important not to jump to 
attractive explanations of LIM behaviour before considering the more 
mundane possibilities.
The nature of the possible bias caused by the non-availability 
of a proper measure of the TS is a difficult problem to resolve 
since statistically it is not possible to isolate and measure the 
inpact of this type of behaviour. However, a number of
possibilities exist whereby the extent of the bias may be reduced.
(10) in Nelson, for example, unemployment rose from 8 in the summer 
of 1951 to 280 a year later. During the same period the number of 
temporarily stopped increased from a negligible number to over 2000.
(11) It may be that dominant plants as a group will favour the use 
of work sharing and similar measures by recognising the inportant 
inpact any redundancies it declares will have on the LIM. If this 
is the case then they may be particularly difficult to distinguish 
between real and statistical differences in these LIMs.
(12) Moreover, there is little available evidence on whether the 
use of TS follows any systematic pattern or is influenced by any 
particular variables.
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One partial solution would be to analyse the available data on a 
regional basis since this will effectively control for a part of the 
spatial variations in the pattern of using TS and therefore may help 
reduce the significance of any bias. Similarly the TS problem
can be reduced by restricting the analysis to areas where the demand 
for labour is traditionally high and the extent of TS is 
correspondingly low. In practice this would probably involve 
excluding Scotland, Wales, Northern Region, the North West and 
Yorkshire Humberside from the analysis which is approximately 50% of 
the total sample. Adopting this approach it should then be possible 
to in part identify the significance of the TS effect by comparing 
the level of U* and B between regions for each type of LIM.
ipart from a minor registration problem and the possible 
biases caused by differential use of work sharing methods there are 
no other shortcomings associated with the unemployment data. 
Therefore, as long as sufficient care is taken when using the series 
the data should be adequate when estimating the UV regression 
equations.
2.2 The Vacancy Series
Although the problems presented by the unemployment data are 
limited both in number and severity the same may not be true for the 
vacancy series. In this case the data has to be analysed with care 
before confident predictions can be derived on how the 
characteristics of the LIM influence the statistics. It must be
(13) However, given the hypotheses under test controlling for
inter-regional variation in the use of TS will not be of paramount 
importance.
(14) If plant and industry dominated LIMs were less likely to
favour work sharing and similar practices it may have been possible 
to ignore the impact of TS. If the observed U* and B statistics
were lower in these LIMs then it would have been possible to say
that the impact of the LIMs structural characteristics had overcome 
statistical pressures operating in the opposite direction. However, 
in this case both aspects of behaviour operate in the same direction 
so this is not possible.
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remembered, however, that despite the shortcomings associated with 
the vacancy series this statistic is the only broadly compatible and 
readily available source of data on labour demand, as a result it is 
an integral part of the measures of LIM efficiency used in the 
empirical analysis. Accordingly, it is important to systematically 
consider the most effective way of using the data and how to at 
least try to overcome the problems inherent in the series.
One of the fundamental problems with the vacancy data, and the
drawback which makes it significantly more difficult to interpret 
than the unemployment figures, is that in general the vacancy
statement ratio falls well below unity. That is, only a limited 
proportion of total vacancies are notified to the Department of 
Employment. This aspect of vacancy behaviour is well established 
and reflects the costs and benefits associated with notifying 
vacancies. One particular reason for this behaviour is that it is 
possible to recruit workers through a series of overlapping channels 
and there is no need to rely exclusively on placements by the Job 
Centre. The fact that there is no legislative or
administrative requirement to notify vacancies also helps explain 
why the statement ratio is relatively low.
The low vacancy rate is not in itself an important problem
since if the shortfall could be accurately and consistently 
estimated a correction factor could be built into the UV equation. 
Unfortunately, however,the picture is more complicated than this 
since vacancy registration is influenced by a number of different
(15) See the discussion on recruitment in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
For general evidence on the extent of vacancy notification see 
MacKay ^  (1971).
(16) The extent of under-notification may be exaggerated since 
vacancies not notified to the Job Centre seem to be of relatively 
short duration. Therefore, if vacancy registration was increased 
substantially then this may only increase the vacancy rate 
marginally. This view is in part supported by Dow & Dicks-Murreaux 
(1959) who noted that seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in the 
vacancy series were similar for periods of both voluntary and 
compulsory vacancy notification. This evidence was supported by 
later contributions to the debate and especially Cheshire (1979).
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variables which may lead to differences in the notification
ratebetween LIMs and between time periods. Naturally any 
sufficiently large effect of this nature will, in turn, introduce a 
differential bias into the IXM efficiency estimates and so again 
threaten to confuse the important distinction between economic and 
statistical phenomena.
perhaps the main potentially disruptive influence on the 
vacancy statement ratio is the level of labour demand in a LIM. 
Indeed there are several theoretical reasons to suggest that there 
may be a relationship between demand and the registration rate, and 
all of these are generally associated with the changing costs and 
benefits related to notifying vacancies over the cycle. When demand 
is high and unemployment low, employers will tend to search more 
intensively in order to attract labour and as a result they may
decide to notify a higher proportion of vacancies to the Job
Centre. Conversely, when demand falls and unemployment increases the 
burden of job search will shift to the workers and there will be 
little need to register vacancies to secure recruits. As a result, 
the statement ratio will fall under conditions of low labour
demand. However, this model of vacany notification is complicated 
by forces tending to work in the direction. For
exairple, as demand increases employers may feel that the probability 
of the Job Centre filling a vacancy becomes increasingly remote and, 
as a result notifing employment opportunities will not benefit the 
firm. Similar logic suggests that as unemployment increases firms 
may decide that the Job Centre is more likely to fill a vacancy, and 
therefore the registration rate will rise in the downturn. Which of 
these two arguments is the strongest cannot be decided 
theoretically, and unfortunately the limited empirical evidence 
offers little guidance. F^r example, on the one hand there is the 
evidence of Mackay e^ ^  (1971) which notes significant differences 
in the rate of vacancy notification for two areas experiencing 
different levels of demand, whilst on the other hand there is the 
work of Dow & Dicks-Mir r eaux (1959) which shows that the rate of 
vacancy notification parallels that of unemployment which is not 
subject to major cyclical changes.
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Although it is difficult to say with any precision whether 
there is a cyclical element in the vacancy series due to variations 
in notification policies this may not be of major importance to the 
research. Even if there is a bias it will not differentially affect 
the calculations of the measures of LIM efficiency as long as the 
bias is the same for all LIMs. That is, whilst changes in the rate 
of notification may occur throughout the economic cycle, and this 
will influence the position of the UV curve, it will not change the 
expected ranking of the efficiency measures for the categories of 
LIM under observation. The only exception to this will be LIMs 
where economic conditions have remained stable under the period of 
observation. Uhder these circumstances the calucalation of the UV 
regression will be based on a narrow spread of data and the derived 
measures of efficiency will be biased accordingly. To offset this 
danger it will be necessary to control for this problem in the
empirical analysis.
Another possible influence on the propensity to register 
vacancies may be plant dominance. This will tend to happen if these
quasi-monopsonistic establishments are either viewed as the focus of
LIM activities, or because the plants develop a special working
relationship with the Job Centre as a direct result of their 
importance to the local economy. Uhfortunately, it is difficult to 
predict any systematic relationship between plant dominance and 
vacancy registration since there are again a number of influences 
affecting a plant's policy. Moreover, many of these may be based on 
custom and practice reflecting the unique position of the
individual plant rather than broader based considerations. The only 
available evidence on this aspect of vacancy registration comes from 
the questionnnaire analysis which indicates that registration rates 
tend to be relatively high in dominant, plants. This in some part 
supports earlier suspicions. Nonetheless, if this is the case
it may not present a problem when testing the original hypothesis on
(17) This may reflect the tendency for labour shortages to appear 
in these IIMs because of the supply inelasticities faced by the 
monopsonistic plant.
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dominance since this predicts that the UV curve will be closer to 
the origin relative to non-dominated LIMs. That is, if the 
hypothesis holds it will be despite variations in dominant plant 
registration rates moving the UV curve outwards.
Finally^it is possible that there will be variations between 
industries in the rate of vacancy notification. For instance,
some industries may rely almost exclusively on informal recruitment 
methods when hiring, whereas others may prefer to operate through 
Job C e n t r e s . H o w e v e r ,  as the evidence on inter-industry 
variations in the propensity to notify vacancies is almost 
non-existant it is difficult to derive any firm conclusion on how 
best to either measure or subsequently control for this problem. 
Consequently, when analysing the empirical results, it is only 
possible to mention rather than quantify that part of the 
explanation of any observed differences may reflect industrial 
biases in the statement ratio. Nonetheless, any such bias is likely 
to be insignificant when measured across a range of industries, 
hense it is unlikely to influence the hypotheses under test.
(18) Although the evidence is far from comprehensive, Beaumont 
(1976) found that several major plants registered vacancies by 
standing order. In the system operated by Job Centres standing 
orders often count as one vacancy and as a result job opportunities 
in the LEM will be underestimated and the UV curve will be biased 
inwards. Uhfortunately, without more detailed evidence on this it 
is difficult to quantify how inportant this problem is and therefore 
take it into account when considering the empirical results.
(19) Note that the presence of TS may confuse the issue: see 
footnote 14.
(20) The industry effect may in fact reflect an occupational or 
skill effect.
(21) Other less tangible factors will also effect vacancy 
registrations including the local Job Centre's image and efficiency, 
and even the perceptions and policies of the LIMs leading personnel 
managers. However, it is not anticipated that these factors vary 
systematically between LIMs . Therefore they will not influence the 
overall results of the study.
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Summarising the problems of the vacancy series it appears that 
although the data is subject to a range of imperfections which 
combine to reduce its reliability as a measure of demand there is 
evidence to suggest that the data collected remains a sufficiently 
good proxy for demand to meet the study's requirements. Moreover, 
in circumstances where biases remain, for the purposes of the 
research it will be possible to at least partly control for many of 
the problems.
2.3 The Employee Series
The employee series also has its shortcomings, although for 
the most part these relate to data availability and compatability 
rather than the more complex and subtle problems associated with the 
unemployment and vacancy series. One of the data problems
with the employee series concerns the absense of quarterly estimates 
and the subsequent reliance on yearly figures interpolated to 
provide 100 observations. Although this process inevitably will 
introduce an element of imprecision to the calculation of the 
unemployment and vacancy rates the effect is likely to be marginal
and should not significantly bias the results. A second, and
related, problem concerns the absense of employee data for the years 
1974 and 1975. Again for pragmatic reasons it was decided to 
estimate the figures for the two year period and hence the 1975 
estimate was used to derive the eight outstanding observations. 
This procedure is unlikely to materially affect the results as the 
inter-year variation in LIM employees was generally very small.
A more serious problem in the employee figure arose from the
large jumps which occAsionally appeared in the series at the LIM
level. Indeed in some areas there appear to be annual changes in 
the number of employees which can only be accounted for by some 
changes in the basis of the compilation of the figure. Accepting
(22) EOr a detailed survey of the problems faced in the employee 
series see Allen and Yuill (1975).
Ill
this it seems that the most likely explanation of these large jumps 
is a change in the location of the workforce attributed to some 
employers in the area, Such problems with the employment
series will have a critical inpact on the calculation of the 
unemployment and vacancy rates, and therefore have to be taken into 
account before estimating the UV equation, Difortunately there is 
no way these changes can be satisfactorily incorporated into the 
calculation given the data available from the Department of 
Employment, Furthermore, it is not possible to take account of 
these variations indirectly through the behaviour of other 
variables. For example, it is very difficult to say whether these 
problems are getting better or worse over time since they are 
essentially erratic changes caused mainly by local practices. Given 
this g the only solution to the problem will be to disc ard LIMs 
exhibiting large random jumps in the employee series since this is 
the only effective method of avoiding unexplained shifts in the UV 
equation.
Another more general problem with shifts in the employee 
series occurred in 1971 when the approach to collecting data on 
employee numbers changed from the Card Count method to data 
collected by the Annual Census of Employment. In most cases the 
disparity between the figures is relatively small and only has a 
marginal effect on calculating the appropriate unemployment and 
vacancy r a t e s . H o w e v e r ,  in other cases, and for a variety of 
reasons the size of the shift was significant and potentially
(23) Thus in Ashford, for example, the number of employees dropped 
from 16,880 to 12,056 between 1951 and 1952. Similar drops in the 
same period occurred in Maidstone, Brighton and Winchester, whilst 
rises of the same order can be found in Chatham and Slough and 
several others. The Maidstone change can almost certainly be 
attributed to the fact that in 1951 a large number of local 
authority employees in the education sector were allocated to 
Maidstone whereas their actual workplaces, as reflected in the 1952 
count were outside the Maidstone area. **
#
(24) In some measure the process of estimating UV equations will 
automatically reject areas with a large shift in the employee series 
since this type of LIM will not conform to the specification of the 
equation.
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damaging to the estimations of the UV equation. As before there is 
no means of overcoming this problem with the available data and as a 
result the offending LIMs have to be dropped from the analysis.
A final major problem with the employee series is that, 
whereas the registered unemployed refer to men living in a 
particular employment office area, the employee estimates refer to 
the number of men working in the area. As a result areas which are 
job centres will have an artificially low unemployment rate, whilst 
dormitary towns will be characteristed by an artificially high 
unemployment rates. To some extent this problem is limited
because the LIM configurations under review have been selected on 
the basis of relatively high degrees of self-containment. Despite 
this, however, many of the LIMs still have significant minorities of 
residents working outside the area, and workers living outside the 
area, which may continue to bias the calculation of the unemployment 
rate and hense the position of the UV curve.
TO overcome this problem it may be necessary to restrict the 
analysis to LIMs with high levels of self-containment, and therefore 
leave the unemployment rates free from the problems caused by cross 
boundary flows, unfortunately, implementing this control means that 
it will no longer be possible to test whether self-containment 
itself influences the position of the UV curve through real economic 
pressures as suggested in Chapter 6. However, given the existence 
of such a bias in the unemployment rate this would not have been 
possible anyway. As an alternative to this problem it should be 
possible to establish whether any of the LIM characteristics under
(25) See Allen and YU ill (1975) for a detailed explanation of the 
problems involved.
(26) The importance of this problem will also change over time due 
to alterations in journey-to-work patterns. However, since these 
changes only occur very gradually and are unlikely to effect the 
basic direction of well established flows and therefore alterations 
to journey-to-work patterns are assumed to be of insignificant 
importance.
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review are systematically related to the level and nature of 
self-containment. If there is no relationship then there will be
little need to carefully control for the problem when analysing LIM 
performance. Similarly, if the average unemployment and vacancy 
rates are not statistically different for dormitary towns and job 
centres, and this does not appear to be as the result of an 
intervening variable, then it will be possible to conclude that the 
impact of self-containment on unemployment rates is marginal. This 
last approach may be especially useful since if there is no 
difference between the respective average unemployment and vacancy 
figures it will be possible to test whether high self-containment 
influences the UV curve without worrying about possible statistical 
biases disrupting the analysis.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Table A13.2 summarises the principal drawbacks associated with 
the unemployment, vacancy and employee time series. The table also 
shows the anticipated significance of the data inadequacies and the 
possible methods of overcoming the problem. Prom the table and the 
previous discussion it appears that some of the data problems may be 
dismissed because their impact is either insignificant or because 
the bias generated will not affect the specific hypothesis under 
test. Nonetheless, there remain several shortcomings associated 
with the data which still threatens to disrupt the analysis of LIM 
efficiency. Moreover, it is very difficult to quantify the possible 
inpact of these problems since there has been a marked lack of 
adequate and systematic research on the subject. The most serious 
problems occur when the data problems are correlated with the 
hypothes</s and variables under test with the result that it is very 
difficult to accurately separate statistical phenomena from real 
economic pressures.
To be more positive, even if these more serious data problems 
exist it should still be possible to avoid the more obvious pitfalls 
associated with them by carefully structuring the empirical analysis
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to take account of the biases. In particular, this may result in 
the analysis being organised on a regional basis or controlling for 
the level of unonployment. Allied to this where there are severe 
problems relating to the available data the offending LIMs should be 
discarded. Adopting this more focused approach should help overcome 
the most fundamental problems associated with the data set. 
However, and even allowing for these possible correction factors, 
residual data problems may remain. Therefore, where necessary 
conclusions based on the LIM statistics should be appropriately 
qualified.
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APPENDIX 14
A CLASSIFICATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
UV ANALYSIS
An aggregate unemployment figure may be broken down into three 
component parts; frictional unemployment (Uf), structural 
unemployment (Us), and demand deficient unemployment (Uâd). As is 
shown below each component relates to the cause of unemployment and 
in turn suggests how such unemployment may be eliminated.
Frictional unemployment represents the total number 
of employees for whom a suitable vacancy exists.
That is, the frictionally unemployed are workers who 
possess the right characteristics to fill a specific 
job vacancy but for some reason have not secured 
employment. As a result for any industry the
frictionally unemployed are either the number 
unemployed or the number of vacancies, which ever is 
the smaller. The total Uf for a LIM is the sum of Uf 
across all industries.
(1) Both US and Uf may be defined as the two components making up 
non-demand deficient unemployment (Uüd).
(2) One of the major causes of frictional unemployment is the lack 
of adequate labour market information. It is widely recognised (for 
example, see Chapter 2 & Chapter 3) that there are severe limits to 
the job knowledge possesed by the labour force and job seekers. The 
typical worker has little knowledge of the full range of jobs, wage 
rates and working conditions prevailing in an area. In particular, 
since the job seeker often acquires information through a restricted 
circle of friends and relatives and is not able to evaluate more 
than a few vacancies, or assess detailed information on any specific 
opening. Employers will also face seriously imperfect information 
and will be unable to judge accurately and quickly the calibre of 
job applicants. Consequently, and as a result of these 
imperfections in information, it will take time to fill a job 
vacancy and hence frictional unemployment will develop.
(3) Although Uf is defined in terms of industry it could equally 
well be measured in terms of occupation. The methodology and the
end results are the same and indeed this is the approach adopted in 
Chapter 6.
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Structural unemployment relates to a mismatch between 
the characteristics of the unemployed and the 
available vacancies. Whenever there is structural 
unemployment the unemployed can only secure 
employment by changing industries which may be 
prohibitive because of the costs and time involved.
In more abstract terms the level of us varies 
depending on whether Ut is greater than Vt, where Ut 
and vt are respectively the total number of 
unemployed and vacancies in the LIM. If the total 
number of vancies is greater than the total 
unemployed, then structural unemployment equals 
£-(Ui-Vi) for all industries where U > V^^^ That 
is, all the non-frictional unemployment must be 
structural since total vacancies exceeds total 
unemployment. Where Vt is less the Ut, then Us 
equals Z(Vi-Ui) for all industries where V is greater 
than U. Cnly where vacancies in a specific industry 
exceed unemployment in that industry and ut exceeds 
Vt is there any structural unemployment.
Demand deficient unemployment is the simplest to 
define since it represents the excess of total 
unemployment over total vacancies. Demand deficient 
unemployment, therefore, measures the number of 
workers for whom no vacancies exist under any 
circumstances.
(4) The subscript i stands for industry.
(5) For more details on the classification of unemployment see Hughes
(1974).
(6) One problem with this unemployment breakdown is that the relative 
importance of the unemployment categories tend to be related to the
size of the area under examination. For example, although a region
may have a match between unemployment and vacancies, geographical 
immobilities within the area may prevent the worker accepting 
otherwise favourable employment. At the other extreme in small LIMs 
there may be a high proportion of Us because there may be a lot of 
unenployed for whom there are jobs in there own industries in other 
areas, but who in relation to the opportunities in their own area have 
the wrong skills. As a result of these considerations the extent of 
us and uf may be changed by altering the boundaries of the LIM.
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When using this "causal" classification of unemployment it is 
inportant to recognise that the relative size of the unemployment 
components fluctuate with labour demand. At one extreme when demand 
is very low, and therefore unemployment very high, Ut - Vt = Ut, 
because Vt = 0. In this situation all unemployment is demand 
deficient as there are no vacancies. However, as demand increases 
vacancies will begin to appear as a result of LIM imperfections. 
Hence over time an increasing number of vacancies will remain on the 
unemployment register thereby marking the appearance of frictional 
unemployment. The growth in frictional unemployment will tend to 
offset the decline in total unemployment. Nonetheless, under normal 
circumstances total unemployment will continue to fall since 
increased labour demand will not be reflected exclusively in an 
increased level of vacancies. Further increase in demand will tend 
to lead to vacancies exceeding the number of unenployed in selected 
industries which signals the appearance of structural unenployment 
(that is Vi > Ui for some industries).
If donand continues to increase, eventually the LIM will reach 
the point ut = Vt where Udd is zero and the remaining unemployment 
is a combination of Us and Uf. If demand continues to increase Us 
will cease to exist when vacancies are greater than unemployment in 
every industry. Ftictional unenployment will disappear only when 
unemployment falls to zero. Recognising the impact of demand 
changes on the classification of unemployment indicates that simply 
by measuring the separate conponents of unemployment at a given 
level of demand and inplementing policies to cure each contributory 
factor will not solve the unemployment problem. Instead the 
importance of different unenployment categories would change, and 
although total unenployment would probably fall, it would decline by 
less than the original estimate.
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APPENDIX 15
STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
UV REGRESSION EQUATIONS
To test the hypotheses relating dominance to LIM efficiency 
this Appendix first considers how best to analyse the LIM based UV 
data bearing in mind the shortcomings inherent in the data set (see 
appendix 13) and the time and resource constraints facing the 
study. Besides examining the basic statistical issues the Appendix 
also examines the underlying properties of the UV equations 
generated by adopting the recommended econometric approach and 
subsequently discusses the implications these results have for 
testing the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 6.
1 THE EOCNOMSTRIC APPROACH TO TESTING THE LIM BASED HYPOTHESES
Although the hypotheses under test are relatively 
straightforward it is important to recognise the statistical and 
econometric constraints facing the investigation since these serve 
to compound the already significant data problems inherent in the 
unenployment, vacancy and employee series. Failure to
explicitly recognise these dangers and structure the analysis 
accordingly would almost certainly result in potentially misleading 
conclusions based onomisinterpretation of the available data. It is 
inportant, therefore, to select the most appropriate statistical 
methods in order to at least tentatively identify whether there are 
any relationships between LIM efficiency and the characteristics of 
the market.
(1) One of the main shortcomings of previous UV work has been their 
failure to recognise the inadequacies and potential biases in their 
empirical work. As a result many of their conclusions must be 
heavily qualified. This, in particular, applies to Thirwall (1969) 
and Cheshire (1979) where the problem of autocorrelation seems so 
severe.
(2) For a more detailed examination of the problems associated with 
^plying statistical techniques to complex LIMs see Warren (1977), 
Holden and Peel (1975), and Bowden (1980).
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The first key point to bear in mind is that the underlying
objective of the research is to relate specific LIM characteristics
to LIM efficiency as measured by the relationship between
unemployment and vacancies. However, since the measures of LIM
efficiency are exclusively based on the equation Log U=Log A + Blog 
V(in that this equation measures the distance of the UV curve from 
the origin of the UV axis) it is not possible to simply expand the 
functional form of the equation to include these additional
variables. That is an equation of the form;
Log U = Log A + B Log V + Dl + D2 + D3 + CS
(where Dl - D3 are dummy variables relating to particular 
characteristics of the LIM and S represents, say LIM size) would not 
be compatible with the two dimensional measure of LIM efficiency.
As a result it is necessary to adopt a more simplistic
approach to the problem. For every LIM it was decided to estimate
the standard UV equation Log U = Log A + Blog V. Using the
coefficients generated by this model the measures of efficiency
outlined previously can be calculated. It is then possible to test
whether the variation in the measures are related to the
(4)characteristics of the LIM. Having decided that the most
appropriate approach to testing the hypotheses under examination was 
to run the Log U = Log A + Blog V equation, the next step was to 
decide on the most appropriate estimation technique. To reiterate 
in more detail the model under examination is the form :
Log Uit = Log Ai +Bi Log Vit +Eit (1)
where i = 1, N denotes the LIM and t = 1^ T refers to the
time period. In order to obtain separate estimates for A and B for 
each LIM it is necessary to estimate the set of equations given 
below.
LIM 1 : Log Ult = Log A1 + Bl LOG Vit + Elt
LIM 2 : Log U2t - Log A2 + 32 LOG V2t + E2t
LIM N : Log U3t = Log A3 + B3 LOG V3t + E3t
(Z)
(3) See Chapter 6 for a full explanation of the measures of 
efficiency.
(4) Not surprisingly this approach has a number of shortcomings and 
these are discussed in more derail below.
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The set of equations given in (2) can be estimated either by 
ordinary least squares (CXS) or by generalised least squares (GIS). 
The latter method when applied to this type of equation system is 
known as Zellner's "Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation" 
(SURE). TO obtain the GLS estimates each equation in (2) is
estimated separately by OIS. The residuals. Et, from these 
regressions are then used to calculate ;
S
The GIfi estimators are then obtained from ;
The GLS estimates as asynptotically more efficient than the 
OLS estimates. However, in small samples, as in this 
exercise, it cannot be said that using GLS would neccessarily 
improve the effiency of the estimation procedure.
It is inportant to be clear about the likely effect of usirg 
the simple technique on the properties of the estimates. Both GI5 
and OLS estimates are unbiased assuming E (eit) = 0 for all i. In 
an infinite sample GLS would be more efficient; in samples of the 
size used in the study it is quite possible that GIS estimates will 
be more efficient but this is not necessarily true.
Given the absence of the neccessary Monte Carlo evidence, the 
greater computational cost of the GLS estimation and because it was 
felt that the cross correlation in the errors were likely to be 
small it was decided that OLS was the rrast practical estimation 
method. Another advantage of using OLS is that the results can be 
more easily compared w/ith earlier studies which used this estimation 
method.
(5) See Zellner (1962)
(6) All the OLS equations, when run, should be corrected for 
autocorrelation since this was a severe problem in previous 
studies. For a full explanation of the problems associated with 
autocorrelation and the Cochrane Orcutt correction method, see 
Johnson (1972). The important point to note is that autocorrelation 
leads to biased estimating of sampling variances and hence standard 
errors and t statistics are incorrect.
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Estimating the efficiency measures on a LIM basis and in the 
most sinple functional form potentially introduces several 
econometric weaknesses which have to be taken into account if the 
results are not to be misinterpret ted. One inportant shortcoming of 
the adopted approach is that if the value of the B Coefficient can 
be explained in terms of other variables, which ideally should have 
somehow been included in the regression equation (see above), then
As
the resultant B estimates may be biased and the standard errors may 
be misleading. Another problem is that using this sinplified 
functional form it will be inpossible to accurately distinguish 
between the variation of the &  caused by the structural 
characteristics of the LIM and the random "white noise" variation 
associated with estimating the coefficient. Finally, and related to 
the previous point, since the B and the derived U* measure are 
estimates it is not really possible to conpute statistical tests of 
significance between the different categories of LIM .
The only way of partly overcoming the statistical problems 
inherent in the adopted e Ltamation technique is to test the 
dominance hypotheses whilst controlling for other potential 
influences on LIM efficiency. Adopting this approach makes it 
possible to remove some of the variation in the efficiency measures 
and therefore identify more accurately any systematic relationship 
between dominance and efficiency. TWO important variables which can 
easily be controlled for are region and unenployment. This should 
be borne in mind in the enpirical analysis.
(7) That is, it may be theoretically possible to compute statistical 
differences, but the techniques involved are well beyond this 
research.
(8) The nature of these statistical problems to some extent also 
restricts the nature of the LIM hypotheses under test. That is, the 
crude statistical techniques available can only tend to identify the 
more general propositions related to LIM performance. Luckily the 
hypotheses under test are relatively fundamental and therefore 
suited to the more simplistic approach.
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THE STANDARD UV EQUATION RESULTS ; GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 2ND
IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS
The individual LIMs under study cover a wide range of labour 
market types and incorporate areas with considerable variation in 
size, industrial structure, self-containment, growth, unemployment, 
and many other interrelated economic and social characteristics. As 
a result there will tend to be substantial differences in the extent 
to which the standard UV equation explains the relationship between 
these two variables in the LIM. That is, a UV regression with only 
one independent variable may be significantly under-specified and, 
to properly ei^lain variationsin unemployment, several other factors 
may have to be included to generate a high degree of explanatory 
power. By contrast such problems will be less severe at higher 
levels of aggregation where localised economic characteristics and 
variations become less significant and therefore a relatively 
straightforward equation may be sufficient to adequately explain the 
UV relationship. In other words, disaggregated UV measures are more 
liable to experience significant shifts and jumps in the UV 
relationship. For exanple, structural changes will be more in 
evidence at the local level since the probability of offsetting 
variations within the LIM area will be lower.
Su^icions that the standard UV equation may fall short of a 
precise explanation of UV behaviour are to some extent confirmed by 
Table A15.1 which presents on a regional basis the key measures and 
statistics associated with the UV equation. As the table indicates 
there are widespread variations in the results produced by the 
regression analysis. The extent of these variations are, however, 
rather suprising with, in several instances, the standard deviation 
of a variables' mean approaching or greater than the mean
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itself. Similarly the table also illustrates that some of the
regressions produce highly unusual values both for the B coefficient
and the constant. In the case of the B coefficient eight are
reported as being positive and others lie very close to zero.
Equally unusual thirteen of the values calculated for the constant
are negative or very close to zero. Although the low level
2
of the average UV equation R is perhaps of more immediate and
2
wide^read concern. The average R for the total sanple is 0.79
but in some regions this falls below 0.70. l^reover, in several
2
regions the minimum R explains less than 20% of the variation in 
the unemployment and vacancy statistics
On the basis of these summary statistics there is an argument 
for establishing a set of criteria or benchmarks to help measure 
more precisely the extent to which the UV equations match their 
predicted theoretical specification (that is U=AV®) whilst
remaining économe trically well behaved. Bearing in mind the 
specification of the equation and the nature of the problem being 
examined the following, albeit subjective, conditions would seem to 
be appropriate:
(i) the estimated equation should have a Durbin -Watson 
statistic falling within the acceptable range, thereby 
confirming that autocorrection has been satisfactorily
corrected by introducing the Cochrane Orcutt technique into 
the estimation of the regression coefficients. If the 
reported DW value falls outside the acceptable limits the UV 
equatior/..........
(9) This is true even controlling for region a variable whick 
probably explains a proportion of the differences.
(10) Note that a marginally negative constant measured in log terms 
is not, of course, incorrect but values so close to zero must be 
considered as extremely unlikely
(11) The variation in the value of the EW statistic are markedly
lower reflecting the extent of autocorrelation inherent in
time-series data, and the success of the corrective technique.
(12) Note that high r2 should not be expected. It is known that 
aggregation artificially increases as the degree of variation 
to be explained in more aggregated models is lower than in highly 
disaggregated equations.
126
equation should be rejected since the estimated coefficients 
would remain subject to measurement error
2
(ii) the reported R should exceed 0.75 thereby indicating 
that the UV specification explains a relatively high 
proportion of the variation in U through the constant term 
and the variation in vacancies. The 0.75 level is a 
subjective cut-off point but nonetheless represents a 
reasonably liberal break point given that the time-series 
nature of the data itself probably explain between 40% and 
50% of the variation.
(iii) The B coefficient should be statistically significant 
as this is the only independent variable in the equation and 
its non-significance would suggest that the specified UV 
equation does not explain the relationship as suggested by 
theory and to some extent previous empirical research. 
Similarly, as the B statistic is one measure of LIM 
efficiency and forms the basis of others it may be misleading 
to include non-significant values without some form of 
qualification.
(ivj the constant term should be statistically significant as 
this is again an important element of the estimated equation 
and directly influences the U* measure of LIM efficiency.
(13) Unfortunately since the DW statistic contains an intermediate 
range it will on occassions not be possible to conclusively 
establish whether or not auto correlation is significant. In 
practice this will only occur on a few occassions and therefore to 
help maintain the sample size the UV equations should also be 
regarded as acceptable. F o r a full explanation of the DW 
statistic see Johnson (1972) PR 249 - 254, or Kelejian and Oats 
(1976) PP200 - 207
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Taking account of these considerations Table A15.2 summarises
on a regional basis the extent to which the W  equations satisfy
each of these conditions. The figures show that in 70% of the LIM
2
regressions the value of R was above 0.75; in 78% of the Llils the
B coefficient was significant; in 55% of the sample the constant was
significant; and in over 98% of cases the Durban-Watson statistic
fell within acceptable bounds. Noticeably for each of the
regressions characteristics the pattern differs significantly
between regions. For example, although 70% of the LLMs reported a 
2
level of R above 0.75 the figure for East Anglia was much lower 
at 25% and much higher for the West Midlands at 100%. This pattern 
is repeated for other variables and suggests that regional 
variations may be an important element to be examined and controlled 
for when analysing the determinants of LIM efficiency.
Table A15.3 indicates the principal shortcomings of the
estimated UV equation in terms of the previously developed
performance indicators. In total^75% or 216 out of 289 regressions
estimated did not meet all the criteria set out above. The most
important single shortcoming was the constant term which was
insignificant in 101 LIMs, 35% of the total. Taking into
account LLMs where the constant was only part of the cause of LIM
inperfections the total increases to 122, 56% of all LIMS with
2
shortcomings. A low R /.........
(14) This view is confirmed by previous work. For example, see 
Cheshire (1979)
(15) At first sight this may seem to be a highly unusual result 
given that the basis of the log equation and the estimation of U* 
depends on a positive constant term from which an amount is 
substr acted depending on the value of vacancies in the LIM. 
However, the results reflect the properties of log equations. That 
iSfif the log A terms is insignificantly different from zero then 
that natural number A equals one and as a result the function 
U=WB becomes Note that theoretically this means that all 
such UV curves pass though the point (1,1) and therefore the UV 
equations have the same value for U* Under these circumstances it 
will be difficult to distinguish between LIMs in terms of 
efficiency. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
TABLE A15.3 CAUSES OF UV EQUATION SHORTOOMINGS
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Nature of 
Failure
Number of 
LIMs
% of 
LIMs
Nature of 
Failure
Number 
of LIMs
Failure
LIMs
R2 52 18% B 24 8%
R2 + B 15 5% B + DW 1 1%
R2 + B + A 2 1% B + DW + A 2 1%
R2 + B + A + EW 0 0% B + A 10 3%
R2 + A 7 2% A 101 35%
R2 + DW 2 1% A + DW 0 0
R2 + B + DW 0 0% DW 0 0
R2 + A + DW 0 0% TOTAL 216 75%
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2
A low R was the second most inportant reason for questioning the
2
applicability of the UV equation since on 52 occassion the R
value fell below 0.75, and this featured a further 26 times in
conjunction with other problems associated with the equation. The 
insignificance of the B coefficient was relatively less important 
as there were only 24 LIMs where the coefficient was insignificant, 
although offsetting this there were another 30 LLMs where the 
independent variable was partly responsible for an equation's 
questionable performance. An inadequate IXirbin Watson statistic was 
the least iirportant shortcoming of the UV equation results which 
largely reflects the success of the Cochrane Orcutt procedure used 
to correct for autocorrelation. indeed in only 5 cases did an
inappropriate EW appear in regression results.
In addition to the LIMs failing to meet all the 
econometric related conditions specified above have to be added LIMS 
experiencing significant bounda<^ changes and employment shifts since 
both these problems may seriously distort the UV equation results.
The total number of LIMs suffering from the statistical
defects are shown in Table A15.4 and Table A15.5 In total there were
(16) See Appendix 4 for a list of these LLMs.
TABLE A15.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EMPLOYMENT JUMP
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EXTENT OF SICMEFICANCE
NUMBER %
INSIGNIFICANT 262 87.0
SIGNIFICANT 39 13.0
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TABLE A15.5 EXTENT OF BQUNDAtl/CHANGES
NATURE OF CHANGE Number %
No change 224 74.4
Marginal change 37 12.3
Significant change 
1951 - 61
11 3.7
Significant change 
IS 61 - 71
27 9.0
Significant change 
1951 - 61 & 1961 - 71
2 0.7
TOTAL 301 100
39 LIMS where the employment jump was significant, and 40 cases were
bounday changes were a major problem. Taking account of the overlap
between these considerationsand earlier qualifications the effect of
these additional factors means that a further 20 LIM UV regression
results have to be considered as questionable. In total, therefore,
of the 289 LIMs where UV data was available 236 (82%) did not meet
(17)all the conditions set out above.
One of the reasons why such a high proportion of 
LIMs fail to meet all these conditions is that there is little
(17) That is, the total number of rejected LIMs is 236 once the 
overlap between LLMs with significant boundry changes and employment
shifts is taken into account along with LIMs where it was not 
possible to run regression because of missing data.
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TABLE A15.6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN R THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
ODNSTANT AND THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Constant Independent variable
insignif­
icant
Signif­
icant
Total Insignif­
icant
Signif­
icant
Total
R^ less than 0.75 9
(7.4)
69
(41.3)
76
(26.3)
17
(31.5)
61
(26.0)
78
(26)
R^ above 0,75 113
(92.6)
98
(58.7)
211
(73.0)
37
(68.5)
174
(76.0)
211
(73)
Total 122
(100)
167
(100)
289
(100)
54
(100)
235
(100)
288
(100)
overlap between the different factors detracting from the overall
performance of the UV curve. For example,as Table A15.6 shows^LIMs
with an insignificant B or A value are not generally associated with
2
an insignificant R . Similarly as Table A15.7 shows, an 
insignificant B is not generally correlated with an insignificant 
value of A. The limited/..........
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TABLE A15.7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONSTANT
AND THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
B INSIGNIFICANT B SIGNIFICANT TOTAL
A Insignificant 14 108 122
(26) (46) (40)
A Significant 40 127 167
(74) (54) (60)
Tbtal 54 235 301
(100) (100)
Nùte ; (i) CHI SQ differences significant at the 99% confidence 
level.
The limited extent of the overlap between the equations' 
shortcomings suggests that particular LIM characteristics affect the 
performance of the UV equation in different ways. This, to some 
extent, is confirmed by the results presented in Table A15.8* In 
this case figures indicate, for example, that LIMs where the 
constant is significant are characterised by high unemployment, a 
relatively low variation in unemployment, and a relatively low 
number of UV observations. Even from an intuitive point of view 
this result is not surprising. By contrast, the table also shows 
that LLMs displaying the same characteristics tend to have an 
insignificant B coefficient. Therefore, and by implication, LIMs 
with significant B coefficientbare largely associated with LIMs with 
relatively low unemployment, relatively high fluctuations in 
unemployment and areas where there is a high number of/..........
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TABLE A15.8 SELECTED LLM CHARACTERISTICS AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE PRCPERTIES OF THE UV EQUATION
LIM
Characteristics
A
Insignificant
A
Significant
Significance 
level of 
differences
Mean U rate 1.64 4.09
(0.57) (2.0) 99%
No of observations 92 76
(11.5) (22.6) 99%
DISP unemployment 0.33 0.24
(0.08) (0.07) 99%
LLM B B Significance
Characteristics Insignificant Significant level of 
differences
Mean U rate 4.21 2.79
(2.47) (1.78) 99%
No of observations 69 87
(25) (17) 99%
DISP unemployment 0.27 0.28
(0.08) (0.09) NS
LIM R less than
2 ....
R above Significance
Characteristics 0.75 0.75 level of 
differences
Mean U rate 4.12 2.67
(2.0) (1.8) 99
No of observations 77 86
(23) (19) 99
DISP unemployment 0.24 0.29
(0.07) (0.09) 99
Note; (1) DISP is a measure of the level of fluctuation in the 
unemployment rate. See Lever et al 1979.
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fl8) 2
number of UV observations. In terms of the R values the
2
figures indicate that the higher R values are associated with a 
high number of observations, greater fluctuations in the
unemployment rate, and with low unemployment areas. Once again this 
is not surprising given the specification of the equation and the 
econometric properties associated with the regression
(19)
calculations.
Although it is possible to partly relate the causes of the 
regression equations shortcomings to particular characteristics of 
the UV data this does not overcome the fundamental problem that such 
a high proportion of UV regressions fail to meet a set of 
interrelated conditions which could be interpreted as qualifying 
criteria for subsequently testing the hypotheses relating to 
dominant plant behaviour. However, if LIMs failing to meet all 
these performance indices are discarded this will severely limit the 
extent and sophistication of the analysis based on the remaining 
group, particularly if there is a requirement to control for other 
variables. As a result of such considerations it is important to 
consider ways of including as many LLMs as possible in the sample 
despite the apparent drawbacks and shortcomings associated with many 
of the equations. Conveniently there are several reasons to 
statistically justify this course of action.
Cne means of justifying extending the sample beyond the 
limited "well behaved" sub-set is by showing that there are no 
significant differences between the characteristics of the well 
behav ed sub-group and the total sample. In many respects this 
pattern is borne out by the figures presented in Table A15.9. In 
this case the only differences between the two groups is in the 
average unemployment rate since for all other LIM characteristics 
the statistical differences between the good and bad LIMs are 
insignificant. Perhaps of even more relevance is the evidence 
presented in / .......
(18) See WOnnacott and Wonnacott (1970) P23 for a discussion on the 
problems of estimating B on the basis of observations that are 
closely grouped together
(19) That is, and conversely in low R^ areas, the number of UV 
observations are limited and tend to be bunched in one section of 
the UV quadrant rather than distributed along a curve as suggested 
by the ideal specification of the UV curves.
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TABLE A15.9 LLM CHARACTERISTICS ; DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
GOOD AND BAD FIT EQUATIONS
VARIABLE Q O œ  FIT BAD FIT
Mean unemployment rate 3.48 2.96*
(1.85) (2.02)
Disp Vacancy Rate 0.45 0.48
(0.17) (0.17)
Total Population 1971 95483 87412
(98772) (131284)
Acreage 13980 13904
(12979) (13609)
Compound Self Containment 161.3 161.6
(10.7) (10.2)
Total number of observations 80 84
(22.1) (19.8)
Standard Deviation of U 1.68 1.52
(0.78) (0.86)
Note ; (i) * signifies differences are significant at 90% confidence
level (using F-Test)
(ii) **signifies differences are significant at 95% 
confidence level (using F-Test)
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TABLE A15.1Q LIM EFFICIENCY INDICES ; DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GCXDD
AND BAD FIT EQUATIONS
VARIABLE GOOD FIT BAD FIT
B - 0,25 -0.25
(0.15) (0.19)
u* 3.14 3.07
(1.8) (5.0)
U - U* 0.33 - 0.10
(1.4) (4.7)
Note ; (i) No statistically significant differences are evident.
Table A15.10 which shows that there are no significant differences 
between the accepted and rejected LIMs on the basis of the measures 
of LLM efficiency used in the study. Taking this into account, 
therefore, it is unlikely that by using the entire sample as a 
statistical base the results of any subsequent investigation will 
differ from those produced by analysing only the good fit LIMs.
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Another justification for extending the sample size would be 
if the selection process identifying well-behaved equations was 
itself related to dominance or industrial structure. Under these 
circumstances the good fit sample would be biased and, therefore, 
may mask the true relationship between dominance and LIM 
efficiency. The extent to which any such bias exists is
illustrated in Table A15.11. Although some cell sizes in the matrix 
makes it difficult to accurately assess the significance of the 
differences it appears there are proportionately more non-dominant 
LIMs in the good fit but restricted sub sample. Accordingly there 
is some evidence to suggest that there is a bias in the selection 
process. Once again, therefore ^ there is an argument to extend the 
analysis beyond the well behaved sub group.
The nature of the selection criteria associated with both the 
independent variable and the constant terms in the equation also 
leaves scope to extent the sample to include UV equations where 
these are statistically insignificant. In this case the argument is 
that although the estimates may be insignificant they remain the 
best avalable estimates and as such should be included in any 
ralated analysis. Moreover/....... .
(20) In this respect one particular danger is that the LIM selection 
procedure may exclude many of the LIM types of particular interest 
to the research, thereby abstractirg from the hypotheses under test.
(21) Note that as Table 12 ippendix 20 shows that there are no 
statistical differences between the proportion of high and' low 
industry and plant dominated LIMs that are good or bad fit.
(22) As Table 13 Appendix 20 indicates there are also widespread 
differences on a regional basis between the proportion of LIMs 
classified as either good or bad fit.
(23) See any applied econometrics text for an explanation of this.
IKD
Moreover, if the UV regression suffers from either heteroscedasticity 
or autocorrelation then this will bias the standard error in a 
random fashion making it difficult to establish whether or not a 
coefficient is truely significant.
TABLE 15.11 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLANT DOMINANCE 
AND UV EQUATION FIT
.........  ■ ■ T
NATURE OF 
DOMINANCE
GOOD FIT LIMs POOR FIT LIMS TOTAL
No % No % No 1 %
Plant and Ind 
dominated 15 26.3 71 30.0 90 29.9
Plant but not 
Ind dominated - - 1 0.4 1 11.0
Ind not plant 
dominated 3 5.7 30 12.7 33 0.3
Not dominated 35 66.0 134 56.8 177 , 58.8
TOTAL 53 100 236 100 301 100
(24) The insignificance to the constant terms (Log A) the major 
cause of LIMs rejection actually (see above) indicates that U = ^  
There is nothing fundamentally wrong with this pacification of the 
UV equation, and therefore it is perhaps too harsh to demand that 
the constant terms should be significant.
(25) Note also that if the UV equation is mispecified then the 
constant and the B coefficient will be biased and there will be a 
danger of accepting insignificant B and rejecting significant Bs and 
As.
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2
It should also be remembered that the R cut-off is 
arbritary and does not necessarily imply that either the constant or 
the B coefficient are not important determinants of the relationship 
between unemployment and vacancies, but rather that the total 
variation in unemployment and vacancies is not exclusively explained
by A and B. Accordingly there is no fundamental reason why the 0.75
2
R criteria should be rigidly adhered to if, as a result, it 
significantly reduces the number of LLMs under investigation.
Bearing in mind the arguments both for and against restricting
the number of LLMs analysed it is difficult to unambiguously
establish the most appropriate approach to the problem. Inevitably 
there has to be a trade -off between sample size, the performance of 
the UV equation and any bias created by excluding a proportion of 
the estimated equations. As a compromise, therefore, it is perhaps 
most appropriate to analyse the equations at different levels
related to what extent they meet the predetermined econometric 
performance . easures. More specifically it would seem appropriate 
to examine the UV equation results in parallel within the following 
hierarchy of sample sizes;
(1) The total sample excluding LIMs where there have been 
serious bounda^ changes or employment shifts, where an
unacceptable level of autocorrelation persists, and where 
the are the highly unusual U* values.
(ii) Level one excluding LIMs where B is insignificant
(iii) Level two excluding LIMs where A is insignificant
(ivj Good fit LIMs
(26) The last point involves 3 LIMs The anomalous U* values were 
caused by errors in the data collection.
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Differences between the groups not explicable in terms of a
bias in the selection procedure may then be attributed to the
econometric and other difficulties associated with the analysis.
For the practical purpose of recording the results of the research
and deriving conclusions based on these it should be sufficient to
record only the results relating to the total sample, excluding the
LLMs with basic econometric shortcomings or data deficiencies. Cnly
in instances where there are differences between the total sample
and the smaller more tightly specified sub-samples need any other
results be included. A complete set of tables covering all the sub
samples associated with figures presented in the main text is
(27)presented for reference in impendix 16 ' '
(27) This i^^pendix also presents tables which although either not 
directly referenced to in the text or not examined in any detail 
remain useful supplements to the more central discussion.
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APPENDIX 16
UV REGRESSION RESULTS ; SUMMARY TABLES FOR ALL
SUB-SAMPLES AND OONTROL GROUPS
A16.1 PREFACE
This Appendix contains the tables relating to the results 
reported in the main body of the UV text but which for reasons of 
brevity and clarity it was thought best to include underu separate 
heading. As explained in the text (see Chapter 7, Section 1) the 
Appendix not only sets out the principal results of the UV exercise 
but it also presents all the tables related to these results. That 
is, the Appendix shows the figures produced by running all the 
sub-sample and control group data.
For illustrative purposes in each separate sub-section of the 
Appendix there is also a short summary statement indicating how each 
of the sub-groups investigated relates to the total sample. Where 
appropriate in these summaries the results of the control tables are 
also related to the uncontrolled statistics and tables presented in 
the main text. Differences within and between the tables have been 
noted and incorporated into the main body of the text where 
necessary. The differences within and between the tables presented 
in the summary statement have been recorded on a partly subjective 
scale running from an "exact match" through to "no match". A more 
detailed of the scale is shown in Table A16.1. Where further 
explantion of the differences between the tables under examination 
is required this is generally given in the comments section of the 
summary table.
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TABLE A16.1 NATURE OF SCALE INDICATING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
UNCONTROLLED TABLES AND THE SUB-SAMPLE AND OONTROL GROUPS
Index Meaning
Exact match the rankings in the table (s) being compared
coincide exactly
Very close match the ranking in the table(s) being compared
only differ in one marginal respect
Close match the rankings in the table (s) being compared
only differ in one or two respects
poor match the rankings in the table (s) being compared
are only marginally alike
No match there is no match or resemblance in the table
rankings
Although all the key points to emerge from the UV data 
appendix are included in the main text in Chapter 7, it is
worthwhile enpahsising the two most important features to emerge
from this exercise;
(i) The rankings across the different sub-sample groups, and 
particularly for the uncontrolled tables focussing either on the 
nature of dominance or the high/low dominance split, are generally
very consistent. As a result, the decision to only refer to the
complete sample in the main text may be defended with confidence.
(ii) In the controlled tables the consistency of the rankings is 
reduced. In some part this reflects the more limited number of 
observations in each category but probably mainly results from the 
reduction in varition between groupings brought about by the control 
process itself. Despite this particular problem, however, in most 
cases the uncontrolled rankings do reassert themselves at the 
control level. Therefore, once again it would seem that only a 
limited number of control statistics need to be included in the main 
text.
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SECTION A16.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMINANCE AND LIM VARIABLES 
ACROSS THE SUB-SAMPLE GROUPS
Summary of Results
Consistency of Ranking
Variable Across Sub Samples Comment
log A exact
B exact
r2 close variations only appear
when sample size decreases
significantly
U* exact
Ü very close only change is in the
smallest sample
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2.1 The Relationship Between Dominance and Log A Across the Sub 
Sample Groups
Dominance
Group
Total Sample B Significant
B & A
Significant Well Behaved
No Rank NO Rank NO Rank No Rank
Plant
Dominated 0.91 2 0.71 2 1.17 2 1.12 2
Industry
Dominated 0.47 3 ^ 0.49 3 0.79 3 0.74 3
Non Dominated 1.0 1 0.97 1 1.23 1 1.21 1
Total 0.93 - 0.84 — 1.19 - 1.17 -
2.2 The Itelationship Between Dominance and B Across the Sub-Sample 
Groups
Dominance
Group
Total Sample B Significant
B & A
Significant Well Behaved
No Rank NO Rank No Rank No Rank
Plant
Dominated -0.22 1 -0.28 1 -0.24 1 -0.22 1
Industry
-0.33 -0.30Dominated -0.32 3 -0.37 3 3 3
Non Dominated -0.26 2 -0.29 2 -0.26 2 -0.28 2
Total -0.25 - -0.30 - -0.26 - -0.26 -
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2.3 The Relationship Between Dominance and R2 Across the 
Sub-Sample Groups
Dominance
Group
Tbtal Sample B Significant
B & A
Significant Well Behaved
Nb Rank No Rank No Rank No Rank
Plant
Dominated 83 1 84 1 79 1 86 2
Industry
Dominated 82 2 82 2 68 3 89 1
Non
Dominated 74 3 76 3 70 2 82 3
Tbtal 78 - 0.79 - 72 - 83 -
2.4 The Relationship Between Dominance and U* Across the Sub-Sample 
Groups
Dominance
Group
Tbtal Sample B Significant
B & A
Significant Well Behaved
No Rank No Rank No Rank No Rank
Plant
Dominated 2.7 2 2.0 2 2.9 2 2.9 2
Industry
Dominated 1.6 3 1.6 3 2.1 3 2.5 3
Non Dominated 2.8 1 2.5 1 3.0 1 3.0 1
Tbtal 2.6 - 2.3 - 3.0 - 3.0 -
2.5 The Relationship Between Dominance and U Across the Sub-Sample 
Groups
Dominance
Group
Tbtal Sample B Significant
B & A
Significant Well Behaved
No Rank No Rank No Rank No Rank
Plant
Dominated 2.8 2 2.3 2 3.5 2 3.1 3
Industry
Dominated 1.9 3 2.1 3 3.0 3 2.9 2
Non Dominated 3.4 1 3.1 1 4.0 1 3.5 1
Tbtal 3.0 - 2.8 - 3.9 3.4 -
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SECTION Al6.9. LIM Variables For Plant and Industry Dominated
Areasr Broken Down by Industry
Industry log A B r 2 U* Ü
Coal Mining 1.32 “0.05 88 4.07 2.58
Pood & Drink 0.60 -0.23 62 1.81 3.57
Chemicals 1.37 -0.12 86 3.50 2.32
Iron & Steel 1.00 -0.20 85 2.83 3.61
Mechanical Engineering 1.12 -0.30 83 2.44 3.15
Electronics &
Electrical Machining 1.05 -0.26 84 3.12 3.01
Shipbuilding 0.64 -0.33 87 2.16 3.40
Automobiles 0.59 -0.25 81 1.70 2.41
Metal Goods, Cans,
Metal Boxes 0.34 -0.39 93 1.28 1.95
Textiles 0.43 -0.28 83 1.49 1.19
Footwear 0.17 -0.31 85 1.25 1.85
Glass, Pottery &
Bricks 0.67 -0.45 78 1.60 1.39
Timber 1.04 -0.47 78 2.02 1.83
Paper & Board 0.44 -0.36 87 1.45 2.11
Rubber -0.13 -0.24 85 0.90 1.75
Double Dominated 0.77 -0.28 80 2.41 0.86
Total 0.79 -0.25 83 2.37 2.64
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SECTION 16.10 LIM VARIABLES FOR PLANT DOMINATED AREAS, BROKEN DOWN 
BY INDUSTRY
Industry log A B R^ Ü* U
Goal Mining 1.32 -0.05 88 4.1 3.6
Food & Drink 0.55 -0.21 70 1.8 2.1
Chemicals 1.35 -0.09 81 3.6 3.9
Iron & Steel 0.94 -0.20 85 2.7 2.9
Mechanical Engineering 
Electronics &
1.39 -0.28 85 2.8 3.5
Electrical Machining 1.05 -0.26 83 3.1 3.4
Shipbuilding 0.69 -0.29 86 2.3 2.5
Automobiles 
Metal Goods, Cans,
0.50 -0.25 87 1.6 1.6
Metal Boxes - - - - _
Textiles 0.54 -0.27 82 1.6 2.0
Footwear 0.18 -0.36 77 1.1 1.3
Glass, Pottery & 
Bricks
Timber 1.04 -0.47 78 2.0 2.1
Paper & Board 0.67 -0.22 89 1.7 2.0
Rubber -0.13 -0.24 85 0.9 0.9
Double Dominated 0.77 -0,28 80 2.4 2.6
Total 0.91 -0.22 83 2.7 2.8
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15.8 Plant and Industry Dominated ; No of Observations in each 
Industry
Industry No of Observations
Goal Mining 11
Food & Drink 6
Chemicals 3
Iron & Steel 9
Mechanical Engineering 8
Electronics &
Electrical Machining 9
Shipbuilding 10
Automobiles 5
Metal Goods,...., Cans
Metal Boxes 1
Textiles 12
Footwear 7
Glass, Pottery &
Bricks 1
Timber 1
Paper & Board 3
Rubber 1
Double Dominated 6
Total 9 3
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15.9 Plant Dominated : No of Observations in each Industry
Industry No of Observations
Goal Mining 11
Food & Drink 5
Chemicals 2
Iron & Steel 8
Mechanical Engineering 6
Electronics &
Electrical Machining 9
Shipbuilding 9
Automobiles 3
Metal Goods,...., Cans 
Metal Boxes
Textiles 3
Footwear 2
Glass, Pottery &
Bricks
Timber 1
Paper & Board 1
Rubber 1
Double Dominated 6
Total 67
15.10 Plant Dominated LiMs; no of Observations for Ownership Group
Ownership Group No of Observations
State 22
Quasi State 4
Foreign 6
UK Non Local 30
Local 5
Total 67
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Appendix 17 
Miscellaneous Tables
TABLE A17.1 INDUSTRY BASED EARNINGS CDMPARISION; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
HIGH AND LCW DOMINANT GROUPS.
High Dominance Group Low Dominance Group
Earnings Level Skilled Male 
Manuals*
Other Male 
Manuals
F&male
Manuals
Skilled Male 
Manuals
Other Male 
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Amongst the 
highest 12.5 6.2 6.2 5.6 11.1 12.5
Above average 12.5 12,5 18.7 33.3 27.8 31.2
Average 62,5 62.5 68.7 22.2 27.8 31.2
Below Average 12.5 18.7 6.2 22.2 16.7 6.2
Amongst the lowest 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Dont Know 0 0 0 16.7 16.7 18.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note (i)* equals significant difference at 90% level of confidence.
(ii) the figures in each cell relate to the percentage of each sample falling 
into individual categories.
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TABLE A17.2 THE PROVISION OF FRINGE BENEFITS : DOMINANT PLANT &
CONTROL GROUP COMPARISONS
Proportion of Plants 
Providing Fringe Benefits
Extent of Fringe Benefits Dominant Plant Sample Control Group
More extensive than other 
firms 70 29
About the same as other 
firms 24 71
Less than other firms 5 0
Dont know 0 0
Total no. of observations 37(100) 24(100)
Note (i) differences between the two groups are significant at the 
90% confidence level.
TABLE A17.3 THE EXTENT OF DOMINANT PLANT AND CONTROL 
GROUP WAGE SURVEYS
Nature of Wage Survey
Proportion of Plants Undertaking Wage 
Surveys
Dominant Plant Sanple Control Group
Other firms in the same 
industry operating in the 
same area 51 78
Other firms in the area 
not in the industry 47 57
Other firms in the 
industry not in the area 18 60
Other firms not in the 
area and not in the same 
industry 8 23
Total number of observatiorLS 37(100) 24(100)
,
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TABLE A. 17.4 THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF RECRUITMENT METHODS USED BY DOMINANT AND
CONTROL GROUP PLANTS
Dominant Plants Control Group
Skilled
male
Manuals
Other '
male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Skilled
male
Manuals
Other
male
Manuals
Female . 
Manuals
Mean no of recruitment 
methods usa-d, in last 
6 months 5.7 4.6 3.4 5.8 4.6 3.9
Ifean no of recruitment 
methods used when 
difficult to recruit 6.1 5.1 3.9 6.6 4.9 4.3
Mean no of recruitment 
methods used when easy 
to recruit 3.7 3.7 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.4
TABLE 17.5 THE OVERALL USE OF RECRUITMENT METHODS CONSISTANT WITH
OVERCOMING MONOPSONISTIC PRESSURES: THE TIGHT LIM CASE
Dominant Plant Control Group Plants
Skilled
Male
Manual
Female
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Use o£ recruitment 
methods potentially 
associated with 
monopsonistic pressures
77
(52)
54
(36)
40
(27)
' 42 
(46)
28
(29)
26
(27)
Note, (i) the top figures represent the total number of times the potentially 
monopsonistic methods are used to hire labour.
(ii) the percentages (the figures in brackets) are calculated as a 
proportion of the maximum possible use of each method.
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TABLE 17.6 THE USE OP EXTERNAL TRAINING COURSES
Dominant Plants Control Group Plants
The proportion of plants 
using external courses
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
89 44 17 87 45 30
Total number of 
observations 37 34 29 23 20 20
The proportion of plants 
using external courses
High Dominance Low Dominance
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Skilled
Male
Manuals
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
90 40 12 87 50 23
Total number of 
observations 21 20 16 16 14 13
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TABLE A17.7 HIGH AND LOW DOMINANCE UNIONISATION LEVELS
Level of Unionisation
Level of Dominance
Skilled
Male
Manuals*
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
High Dominance 99.6 98.4 86.5
Low Dominance 95.0 93.1 80.7
Note (i)* equals significant at the 90% level of confidence.
TABLE A17.8 TOTAL OVERAIE QUIT RATES AND TURNOVER
Dominant Plant Control Group
Turnover rate 12.4 13.6
Quit rate 7.7 9.0
TABLE A17.9 AVERAGE SCREENING INDICES
Work Group Dominant Plants Dominant and Control
Skilled Male Manuals 14.2 14.0
Other Male ^^uals 12.9 12.9
Female Manuals 12.5 13.0
TABLE A17.10 UK VERSUS NON-PUBLIC SECTOR DOMINANT 
PLANT UNIONISATION LEVELS
Average Levels of 
ionisâtion UK 
Manufacturing 
industry
unionisation 
Skilled Male 
Manuals, 
Dominant Plants
unionisation 
Other Male 
Manuals
Dominant Plants
unionisation 
Female Manuals, 
Dominant plants
62.2% 97.7% 96.3% 84.0%
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TABLE A17.11 TOTAL CURRENT AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT IN DOMINANT PLANTS
AND CONTROL GROUP PLANTS
Average NLmber of Employees
Dominant Plant Sample 
Control Group Sample
5516
2438
Notes, (i) The difference is significant at the 95% confidence 
level.
(ii) The number of employees was calculated by adding male 
and female part and full-time workers.
(iii) This pattern wasrepeated 2 years previously.
TABLE A17.12 PERCENTAGE OF MANUAL EMPLOYEES IN DOMINANT
AND CONTROL GROUPS
Proportion of Manual Employees
Dominant Plant Sample 
Control Group Sample
82.9
70.3
Note, (i) The difference is significant at the 95% confidence level.
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TABLE A17.13 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIGH AND UCW DOMINANCE 
LIMs AND PEREOBMANCE OF W  EQUATION
Nature of Equation Fit Low Dominance High Dominance Total
Good fit 10(12.3) 5(14.7) 15
Bad fit 71(87.7) 29(85.3) 100
Total 81 (100) 34(100) 115
Note (i) No significant difference on CHI squared test at any 
meaningful confidence interval.
(ii) The figures in brackets relate to percentages
TABLE 17.14 THE PROPORTION OF GOOD AND BAD FIT EQUATIONS BY REGION
Region Good Fit Bad Fit
Total Number of 
Observations
Scotland 7(22.6) 27(77.4) 31
Wales 3(16.7) 15 (83.3) 18
Northern 9(33.3) 18(66.7) 27
N. West 8(21.6) 29(78.4) 37
Yorkshire 3(13.6) 19(86.4) 22
W. Midlands 1( 4.5) 21(95.5) 22
E. Midlands 3(11.5) 23(88.5) 26
E. Anglia 0( 0.0) 12(100) 12
S. East 12(21.8) 43(78.2) 55
S. West 7(17.9) 32(82.1) 39
Total 53(18.3) 236(81.7) 289
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/IHSTRirgTIOI'TS FOR CQI'OPLETIQIT OF THE QUESTIQffiTAIBE
This questionnaire contains two types of questions:
(i) Questions which require an answer consisting of an informal 
opinion which nay he answered quickly by the personnel manager, 
or similar staff member, without consulting records or 
collecting information,
(ii) Questions which require more precise replies which can only 
be adequately answered from the firm * s records.
In some cases precise answers for these questions may be 
unavailable or may require excessive research by the company,
Good estimates, within say 5^ of the actual figure, are 
acceptable here.
If the company decides it is unwilling or unable to undertake 
the small amount of information collection needed to answer 
the second type of question, a questionnaire v/hich contains 
only answers to the first type of question would still be 
useful to us.
There are four different ways in which answers to questions are actually 
written on the questionnaire itself. These are:
(i) a small number of completely open ended questions vdiere
answers are to be v/ritten out in full in the space provided 
(e,g, Q.B5);
(ii) questions which require the respondent to ring a printed 
number placed opposite the relevant answer (e,g, Q,B3)j
(iii) questions which require the respondent to tick an empty box 
opposite the appropriate answer (e,g, Q,B2);
(iv) numerical answers to be written in an appropriate box or 
table (e.g, Q,A5)? where a grid is provided the figures 
should be right justified (i,e, 5 would be written as | Q" )*
All rows or columns with the heading CODE should be left blank.
GLASGOW
UNIVERSITY
Al.
Q Ï Ï E S T I O I T Ï Ï A I S B
SECTION Aî GENEPjIL BAGKGROÏÏITI)
Al, Please complete the table below by writing dovai the main product(s) produced 
by this establishment and the percentage of total output (in value terms)
■ • represented by each product.
Product
All others (specify)
5I
L_
11
1 7
23'
295
CODE ; fi of output
34
A2, Please complete the following table showing the numbers employed in this 
establishment over .the past two years,
N,3, (i) Take any recent month for current employment and the same month
one year and two years ago,
(ii) Part time is talcen to mean employed for less than 30 hours, as 
defined by the new earnings survey.
Current Employment Employment 12 months ago Employment 24 months ago
Males Females Males Females | ■ Males ■ Females
Pull Part Pull . Part Pull Part Pull jPart Full
I
Part ' Pull i Part
time time time • time time time time i time time time time 1 time
11 I 1
______ I____1______ I 1
35 40 42 46 50 55 57 61 65 70 72 7S 79
TÔT2I
A2./B1,
Please complete the table below relating to the composition oi the current
manual workforce iii the establishment.
; Skilled Male 
I i'ianuals '
Other^Male 
Manuals
Female
Manhals
1------------ --- ..— ...:.-'n -
1 Numbers currently ! i I T T  ! 1 ! 1j employed - i j . j Î ! i i _ ! .J_J
IT.B,
5 ^ 13-16
Skilled refers to all jobs in which time served men are employed or 
in which a period of at least two years training is required.
A4* What was the total number of employees 
in tViis establisliment five years ago?
A5-. In what year was this establishment set 
up in this area?
1 •
1 ! ! 1
17-21
1 ! ! !
)__ _.h  ! :
SECTION B: LABOUR TURNOTER Al'ÎB RECRUITIvIENT
Bl, For each occupational group give the total number of employees vrho left the 
establisliment in a recent 12-month period and the total who left of their 
ovm accord; thair is, those- who did not leave due to redundancy, dismissal, 
retirement or death.
. .... ...
Skilled Male other Male 1 ' Female
Manuals Manuals j Manuals
Ï
Total leavers 26
• : 1 1 1 1 i n
Total loft of own accord 35
■ 1 : ■ r . i  1
43
B2. In the following table different methods of recruiting labour are listed. 
For each of the broad categories given in each column, please tick:
(i) which recruitment methods have been used over the last six months;,
(ii) which methods are used when this type of labour is difficult to 
recruit;
(iii) which methods are used when this type of labour is easy to
N.B. In this table the following abbreviations are used for the skill 
categories:
SIM = Skilled male manual employees
OIvIM = Other male manual employees (i.e. SBtii-skilled and unskilled) 
FSÎ = Female manual employees
A3. Please complete the table below relating to the composition oi the current
manual workforce ih the establishment.
Skilled Male Other^Male Female
I I'ilanuals ' ■ 1 . Manuals Manuals |
1 Numbers currently j ! ; 
1 employed 1 j. i 1 I 1i I N I
5 . 9 15-16
IT.B, Skilled refers to all-jobs in which time served men are employed or 
......in which a period of at least two years training is required.
-A4. ?7hat was the total number of employees 
in tliis establishment five years ago?
A3. In what year was this establishment set 
up in this area?
{ ■
1 ! 1 i
17-21
i ! 11
!
SECTION B: LABOUR TIJi^ TOVBR AlLp EECRNIT?,S3TT
Bl, For each occupational group give the total number of employees v/ho left the 
establisliment in a recent 12-month period and the total who left of their 
Own accord; thair is, those- who did not leave due to redundancy, dismissal, 
retirement or death.
j Skilled Male Other Male 1 ' Female
1 Manuals Manuals Manuals
j Total leavers “ 1 ! i 1i ' i
1 Total loft of own accord
..... . . . . . . . . . . .  - «  ! . . . . . . . ! . . . . . . _
! .
L_ , _1_ !  1 : J
43
B2, In the following table different methods' of recruiting labour are listed. 
For each of the broad categories given in each column, please tick:
(i) which recruitment methods have been used over the last six months;
(ii) which methods are used when this type of labour is difficult to 
recruit;
(iii) which methods are used when this type of labour is easy to 
recruit.
N.B, In this table the follo\'m.ng abbreviations are used for the skill 
categories :
SIM = Skilled male manual employees
OMÎ = Other male manual employees (i.e. soui-skilled and unskilled) 
FÜÏ = Female manual employees
A2./B1,
A3. Please complete the table below relating to the composition oi the current
manual workforce ih the establishment.
I, Skilled Male I Other_Male ^emale
îkmuala Manuals f Manuals
Numbers cui’rently ! 1 T " 1 ..1" 1" 1 I I 1
employed ! ■! _ . J. ,.l L j
5 15-16
IT,B. Skilled refers to all jobs in which time served men are employed or . 
......in which a period of at least two'years training is required, i e T
. A4*- What was tho total number of employees 
in tills establishment five years ago?
17-21
XT', i
A3. In what year was this establishment set 
up in this area?
SECTION B: LABOUR TUIRTOVER AND RECRUI'E.IEITT
Bl, For each occupational group give the total number of employees who left the..
establishment in a recent 12-month period and the total who left of their ■ 
own accord; thair is, those-who did not leave due to redundancy, dismissal,., 
retirement or death.
1 Skilled Male
-------------- -
Other Male 1 ' Female
-- . 1 Manuals Manuals ! liionuals
1
j Total leavers
! ! 1 1 ' ; ; .
1 Total•left of own accord 55: 1 I 1 M  . ! 1
45 t.r:
B2, In the following table different methods of recruiting labour are listed. 
For each of the broad categories given in each column, please tick:
(i) which recruitment methods have been used over the last six months;
(ii) which methods are used when this type of labour is difficult to 
recruit;
(iii) which methods are used when this type of labour is easy to 
recruit,
N.B, In this table the following abbreviations are used for the skill 
categories:
SÏÆt'â = Skilled male manual employees
OMI - Other male manual employees (i,e, SEtji-skilled and unskilled) 
FM = Female manual employees
JÏÏ'
:e i 
" c I
B2.
Hecrnitment Method
Methods used in Laatfj Methods used when I)Methods used when 
Six Months it Difficult to Recruit! | Easy to Recruit
sm o m m SMM om EM SMM OMÎ EM
Advertise in local press
441
Advertise in national 
press 53
Notify vacancy to local Johj 
Centre/Employment Office ^
Notify Job Centres in other 
areas 71
m 3
ÏÏae Employment Transfer 
Scheme 5'
Contact Skill Centre
Contact schools/technical \
colleges 23
: Use private employment |
; agencies 32(
i Take ‘on spec » appli- ' | 
; cants 4H
Use list of previous [
applicants 50|
fContact former employees 59
Recommendations from exis-
; ting employees 6a;-
! Upgrade/train/transfer j
i existing employees 5j
Offer higEhr- earnings than 
; other loc^l employers I4
'Other
23
31
B3. For each occupational group indicate how often each of the following 
methods is used to select suitable employees from all applicants for 
vacancies,
Selection
Method
Skilled L'lale Manuals other Male Manuals |i Female Manuals
Rarely
Used
Occasion­
ally Used
Often
Used
Rarely
Used
Occasion­
ally Used
Often} 
Used I
Î
jRarely | Occasion- 
Used jally Used
Of ter. 
Used
arviewed by 
aman 32 1 2
;
3 2
1
3 1 1 2 3
srviewed by 
ber of per- 
ael dept, 35
1 2 3 1 2 3 j 1 2 3
srviewed by 
ar managerial 
ff 38
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
nal test of 
11 or'compe- 
00 41
1 2 3 1 1
1 .....
2 3 ; 1 2 3
ain references | 
a previous 1 1 
loyers ■ 44j
2 3
■ "■
i
2
.-..t
2
i
3
leal test
47
1 - 2
1
1 :
i.._ .
2 3 .1 2 3
er; specify |
' 1 '■ 
30i
2
-
3 I 1
■ 1
2
»
3 1
i
1
i
'  !
'
52
B4* Many large employers find that employees apply for jobs ^^ rith the company by 
tuu'uing up at the gate 'on spec' even when ho vacancies are advertised or 
exist. Wliat does the establishment do with such 'on spec.' applicants when 
there are no vacancies?
Skilled i OthoT 1 1
..... 1 ! __ - -.
No details of any on spec applicants kept 1 1 1 !
, ..... , ..._
Details of most suitable applicants only kept 2 2
^ 1
Details of almost all on spec applicants kept 3 3 3 1
Others specify
i ■ ■ - - ..- -- -
4 T
53
IP 1 IS NOT RINGED AT ALL GO TO Q.B6
54 55
B5* Why are no details of 'on speo* applicants kept? . 4
56-57
B6, ■ How is the list of the details of .'on spec' applicants used when an 
■ appropriate vacancy arises?
B4.
! Skilled
ÏÏS0 of 'On Spec' List ! Hale
1 Manuals
Other I 
Manuals j
Hake very little use of list
:
1
I
1 1 1
Contact most recent on speo 
I applicants on list 2
' ..L  '
i Contact applicants on list who have 
1 been on it for the longest time 3
1
3 1 3 .
. -.. f
! Contact best qualified/most skilled 
j applicants on list 4 ■ 4
‘ 1
! Varies/Ho clear pattern
L ...... ■............. ■ ____  _ _ ____
5 5
’ i
58 59 60
B7. Amongst local employees and employers 
do you have a reputation for employing 
in skilled jobs men who are on average
Highly skilled
About average skill
Less skilled
Don't know
2!
h!
Ho particular reputation j 4j
61
B8. Amongst local employees and
employers do you liave a reputa­
tion for emplojdLng in semi-skilled 
and unskilled manual jobs employees 
who are on average
Above average quality } 1
About average quality 2}
I— ---------------------- M
I Leas than average qualityj 5j 
j Ho particular reputation ; 4
I Don't know 1 5
6 2
Cl.
SECTION C: Iu\BOUR SHORTAGES
Cl. During the past two years has the company experienced any difficulty in 
recruiting any t‘’pe of manual employee?
Recruitment Difficulty
Skilled 1 
Tvlale ! 
Manuals !
Other
Male
Manuals
!
Female i 
Manuals
Ho Difficulty 1 1 1 1
j Some Difficulty 2 . . 2 2
65 64 65
IP 1 RINGED FOR ALL GROUPS GO TO Q.C6,
C2. Below are'listed some possible reasons for having difficulty recruiting
employees to your firm. How important do you think each of these reasons 
is for this establishment? . . -
■ ■ 1 I ... - Reasons
i
. .. . -.. .....
■ 1 
Very
Important
1
. Quite ,T 
Important, j
Hot j 
Impor-j 
tant 
at all
! Employees attracted away from area by higher pay 66 1 2 5 4 5 !
Employees attracted away by other local employers 1 2 5 4 5 I
1 Small size of local labour market 1 2 5 4 5 i
1 Some local firms not contributing sufficiently 
1 to training -
1 2 3 4 3 ■
Union restrictions on efforts to increase labour 
supply
1 2 3 4 3
j Inadequate training place at local skill centres 1 2 5 4 3
)
Skill centre training not related to local 
! requirements
1 2 5 4 3
! General rise in demand for .these types of employee 1 2 5 4 3
1 Journey to work difficulties for possible employees
{ ■ ■ ■ ■ " " _ .. - - - ..- :
2 3 4 3
1 Potential recruits dislike working in large plants 1 h 3 4 ^  1
1 Work involves anti-social hours,. 1 1 i 2
_ .. _
3 4 ■ 5  i
rUnemployed are physically unfit.for these jobs 1 2 5 4 5  j
1 Unemployed are of poor quality ■ 1 2 1 5 4 5
) Gannot attract new workers because of housing 
1 problems
1 2 j 3 4 =  1
1 Other: specify 
1 80
;
1 1 2
i
1 3
!
4
Î
i—
,  i
t
02.
G% Has the firm used any of the actipna listed below to ease recruitment diffi­
culties in the last two years? -'Tick Tfhere appropriate.
Increasing apprentice recruitment 5
Increasing training in firm
Upgrading less skilled employees
Reducing standards required of recruits
Subcontracting some work
Investing in labour-saving equipment
.Using more overtime"S.
Using part-time employees • j
Using seasonal or temporary employees j
Using retired employees
Transferring from other branches of the company
Increasing relative earnings for particular groups
Improving working conditions [
Attracting employees from outside the local area
Using Employment Transfer Scheme 1
Others specify 20
:
1
04* For each occupational group in which you have experienced recruitment diffi­
culties are these problems temporary or have they persisted over a long time?
Skilled
Hale
Manuals
- Other 
Male 
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Temporary 1 1 1
Persistent 2 2 2
No recruitment difficulty 3
.
3 3
, i
21 22 23
C5- For each occupational group in which you have experienced recruitment diffi­
culties do other employers in this area also suffer from these difficulties?
C6, Has the local Employment Office or Job Centre 
been particularly helpful in filling any vacancies 
in the last two years?
—  -* ■- •' - .....
•... —
Skilled
Male
Manuals
■ Other 
Male 
Manuals
.....— j
Female
Manuals
Yes 1 1 1 1
1
Ho 2 2
 ^ i
Don't know 3 3
'
 ^ 1
Other employers do not recruit this 
type of labour • ■ -- ■ - ...4 ■ 4 1
_ .......u
4 I
-1
■ !To'recruitment difficulty with this 
occupational group 5 '
1
' 1
• ■ 24 25 26
Yes 1
ITo 2
27
■IF--2 P.FTGED GO TO SECTION- D.
C7« Please give'"'brief details of how the local 
EmplojTiient Office or Job Centre has helped 
with recruitment.
28-29
Dl.
SECTION D; TR/iBTIHG
Dl. How many full-time training staff (i.e. staff whose 
duties relate exclusively to their training function) 
: does the plant provide?
3 0 - 3 2
D2. Are training courses provided 
for the following groups?
■ • ••Tick where appropriate.
Apprentices 33
—
Post Apprentices i
Skilled employees (non-apprentioed)
I Semi-skilled employees
1
1 Unskilled employees
1 Clerical employees ;
1 Technical staff
■ Supervisory grades
Management
\ Hone of these 4.2! 1
firm's training programme?
the
Skilled
lÆanuals
Other
Male
lianuals
Female
]\îanuals
j e^s 1 1 1
pTo
2 2 2
43 44 45
D4* Do you provide formal training facilities 
to other firms? ) Yes
j _ .
; Ho 2 j
4 6
D3. How much training do you undertalce, 
on a per capita basis, relative to 
other firms in the area?
more than average
about average
less than average
don't know
u
47
El,
SECTION El YfAGES/EARHETGS
El, For each occupation group tick which elements \Tithin the pay structure are 
determined at plant level*
Elements of Pay Structure
Skilled
îvîale
Manuals
Other
îâale
Manuals
Female
L'lanuals
Basic rate 48
Overtime rate 51
Shift premia 54
Production bonuses, 
incentive bonuses, 
P.B.R, 57
1
1
I
E2. Taking account of your answers to the previous question, what percentage 
of total earnings for each occupation group is determined at plant level?
Skilled
Hale
Ivlanuals
Other
Male
lïanuala
Female j 
Manuals 1
Percentage of total
i
\1
1 1
earnings determined 1 1
at plant level 60 1
i
68
E3* For each occupational group select a specific occupation, preferably one in 
vfhich there are a large number of employees (for example, a fitter in the 
skilled category) and for a recent week please list the following in the 
table below;
(i) the basic hourly rate (including phase one and phase.two 
supplements if unconsolidated);
(ii) an estimation of average weekly earnings;
(iii) indicate by a tick Y/hether the earnings estimate you have 
given includes elements for
overtime
shift payments j
payments related to output I
Skilled 1 
Male 
.Manuals
■ ■■ . ----^
Other
Male
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Specific Occupation Selected
CODE 5 1 , Î i
Basic Hourly Rate (pence) 14 1 1 1
Average Weekly Earnings (pounds) 23
i
L _ i )  ' 1
Element for Overtime 32
Î Element for Shift Pay 35
\ Element for Payment Related to Output 38
40
E4# Please specify by ticking whether any employees in the listed occupational 
groups are paid either a length of service supplement or any individual 
merit supplements.
j Skilled I Male 1 Manuals
Other 1 _ Hole
j Length of service supplement 4lt 1
I Individual merit payment ■141 ! i
4S
E5,- , Approximately what percentage of each occupational group are union members?
I Skilled 
j I'lale 
F LTanuals
Other
Male
I'ianuals
• Female 
Manuals
I Percentage who are union members |
4
I
1
47 55
E6,. Does the establishment oarry out regular surreys into the wages and 
earnings of manual employees in:
Yea ÎÎO
Other firms in the same industry in the same area $6 1 2
Other firms in the area not in the industry 1 2
Other firms in the industry not in the area 1 2
Other firms not in the area a:id not in the same industry 59 1 2
B7- If no such wage surrey is carried out, why not?
60-61
S8, In comparison with other firms in this area do you think that the level 
of earnings in this establishment for the following groups is :
Skilled
Male
ITanuals
Other
Hale
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Amongst the highest 1 1 1
•
, Above average 2 2 2
About average. 3 3 3
Below average
*
4 4 4
1
Amongst the lowest 5 5
i
5
;
!
I Don't know ' 6 S , ^ 
■
62 63 64
u
E4o
E9. In comparison vâtli other firms in the industry hut not in the same area 
do you think that the level of earnings in the establishment of the 
following groups is:
j Skilled 
Male
I Manuals
• . . . .... ! . ..  .
Other
!/Iale
Manuals
Female
Manuals
Amongst the highest 1 1 1
Above average 2 2 2
Average 3 : 3 5 1
•Below average 4 4 4 ■.... f
ilmongst the lowest 5 1 5 5 •
Don't know 6 , 6
 ^ 1
65 66 67
ElO* How important do you consider the following factors to be in the determination 
of earnings for manual employees in this establishment?
1
Factor j [Importât Quiteimportant
Of little 
importance
Hot important 
at all
lbour recruitment and 
3tention problems caused 
r the action of other 
Lants in the area 68
1
: 2 5 4 5
le earnings of other firms 
ampeting in the same
70duct market
- . . ...
1 2 3 4 5
lion pressure for compara- 
Llity with other firms in 
xe area
1 2 3 4 5
lion pressure for compara- 
Llity Tfith firms in the •
?me industry but a different 
7ea
1 2
I "
4
!
5 j
.. . ..... . i
lion pressure for compara- 
Llity with other plants in 
le same company •
1 • 2 . 4
1
5 j
aion pressure for compara- 
Llity with other firms, not 
a the some area or industry
j 1
1 ■ ■ ....-
2 5
;
4
' 1
government Incomes Policy : I 2 ■ 3 h, . 5 1.. - i
as cost of living 75 1 ' I " 2 3 4 .. 5 .. 1
FI,
SECTIOH F: FHIÎTGE BENEFITS
lU
Yes 1 1
Ho 2
5
FI. Does this estahlishnent pay sickness benefits 
to any manual employees during periods of 
absence from work due to sickness?
IF 2 RU'TGED GO TO Q.F4.
F2. Please specify which elements of the sick pay scheme(s) for manual employees.......
are determined at plant level either through a collective agreement or at 
management's discretion.
Element of Sick Pay Scheme
Determined at Plant Level
Hot determined 
at Plant Level.Collective
Agreement
Management
Discretion Combination
Types of employees eligible 
for sickness payments 6 1 2 3 4
Level of payment which 
employee receives 1 3 4 !
Length of time for which 
benefit is paid 8 1 2. - '
3
:
4
F3. For each occupational group specify the maximum level of weekly payment to 
which an employee is entitled when absent from work due to sickness.
Skilled îjîale 
îkinuals
other Male 
Silanuala Female Manuals
j Maximum level of weekly payment 
1
! . . .  - . . - . . . . :
j CODE r  1 ------ -------!
14
ÎT.B. Answers of the form 'full basic pay minus national insurance 
benefits' are acceptable here.
P4* Does the establishment have an occupational pension 
scheme for any of its manual employees?
F2.
Yes "  i
ITo '  I
15
IF 2 RIHGED GO TO Q. F?,
F5# Please specify which elements of the occupational pension scheme(s) for
manual employees are determined at plant level either through a collective 
agreement or at management's discretion.
1 Determined at Plant Level
Hot determined j 
at Plant Level j
; ..... - ...I
Element of Pension Scheme j Collective j Management 
Agreement Discretion Combination
'ypes of employees eligible 
‘or scheme ' 16 1 j 2 3
’ 1
jsvel of pension paid 17 1 i 2 
. '
3 4 1
F6. For each occupation group specify the maximum level of pension to whicn an 
employee is entitled.
—
Skilled Male 
. îLanûals
Other Male 
\i Manuals
i
, Female Manuals |
i
iximun level of pension 
ititlement ■
'
1 ! 
1 ■ 1
' CODE
1^1'1*.*«Hil »
1 .1
18 ‘ ■ 25
1 .
Answers of the fcrm * /g^th of final weekly earnings for each year 
of service' are acceptable here*
F7* Does the company own any housing in this area which 
is occupied by manual employees? Yes l i  !
Ho U  j
IF 2 RliTGED GO TO Q.FQ,
F3.
P8, How many mantial employees currently live in 
such accommodation?
F9* ' Dogs the company run a sports, social or recreational 
club which manual employees are entitled to join?
2 5 - 2 7
Yes 1
Ho 2
IF 2 RII'TGED GO TO Q.Pll.
FIO, For each such club please give details of-
(i)' the main purposes of the club}
(ii) whether the club is self-financing from members' subscriptions 
or whether it is partly subsidised by the compsny;
• (ill) the approximate total level of the subsidy from the company 
(to the nearest hundred pounds) over the last financial year.
28
Hame of Club Main
Purpose
1
CODE i
t
Self- Subsi- 
financing disea
1 Level of 
j Subsidy
29 i
1 2
i
!
1
I . 1
i
{
35j
1
i1 ;
1 2
1
i
 ^ 1 
1
.""i
II 1
4l|| 1 ! ^ 1 11 ;
!
1
i
Fll. In comparison with other employers 
in this area are the fringe benefits 
offered by this company to its 
manual employees:
More extensive than 
other firms
About the same as 
other firms
Less than other firms
Don't know
2 Î
31
47
F12. "That percentage of the total labour force in the 
establishment are registered disabled persons?
48-45
F4*
F13# What percentage of the total labour force are 
. over normal retirement age?
5 0 - 5 1
F14ii,~~.Does the establishment reserve any jobs for 
its workforce who become disabled or have 
'. difficulty with their current jobs for 
- health reasons?
Yes 1
Ho 2
Sometimes 5
5 2
IF 2 FlIHGED go TO Q.FI6.
F15* Please specify which jobs these are (i.e. give job title) and the number of 
employees currently doing each such job.
H u m b e r j  
CODE j currently 
i employed
Job Title
55
58j
65
731
77
8 !
Fl6, Has this establishment in the last year made any 
contributions to local charitable organisations?
IF 2 RIITGED FIIÎISH
GLASGOXX'-
UNIVERSITY
LIBRA^f_j
1 Yes 1
! Ho
;
2
5
F5.-
PIT, Specify the total number of local charities to 
which a contribution, has been made by the 
establishment in the last year*
6-8
P18, For each of the three local charities to which the largest contribution has 
been made by the establishment, please give brief details of the main 
purposes of the charity and the approximate size of the contribution (to 
. the nearest one hundred nounds) over the last year.
Purpose of Charity CODE
Contri­
bution
bize
9 1
.........  ■■■ ■ ^
1
‘i-
' . ■ .............  ■ 191 i
23
2 4
33
